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This study deals with an important concept in fiqh known as (/,amlin. Despite its 
universal usage in various areas of law, including that of criminal law and law 
of torts especially in facilitating award of compensation, this study will confine 
its survey within the bounds of commercial transactions. paman forms one of 
the most complicated subject-matters in the Islamic Law of Obligation. In this 
context, (/,amlin is generally perceived as civil liability in the widest meaning, 
arising from the non-performance of contractual obligation, violation of trust, 
misrepresentation and unlawful enrichment. Firstly, this study will discuss 
suretyship, as ¢aman is, to some extent, treated as synonymous with kafalah by 
the jurists. Secondly, (/,amlin will be surveyed as a method of redress of any 
contractual irregularities under the notion of gharlimah. Such practices are 
motivated by the Sharrcah doctrines of maqa~id sharciyyah (objectives of the 
law), upholding the concept of la ¢arara wa la (l,irar (no harm shall be inflicted 
or reciprocated) and respecting the notion of sanctity of legitimate ownership 
(!Jurmat al-milkiyyah) and freedom of contract (!Jurriyat al-tacaqud). Methods of 
establishing liability ({Uruq ithbat al-(/,amlin) and its waivers (al-i1'a) min al-
(1,aman), provision of redress (mabda) al-tacwr¢) and the institutional framework 
which are involved in it are then discussed. 
The study will be concerned with the prescriptions of the Qur'an and Sunnah on 
(/,amlin and their explanations in the classical manuals of Islamic Law. In addi-
(v) 
tion, certain post-classical texts offering specific treatment of ¢aman, particu-
larly al-Baghdadi's Majmac al-J?amlinlit and al-Macdan'i's Ta(i,mln al-$unnlic will 
be studied. Also, decisions by juristconsults of various localities, recorded in 
various collections off atliwli and court decisions in the literature of adab al-
qa¢li), will be examined to enhance our knowledge of the way ¢aman has been 
treated. For the purpose of systemization, texts of U~al al-Fiqh and Qawlicid 
Fiqhiyyah are essential. Similarly, evidence on the economic history of Muslim 
civilization in the form of actual contracts, letters, business records and institu-
tional operations, are examined. The research also relies heavily on the codifica-
tions of Islamic law like the Ottoman Majallat al-AIJkiim al-cAdliyyah, Qadrl 
Basha' s Murshid al-lfayrlin and the I:Ianbalis Majallat al-AIJkiim al-Sharciyyah. 
Finally, an analysis of the contemporary legislations in Egypt, the United Arab 
Emirates and Malaysia will prove that a classical concept like ¢amlin is still vital 
for modem commerce. This also lays stress on the importance of neo-ijtihlid to 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND ITS TABLE. 
There is no universally recognized system of transliterating Arabic into the Latin 
alphabet. In this work, the transcription system used by the Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(New Edition), with some modifications, has been adopted. The NB Lingua soft-
ware produced by the Technology Group Inc. has been used to prepare the trans-
literation, and their version of cayn and hamzah is adopted accordingly. All letters 
are fully represented which means that ta» marbu[ah at the end of a word is vocal-
ized as h, instead of being normally omitted. When tli) marbu[ah occurs in the first 


















































Long : a, u, 1 
Doubled : 1yy, uww 
Dipthongs : aw, ay 
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It is important to mention here that the term God occur-
ing in the thesis is referring to AJ.lah normally used in 
the Islamic literature particularly that written in 
Arabic. Further, it was extremely difficult for the . 
IS 
writer to pronounce the formula, whichLnormally rendered 
in English as "peace be on him" after mentioning the 
Prophet Muhammad and the other Prophets, and "God be 
pleased with them" and "God have mercy on them" in respect 
~~ the Companions or the Successors and other revered 
personalities in Islam. 
The difficulty of including these formulae is evident 
because they would have sometimes appeared many times in 
a single page. In consequence to that, these for111ulae may 




Law is a system of social control established for the purpose of maintaining 
an ordered society among men. Different societies developed different legal 
systems, but every mature system reveals the way in which the society, from which 
it sprang, endeavours to protect what it honours. Islamic law, which is perceived 
by Muslims as a divinely ordained system alongside Islam's centuries of experi-
ences, is the embodiment of the Islamic ideal life. The Sharlcah, the Islamic code 
of life and the fountain of the Islamic legal philosophy, is nothing but a divine 
guidance and an embodiment of God's Will and Justice. I 
Underlining its concept of the sanctity of private ownership, the Sharlcah 
has enjoined that a property owned by a rightful owner must be honoured and pro-
tected from any kind of outrage. An outrage will normally result in loss and suf-
ference to the affected party and they need to be protected. In this respect, the 
Sharlcah has prescribed rules on (/,amlin in pursuit of protecting legitimate owner-
ship and to prevent the injurious consequences ((l,arar) of any outrage. In commer-
cial transactions, other than the mainstream discussion in fiqh literature on tortious 
and delictual liabilities, (/,amlin has been accepted as an important hallmark in the 
1 Majid Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence: Shdfi'l Ristilah, Baltimore, 1955, p.3. 
- 2 -
Sharlcah' s primary objectives of establishing justice (cadalah) and general interest 
(ma#alJah). 2 
Questions on c)amlin form one of the most complicated subject-matters in 
the Islamic law of obligation. Liability may arise from the non-performance of 
contract3 and from tort4 or from the combination of both. The depository and other 
persons in a position of trust (amlinah) are not liable for any accidental loss. They 
will only lose this privileged position through tacaddi, an illicit act which is 
incompatible with the fiduciary relationship. In this regard, Islamic law distin-
guishes liability for the effect of an unlawful act or delict, from liability for an act 
contrary to a contract and it discusses both kinds of liabilities whenever they hap-
pen to arise concurrent! y. 5 
This present research is an attempt to examine the principle of c)amlin as 
developed in the various legal treatises of the fuqahli) which cover all areas of 
2 A group of legal theorists (u~aliyyun) insisted that ma#a~ah is the primary purpose of 
legislation and should be the basis of every legal decision. Ma#a~ah means human or public good, 
interest, welfare and utility. A major work devoted to the study of this concept is al-Muwtifaqtit fl 
U~al al-Shar'iyyah by Abii Is}:iaq Ibrahim b. Musa b. Mu}:iammad al-Lakhm1 al-Shatibl. The 
original title of this work is reported to be 'Unwtin al-Ta'rlf bi Asrtir al-Taklif. The value attached 
to this work is such that al-Shatibl has even been accorded the rank of a mujaddid. This work con-
veys al-Shatibl's development of legal philosophy known as the doctrine of al-maqa~id al-
shar'iyyah (objectives of Islamic law). For details see Mu}:iammad Khalid Mas'iid, Islamic Legal 
Philosophy: A Study of Aba /s~tiq al-Shti!ibl's Life and Thought, Islamabad, 1977, p.111. Also see 
Mubammad al-Tahir al-'Ashiir, Maqti~id al-Shar'iyyah al-/sltimiyyah, Tunis, 1946, p.63. 
31n fiqh works, it is known as 'aqd : a binding contract between contracting parties which 
will give rise to various legal consequences primarily performance of the terms and conditions of 
the contract. Surveys on 'aqd, in various branches of law, have occupied a substantial portion in 
fiqh manuals. See Majabtit, p.277. 
4It is known as civil wrong (mas'aliyyat al-taq~Triyyah). In the classical fiqh works, the 
term ta'addr has been employed. The later jurists are using terms like al-fi'l al-4ar. See Fi'l-/)tir, 
p.60-63. Other terms used are 4amlin and ta'wr4. However, the term 4amtin, according to Mu~tafi 
Zarqa' is preferred and adopted by the Jordanian Civil Code as it is the most popular term used by 
the scholars and best represents the intended meaning. 
5 lntroduction, pp.147-148. 
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commercial transactions. All these matters are viewed under the notion of general 
liability (iltiztim), suretyship (kaftilah), indemnity (ghartimah) and the protection of 
legitimate rights under the notion of al-IJift... In light of the sophistication of com-
mercial life due to changes in social and economic milieu, the emergence of new 
issues in commerce associated with the application of c)amtin such as insurance 
(ta)min), usage of various banking and negotiable instruments (camaliyyat al-bunak 
wa )l-ma~tirif) and others, will be examined. 
Briefly, the research is geared towards evaluating provisions of Islamic law 
on c)amtin in respect of various protections given to parties taking part in any com-
mercial activities. This will begin by examining classical legal manuals of various 
madhtihib (schools of law), comparing them and finally will exercise the process of 
evaluation (tarji}J) in order to extract the most practical principle. The discussion 
on c)amtin under Kittib al-I;Jamtin is in most manuals very brief. However, this 
concept is discussed practically in most other chapters as all contracts will involve 
c)amtin of varying degree. 6 
A new dimension will be embodied in this research that is the study of a 
few selected exclusive work on c)amtin. Being different from the established meth-
ods adopted by the all-embracing manuals, these exclusive works concentrate 
solely on the question of c)amtin. This is done by a later generation of jurists espe-
6 A detailed elaboration has been carried out in Madhahib, vol.IV, pp. 221-237. A more 
recent excellent work worthy of close scrutiny is Fiqh /slaml, vol.V, pp.140-150. It is also impor-
tant to note that this present work will have to be based on legal manuals choosen more or less 
arbitrarily. Indeed, as Udovitch maintained, there can be no objection to this method if one wishes 
simply to investigate the various prescriptions of Muslim positive law. After all, this research is not 
historically oriented study. See Partnership, p.12. 
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cially from the ij:anafi and MfilikI schools. This research will embark on analysis 
of two of these exclusive treatments. Firstly, a ij:anafi work by Ghiyath al-Din Abu 
Mul:iammad bin Ghanim al-Baghdad! (d.1030 A.H./1620 A.D.), who wrote an 
important conpendium on rjaman which has a great impact on most contemporary 
work on Islamic law of obligation such as Ma~adir al-Ifaqq by al-Sanhuri, 
Na+ariyat al-Mujablit wa ;z_cuqad by MaJ:ima~~ani, Na+ariyat al-J?aman by Wah-
bah al-Zul:iayll, al-J?aman fl )l-Fiqh al-Isllimi by cAli al-Khafif and so on. His 
neglected work, Majmac al-J?amanat7 will be one of the mainstay of this work due 
to its detailed treatment. 
Another work is Kitab Tarjmin al-$unnac8 by Abu cAn al-ij:assan bin Ral:il:ifil 
al-MacdanI. It is a work devoted to the study of the civil liability of the artisans 
7Brockelmann, Geschichte Der Arabischen Litteratur, vol. II, p.492 ; Sil, p.502. Another 
work of al-Baghdadi is Malja) al-Qa¢a) 'inda Ta'aru¢ al-Bayyinat. See also Khayr al-Din Zirkli, 
al-A'lam, vol.V, p.126. The important chapters in Majma' al-(Jamanat for this study are: 
i] Chapter Four on ijarah covering rights and obligations of both the lessor and the lessee. 
The status of ajlr kha~~ and ajlr mushtarak has been highlighted. Liabilities of the artisans 
were dealt with in detail. Practically every known craft and professional services known at 
that time were discussed. 
ii] Chapter seven on wadl'ah. 
iii]Chapter eight on rahn. 
iv] Chapter ten on fu¢ull. 
v] Chapter eleven on itlaf. 
vi] Chapter eighteen on bay'. 
vii]Chapter nineteen on wikiilah. 
viii] Chapter twenty on kafalah. 
ix] Chapter twenty one on J:zawalah. 
x] Chapter twenty two on sharikah. 
xi] Chapter twenty three on mu¢arabah. 
xii]Chapter twenty four on muzara'ah. 
xiii]Chapter twenty nine on da'wa. 
xiv] Chapter thirty on shahddah. 
xv] Chapter thirty one on iqrar. 
xvi]Chapter thirty two on ~ulJ:z. 
8Jbid., S II, p.696. One J.Berque has come up with an introduction, translation and notes 
of this book in French, published as "De la Responsabilite civile de l 'Artisan" in the series of 
Bibliotheque Arabe-Francaise, XIII, Algiers, 1949. 
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(~unnac-y, a smaller work compared to that of Majmac al-J?amiinat. Despite the 
size, the book is a valuable reference on the subject. There are two other works, 
al-J?amiinat ft )l-Furuc by Fuc.fayl bin cAn al-Jamfilt9 and al-Tal]rlr ft J?amiin al-
Ma)mur wa )!-Amir wa )l-Ajir by Ma}Jmud Affendi bin ijamzah al-Hamzaw110, 
which would undoubtedly be valuable to complement the whole endeavour, but 
they are not available for consultation. 
Apart from the typical legal manuals and special treatises, the researcher 
discovered that great assistance can also be drawn from various other sources. 
Books of fatawa containing opinions of the jurisconsults of various localities can 
offer valuable legal thoughts. To mention a few examples, Fatawa al-Subkl, 
Fatliwli lbn Nujaym, Fatliwa cAlamgiriyyah and the like. For the purpose of 
systematization, certain book of u~ul al-.fiqh and qawacid ftqhiyyah, are needed. 
Reference to important works like al-Ashbah wa )l-Na+li)ir by both al-Suyutl and 
Ibn Nujaym, Kitab al-Qawacid ft )l-Fiqh al-Islaml by Ibn Rajah al-ijanbal1 and 
Qawacid al-Al]kam ft Ma~alil] al-Anlim by cizz al-Din cAbd al-Salam are essential. 
Similarly, a substantial reference is made to the ijanafi's Majallat al-Al]kam al-
cAdliyyah together with its commentaries like that by Rustam Salim Baz, 
Mul)ammad Khalid al-Atasl, cAn ijaydar and others. Whenever necessary, 
reference will made to codifications of other schools of law as well as con-
temporary legislation in selected Middle-Eastern nations which is Sharlcah-based. 
9Ibid., vol.II, p.573 ; S II, p.645. · 
IOlbid., S II, p.775. Another work of MaJ.uniid ijamzah on legal maxims can, at least, 
exemplify his opinion on fiamtin. See his al-Fara)id al-Bahiyyah ft )l-Qawa'id wa Jl-Fawa)id al-
Fiqhiyyah, Damascus : Dar al-Filer, 1986. 
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There are also a number of sources containing practical experiences relating 
to various legal issues including that of fl,aman. The research discovered that the 
literature of adab al-qafl,l had recorded decisions of the judges, including those 
associated with fl,aman, which is an extensive exercise of ijtihad. Leading texts of 
this category had been consulted, namely Ibn Abi al-Damm's Kitab Adah al-Qafl,a) 
of the Shafi<:t school, Ibn Farl)un's Tab~irat al-lfukkam of the MfilikI school, al-
Tarabulusl's Mucln al-lfukkam of the ijanafi school and lbn al-Qayyim's al-Turuq 
al-lf ukmiyyah of the ijanbalI school. As far as l]isbah was concerned, the research 
relied heavily on the l]isbah manuals, particularly Ibn Ukhuwwah 's Macalim al-
Qurbah to demonstrate its role as the authority responsible for fair trading. I I Texts 
written on business ethics are also valuable like Kitab al-Isharah ila Mal]asin al-
Tijarah by al-DimashqI. 
To suit the nature of the subject-matter under consideration which concerns 
some points of economic history12, it is necessary to compare the information con-
tained in legal codes and treatises with the materials relating to its application in 
I 1 There are also a number of other ~isbah manuals, some of which were written before 
Ma'tilim al-Qurbah and some came later. Among the earlier work are :[a] A~kiim al-Saq by Yal:tya 
b. 'Umar [d.289/901]; [b] Fr Adtib al-ljisbah by al-Saqafi [ca.500/1100]; [c] Nihayat al-Rutbah.fi 
Talab al-ljisbah by al-Shayzari [d.589/1I93]; [d] Nihtiyat al-Rutbah ft Talab al-ljisbah by lbn 
Bassam. See Abdulla Mansy Omari, The Market Society of Greater Syrian Cities in the Later Mid-
dle Ages [1250-1517], Unpublished Ph.d Thesis, University of Winsconsin Milwaukee, 1986. 
I21n this respect Udovitch commented : " From the point of view of economic history, the 
ideal way to study any institution of commercial law would be to compare the information contained 
in legal codes and treatises with the material relating to its application to economic life as 
manifested by actual contracts, letters and business records found in archives and other 
repositories .... Theoretical legal texts exist in an abundance but any corresponding documentary 
material is for all practical purposes not extant. In order to determine the framework in which the 
trade and commerce in early Islamic period was carried on - a trade known to have been active and 
important - we must of necessity rely on legal treatises for most of our information, while trying 
wherever possible to call upon whatever meagre help other literary sources may provide. See Part-
nership, p.3. See also Bernard Weiss, "Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of ljtihad," 
AJCL vol.26 [1978], pp.199-212. 
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economic life. This can be done by analysing actual contracts, letters, business 
records and other such thing. Evidence such as documents of Cairo Geniza13, court 
records of the Behn Mamliik and Anatolian Keyseri need a careful scrutiny. 
Briefly, the later development of Muslim civilization has witnessed positive <level-
opments in respect of evidences of practical commercial activities. 
As has been indicated earlier, study of rj.aman in Islamic commercial law 
(muclimallit maliyyah Isllimiyyah) will be the primary concern of this research. It 
will thus exclude rj.aman in criminal law (jinttylit) and those transaction which is 
not purely commerce in nature. Study of rj.aman will operate on the basis of three 
important themes, namely the concept of suretyship (kaflilah), the application of 
the idea of providing remedies in the form of compensation for contractual wrongs 
(gharlimah) and the notion of protection of rights (al-~.ift.) for both consumers and 
the businessmen from any unlawful transgression. Evidently, this immense 
undertaking will require a study of both legal and socio-economic development as 
the issue is getting more sophisticated as is human civilization itself. Fresh issue 
like the role of insurance (ta)mln) will be important especially when involving 
long-distance trade, huge capital, fluctuation of world markets and the like. 
13see S.D.Goitein, "The Cairo Geniza as a Source for the History of Muslim Civiliza-
tion", SI, III, 1955, pp.75-91. A more detailed account has been incorporated in a three volumes 
work by Prof.Goitein entitled A Mediterranean Society : The Jewish Communities of the Arab 
World as Portrayed in the Documents of Cairo Geniza, n.d. 
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In the concluding part, this research will analysing the trend of legislation 
on fjaman in selected Middle Eastern nations namely Egypt14 and the United Arab 
Emirates.15 At the institutional level, the Malaysian Islamic Bank will be the case 
study, at least to see the extent of the application of fjaman in its operations. This 
part of the study is quite nominal as the main area of the research is investigation 
of the classical works. 
14Egypt is choosen because of its unique position amongst the Arab nations. It is mother of 
all the Arab world. The new Egyptian Civil Code (1949) has been adopted as a model by many 
countries. Egyptian lawyers and jurists have been invited to draft new civil codes of certain 
coutries. See Ian Edge, "Comparative Commercial Law of Egypt and Arabian Gulf' Cleveland 
State University Law Review 74,[1985/86], pp.129-144. See also G.M.Badr, "The New Egyptian 
Civil Code and the Unification of the Laws of the Arab Country," Tulane Law Review vol.XXX 
[1956], pp.577-584 and F.J.Ziadeh, "Law of Property in Egypt: Real Rights," AJCL, vol.26 
[1978], pr 239-271. 
5The choice of the UAE is because of its strong adherence to the Sharl'ah in its legislation 
compared to the earlier codes like Egyptian Civil Code. The influence of the Majallat al-AJ:zktim al-
'Adliyyah is still very strong and the era of "reassertion of the Sha6'ah" took place when the codes 
were drafted. This has boosted the effort to put more Islamic input in them. See 'Uqad, Beyrut 
1990. Also see William Ballantyne, "The Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates : A Further Reas-
sertion of the Shan-cah," ALQ, Nov .1986, pp.3-34. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS OF ])AMAN. 
"The very objective of the Sharf'ah is to promote the welfare of the 
people, which lies in safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, 
their posterity and their wealth. Whatever ensures the safeguarding of 
these five, serves public interest and is desirable ... " 
[Al-Ghazall, al-Musta~fa min 'Ilm al-U~al, vol.I, p.139]. 
This chapter in concerned with a brief inquiry of fi,amlin as an important 
concept found in fiqh literatures. Despite its universal usage, this discussion will 
focus on fi,amiin in the realm of commercial transactions. The coverage of this 
chapter will include : [a] Definition of fi,amiin; [b] pamiin in the Quran; [c] Scope 
of fi,amiin; [ d] Grounds of fi,amiin and [ e] Functions of fi,amiin in protection of 
rights. 
1.1 Definition of <Jaman 
Pamlin literally means security or bail.16 In various dictionaries of Arabic, 
the term fi,,m,n is used to denote suretyship (kafalah) and liability (iltizam) and in 
certain instances was referred to as indemnity or reparation (gharamah). lbn 
Man'.?iir has further reinforced in his Lisan al-(Arab that fi,amiin stands for both 
suretyship and the general notion of liability. In addition to that, he included the 
notion of protection (IJ.ift.) because one of the noble objectives of the legislation of 
16Th.W.Juynboll, "l;>aman," El(l), p.901. See also Editors, "l;>aman," E/(2), p.105. 
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¢amlin is to protect rights and interests of mankind in their life, from any form of 
wrongdoing or transgression.17 
Therefore, ¢amlin have vanous connotations such as responsibility, 
accountability, suretyship and the like. paman is synonymous with kafalah but it 
has a wider coverage. This is due to the fact that ¢aman signifies more than the 
meaning of suretyship. Apart from suretyship, it means the concept of compensa-
tion and restitution for a destroyed property or an infringed right, by making it 
good, replacing the like or paying the value.18 In short, ¢aman is also associated 
with some other terms like kafalah, zacamah, qabalah. and ~amalah, which are 
treated as bearing a similar connotation.19 Al-MawardI has attributed to have said 
that ¢amln has been used in respect of properties (amwal), ~amrl in cases involving 
criminal liabilities like diyat, zacrm is normally applied in cases concerning costly 
properties (al-amwal al-ci!-am), kafil is common in cases of personal guarantee and 
~abrr is a term of universal application. 20 
Technically, the jurists have employed the term ¢amlin in two respects, 
namely in suretyship (kafalah) and in liability (iltizam), identical to its literal 
meaning. This application has been adopted by the Shafitr, MfilikI, ijanbalI and 
17 Lisiin, vol. VI, pp.550-551. The linguists debated the term as whether it originates from 
9amima which means an amalgamation of one thing to another or it stems from 9amina which mean 
the inclusion (idkhal) of something into one's commitment. This has given rise to two different con-
ceptual interpretation among the jurists. Based on the idea of inclusion, the Shi'I jurists saw 9amlin 
as the shifting (naql) of a debt from the dhimmah of debtor to the surety. The mainstream opinion is 
that 9amtin which was derived from 9amm means the joining of the two dhimmahs. See 'lzz al-Din 
Babr al-'YJiim, Buf}ath Fiqhiyyah, pp.24-34. 
Lexicon, vol.1, p.1805. 
19 Sales, pp.385-388. 
20shaykh Sulayman al-Jumal, Hiishiah al-Jumal 'ala Sharf} al-Minhiij li Shaykh al-Islam 
Zakariyya al-An~iiri, vol.III, n.d., p.378 cited in Fiqh /sliimi, vol.V, p.130. 
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ZaydI schools of law to signify the concept of surety or guarantee. They have 
named the chapter on this subject as blib al-cjamlin or kitab al-cjaman in their legal 
manuals. 21 
The Shafi'Ts defined cjamlin as a liability in the sense of an established 
obligation (IJ,aqq thtibit) belonging to one person, which has been shifted to 
another's dhimmah. It also means an obligation to produce the person guaranteed 
in legal proceedings or to produce the property which stood as a guarantee, as 
required by the interested parties. J?amlin has also been associated with the contract 
(caqd) to bring about such an undertaking.22 
According to the Mfilikis, cjamlin is the engagement of the liability of one 
person to another, pertaining to certain rights. Such engagement involves, inter 
alia, guarantee for property (cjamlin al-mlil), personal guarantee (cjamlin al-wajh) 
and guarantee for claim (cjamlin al-{alab).23 The ijanbalis defined cjamlin as joining 
(cjamm) the responsibility of the guarantor to the liability of the person guaranteed 
in respect of fulfilling of an obligation and thus becoming jointly responsible. In 
such cases, the claimant may claim for satisfaction of the obligation from either 
party. 24 The ZaydI school opined that cjamlin is establishing a debt (dayn) on the 
guarantor's liability, which, in turn, make him responsible together with the princi-
pal debtor. 25 
21 Mutlifat, p.29. 
22M.Mu!Jtaj, vol.II, p.198. 
23 Al-Dardlr, al-Sharh al-Kablr 'ala )l-Mukhtasar Khalil, p.329. 24 . . 
Mughnl, vol. V, p.80. 
25 Al;tmad b. Yal}.ya b. Murtac;la, al-Ba/Jr al-Zakhkhar al-Jami' li Madhhab 'Ulmnte al-
Am~ar, 1947, vol.V, p.75. 
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It is also crucial to examine two related terminologies, namely majib and 
iltiziim. Literally, wajaba and lazima are synonymous carrying the meaning of 
binding, obligatory, incumbent and due. 26 In its technical usage, the term miljib 
carries three different meanings. 27 Firstly, miljib means the person who concluded 
the contracting pact.28 Secondly, majib also denotes the meaning of the basis that 
necessitate the engagement of the dhimmah with ¢,amiin. This has been exemplified 
by the dictum : "destruction is the majib (cause) of ¢,amiin" and "¢amiin is the 
duty to return a property or rendering its substitute with a similar property or its 
value. "29 Thirdly, the term majab means the value and legal effect consequent of 
something like the dictum : "the majab (consequence) of a valid contract of sale is 
the transfer of the object of contract". It is also known as muqta¢ii al-caqd. 30 
Sublii Ma.Qma~~ani observed that the closest concept to majib and iltiziim in 
the science of sources of Islamic law is al-wiijib al-mal}dad whereas in the bran-
ches of law it is known as either dayn or ¢,amiin. The term dayn meaning what fall 
due on the dhimmah of a person as an outcome of a contract or otherwise3 1, is very 
close to majib. The same is with the term ¢,amiin which has been employed to 
denote the obligation to provide restitution. In short, it can be seen that liabilities 
are numerous whether arising from contract or any civil wrong as well as other 
sources of obligations. 32 
26Lexicon, vol.II, p.2922. 
27 Majabtu, p.25. 
~~Qawa'id AJ:zklim, vol.II, p.141; Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.101. 
Wajrz, vol.II, p.205. 
30Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.44. 
31 Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.15 8. 
32Majabat, vol.I, pp.28-31. 
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Generally, cjamlin m Islamic law can be defined as the civil liability 
(ma,s)uliyyah ma,daniyyah) in the widest meaning, whether arising from the non-
performance of contract or from tort or negligence. 33 
1.2 I)aman in the Qur'an. 
The term cjamlin does not occur in the Qur'an at all. However, there are 
various instances in the Qur'an where different other words have been employed 
bearing similar meanings and connotations to that of cjamlin. The Qur'an used 
words like ka.fiilah, zaciima,h and qabiilah which are treated as synonymous or as a 
substitute for cjamlin. Some scholars have tried to search for other authorities on 
cjamlin using the notion of fiduciary relationship (amlinah), retribution (jazii)), 
sanctity of contract (IJ,urma,t al-caqd) and others. 34 For example, al-Tabar! opined 
that the word zacim occurring in surah Yusuf verse 72 which reads: "For him who 
produces it, is (the reward) of a camel load; I will be responsible for it", is an evi-
dence for the legality of cjaman. 35 
On the other hand, al-QurtiibI said that verse 66 of surah 12 is the basis for 
the legality of cjamlin as it involves security based on personal guarantee. The 
33Editors, "J:>aman" E/(2), vol.II, p.105. 
34netailed surveys have been carried out by 'Ali al-K.hafif in his al-paman .ft Jl-Fiqh al-
/sltimI and Wahbah al-Zul}.ayli in Ncq.ariyat al-pamii.n, the two modem literatures on the subject. 
These two works have a clear influence on the contemporary research on flamii.n, among others a 
recent work by Sulayman MW,ammad Al}.mad entitled paman al-Mutlifii.t .ft Jl-Fiqh al-/slii.ml 
(1985), o~inally a doctoral thesis submitted at al-Azhar University, Cairo. 
3 Al-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayii.n 'an ii.yr Jl-QurJii.n, vol.XII, p.20. 
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implication of this verse represents such a notion when the Prophet Jacob 
demanded security for the safety of Yusuf from his other sons : 
"Jacob said : Never will I send him with you until ye swear a 
solemn oath to me, in God's name, that you will be sure to bring 
him back to me." 
There is another verse which uses the term qabalah which connotes the 
concept of (l,amiin. The verse reads : "Or thou bring God and Angel before us, 
face to face". 36 In his Tafsir al-Kashshaf, al-ZamakhsharI elucidates that the word 
qablla occurring in this verse could be construed as kaftla that is a surety of what 
is said and as witness of its reliability and authenticity. 37 Al-KasanI, author of the 
well-known f;Ianafi text, BadtHc al-$ana)i( also supported the same opinion. This 
verse however, according to him, is not an authority for the legality of kafalah but 
just to indicate the word qabll has an element of kaftl in it. 38 
The word mas)al occurred in various places in the Quran. Normally the 
term will connote the notion of a person's liability upon perpetrating any action 
that attracts censure. For instance, the Quran has ruled a principle which reads: 
"Detain them for they are answerable (mas)ulun)" .39 The same expression has also 
been used to demonstrate an undertaking imposed on a person who has entered into 
a valid contract by virtue of a Quranic injunction : "O ye who believe, fulfill your 
undertakings for you are accountable and liable therefore". 40 
36 Al-Qut1fibI, al-Jami' Li AJ:zkiim al-Quran, vol.X, p.331. 
37 Al-ZamakhsharI, al-Kashshaf 'an lf aqa)iq Ghawamifi al-Tanzll wa 'Uyan al-Aqawil ft 
Wujah al-Ta'wll, p.507. 
38Badti)i', vol.VI, pp.2-3. 
39Q, al-$affiit (37):24. 
40Q., al-Ma'idah (5):1. 
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The ambit of general liability of an individual for all his deeds has also 
been endorsed by the Qur3an in another verse: "Surely the hearing, sight, heart -
all those (you) shall be questioned". This is an evidence that the liability of an 
individual for whatever actions he did, is well recognized by Islamic teachings. 41 
Both cAli al-Khafif and Wahbah al-Zul)ayli in their modern treatment on 
¢amlin, have quoted verses on retribution (jaz.a)) in support for the legality of its 
application. In this regard, they quoted a Qur3anic provision which reads : "If you 
punish, let your punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has been inflicted 
on you. But if you have forbearance, it is certainly more honourable for those who 
have forbearance". 42 
Verses concentrating on trust (amlinah) have also become a centre of dis-
cussion as they carry a strong foundation for ¢amlin to be applied. As amlinah 
represents the core concept in any legal relationship, and diversion from the trust 
will attract ¢amlin to step in for remedy, reference to it is appropriate. Further-
more, the verse make a clear reference to justice in any process of adjudication 
(ta~klm), which is a landmark in the application of ¢amlin. The verse specifically 
cited on this subject is : "God commands you to hand back your trusts to their 
rightful owners and whenever you judge among men, pass your judgement with 
justice" . 43 
41 Dr.Jamal al-Din MuQ.ammad Malµniid, "Compensation for Damages and its Element in 
the Islamic Shan-cab in Contractual Liability", International Bar Association Proceeding, 1985, 
p.34. 
42Q., al-NaQJ (16):126 
43Q., al-Nisa,(4):58. 
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It 1s self-evident that from the above discussion that fulfilling 
responsibilities is an incumbent duty for all in their different capacities. From a 
legal point of view, the duty to supervise the smooth operation of law and order is 
for the authorities who are appointed to hold the amlinlit. 44 This will not, at any 
rate, deny the role of the individual in pursuing fair and ethical trading and avoid-
ing or minimising, as far as possible, any dispute between them. This could be the 
reason why cumar bin al-Khattab used to require that all prospective traders in the 
Madinah markets should equip themselves with sufficient knowledge of commer-
cial laws (a}Jkam al-muclimallit) so that they would appreciate the pursuit of trust 
and justice better. 
Mu~tafli al-Zarqa', in his work entitled al-Fief al-par, has recounted a num-
ber of Quranic verses on a variety of themes, all associated with wrongful action 
which necessitate flamlin. Firstly, he speaks on the prohibition of violation against 
property quoting the verse which reads: " 0 you who believe, eat not up your 
property among yourself in vanities, but let there be amongst you traffic and trade 
by mutual good will..". 45 Secondly, he highlighted the strong denunciation by the 
Quran of inflicting mischief ifasad) in society. He quoted the injunction which 
44'rbat is why it is quite important, in the later part of this work, to analyse the structured 
institutionalised efforts towards enforcement of fiamiin. As a noble achievement of Islamic civiliza-
tion, institutions like J:zisbah deserves a comprehensive study as there is a close link between its 
operation and the notion of redress, restitution and protection of rights inherent in fiaman. See Ibo 
Taimiyyah, al-ljisbah ft )I-Islam, Maktabah al-Nah<;lah, Cairo, 1976. Also see Ma'alim . 
45Q., al-Nisa'(4):29. See also al-Baqarah(2):188. 
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reads: Do not spread mischief on the earth after it hath been set in order. .. ". 46 
Clearly, Zarqa) has conveyed that the Quran has unequivocally prohibited both 
violation against property and mischievous deeds. As such, the wrongdoing will be 
severely punished both in the world and in the hereafter, to protect mankind from 
injustices and transgression. This standpoint has the backing of 'lzz al-Din 'Abd al-
Salam who said: 
"Among the evidences which encompass the prohibition of ifsiid is 
the Quranic verse "Do not do any mischief on earth after it has 
been reformed" and the verse "Verily God dislikes mischievous 
deeds" and the verse "And we would increase the suffering [of the 
penalty] as a result of the mischief they committed". And also the 
verse "That is the abode in the hereafter We build for those who 
were not arrogant nor did they commit any mischief on earth" and 
the verse "Whosoever did a wrongful act will be punished 
[accordingly]", as well as a more general prescription "And anyone 
who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it". ,,47 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the occurrence of the word kafiilah on 
numerous occasions in the Quran is not a conclusive proof of the legality of 
(i.amiin in the Quran. Although it was mentioned a few times like: "He 
(Zakariyya) took care (as a surety) of her (Maryam)"48 and in another verse: "You 
must not be present when they cast their pens (to see) which of them should have 
charge of Maryam "49 and "Do not break your oath after you sworn it, for (by 
46Q., al-A 'raf(7):56. He also quoted al-Baqarah(2):205 which reads: "When he turns his 
back, his aim everywhere is to spread mischief through the earth and destroy crops and cattle, but 
Allah loveth not mischief." See Fi cl par, pp .18-19. Reference was also made to the story of 
Prophets Dawiid (David) and Sulayman (Solomon) in al-Anbiya' (21):78 "And remember David 
and Solomon, when they give judgement in the matter of the field into which the sheep of certain 
people had strayed by night, We did witness their judgement." In his analysis, Zarqa' speaks about 
his conclusion from this case, that the must be a balance (tacadul) between the injury and the com-
pensation. See Ficl par, pp.20-21. 
47 Qawa.cid AJ:zlaim, p.157. 
48Q., AI 'lmran (3):37 
49Q., Al 'lmran (3):44 
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swearing in His name) you make God your surety" 50, it is more applicable to the 
notion of guardianship rather than strictly a guarantee for commercial dealings. 
Hence, the proof on the legality of (l,amiin can be found in other Qur'anic injunc-
tions, through some other concept consonant to its very nature. After all, ¢am.an is 
not only confined to kaflilah in its strictest sense but has been utilized in Islamic 
jurisprudence as a basis for restitution in any unjust commercial dealings, pro-
tections in markets and among professional artisans and so on. 
1.3 l)aman in the Sunnah 
The subject of (l,amiin has been treated quite extensively in the sunnah of the 
Prophet, being the detailed explanation and practical elucidation of the Qur'anic 
general rules. In this respect, the sunnah in its three forms - aqwlil (sayings), acmiil 
(deeds) and taqrlrlit (tacit approvals)- has provided ample evidence for the legality 
of (l,amiin. 
Unlike in the case of the Qur'anic provisions where the term (l,amiin has 
never occurred at all, this term has been used in various traditions of the Prophet 
along with other synonymous terms like kaflilah, zaclimah, qablilah, l}amiilah or 
the like. As far as the l)adith collections are concerned, the subject of (l,amiin is 
placed under various headings, depending on the issue involved. It has been 
placed, among others, under kitlib al-kaflilah (book of guarantee), kittib al-bayc 
(book of sale), kittib al-qar(l, (book of loan), kitlib al-mu(/,lirabah (book of dormant 
soQ., aI-Nabl (16):91 
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partnership) and so on. As fl,aman also relates to settlement of disputes and paying 
restitution, it was also discussed under kittib al-aqfl,iyah (book of adjudication) and 
even under kittib al-aiman (book of oaths).51 
The Muwarra) of Malik b. Anas is an important example as it has recounted 
in various places the way that fl,aman is administered. It has been reported that: 
"Malik said : concerning a man who gave another man a property 
on dormant partnership (qirtifl,) so that he can make enterprise using 
it. Whatever that he sells from the debt (dayn), he is responsible and 
thus liable therefor. This is incumbent upon him if he so sells 
whatever property he has taken [on that basis] and he is responsible 
for it". 
"And in another occassion Malik said : if any person undertakes a 
deposit from a depositor [in a wadlcah contract] and trades them for 
himself and gained profit out of it, the profit is absolutely his in 
return for the responsibility he is bearin~ for the [safety] of the 
property until it is returned to the owner". 
In one l)adith, the Prophet was reported to have ruled that: "A surety 
(zaclm) holds liability (gharim)" .53 This l)adith has been quoted by the jurists as a 
proof of the status of fl,aman as a gratuitous contract (caqd tabarru~, as the surety 
is willing to become legally responsible without any pecuniary consideration 
(ciwafi,). Therefore, the underlaying notion suggested in the l)adith is liability 
(ghurm) but not profit or advantage (ghunm).54 
51see A.J.Wensinck, Concordance et Indices de la tradition Musulmane, Leiden : 
E.J .Brill, 1965. 
52Al-Suyiifi, Tanwlr al-lfawalik SharlJ Muwaf!a) Imam Malik, 1951, vol.II, pp.742-748. 
See also, Farhat J.Ziadeh, "al-Muwa!!a> as a Source of Social and Economic History of the J:Iijaz," 
IS, 18 (1979), pp.299-309. 
53 Abii 'Abdullah Mul;lammad b. Yaz!d al-Qazwayru, Sunan Ibn Majah [Kitab al-Kafiilah], 
l:ladlth no.2405, 1952. 
54Kafalah, 1986, p.31. 
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During the Day of Sacrifice in Mina, the Prophet is reported to have said : 
"Indeed, your blood, property and honour are sacrosanct and inviol-
able similar to the sacrosanctity and inviolability of this day, this 
month and this land ... " 55 
The fact that the notion of sacrosanctity of property (J:iurmat al-mal) is 
treated on the same footing as that of human life is a clear proof that any destruc-
tion or causing any loss to the property will give rise to payment of restitution. 
In another report, the Prophet did not offer his special prayer (~·alat al-
janiizah) for a dead man who left behind an unpaid debt. When the body of the 
man was brought in, the Prophet asked : "Has he any debt?", the people replied, 
"Yes, two dinars". The Prophet said, "Therefore say the special funeral prayer for 
your friend". Abu Qatadah then remarked: "O Mesengger of God. I take the 
rresponsibility for paying the two dinars". Then, the Prophet prayed for the dead 
man. Afterward, the Prophet made a statement: 
"I am closer to every believer than his own self. So if a true 
believer dies and leaves behind some debt unpaid, I am responsible [ 
as surety for him ] and if he leaves behind some property, it will be 
for his legal heirs. "56 
551bn I:Iajar al-'Asqalaru, Bulagh al-Maram ma<a SharJ:zihi Subul al-Salam, Cairo, 1955, 
vol.III, p. 73. 
56 According to Ibn I:Iajar al-'Asqalani, lbn BaHfil said : The Prophetic saying " I will be 
surety for his debt" has abrogated his decision not to perform the funeral prayers. Repayment of the 
debt is drawn for the state treasury (bayt al-ma[) from the allocation for al-ghii.rimfn (those who are 
in debt and in genuine difficulty and have satisfied the conditions to receive assistance from the 
state). This is construed from his statement [fa <alayya qafia)uh]. This decision has set a precedent 
later followed by Muslim Heads of state when confronted with such a problem. See lbn I:Iajar. al-
' Asqalani, FatJ:z al-Bari, vol.IV, p.478 ; al-Shawkaru, Nayl al-Aw!ii.r, vol. V, p.357 ; al-$an'aru, al-
Mu~atmaf, vol. VIII, p.290. See also Badii.Jic, vol. VI, p.206; Kafalah, p.41. 
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There is also a l)adith dealing with actual occurrence of incidents in which 
¢,aman was applied as remedy. On one occassion, it was reported on the authority 
of Anas that the Prophet was with some of his wives when he received a servant 
carrying a wooden container full of food from another wife. One of the wives took 
the container and unfortunately broke it. The Prophet asked them to eat the food 
and at the same time held the container until the gathering adjourned. Finally, the 
Prophet returned a sound container to the donor and kept the broken one. 57 
In a case involving an apparent transgression (tacaddl) wherein a camel 
owned by al-Barra? b. cA.zib had trespassed into someone's garden causing certain 
damages in it, the Prophet ruled that: "The owner of the land has to take due care 
of his land during daytime but if there is destruction caused by animals at night 
will be the responsibility of the animal's owner" .58 In respect of the safety at pub-
lie places, the Prophet was reported to have said: "Whoever stationed their riding 
animal at the public roads or at marketplaces and it caused destruction, he shall be 
liable". 59 
There are also reports of Prophetic sayings not directly dealing with the sub-
ject of fiaman but on a rather wider and more universal platform. Normally, these 
come under the subject of ordinary liability. A celebrated l)adith on the matter 
points out that: "A man is responsible for whatever he has taken into possession [in 
57Ibn ijajar al-'Asqalaru, Fatl:z al-Barf, vol.VI, pp.49-50.Cf.Ibn Majah, Sunan lbn Majah, 
vol.II, p. 782. 
58Muwa!fa', vol.II, p.747. Also see al-Shafi'I, Ikhtilaf al-lfadrth [on the margin of al-
Umm], vol.II, p.400. 
59Ibn Taimiyah, Muntaqa al-Akhbar min Al:zadith Sayyid al-Akhyar, vol.II, pp.342-343. 
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his hands] until he dispenses his supposed obligation". 60 The concept of sanctity of 
ownership (IJurmat al-milk) is also said to be a premise for rjaman in which the 
Prophet said: "No one may appropriate the property of his fellow, either with 
intention or deceitfully. Should he have taken the walking stick of his fellow, he is 
bound to return it". 61 
Among the strongest justification for application of rjaman found in the 
l)adith is based on the notion of protection of the society from injury (rjarar). The 
specific l)acfith on the subject reads: "There shall be no injuring [of one man by 
another], in the first instance nor in requital". 62 This l)adith conveyed a message 
that public interest must be safeguarded. It is also important to note that inflicting 
an injury is completely prohibited as it is contrary to the concept of justice and 
peace. However, had an unwanted injury been inflicted, the victim can tum to the 
approriate authorities where proper action will be taken. In this realm, rjaman will 
play an important role as a kind of popular redress to such injury. 
"This maxim has been the bedrock for various topics of fiqh. 
Among others, returning the merchandise on count of defect (al-
radd bi )z_cayb), all types of rights of option (khiyarlit), all types of 
interdiction (IJajr), and right of pre-emption (shu.fah) which must be 
given to a person sharing the border of the [adjoining] property. 
This also applies to the neighbour to prevent the mischief of a bad 
neighbour as a result of his building a higher or lower storey [that 
bring about mischief to his neighbour]. This is also true in the case 
of qi~a~, IJudad, kaffarlit and rjaman al-mutlifat and ordering for qis-
mah. It has also been the basis for appointment of political and judi-
cial authorities, preventing bloodshed and fighting against the 
polytheists and rebels. "63 
60 Al-Zaylacl, Na~b al-Rayah li Al}iidTth al-Hidayah, vol.IV, p.167. Also see Ibn Majah, 
Sunan Ibn Majah, vol.II, p.802. 
61Af-Zayla'1, Na~b al-Riiyah, vol.IV, p.167-168. 
~;Al-Shawkaru, Nayl al-Aw[iir, vol.V, pp.219-221. 
Ashbiih. N, p. 85. 
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There are also a number of l)adith of the Prophet touching on the subject of 
fair trading and condemnation of any fraudulent misrepresentation in business deal-
ings. Abu Hurayrah reported the Messanger of God saying: "He who bought a 
sheep with its udder tied up [as to show high yield of milk and induces sale] could 
hold it [for certain time] and milk it. If he satisfied, the sale is concluded, other-
wise he could return it alongwith a cubic measure (~ll') of date". 64 The dates are 
considered as a kind of compensation for the milk consumed by the buyer while 
keeping the animal. According to Abu ijanifah, the price of milk could be paid, as 
the restitution is not necessarily to be in the form of dates. 65 
In lease of lands (kirli) al-arr/) or other related transaction like share-
cropping (muzliracah) and planting of trees (musliqlit), there are a set of guiding 
rules provided by the Prophet as regards the amelioration of the situation in such 
agricultural ventures which are affected by natural calamities (jawllWJ). Jabir b. 
'Abdullah is reported that the Prophet said: "If you sell fruits to your fellow and 
such are stricken by calamity, you are not allowed to gain any [monetary] gam 
from him, as that is unjustifiable". 66 
By the same token, there are also provisions for protecting the right of 
creditors if the debtors become insolvent. The Prophet was reported to have said 
that: 
64at-Nisabiiri, $af.zIJ:z al-Muslim, vol.II, p.1155. 
65see discussion in MughnI, vol.IV, p.237. Also see Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, 
vol.II, p.272. 
66 Al-Suyuti, $af.zIJ:z Muslim bi SharJ:z al-Nawawi, vol.X, pp.215-219. 
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"Whenever a man sells wares and then the purchaser becomes 
bankrupt and the vendor has not taken any of the price and he finds 
some of his property intact with the purchaser, he is more entitled to 
it than anyone else. If the purchaser dies).. then the vendor is the 
same as other creditors with respect to it". 6 t 
1.4 Scope of l)aman 
Based on the definitions dealt with earlier, it appears that the jurists have 
applied this concept in two senses, the general (ca.mm) and particular (khli.~~). In the 
general expression, ¢amlin is perceived as an obligation to provide indemnity and 
reparation (ghurm). Whereas, in the particular sense, ¢amlin is accepted as the 
holding of the guarantor's responsibility (dhimmah) in respect of rights (}Juquq). 
Therefore, despite the fact that ¢amlin has been overwhelmingly applied in the 
sense of suretyship (kafalah), it equally signifies the notion of redress to any con-
tractual imperfections. 68 
Such perceptions have resulted in the formulations of a pattern of topical 
treatment of these matters in fiqh literature. Sometimes there is a special chapter on 
¢amlin which include discussion of kaflilah, whereas other writers have included 
¢amlin under their chapter on kaflilah. The former approach marks a departure 
from the classical approach represented by the latter. By this transition, kafalah is 
treated as a sub-topic of ¢amlin. It also represents the merging of the two concepts, 
interchangeably used in the past, by systemization of the terminologies and its pop-
671bid., pp.221-223. See also Aishah Abdurrahman Bewley [tr.], al-Muwa!{a) of Imam 
Malik, p.276. 
68Madhahib, vol.IV, p.34. 
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ularisation. Such will allow a better and fuller understanding of the role of (/,amlin 
in Islamic law, particularly in trade and commerce. 69 
There are some definitions underlining the notion of compensation 
(gharamah), like the one by al-f;Iimaw'i who said that (l,amiin is a concept consist-
ing of an undertaking to return the equivalent property in lieu of the one being 
damaged if it is fungible (mithli) or the value if it is non-fungibles (qimi).7° The 
Majallat al-A~kam al-cAdliyyah provides that (/,amiin is to render [to the wronged 
party] the equivalent for fungibles and the value for non-fungibles.7 1 Al-Ghazall's 
definition pointed out that (l,amiin is the onus to return a property or to substitute it 
with something similar or the equivalent monetary value. 72 The definition put 
foward by al-Shawkan'i speaks about the purpose of (l,amiin as the effective cause 
for payment of compensation for violation of rights in respect of property. 73 
As far as application of (l,amiin in transactions based on mu camalat 
sharciyyah, both general and particular senses of (l,amiin will become relevant. 
However, it will depend on the nature of each transaction executed. In certain 
respect, the plain suretyship will be the general premise. For instance, a person 
giving a personal guarantee for performance of certain obligation like repayment of 
a loan. On the other hand, (l,amiin is applied on the premise of mundane contractual 
liability, giving rise to duties that have to be undertaken. 
69 Ashbiih. S., pp.360-362. 
70 Al-I:Iamawi, Ghamz al-'Uyan, vol.II, p.210. 
71 Article 416 reads : [ a/.-{kiman huwli i'ta> ndthl a/.-shay> in klinli ndn a/.-ndthliyylit wa 
qlmatihl in kiinli ndn a/.-qlndyylit]. See Sh.Baz, vol.I, p.235. 
12wajrz, vol.I, p.205. 
73 Al-Shawkaru, Nayl al-Aw{iir, vol.II, p.234. 
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These definitions clearly demonstrated the significance of reparation for any 
civil wrong particularly in the realm of destruction of property (cjaman al-mutlifat). 
It has been recognised as one of the most important aspects of civil matters (a~klim 
madaniyyah). However, this does not rule out the viability of cjaman on a wider 
theme like protection of rights and inculcation of fair trading inherent in the 
redress it seeks to achieve. Al-GhazfilI' s view is the closest to this notion as he 
emphasized the idea of securing people's rights on a universal basis rather than 
exclusively pertaining compensations for torts. 74 
If analysed from the mode of expression (tacblr) used by the jurists, these 
basic differences can be noticed. Some of them used phrases like cjaman al-itlaf 
(compensation for destruction), cjaman al-gha~b (compensation for wrongful 
appropriation), cjaman al-nuq~lin (compensation for diminished value), cjaman al-
ma)mar (compensation of an employer) and the like, each of which signifies the 
reasons for compensation. Some other jurists, on the other hand, used terms like 
tafjmln and taghrlm representing a general sense of responsibility. Tacjmln means 
"to be made answerable" and taghrlm means "to be made to pay". 75 Based on this, 
it is suggested that cjaman is civil liability by which the interests of the rightful 
parties are being protected, a pertinent element in commercial activities. 76 
1.5 Grounds of l)amin 
74wajlz, vol.II, p. 205. 
75Lexicon, p.1805. 
76For details see Majma', p.150 and Tafimln, pp.12-23. 
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Sabab [pl. asbab] literally means cause or medium that will lead to an 
intended destination. Thus, rope (l}abl) and road (tarlq) are associated with sabab 
as they can become a reason for the attainment of a certain goal. Technically, 
sabab is that by which the existence of the effect (musabbab) is necessitated. The 
u~iili perceived sabab as the determining factor for the existence of a l}ukm or 
otherwise. 77 
Sabab differs from that of rukn (basic constituent) in the sense that rukn is 
the essential element of a being. Sabab is an external element which is not part of 
the mahiyah ( quiddity) of it. To sense the difference, it can be seen that sabab has 
always been attached to legal value (l}ukm) that it has given rise to. For instance, 
the expression of fl,aman az-caqd is an illustration that the liability is established on 
the validity of a contract or simply caused by it. On the same basis, fl,aman has 
been associated with a number of grounds such as liability caused by destruction 
(fl,aman al-itlaf), liability resulting from a pledge (fl,aman al-rahn) and the like. 78 
Ibn Rajab opined that there are three grounds of fl,aman, namely caqd (con-
tract), yadd (possession) and itlaf (destruction). Apart from that, he added two 
other grounds which are exclusive to certain circumstances, namely l}aylulah 
(blockade) and ghurur (deception). 79 Al-SuyiitI mentioned four grounds comprising 
that of contract, possession, destruction and blockade. 80 On the other hand, Ibn 
~~ Abii al-Niir Zuhayr, U~al al-Fiqh, pp.118-119 cited in Mutlifiit, p.41. 




Rushd ruled that among other causes for r;Jamlin is direct destruction (muhlisharah) 
or by causal destruction (al-111ubiisharal1 Ii sabab al-mutla..f) or by the commonest 
ground. the established possession (ithbiiJ al-yadd). 81 
Al-Ghaza.r1s2 together with scholars of Shl'ah Imamiyah83 and al-Qurafi84 
are of the opinion that the grounds for r;lamii11 are practically actuating a transgres-
sion. creating a cause of destruction and unauthorised possession (lva{/C al-yadd 
al/an /aysal bi mutaminah). It can therefore be summarised that there are at least 
five important grounds of r;Jamiin which include contract. possession, destruction, 
blockade and deception. 
a] Contract ((aqd) 
Contract (caqd) literally means tie or bond. Technically, a contract is the 
obligation of the contracting parties on a certain matter after offer (ljlib) and 
acceptance (qabiil) is communicated and concluded. On this ground, contract is the 
volition of the contracting parties aiming at creating a legal relationship in form of 
obligations that must be honoured by them. 85 
Al-SuyiitI said that certain assurances guaranteed by the contract were 
absolute, regardless whether there has been a specific provision on it or not. For 
81 lbn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, p.211. 
82 Wa}Iz, vol.II, p.205. 
83M.Jawad al-I:Iusayru, Miftti.J:z al-Kartimah, vol. VI, pp.330-331 cited in Mutliftit, p.43. 
84Al-Qurafi, al-Furilq, vol.II, p.206-208. 
85Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.103-104; Mujabtit, pp.264-265; Commercial, pp.7-10. 
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instance, in a contract of sale, the obligations for delivery of the commodity and 
paying the price is an integral part of the deal. Similarly, remedies for defect, mis-
representation, fraud and such other matters are available so that an automatic pro-
tection is granted. If it is a loan agreement and the debtor fails to repay his debt, 
the basic concept of the inviolability of a contract necessitated r)amlin to be applied 
to remedy the matter. 86 
On the contrary, Wahbah al-Zul)aylI maintained that the standing of con-
tract as a source of obligation is dependent upon the express terms and conditions 
attached to it or sanctioned by custom and usage (curf wa cadah). 87 The basis for 
such obligation is founded on the basis of a Quranic provision: "O you who 
believe, fulfill your undertaking". This prescription is strengthened by a l)adith: 
"Muslims are bound by their undertakings except when they legitimise the unlaw-
ful and prohibited the lawful". A legal maxim further affirmed that the terms of 
the contract must be observed as far as humanly possible. Those who breach the 
terms and conditions of the contract or neglect the performance as agreed will 
become liable. 88 
To allow some flexibility, the role of custom is strongly upheld in Islamic 
jurisprudence provided it does not contradict the basic precepts of the Sharrcah. 
This is true in the case of terms and conditions of contract which will be the 
bedrock of r)amlin. A maxim rules that determination by custom is on the same 





standing as determination by text (na~~). 89 Similarly~ the customs of the merchant 
are regulations among them. 90 The role of custom is crucial for the systemization 
of the application of {lamiin in light of the general Quranic provisions. 91 
In treating the subject of {lamiin. contract is divided into three classes. This 
classification is based on certain parameter associated with the nature. purpose and 
distinct characteristic of each contract. The three division is: [a] (Aqd J?amiin : a 
transaction involving transfer of property and {lamiin is an accompanying legal 
consequence arising therefrom ; [b] rAqd Amiinah: a contract in which property is 
held on trust. It will not give rise to liability except when transgression (ictidli)) and 
negligence (taq~1r) can be established; and [ c] (Aqd Muzdawaj al-Athar : transac-
tion involving both {lamiin and amiinah and thus bringing about a mixed effect. 92 
b] P~on (wa{lc al-yadd) 
Possession can either be on the basis of trust or othenvise. The possession 
based on trust is called yadd al-mu)taminah . In such situation, the trustee holds the 
property in his custody (~iyazah) as he will be responsible for its safety and well-
being. Such possession usually emanate from a legal authorization (wiliiyah 
sharciyyah). The entrusted hands as they are known or simply the trustees are like 
the position of the depository in wadlcah, the entrepreneur in mu{l1irabah or the 
89Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.45. See also Sh.Baz, vol.I, p.38. 
90Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.44. 
91 Farhat Ziadeh, 11 'Urf (Custom) and Law in Islam, 11 in 1he World of Islam edited by 
J .Kritzeck and R.B. Winder, pp.60-67. 
92Madkhal, vol.II, pp.121-128; Nel?-.IJaman, pp.144-173. 
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artisan in isti~nlic. They are not liable for rjamlin as their possession of the property 
is hounoured with the trust unless violation of the trust in any conceivable manner 
can be established. 93 Such practice is approved by a }Jadith which reads : "The 
hands [holding the trust] are held liable until all the supposed duties have been 
carried out". 94 
On the contrary, the concept on unentrusted possession (yadd ghayr al-
mu)taminah) is the situation wherein a person takes possession of a property a 
result of a transgression (clidiyyah). It can be in form of theft95 or usurpation 
(gha~b). This subject does not come under this present work as it falls strictly 
under criminal law and also law of tort. Despite that, there is a situation in com-
mercial activities which falls in this category. It is a kind of unentrusted possession 
without the element of transgression (ghayr clidiyyah) but rather circumstantial. 
The illustration : a concluded contract of sale will result in the buyer possessing the 
goods and being responsible therefor. He is neither on trust nor committing any 
transgression. 96 
Ibn Rajab viewed the question of warjc al-yadd in relation to unauthorised 
disposition of property. Firstly, one may gain control of the property (istllli)) lead-
ing to immediate ownership. In such case rjamlin is exempted like the acquisition 
of the spoils of war. Secondly, the possession without transfer of ownership and 
thereby does not inviting rjamlin at all. This is true in the case of possession for 
93Mutlifat, pp.45-48. 
94Abii Dawiid, Sunan Aba Dawad, vol.II, p.146. 
95Theft is defined as : talcing someone else's property by stealth. See Bada'i', vol.II, p.65 ; 
Ibn Humam, Sharl.z Fatl.z al-Qadir, vol.IV, p.218; Mughnl, vol.IX, p.104. 
96 Al-Qurafi, Kitab al-Furaq, vol.II, p.207. 
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certain purpose and the property is returnable when the intended objective has been 
accomplished. The example cited is the case of wadlcah as basically no fi,aman is 
arising. This rule also applies to the case of lost property (luqafah). Thirdly, the 
possession resulting from a violation of right like theft, usurpation and the like. 97 
Having analysed various types of possession classified by the jurists, it can 
be concluded that possession is not the only determining factor for fl,amiin. Posses-
sion can either be on fiduciary relationship wherein liability is waived or based on 
a possession with an inherent liability to be shouldered. The concept of designated 
possession emanating from a legal authorisation (wilayat sharciyyah) does not 
inculcate benefits to the designated person per se. This is the reason of not burden-
ing him with liability. 98 The Sharlcah ruled that the designated possessor is a 
trustee whose trustworthiness is recognized by law. In the event of damage of the 
property concerned, he is not liable for fl,aman as his position is honoured. This 
will change when it is proven that he has acted in violation of the trust (tacaddl) or 
he has neglected due care in taking charge of the property such as failure to keep to 
maintain the normal standard of care and caution. 
As an illustration to show the shift from the state of trust (amanah) to 
liability (fi,amanah), the case of wadlcah is examined. The grounds for the change 
of the status in the contract of safekeeping is when the depository is found guilty of 
negligence (taq~lr), neglect (tafrlt) or any forms of violation (ictida)). This can be 
97 Qawa'id, pp.220-221. Also see Mutlifat, pp.54-55. 
9Bpaman, p.103. Among other examples cited by the jurists to explain this concept are 
possession in the case of the contract of deposit (wadr'ah), contract of agency (wakiilah), contract of 
partnership (sharikah) and so on. 
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in the form of passing the task of safekeeping to another person, the deposited 
property being used without permission or when it is permitted, it was used 
excessively or abnormally. 99 Al-Shafici has a stricter rule that if the safekeeping is 
destined towards taking advantage from the deposit and it causes damage, the 
depository is liable because he has taken the task with a predetermined motive to 
violate the trust. I oo Liability, in yadd al-cjamiin has al ways been associated with 
transgression, legal authorization, the possessor's committment to undertake 
responsibilities and the possession is contemplated for his sole benefit. 
The case of unauthorised transaction is known as the disposition by afacjull. 
It signifies a transaction executed by a person, who deals with the property of 
another without legal permission. The celebrated maxim of Islamic law reads: "No 
person may deal with the property of another unless by his permission or acting as 
his trustee" .101 Agency and other forms of delegation entail legal permission to the 
agent to manage the affairs on the owner's behalf, to the extent of the permission. 
If the agent goes beyond the limit, he is a facjuli. Muslim jurists are not in agree-
ment on the validity of the transaction executed by the unauthorised agent. al-
Shafici hold that such practice is void ab initio, despite being later ratified by the 
owner.102 
The majority of jurists, including Abu ijanlfah and Malik, have taken a dif-
ferent view. To them, the validity of a transaction by a facjuli is dependent upon 
99Qawa'id, p.38. 
IOOM.Mul:ztaj, vol.III, p.89. 
IOI Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.112. 
102umm, vol.III, p.13. 
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ratification by the owner of the property. It was argued that, subsequent ratification 
has the same effect as a previous authorisation to act as an agent. There is a third 
view, which has been adopted by the modern codes in which afufi,ull transaction is 
validated though not ratified by the owner but not to his disadvantage. 
c] Destruction (itlaj). 
The term itllif is derived from t,lJ carrying the meaning of damage and 
annihilation of something and the verb atlafli signifies that someone has taken an 
active part in the destruction. Technically, itllif is attributed to any injurious act 
committed against prorperties of others in which the perpetrator will become 
liable. This concept is direct! y applied in the case of destruction of property and 
was later broadened by the jurists so as to include personal injury .103 In this 
respect, f/,amlin al-itllif is sometime distinguished from fi,amlin al-mutliflit as the 
former is more general whereas the latter only pertains to property.104 
At a wider ambit, itlaf is seen as a type of transgression (ictidli)), perceived 
as the forbidden act which give rise to liability of the person who committed it. 
The other type is the act of wrongful appropriation (gha~b), involving the unlawful 
appropriation of an usurper from the rightful owner. Gha~b is not directly relevant 
to the present research, but might still be useful in certain respects.105 Al-KasanI 
103Mal}.m~~aru, "Transaction in the Shan-ca," in Law in the Middle East edited Majid 
Khadduri and Herbert Liebesney, p .190. 
l04Mutlifat, p.95. 
105Bada'i', vol.VII, p.143. See also Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.881-911 [on wrongful 
appropriation] and arts. 912-940 [on destruction]. 
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maintains that restitution is more justified in the case of destruction compared to 
wrongful appropriation, as there has been the elements of transgression and injury. 
Thus, if restitution is granted in wrongful appropriation, it is more recommended 
in the case of destruction.106 
Al-KasanI further defined itlaf as the removal of something from its full 
normal utilities and benefits. This removal can be explained in two senses. First, 
when the destruction has been committed in toto (~uratan wa macnan) wherein both 
the object and its utility are destroyed. The second situation is when the destruction 
is only confined to the utility as the object remains intact. This is called partial 
destruction (al-itlaf macnan). J?amiin is awarded in both cases. However, for such 
award, the jurists require the presence of two main constituents of destruction, 
namely injurious act (jZCl fl,ar) and occurrence of the injury itself (IJ.,uduth al-
fi,arar).107 
Injurious act is a deed that will bring about damaging consequences, 
whether being committed directly or indirectly, by commission or omission, by 
physical (IJ.,issl) or psychological (nafsl). In a simpler expression, fi,arar simply 
means any form of harm (adha) inflicted on another resulting in pecuniary loss, 
loss of utility, lowering of market value and so on. Other than fi,arar, terms like 
106BadaJic, vol.VII, p.165. 
107 Mutlifat, p.128. 
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istihliik and ifsad are used.108 
d] Blockade (IJ,aylUlah). 
lfaylulah is derived from rootword ~, w,l meaning blocking or obstructing. 
In the common sense of the Arabs, it was always expressed that "in between us is 
blocked by a river" explaining the person's inability to attain something or reach a 
place because of the obstacle. The jurists have extended the literal sense of this 
concept to the technical legal usage. Therefore, if a person intervenes between an 
owner and his property by preventing access to it, benefitting from it or having 
complete power of disposition, this is known as ~aylulah. It is a ground of rjamlin 
which will make the intervener responsible for his action and he will have to pay 
restitution. I 09 
108There are certain conditions for an injury to be established which merits ~amiin. [l) The 
act must be injurious, either in the sense of physical acts, words, behaviour and negligence; [2) The 
injury must be unlawful, injury resulting from a permissible act or from exercise of rights did not 
necessitate restitution; [3] The injury is a result of an agression; [4] Ill intention can be proven; [5] 
It is committed by a competent person (klimil al-ahliyyah). See Mutlifiit, p.208. As regards the 
theory of abuse of right, the maxim of Islamic law said: "An act endorsed by law cannot be made 
the subject of claim for compensation" [Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.91). Some jurists however opined that if 
such an exercise caused an injury to others, it is prohibited by virtue of the prohibition of inflicting 
~arar in the textual authorities. Some scholars required an excessive injury (~arar fti.IJ.ish) to be the 
reason for taking away this previlige. See Ncq,.paman, pp.22-25. On the this question of abuse of 
right, cf. discussion at page 42 and 187, infra. 
1091t is regarded as a kind of usurpation (gha~b). In Murshid al-ljayriin, Qadri Basha 
explains the concept of ~amlin al-ta'arru~ at article 651 reads : Whenever an obstruction is made 
during the period of the lease (ijiirah) from gaining benefit from the leased property. For instance, 
usurpation of a house on lease and the usurper's control over it could not be removed, the lessee is 
exempted from liability. If it is only for a certain period of time, the exemption is granted for that 
period. See Wa}Tz, vol.II, p.204; Murshid, p.178; Ma~iidir, vol. VI, pp.138-145; Mutlifiit, pp.70-
72. 
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The basis for the inclusion of ~aylulah as one of the grounds for award of 
¢amlin is the }JacITth on prohibition of inflicting injury or retaliating to an injury by 
another injury .110 It was argued that ~aylulah which causes a blockade between the 
property and its owner is a substantial injury. This is due to the fact that the owner 
is unable to profit from his property. Since the basic purpose of having property is 
to obtain the maximum utility and satisfaction from it, any blockade will cause a 
great deal of loss.111 
"lf aylulah has been considered as a source of ¢amiin because it is a 
kind of unlawful aggression against property and is treated as 
tantamount to the legal standing of partial destruction (al-itllif 
macnan) as the utility of it has been impaired. The property, in rela-
tion to its owner, is just like a destroyed property, as it is not in his 
possession [for usage] .. "112 
If the possession is unlawful, the holder would be seen as a transgressor 
who is liable for holding the property. The Mukhta~ar of Khalil rules that: "A 
usurper becomes responsible for the object he detains as soon as he taken posses-
sion thereof, he is not entitled to avail himself of the defence of force majeure 
(supervening impossibility of performance)" .113 
In such a situation, the wrongdoer is required to pay rjaman. If only minor 
destruction takes place and the property remains intact and returnable, he would be 
held responsible until the property is returned. As for the owner, he cannot claim 
restitution of similar property or payment of its value should he decided to demand 
return of the original property. 
l l01bn Majah, Sunan, vol.II, p.784. 
111.paman, p.109; Mutlifiit, p.73. 
l 12Mutlifat, p.74. 
113Mukhta~ar, p.134. 
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In a normal situation, ~aylulah is associated with the detention of the prop-
erty. Some jurists have attempted a survey of a reverse situation of ~aylulah, that 
is when the owner is the one being detained instead of the property. This takes 
place when the owner is being held and prevented from taking charge of the prop-
erty and destruction eventually occurs. The Ijanafi114, Ijanbal1115 and Shaficill 6 
schools agree that there will be no r;famlin if the owner is being held and denied 
control of his property which leads to its destruction. Their decision is founded on 
the fact that nothing has been done to the property and wacjc al-yadd cannot be 
established. 
e] Deception (ghurii.r). 
Literally, the word ghurar originates from the verb gharra carrying the 
meaning of deception and beguilement.117 Technical! y, the jurists have employed 
the term ghurar to denote the meaning to lead a person and direct him through a 
wrong way to accept something which does not actually bring about benefit to him. 
This is carried out by supplying a favourable impression about the utility of the 
merchandise and if he should know the real state, he would not accept it. Based on 
this definition, it can be suggested that ghurur can only be established by an act of 
Il4Majma', p.107; Ibn 'Abidin, Radd al-Mukhtar, vol.V, p.145. 
115 Al-Buhufi, Kashshaf al-Qina', vol.II, p.366. 
l I6wajlz, vol.I, p.206. 
117 Lexicon, vol.II, p.2237. Lane has also cited the concept of gharratha al-dunya explain-
ing it as the world deceived him or beguiled him by its finery or show or pompous. He also cited a 
Qur'anic verse which reads : What hath deceived thee and led thee to error, so that thou has 
neglected what was incumbent on thee to thy Lord?. 
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promoting a merchandise by fraudulent means and describing the object differently 
from its actual characteristics. Such must be accompanied by fraudulent motives 
and malignant intentions. 118 
As in ~u1ylii./al1. the jurists argued the case of ghuriir on the premise of the 
same l)adith on <jarar. If a fraudulent act managed to influence a purchase. there is 
a manifest injury on the purchaser. The injury need to be removed and it can be 
done by making the fraudster liable to make reparation deemed appropriate. 119 Ibn 
I:Iazm opposed this standpoint saying that ghuriir could not become a ground for 
<jamlin as fraud did not cause direct injury. Rather it is executed by the affected 
party himself. 120 
In replying to Ibn I:Iazm, the majority of scholars maintained that deception 
has been overwhelmingly accepted as a ground for <jamlin. One of them~ Ibn al-
Qayyim, argued, saying : 
"' .... then establish justice by allowing the victim of fraud (maghrilr) 
to go back to the person who committed the wrongful act to recover 
the loss he suffered. Analogy and justice ruled that whoever causes 
destruction on the property of another or causing him to suffer loss, 
would be liable to pay compensation on the same basis as itliif 
though the damage done is indirect. Direct or indirect is immaterial 
as far as rjamlin is concerned". 121 
It must highlighted that ghurar is different from gharar, another prevailing 
concept in the literatures on Islamic law of civil transactions. Despite the fact that 
118.paman, p.194. 
119Mutlifat, pp.82-85. 
120rbn ijazm, al-Muhalla, vol.II, p.2111. 
121 . A'lam, vol.II, p.158. 
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they have common features in the sense of being prohibited, it is necessary to see, 
at least, two basic differences between them. Firstly, fraud can be in the form of 
either utterence or action aimed at deceiving a party in the contract, whereas 
gharar has· no element of deception of either party in the contract. For instance, if 
a man purchases a lost riding animal from a seller and the latter knew the animal's 
whereabout, it is ghurar. However, if he has no knowledge about it at all, it is 
gharar. Secondly, ghurur will give rise to a newly created right, in favour of the 
affected party, to rescind the contract. Ghurur has an inherent defective element, 
which is deleterious to mutual consent (rifi,a) needed in a perfect transaction. As 
for gharar, the contract will be rendered invalid by virtue of the element of 
uncertainty, contradictory to public interest promoted by the Sharlcah. In such 
case, public interest should prevail over private rights.122 
Fraud can either be by statement (qawll) or by action (ficll).123Tue remedy 
for fraud granted by Islamic law is specifically the right to exercise option for 
fraud (khiyar al-tadlls) which is considered as an important hallmark in Islamic 
consumer protection law _124 However, there are two conditions to be satisfied 
before a fraudulent act is actionable in the eyes of the law. Firstly, the complainant 
must have suffered material damage (fi,arar miiddl) accepted by commercial 
standard and practice. Such standards are determined by the custom and usage of 
122$iddlq Amin al-I;:>arir, al-Gharar wa Atharuhu.fi Jl-Fiqh al-Islami, pp.36-37. 
123Fraudulent statements are like telling inaccurate or misrepresented facts about the 
negotiated merchandise, market price and anything related to the trading, in order to gain 
advantages. Fraudulent actions are like the classical example of mu~arriit (tying the udder of an 
animal to show high yield of milk), dyeing an old garment and the like. For detailed treatment on 
the subject with comparison with the English Legal System, see Mohd.Ali Baharom, Misrepresenta-
tion: A Comparative Study Between English and Islamic Law, 1988. 
124commercial, pp.70-71. 
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the said society .125 Secondly, the fraudulent act must be cunning to the degree that 
it would aim to deceive any ordinary person.126 
The jurists hold different views concerning ghurar both by statement or 
action. In the MfilikI school, it is a consensus that ¢aman is compulsory in fraudu-
lent acts but not statements. Actions like dyeing an old garment to look new, spill-
ing ink on the hands and clothes of a slave to mark his literacy, are accepted as 
grounds for imposition of ¢aman. But if a financial dealer (~ayrafl) who undertakes 
to verify the soundness of a currency and the currency was later found as counter-
feited and a tailor who measures cloth and confirms that it is sufficient for the 
intended garment, liability is unlikely to be established.127 
The ij:anafis came up with a more detailed account of the subject by opining 
that one who deceives is not liable for ¢aman except in four different circum-
stances. First, the fraud must take place in bilateral and commutative contracts. 128 
"If any party to a contract, upon consideration, deceives another 
party thereto, such party must make good any loss caused to the 
other. For example, a person buys a piece of land and erects a build-
ing thereon. Thereupon, a person appears, who proves to be entitled 
to such land and takes possession thereof. The buyer is entitled to 
recover the value of the land from the vendor and in addition the 
value of the building at the time of handing it over" .129 
Second, the fraud takes place in a transaction which brings about benefit to 
the giving party. Third, the fraud takes place in a transaction attached to a condi-
125The maxim reads: "Public usage is conclusive evidence and action must be taken in 
accordance therewith." Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.37. 
126commercial, p.73. 
127 Al-ijattab, Mawtihib al-Jalll, vol.VI, p.438. 
128 Al-l:I~kafi, Durr al-Mukhtar, vol.IV, p.221. 
129Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.658. 
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tion. If a person gives a piece of cloth to a tailor for his garment saying that : 11 if 
the cloth is sufficient for my garment, you can proceed with cutting the cloth 11 , 
means that the owner has consented to cutting with a condition. Fourth, if the 
deceiver offers guarantee involving safety in express terms, and the guaranteed 
party suffers injury, he is liable. However, if there is no guarantee attached but as 
mere information, no liability would arise.130 
The ij:anbalis seem to agree with these opinions. In their texts,it was men-
tioned that in the case of demolition of building erected on the land belonging to 
others, the vendor would be held responsible as his deception has led the buyer to 
erect that building.131 In a Shafit'f text, it was opined that (l,aman is still imposed in 
the case of a fraudulent statement (ghurur qawll) provided that it is accompanied 
by a condition.132 
As a conclusion, it is clear that a fraudulent act is an absolute ground for 
(l,aman, according to majority of jurists. However, fraudulent statements, accord-
ing to the majority opinion, did not give rise to liability, but it is a sinful and 
unscrupulous pursuit. 
1.6 Function of l)aman: Protection of Rights. 
1301bn 'Abidin, Radd al-Mukhtar, vol.III, p.83; Fatawii Qii(ilkhiin, vol.VI, pp.221-223. 
131 Qawa'id, pp.226-227. · 
132Muhadhdhab, vo.I, p.414. 
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From the outset, it is evident that the main function of ~aman is to protect 
the rights of mankind. In this respect, it is essential to bring up the Islamic theory 
of right. Although "right" is established as the primary meaning of IJ,aqq 
[pl.IJ,uquq] in the field of law, outside the law, its dominant meaning is truth or 
something which corresponds to facts. Both meaning are equally prominent, so 
much so that some lexicographers consider the second meaning to be the primary 
one.133 In the context of law, right, power and claim signify other equally promi-
nent meanings. Some writers added beneficence and public good (al-khayr wa >[-
ma#aJ:iah) to the list of meanings attributed to IJ,aqq. 
In the Qur'an, the term IJ,aqq occurs frequently, denoting the notion of 
certainty and proof of values, rewards, promises and punishments.134 The term is 
also employed interchangeably with duty (wlijib) and it can also mean a right as an 
opposite of an obligation.135Qccasionally, IJ,aqq denotes the Muslims' ultimate vic-
tory and salvation 136, the cause of justice and truth 137 and it was also concluded 
that IJ,aqq is inextricably linked with justice and benevolence (cadl wa i~slin) and 
they are the ultimate values sought wherever IJ,aqq appears in the Qur'an. 
1330.B.MacDonald and E.E.Calverley, "I:l~" E/(2), pp.82-83. Also see M.H.Kamali, 
"An Analysis of Right (l:laqq) in Islamic Law", AJISS pp.340-366. For detailed treatment on the 
subject, particularly in the realm of property right and personal liability see Mu~tafii Al)mad al-
Zarqa', N<l!-rat 'Ammah fl Fikrat al-ljaqq wa )l-lltizlim wa N<l!-ariyatay al-Amwiil wa )l-Ashkhli!f fl 
)l-Fiqh al-lsltiml, 1948. 
134Kamali, ibid., p.343. 
135Q.al-Dhariyat(51) : 19 reads: And in their wealth and possession (was remembered) the 
right of the (needy), him who asked and hi who (for some reason) was prevented (from asking). 
136Q., al-Riim(30):47 reads : .... and it was made due from Us to aid those who believe. 
137 Q., al-Baqarah(2):42 reads : And cover not truth with falsehood nor conceal the truth 
when ye know (what it is). 
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Classical jurists did not articulate a juridical definition for l]aqq, but rather 
relied on its linguistic meaning. They may have done so because the word is clear 
and versatile and because its juridical usage often comes close to its literal mean-
ing. Ibn Nujaym 's definition of IJaqq as "the entitlement of a person to a thing" 
(al-IJaqq mli yastal]iqquhu al-rajul) and "an exclusive assignment" (ikhti~li~ 
IJajiz)", though seemingly inconclusive, but at least shed some light to the analysis 
of the subject. Mul)ammad Yusiif Mus~ said that IJaqq is "a benefit (ma#alJah) 
which the Lawgiver has granted to the individual, or the community or both." The 
definition by al-DarinI, which is perceived to be comprehensive reads: "lfaqq is an 
exclusive appropriation or power over something, or a demand addressed to 
another party which the Sharlcah has validated in order to realize a certain bene-
fit". 
lfaqq in Islamic law seems to be essentially goal-oriented and normally con-
templates a benefit. For instance, if it is used in a way that violates the benefit it is 
proclaiming, the right has been abused.138 As far as justice is concerned, there is a 
possibility that following a Sharlcah-oriented policy (siylisah sharciyyah) could 
result in cases where justice under the law might not be consonant with the greater 
benefit or interest.139 
As a general rule in Islamic law, rights and obligations do not exist unless 
there is evidence to suggest otherwise. Such a rule is designated as bara)at al-
dhimmah al-a~liyyah (original absence of liability) by which is meant a presump-
138Mu~iafa Zarqa), NO?,rah 'Ammah ft Fikrat al-lfaqq wa )l-Iltizam wa NO?,ariyyatai al-
Amwal wa )l-Ashkha~fi )l-Fiqh al-Islaml, pp.7-9. 
139Kamali, op.cit., p.346. 
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tion that can only be overruled by positive evidence. The only exception to its 
application noted here appears in the case of al-J:tuqaq al-.fitriyyah (natural rights) 
that come into being without legal cause.140 The direct causes of J:taqq are Sharlcah 
rulings, contract, unilateral commitment, inheritance, a lawful act and the violation 
of another's right, which may create a right to compensation on the part of the 
aggrieved party .141 
In this respect, it is also important to realize the divisions of rights avail-
able. Firstly, rights attributed to the right of God (J:taqq Allah), in which public 
rights rest and secondly right of individuals or private rights (J:taqq az-cabd). As far 
as private right is concerned, Islamic law recognizes it as a prerogative of its 
bearer. However, in the event of conflict with a public right, the public right 
should prevail. In his article, Kamali highlighted another division of rights as dis-
cussed mainly in the context of property and ownership. Those rights are al-J:taqq 
al-mubaJ:t (permissive right), al-J:taqq al-thabit (imperfect right) and al-J:taqq al-
mu)akkad (perfect right). He futher said that both permissive and imperfect rights 
are weak in the sense that they cannot be sold, inherited or used to form the basis 
for compensation (¢,aman).142 
Conclusion. 
This chapter has provided the research on ¢aman with a brief theoretical 
bases. Various prescriptions in the Quran and Sunnah touching the matter directly 
140Kamali, op.cit., pp.346-347. 
141 Fat.QI Abu Sinnah, "Naµriyat al-l:Iaqq" cited in Kamali, ibid, p.347. 
142Kamali, ibid., pp.350-351. 
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or indirect! y, are being highlighted. The scope of r;famlin as treated in classical 
sources of Islamic law are surveyed. Similarly, the grounds of r;Jarnan are 
explained to develope some familiarity with them as they will be involved the 
whole endeavour this present work seeks to achieve. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the research will pursue further examina-
tion on the use of r;famiin. It will operates on two major themes, namely r;Jamiin in 
the sense of suretyship and r;famiin in the sense of remedial measures for con-
tractual wrongs. The study of suretyship involves the study of personal guarantee, 
documentation of contract, the importance of collateral securities, the function of 
mortgage as well as methods of settlement in the event of default and insolvency. 
The extended role of kafalah in the modem banking by use of various negotiable 
instruments will be focussed on.143 The notion of gharamah in offering remedies 
in contracts, will occupy a larger space in the research. This will involve applica-
tion of r;Jamiin in cases of sales involving defective goods, misrepresentation, mis-
take and the like. Compensation in the contract of work and liabilities of profes-
sional artisans will also be discussed. 144 
Apart from that, the general notion of protection of rights of both con-
sumers and producers will be given attention, especially while looking at the con-
temporary development on r;famiin related legislation in Muslim countries.145 The 
143chapter II. 
144chapter III. 
145 Chapter VI. 
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understanding of the whole subject will be enhanced by an analysis of the methods 
and procedures146 and the institutional framework147 in applying (l,amlin. 
146chapter IV. 




l)AMAN IN CONTRACT OF SURETYSIIlP. 
"The Prophet is reported to have said in his sermon during l}ajjat al-
widiic: "A property on loan [whether through ciiriyah and minl}ah] 
should be returned [as per the agreement], a debt should be repaid and 
a surety (ka.ftl) is liable [for the undertaking of the debtor]. Indeed 
God had rendered every right to their bearers and there will be no 
right of receiving a bequest by a legal heir." 
[Abu Dawfid, Sunan [Ki tab al-Buyfi'), no.3565) 
In its simplest form, kafalah is a collateral promise to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another person. In this regards, the surety is 
taking responsibility for the due performance of the obligation of another 
person (whether imposed by law or contract) in the event of that person 
failing to perform that obligation as required. 
Thus, a guarantee is a form of security contract. It reinforces the obligation 
of the principal debtor with a secondary undertaking that is the obligation of 
a surety (kafil). Although no precise figure can be produced, there is little 
doubt that guarantees are among the most common form of security in use 
in commercial transactions and that vast sums of money are lent every year 
on the strength of guarantees. I 
1see Kevin Patrick McGuiness, The La.w of Guarantee, Carswell Sweet and Maxwell, 
Toronto, 1986, p.l. 
(49) 
The law of guarantee2 is part of the law of contract. The law of contract is 
part of the law of obligations. The law of obligations in Islam is concerned with 
the sources and remedies available for the obligee for the obligor' s failure to per-
form the obligation voluntarily. Obligations which are performed voluntarily 
require no intervention from a court of law. They do not give rise to any cause of 
action. Islamic law is thus concerned with contracts as a source of obligation. The 
basic principle which the law of contract seeks to enforce is that a person who 
makes a promise to another ought to keep his promise. Each promise that a surety 
makes to a debtor by entering into a contract with him, creates an obligation to 
perform it. 3 
2.1 Definition of dhimmah 
From the above statement, is is evident that the central issue of the subject 
is obligation. In the classical works of Islamic law, the term used to signify obliga-
tion is dhimmah4. Literally, dhimmah means a contract, treaty, engagement, bond 
2The term guarantee is sometimes used as a synonym for the term warranty. While such 
usage is legally incorrect, it is etymologically sound. Like so many legal and non-legal terms, the 
word "guarantee" came into English language from Norman French. It is choosen from old French 
noun "garantie" and verb "garantier". These old French words themselves derived from the 
Frankish word "garant", which is itself a derivation of an earlier form "warant" meaning warrant 
or supporter. Thus, the term "guarantee" and "warranty" share a same derivation and are in fact 
etymologically the same word, for in older times the "g" of Norman French is interchangeable to 
"w" of the Anglo-Saxon. Ibid., p.21. 
3For details see Ma~adir, vol. II, p.40. Also see judgement of Lord Diplock in Moschi v. 
Lep Air Services [1973) A.C. 331. 
4schacht suggested that there exist no general term for obligation in Islamic law. The 
nearest approximation to it is dhimmah which means "care as a duty of conscience" as shown in the 
expression "the debtor has the performance in his care". See Introduction, p.144. Cf. Chefik 
Chehata, "Dhimma," E/(2), vol.III, p.231. 
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or undertaking. All these terms are associated with the notion of dhimmah, which 
originates from the rootword dhammliS, simply because the breaking thereof will 
necessitate blame. Further, it is also related to the notion of }Jurmah as it also 
includes the essence of dhimmah in the sense that it reflects the concept of sacred-
ness and inviolability. This obligation also is supposed to be respected, honoured 
and defended. 6 
The concept of dhimmah is also discussed in the light of the notion of 
giving security, protection and safeguard (aman). Accordingly, it signifies the 
notion of responsibility for payment of a sum of money, for restitution, safekeep-
ing, suretyship and others. Al-AtasI in his commentary of the Majallat al-A}Jkam 
al-cAdliyyah said: "Dhimmah literally means cahd (promise), aman(safety) and 
if,aman (guarantee). ,,7 This is because dhimmah is a promise (or rather an obliga-
tion) attached to a person. As regards its relationship to the dhimmah of others, it 
means joining one person to another in respect of obligation in order to fulfill 
certain rights (al-tacahhud bi )l-IJaqq). 
Therefore, dhimmah in Islamic law has always been associated with obliga-
tion. It is a legal attribute (al-wa~f al-sharer) that makes a person entitled to what 
he is legally entitled to, as well as burdening him with responsibilities. 8 This prin-
ciple is founded on the basis of the Prophetic tradition which reads: "Al-Muslimun 
tatakafa) dimli)uhum wa-yascli bi-dhimmatihim adnlihum." This l)adith means that 
when a Muslim enters into an obligation to give protection to an enemy for his 
SThis term carries the meaning of blamed, dispraised, reprehended. 
6Lexicon, vol.I, p.976; Ma~iidir, vol.II, pp.20-29. 
7 SharlJ. Atasi vol.III, p.1. 
8The definition reads : [ wa$/ sharciyy ya/tariff. al-sharic wujiiduhu fl 'l-insan wa yQ$lr bihl 
ahlan Li 'lilziim wa 'l-iltiziim]. 
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safety (aman), he will exert himself to protect the non-Muslim protectorate 
(dhimmr) in their community even among the least capable person. The principle 
embodied in this l)adith is that whenever a person is duty bound to fulfill his 
obligation which is placed on his dhimmah, he is obliged to fulfill it. The promise 
will also be the genesis of istil}qaq (vindication) if such arises. 
"Since a person is duty bound to fulfill his obligation and pledge, 
then his obligation is considered as the source of demanding rights 
(mansha) al-istil}qli.q) in respect of the claimant's right and on the 
contrary, becoming the source of obligation (mansha) al-iltizli.m) as 
regards the claimed party. Therefore dhimmah is the basis for a 
claim (manli.tan li )l-talab) so that when dhimmah is established, 
there will be a claim. ,,9 
In another definition, dhimmah is said to be a matter determined by the 
Sharrcah which is presumed to exist in a human whereby rights (ilzli.m) are 
accorded and obligation (iltizli.m) undertaken. IO Thus, a dhimmah is a point of 
assessment in a person pertaining to rights he is entitled to. In this respect, dhim-
mah is a personal obligation if it concerns that particular person himself. It covers 
financial rights, property rights and the like. 
The notion of personal obligation is important in commercial transactions in 
order to explain a person's liability. The obligation can only be established on a 
person, whether natural or juridical. The dhimmah is on each individual, limitless 
and cannot be shared with others. It will remain in a person during his lifetime, 
commencing from birth and ending with his death. The only question is, whether 
9Madkhal, vol.III, p.24. Also see Zarqa>'s special treatise on the subject in his Ncq.rah 
cAmmah fl Fikrah al-lf aqq wa 'l-lltizam wa Ncq.ariyyatai al-Amwal wa 'l-Ashkha~ ft 'l-Fiqh al-
/slamr, Damascus : Matbacah al-Jamicah al-Siiriyah, 1948, pp.122. 
10 AI-I:Iimawl, Ghamz az-cuyun al-Ba~a'ir Sharf} al-Ashbtih wa 'l-Ncq.a'ir, vol.III, p.199. 
This is regarded as the legal quality which makes the individual a proper subject of law, that is, a 
proper adressee of the rule which provides him with rights or charges him with obligations. 
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that cessation will take immediate effect or will extend to a certain time until all his 
obligations have been fulfilled. 
"The term goes to the root of the notion of obligation. It is the fides 
which binds the debtor to the creditor. The bond of the obligation 
requires the debtor to perform a given act and this act will be 
obtained at the demand of the creditor (mufalabah). In the case of 
real right (~aqq ft ;z_cayn) on the contrary, no bond exists. "11 
2.2 Scope of Personal Guarantee in Islamic law. 
Generally, the subject of kafalah is divided into three categories in almost 
all legal manuals. Firstly, kafalah is associated with the obligation to secure the 
appearance of the guaranteed person at the stipulated time at the request of the 
beneficiary of the guarantee.12 Some scholars simply requires the appearance of the 
guaranteed person in a court proceeding or in an extra-judicial arbitration. The 
Hanafis are sceptical to depend on this method to enforce the law particularly out-
side the sphere of Islamic criminal law, ~udad and qi~ll~, as the guarantor or the 
bailorl 3 is only oblige to ensure the presence of the guaranteed person. He is not 
liable whatsoever with his debt neither he is "responsible for the debtor's 
insolvency." 14 The other schools seem to be quite confident even this type of 
surety only concern with obligation to secure attendance, as that will be a pre 
requisite towards the settlement of any obligation falling due. 
11 Al-Nasafi, l~!illil}lit al-lfana.fiyyah cited in Chafik Chehata, op.cit., p.231. 
12Y.Linant De Bellafond, "Kaffila," E/(2), vol.IIl,pp.404-405. Schacht said that standing 
surety for a person means undertaking the liability for the appearance of the debtor at a lawsuit; it is 
effective only if a lawsuit is possible. See Introduction, p.158. 
~!See Ibn Nujaym, al-Bal}r al-RliJiq, vol. VI, p.204. 
Mukhta~ar, p.96. 
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A surety for a person (kafalah bi )l-nafs)15 shall be released if he delivers 
the person guaranteed to the beneficiary in a place where settlement or if it is 
adjudication, as the case may be, can take place. If it is stipulated that the 
guaranteed person must be delivered to a court of law, the surety must do so and 
he is not allowed to deliver the guaranteed person at other places. The surety shall 
be relieved from this obligation upon death of the guaranteed person (makjal bihi) 
as the ability to make him available at the place of settlement has become 
impossible. Similarly, if the guarantor (kaftl) dies, his obligation become extinct as 
he is no longer capable of delivering the guaranteed person at the required 
place.However, it will not be the case upon the death of the beneficiary, whose 
heirs shall have the right to require the surety to deliver up the person guaranteed 
at a specified time.16 
The second category of kafalah is kafalah bi )l-mal. It is also known as 
surety for the claim. This means that the surety stands as a pledge to the creditor 
(makjal lahu) that the obligation of the principal debtor will be fulfilled. In this 
type of suretyship, it is required that the secured obligation must be a liability of 
the principal debtor (marjmunan caza 'l-a~ll) and the obligation of the surety (kaftl) 
is dependent (tlibi~ on the liability of the principal debtor (a~ll). Suretyship for the 
claim can be independent or additional to suretyship for the person; if the 
guarantor stipulates that the debt of the principal debtor be remitted, its effect is 
that of ~awlilah. 17 
151n the Mfiliki school the term ¢aman al-wajh is used. See Qawiinln, p.279. This is 
important in long-distance trade and international commerce where local brokers and agents will 
give their suretyship for the foreign traders, before securing the confidence of local authorities and 
customers. See Kafalah, pp .169-17 6. 
16NG.?. J?aman cAmm, Kuwait,1983, pp.37; Maj. cAdliyyah, art.642; Maj.Sharciyyah, 
art.1126. 
11Maj. cAdliyyah, art.613; Maj.Sharciyyah, art.1196; Introduction, p.158. 
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The question of establishing the right (thubat al-~aqq) in a kaflilah contract 
has given rise to a lengthy discussion whether the debt in question will fall on the 
dhimmah of both the guarantor (kaftl) and the debtor (madin) or exclusively on the 
principal debtor. lbn Qudamah in his al-Mughnl, a leading ijanbali text is of the 
opinion that the dhimmah will be established to both parties and this view is also 
subscribed to by the Shafici and Mfiliki schools of law. I 8Qnly the I:Ianafis are 
taking a different stance by opining that: "the debt (dayn) will not fall on the dhim-
mah of the guarantor (kaftl)" .19 
Nevertheless, if one has a closer look into the issue, one will notice that it 
is not essential for the purpose of establishing the right, to consolidate the debt to 
the surety's dhimmah while it is subsisting on the dhimmah of the debtor. Even if 
the debt is established on the dhimmah of the surety, the creditor can only make on 
claim, from either the debtor or the surety. In this regard, one opinion said that the 
creditor can claim from anyone as he pleases, but the overwhelming view is that 
definitely demand for satisfaction of the debt must be made first to the principal 
debtor.20 
As regards the practical side of kafalah, Ibn cA.bidin said that the fuqaha) 
are unanimous in establishing the debt in question in a contract of suretyship to 
both the surety and principal debtor. Their arguments are, inter alia, that 
eventhough the suretyship is the joining of liability for claim purposes, it does not 
18Mughnr, vol.V, p.8. In his fatwa al-Subki said that : "Both the principal debtor and the 
surety can be demanded [to pay the entire debt] as ~aman is similar to rahn. If rahn is attached to 
the entire debt, so is the case with daman. See al-Subki, Fatawa al-Subki, p.368. 0 
19Badtf'i', vol.VI, p.2. . 
20Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.644. 
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amount to a proper debt which can be taken from the surety's estate upon his 
death. Obviously, right of claim (mufiilabah) is dropped upon the surety's death as 
the case in kafalah bi )l-nafs, whereas the law in the textual authorities, even 
among the ij:anafis - that the property will break up with the death of the kafll and 
the lawful rights from his estate can be drawn. Therefore, lbn cAbidln can be said 
to be seeking a middle way in mediating the conflicting opinions. 21 
The third category is darak suretyship22 which simply means a guarantee to 
give indemnity if goods are owned by a third party. This is a suretyship to pay the 
price of property sold if there are third party rights subsisting in that property. No 
claim shall be made against the surety of a seller by way of darak unless judgement 
is given that a third party right subsists in the thing sold and the seller is ordered to 
return the price. This type of security is widespread in many societies. 
"The buyer (mushtarl) can ask for a guarantor who can in order to 
ensure return of the price (thaman) should he find any defect ((ayb) 
that necessitates return of the good. On the same scores, if the sold 
goods belong to a third party or someone else has some other right 
like right of pre-emption (shu.fah)" .23 
Essentially the darak is the guarantee against fault in ownership. The 
important place given to this guarantee is the written deed which reflects a promi-
nent feature in Islamic law, the protection of ownership through a series of rules, 
among which is the protection of bona fide acquisition. 
21 lbn cA.bidin, Radd al-Mukhtar 'ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar, Cairo, n.d., vol.IV, p.261; cAli 
al-Khafif, "Al-l:laqq wa al-Dhimmah wa Ta)thlr al-Mawt fihi," cited in Ma~tidir, vol.II, p.21. · 
22Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.616. Cf. Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.1089. Art.1094 of this compilation pro-
vide even a wider protection under the notion of flam/in al-saq. See also Fatawii, vol.XXIX, p.549. 
23Majma', p.233; Qawanln, pp.286-287; Kafalah, p.146. 
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A darak guarantee is a guarantee given by the seller to make good should 
the buyer's title be contested by a third party. It is possible, for example, that prior 
to the transaction, and without the knowledge of the buyer (or seller), a third party 
had inherited all or part of the property sold, it had been given as a waqf, a slave 
had been manumitted, a neighbour exercised his right of pre-emption, or a creditor 
appears with a debt against the seller and declares his right to the property. If such 
a claim (istilJ.qiiq) is proven valid, the ownership of the property newly acquired by 
the good faith purchaser is thus defective. In a contract, the seller is accordingly 
bound to return to the buyer either the property itself, its price, its equivalent (if it 
is fungible), or its value together with the value of such improvements as were 
made by the buyer himself. Thus, tjaman al-darak is a special kind of guarantee 
and is to be treated separately in the forthcoming chapters. 24 
Normally, in the cultural experience of Islam in the Arab Middle East, the 
notaries often felt obliged to enumerate all the possibilities with regard to persons 
who might make a claim, the circumstances that might occur and the obligation of 
the seller. In TaJ:iawi's Kitiib al-$hurut al-Kabir, darak matter has been inserted in 
the clause which reads: 
"Should any claim be made against Fulan [the buyer] with respect to 
whatever is entailed in the sale, mentioned in the document, or any 
part of it or any rights attached to it, proceding from any person 
whatsoever, then it is the responsibility of the Fulan [the seller] to 
deliver what is incumbent upon him as a duty, and what is required 
of him because of this sale, mentioned in this document. [He is 
responsible] until he delivers to Fulan, according to whatever this 
sale, mentioned in this document, makes binding on him in [the 
buyer's] favour. "25 
24Jeanette Wakin, The Function of Documents in Islamic Law (The Chapters on Sales from 
TaJ.iawI's Kitab al-Shun1t al-Kabir), New York, 1972, pp.60-61. 
25Ibid., p.61. 
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2.3 Consolidation of Various Methods of Guarantee 
The theoretical foundation of law of guarantee in Islam is comprehensive 
and susceptible to further extension. The theoretical framework, together with the 
jurisprudential justifications, will serve as a basis for further enlargement of this 
concept, beyond the coverage of the classical principles. There are a number of 
important subjects related to the discussion and will contribute to build the body of 
principles concerning guarantee. 
Firstly, as the commercial life is getting more complicated day by day and 
the extent of people's honour towards trustworthiness and ethics in business is very 
much questionable, it is rather inadequate to rely on verbal guarantee. It was sug-
gested that "the written commercial instrument, in practice is indespensible". 26 
"Court records and written documents have played an important part 
in the practice of Islamic law from a very early period, even though 
they have generally been neglected in the legal theory of the 
Sharrcah. As early as the middle of the second century of Hijrah we 
hear a judge being dismissed from his post for failure to keep the 
records of his court in a proper manner, which implies that the 
keeping of such records had already become a normal part of judi-
cial procedure. The use of written instruments in establishing con-
tractual obligations and legal entitlements also became a feature of 
Islamic practice at an early date, and the consequent need for draw-
ing such documents give rise to a distinct branch of legal literature 
from the eight century. "27 
261bid., p.9. As far as the contract of suretyship is concerned, the written document will 
serve, at least, to help establish the liability of the surety. It is not, at any rate, for purpose for the 
validiting the suretyship. See Sanhiiri's statement in the memorandum of the draft Egyptian Law 
cited in K<:fr.ti.lah, p.68. 
2 R. Y.Ebied and M.J.L. Young, Some Legal Arabic Legal Document of the Ottoman 
Period, p.1. 
(58) 
These written documents are usually certified by a professional witness 
often exercised by the function of notary. 28 There are many practical advantages in 
consulting a witness or a notary to have a document drawn up, but the most impor-
tant was that he would be likely to have a technical knowledge to produce a sound 
document, stylistically correct and recording a legally valid operation. All this 
development has taken place by a direct outgrowth of the shurut literature. 29 
The shurut literature, in actual fact, grew out of the attempt by jurist to 
bring ideal theory and practice closer together. The aim is to keep practice under 
the control of doctrine. One of the way by which the jurists, particularly the 
scholars of I;Ianafi School, tried to accomodate practice was to create certain forms 
of literature that had as their immediate purpose the smooth operation of law and 
legal procedures in everyday life. This literature consisted of a variety of practical 
works, intended not to discover or even explain the law, but to help the qarjJ and 
other concerned persons in the law's application. The work on shurut are an out-
standing example of this literature. These handbooks, or formularies, were 
designed especially for the professional notary, and contained model contracts, 
legally correct in every detail, for all possible needs. 30 Other outstanding examples 
of this practical literature are the treatises on ~iyal, legal devices or evasion. The 
~iyal works were handbooks showing interested persons, particularly the mer-
28The dual role of the shuhad is described by Ibn Khaldiin: "In every city,[the witness] 
have their own shops and benches where they always sit, so that people who have transactions to 
make can engage them to function as witness and register the (testimony) in writing." See The 
Muqaddimah, vol.l,p.462. 
29Documents are called ~akk [pl .~ukak], wathfqah [pl. watha)iq] or dhukr [pl .adhkiir], also 
dhukr ~aqq [pl.adhkiir ~uqaq]. The branch of legal science which deals with documents is called the 
science of shurar (stipulations). See Introduction, p.82. 
30wakin, op.cit, p.10. 
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chants, how they could follow the letter of law and yet arrive at a different result 
than what intended by the law. 
In the Islamic West, shuru{ is known as watha)iq literature, the term popu-
larised by the MfilikI school. Eventhough the MfilikI jurists were in fact hostile to 
the subject of J:ziyal, their interest in the formularies began at a very early date. The 
watha)iq works eventually became closely connected with the carnal, the practice of 
courts, because the term of document were al ways drafted in accordance with this 
judicial practice, regardless of whether or not it agreed with classical doctrine. 3 l 
The Sharlcah, as the ideal religious law, crystallized in the doctrine of the 
texts, was formally to replace those practices and standards of conduct that had 
evolved out of millennia-old experience. Despite that,in many legal spheres, the 
realities of everyday life were too compelling to permit conformity to these 
standards. This was particularly true in commercial law, where demands of an 
urban and increasingly complex society played a further strain on doctrine. 
Attempt have been made to reconcile between the inviolability of the Sharlcah and 
certain practical needs and thereby institution never quite recognized by theory, 
make an attempt to survive. One of this was the practice of using written docu-
ments for private transactions. 32 
Historically, it is proven that private contracts of all kinds depended on 
written instruments and from the earliest Islamic times were used extensively. Dis-
cussion will al ways centre on the interpretation of the Qur' anic verse33, which con-
311bid., p.14. 
321bid., p.4. 
33Q., al-Baqarah (2): 282. 
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tains an explicit ruling on the necessity on documentation of contract (in some cir-
cumstances, at least): 
"O you who believe, when you deal with each other, in transactions 
involving future obligations, in a fixed period of time, reduce them 
to writing. Let a scribe write down faithfully as between parties. Let 
not the scribe refuse to write as God Has taught him, so let him 
write. Let him who incurs the liability dictate, but let him fear his 
Lord God and not diminish aught of what he owes .... Disdain not to 
reduce to writing [your contract] for a future period, whether [the 
amount] be small or big. Is is juster in the sight of God, more 
suitable as evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts among 
yourselves. But if it be a transaction which you carry out on spot 
[direct cash sale] among yourselves, there is no blame on you, if 
you do not write it down.But take witnesses whenever you make a 
commercial contract, let neither scribe nor witness suffers harm .... " 
Despite the explict ruling on the matter, supported by authority from the 
Sunnah that the Prophet ordered cAli to draw up a document in his name at 
ijudaybiyyah, the jurists never modified their attitude towards written documents 
by saying that it is only a recommendation (mandub;musta~abb). In this regards, 
al-TaJ:iawi asserts that document are neither enjoined as a duty nor are they forbid-
den. They are useful support for oral testimony in that they help keep the debtor 
and creditor from forgetting the terms of their agreement. 34 Wakin observed that 
the ijanafis were more hesitant in accepting written evidence but eventually the 
principle of isti~san (juristic preference) prevailed and this acceptance was finally 
confirmed, albeit in a rather negative way, in the Majallat al-A~kiim al-
cAdliyyah. 35 
34niis issue is related one to another. For instance, it is not only the question of refusal to 
recognize written documents but it is also related to the role of a witness as WG.?-ifah diniyyah (reli-
gious duty) and an attempt to safeguard oral testimony. Documents were proof only under restricted 
circumstances and only after qualified witness had attested their content. For details see Emile 
Tyan, "Le Notariat et le regime de la preuve par ecrit dans la pratique du droit musulman," Amzales 
de l'Ecole Francaise de Droit de Beyrouth,(1945) pp. 76 and 82-84 cited in Wakin, op.cit., p.8. 
35Ibid., p.4. 
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It is also suggested that in practice, the legal system can be dependent, to 
certain extent, to the practice of pledge (rahn) which has been institutionalised in 
order to serve the protection of rights in a loan agreement. Pledge simply means 
"setting aside property from which it is possible to obtain payment or satisfaction 
of some claim. Such property is then said to be pledged or given in pledge. 36 
Legally, rahn is holding a property to secure certain right by which the 
satisfaction (istifa)) can be obtained. In this respect, an object bearing pecuniary 
value (qlmah mliliyyah) according to the Sharlcah is considered to be a security 
(wathlqah) by which payment of a debt can be assured. This type of security con-
cern with a property ( wathlqah bi mlil) and not with the liability ( dhimmah) of a 
person. Rahn, therefore, worth more than kafalah. In kafalah, securing rights 
(tawathuq) lies on the dhimmah of the guarantor and not on the property held by 
the creditor (da)in). The connotation of the term "wathlqah"37 is that the property 
is placed as security to the money owed and become an assurance that the debt can 
be satisfied from the pledged property. 38 
It is a fundamental rule that the pledgee has the right of retaining possession 
of the pledge (!Jabs) until redemption thereof. In the event of death of the pledgor, 
the pledgee has a prior right over other creditors and may obtain payment of the 
debt from the pledge. Settlement can be made, whether in case of inability to pay 
the debt or upon death, by selling the property pledged, the pledgee will realize his 
36Maj. 'Adliyyah, Article 701; Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.940. · 
37This term means bond, security or writing of obligation for payment of a debt or the 
like. See Lexicon, Supplement, p.3049. 
38Fiqh /sltiml, vol.V, p.180. See also discussion on rahn in respect of the liabilities of 
parties in the contract in chapter III, infra. 
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money back and if there are remainders, it will be returned to the pledgor or his 
heirs. 
The above discussion concludes that the security devices in loan contracts 
can be better implemented using a multi-tier approaches. Personal suretyship 
(kafiilah bi )l-nafs) might be adequate for certain petty purposes in commerce, but 
if it is involving a massive amount and unexpected outcomes, one has to go beyond 
that. Formalization of a contract and writing it in standard formats is nothing but a 
call of necessity (ma~lal]ah) as it is needed by people as a measure to avoid 
injurious consequences (rjarar) of default. This proposition is not only supported 
but also seen to be supported in various current legislations in Muslim nations as 
well regulations in various Islamic institutions involved in loan transactions. 39 This 
approach is necessary to ensure the smooth operation of granting loan and thus will 
speed the success of business in the society. The Islamic approach in settlement of 
a transaction, by resorting to the most reasonable [or humanitarian] solution before 
finally resorting to adversarial method, can be manifested in this multiple 
approach. At least, at the end of the day, there is something that anyone of the 
parties involved can tum to, rather than mere verbal promises which people will 
always deny.40 
2.4 Kafiilah : A Gratuitous Contract 
39see Malaysian Islamic Banking Act 1983 and cf. Federal Commercial Code of the United 
Arab Emirates 1993. 
40see discussion on the operation of Islamic banks based on these various methods of 
security in chapter IV, infra. 
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In the classical works of Islamic law, kafalah is treated as a gratuitous con-
tract (caqd al-tabarru'). It is also known as unilateral contract, a disposition that 
may be completed by unilateral will (iradah munfaridah), and not dependent on the 
act of both parties as in a bilateral transactions (caqd al-mucawatjllt). It is con-
sidered as a good deed and subservience to God (tlicah) that will be rewarded, 
simply because the guarantor (kafil) is willing to act as such, without any pecuniary 
return or legally known as without any consideration. 
Generally, the legal manuals have adopted this notion of kafalah as being 
gratuitous. However, the change of time and circumstances has bring about a 
change of attitude towards kaflllah, from being accepted as just a gratuitous con-
tract to being considered as a burden and liability the guarantor has undertaken. If 
one traced the ancient legislation (sharcu man qablana), there is a saying attributed 
to the Tawriih pertaining kafiilah which reads: "Verily the beginning of kafalah is 
attributed to regrets (nadllmah), its middle with blame (multi.mah) and its end with 
liability (gharlimat). "41 After the conclusion of the kafalah contract, the kafil will 
blame himself or be blamed by people, and during the claim (muflilabah) he will 
regret that has caused loss to his property and finally, he has to make compensation 
or to undertake the responsibility related thereto. 
In the Bible, the same reminder was also given. For instance, in Proverb 
8: 13 it was mentioned: "Go not surety beyond your means - think any pledge a 
debt you must pay". 42 And in other proverb43 it was said: "He is in a bad way who 
becomes surety for another, but he who hates giving pledges is safe. A person who 
41 See Fiqh /slami, vol.V, p.131. For details see also Durar, vol.III, p.613. 
42 New American Bible, Sirach 8:13 cited in McGuiness, op.cit, pp.8-15. 
43Proverb 11 :15, Ibid. 
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is a surety is liable to fulfill his commitment as you have been snared by the 
utterance of your own lips, caught by the word of your mouth". 44 There is no 
doubt that a guarantee is costly to the person who gives it, as it exposes him to a 
risk of loss to which he would not be otherwise exposed. In giving a guarantee, a 
surety assumes the liability of another in connection with the guaranteed obliga-
tion, although he may draw no direct benefit from the transaction to which that 
obligation relates. 45 
One important issue to be considered during the present time, is whether or 
not a guarantor can obtain payment (muqabil;ajr) for the guarantee he gives. Wah-
bah al-Zul)ayli is of the opinion that if the kafll requires the guaranteed person to 
pay for the guarantee and. the person seeking the guarantee fail to obtain it through 
an active charity, then he is allowed to pay for it on the basis of necessity 
(~arurah) or public need (al-IJ.lij.ah az-cammah). He argued that if the expected 
guarantee cannot be secured it will result in inability to attain ma#a}Jah like doing 
business, to finance an important project, to go abroad for education and other 
things. He further argued that since the fuqaha' allow giving payment for purpose 
of performance of religious duties (al-qurubat wa al-{acah) like teaching the 
Qur'an, such payment is permissible in the case of guarantee. However, the charge 
or payment must be reasonable and not excessive. 46 
2.5 Formalities in kafalah contracts. 
44Proverb 6:2, Ibid. 
45cf.Gideon Lisbon, "Islamic Influence on Medieval Jewish Law? Sefer Ha'arevuth [Book 
of Surety] of Rav Shmuel Ben Hofni Gaon and its Relationship to Islamic Law," SJ LXXIII [1991], 
pp.5-25. 
46Fiqh Islaml, vol. V, p.161. 
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Abu I:Ianlfah and one of his disciples, Mul)ammad al-ShaybanT held that the 
basic constituent of kefalah are offer (ljlih) and acceptance (qabul)47. However, his 
other disciple, Abu Yusuf, supported by other schools of law, opined otherwise, 
saying that mere offer will render a kefalah contract valid. 48 According to the lat-
ter's view, kafalah contract is completed if it is executed by an offer (ljab) from 
the kafil, in both kafalah bi )l-miil and kafalah bi )l-nafs. The acceptance by the 
debtor, according to the majority of jurists at this stage, is not essential. Neither is 
his consent, in so far as he has no objection to the dealing, material as has been 
pointed out in the case of Abu Qatadah. In that event, the mere saying which is an 
offer from Abu Qatadah : "The obligation will fall on me", has been accepted as a 
concluded suretyship, which made the Prophet agree to offer janaz.ah prayers for 
the dead obligor. There was no record of the creditor's acceptance of it. On the 
basis of this definition, kafolah is equivalent to joining (fiamm) and obliging a 
claim (mutalabah) which is supposed to be the responsibility on the principal 
debtor (a~Il), and this can be concluded by the offer from the kafil. It is being 
regarded as having the same liability as nadhr. 49 
On the other hand, Abu I:IanTfah, as represented by his student, Mul)ammad 
al-ShaybanT maintained that, the consent (riff.a) of the creditor (makftll lahu) is 
required. This will emerge quite clearly in the discussion of conditions (shuril!) of 
kafalah. Among others, it is required that the creditor must be present in the ses-
sion wherein the contract is concluded (majlis al- caqd). At least, he can appoint a 
delegated person (wakll) to accept it on his behalf. It is suggested that, some other 
social and cultural considerations, are the possible grounds why this opinion is 
47see Ibn cAbidin, op.cit., vol.IV, p.261. 
48Fiqh /sltiml, vol.V, p.134. 
49see Qawanln,p.325; M.Mu/Jtiij, vol.II, p.198; Mughni, vol.V, p.72. 
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upheld. The creditor, whose rights are being given attention, must at least has the 
privilege of making a choice, whether or not to accept a surety. This is very true in 
the real practice, as often a surety is rejected by virtue of lack of certain qualities 
like trusworthiness, or relationship with the debtor. 
Despite that opposition, the prevalant view remains that on the belief a 
guarantee may be concluded and become executory by the mere offer of the 
guarantor. 50 As a matter of compromise, a clause is often inserted which allows the 
person m whose favour the guarantee is made to decline to accept such a 
guarantee. Until such time as he does so, however, the guarantee is valid (tabqa 
al-kafalah ma lam yarudduhii al-makjal lahu). Thus, if in the absence of the person 
in whose favour the guarantee is made, a person stands security for the latter 
recovering any amount due to him, and the creditor dies without receiving 
information that such person has stood security, the guarantor is still bound 
thereby. As regards the consent (ri{i,a) of the debtor ( makjal canhu), it is unani-
mously decided that this is not essential at all. Paying off the debt of another per-
son without his permission is permissible, eventhough his permission is preferred. 
The subject of ~ighah, that is the manner the intention is being communi-
cated, is an integral part of a contract of kafalah. It is an important acknowl-
edgement by the parties involved that they have to enter into such undertaking. 
There are difference of opinions in details on how the ~ighah should be executed 
but nevertheless, it is important, at least in determining whether the kafalah, is 
attached to a person or to property. 51 
50Maj. cAdliyyah, art.621. 
51Kafalah, pp.51-61. 
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The Majallat al-A~kam al-cAdliyyah is clear on the subject and this trend 
has been followed by other compendiums like Murshid al-lfayrlin as well as the 
subsequent legislation in Middle Eastern countries. A kafalah contract is valid and 
effective if pronounced by a special expression (~ighah mucayyanah), and the 
wordings to be employed, according to ijanafis and Shaficis, can either be 
expressed (~ari~) or implied (kinayah). This simply denotes any utterence that sig-
nifies an obligation in the custom and usage of a society. 52 This is provided in the 
Majallah as: 
"The offer of the guarantor, that is, words used importing 
guarantee, are any words which by custom are evidence of an 
undertaking to be bound. Example: Ali states that he has stood 
security, or that he is a guarantor, or that he is ready to indemnify 
someone. A valid contract of guarantee is thereby concluded. ,,53 
Despite the overwhelming acceptance of both expressed and implied 
undertakings, it is suggested that it is better to have a ~ighah which means nothing 
but the undertaking of the guarantee. This is due to ever increasing complexities in 
business life and the potentials of having disputes in most situations. By taking this 
step, it is hoped that the administration of justice in civil matters is going to be 
much easier. All terms employed in various classical works can be used, for 
instance, the term kaftl, {l,amin, zacim, gharim, ~amil and qabil. All these terms are 
derived from various evidences on the validity of kaftilah and considered express 
terms to denote nothing but suretyship. 54 This it hoped will ensure that potential 
52see lbn Humam, Fatf} al-Qadir, vol.V,p.292; Bada)i', vol.VI, pp.2-3; Majma', p.265. 
53Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.622. Also see Sh.Baz, vol.I, p.336. 
54 See Q. Taha (20):40; a1-Q~~(28):12; ~ad(38):23; al-Nal}.l (16):91 ; Yusuf (12):72; 
al-lsra' (17):92; al-Qalam(68):40. 
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disputes can be prevented from taking place by providing such guidelines before a 
contract of kafal.ah is concluded. 
The jurists have also outlined the conditions (shuriJ!) of a valid kafalah con-
tract. All prime constituents of a suretyship are subject to scrutiny. before a 
kafalah contract can be concluded and thus effective. Therefore~ there are a few 
sets of conditions! which apply to the surety (ka.fil)! the original debtor (a.fi/)55. the 
creditor (makfol l.ahu)56 and the subject of the liability (m~fiil bihi). 
As far as the surety is concerned, it is required that he must be a person of 
full capacity (ahliyyah kiimi/ah)51 , without any defects whatsoever. This is known 
as the state of ru.shd, being creditworthy and prudent in management of his prop-
erty. As kafalah is a transaction involving property, therefore it cannot be executed 
by a lunatic (majniin), a minor (§abT) and a person who is subject to impediments 
(Jµijr) because of prodigal (safah) ~ as all of those are lacking in their prudence 
(ru.shd). 58 
·in order to be able to make a contract of guarantee, a surety must 
be of sound mind and must have arrived at the age of puberty 
(biiligh). Consequently, a madman, an imbecile and a minor cannot 
make a valid contract of guarantee. If a minor becomes a guarantor 
while a minor and after arriving at the age of puberty ratifies the 
contract of guarantee, he cannot be made to abide thereby. ,,59 
Another important condition prescribed by the jurist is freedom (J:iurriyah). 
The transaction from a slave (<abd) is not accepted, on the ground that being a gra-
55 Also known as al-madin. 
56 Also attributed as a claimant or plaintiff (al-mudda'i) and the one who gives away his 
property as debt (da)in). 
57 A person who is legally competent to manage and dispose his own property (kullu ja)iz 
al-ta~arrtfgft malih). See Mughnl, vol. V, p. 78. 
8Fiqh Islaml, vol.V, p.140. 
59Maj. <Adliyyah, art.628. 
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tuitous contract (tabarruc-y, the slave has no right to give his benovelence except by 
permission from his master. Nevertheless, unlike the first condition, the kafalah 
contract given by a slave fails in terms of its effects (nafadh), but still considered a 
concluded contract. The second condition seems to be rather remote as the institu-
tion of slavery has ended. The only focus now will be on the question of full capa-
city of transaction, which is an integral part of the institution of suretyship. 60 
Pertaining to the original or principal debtor (a~ll), it is prescribed that he 
must be capable of delivering the guaranteed obligation by himself or through his 
agent. This is ruled by the ijanafis as they argued that kafalah is not valid if 
involving the debt of a deceased who died without any estate to repay the debt. 
They consider the debt as being dropped (dayn saqit) and thus cannot become a 
valid subject of suretyship. They equate this case to the case of release from the 
debt (ibra)), as the liability (dhimmah) of a person will disappear with death. The 
debt will not remain with him, whereas rj,aman is the act of joining the liability 
(dhimmah) in the course of making claim. 61 
The two leading disciples of Abu ijanifah, Abu Yusuf and MuI:iammad al-
ShaybanT have joined the majority of jurists62 to opine that contract of suretyship 
involving a dead obligor is valid, by virtue of the Qatadah case, wherein the 
Prophet has asked a person to stand surety to the debt of the dead obligor. 63 That 
debt is an established debt (dayn thlihit), and therefore the law permits to offer 
60For a fuller discussion see lbn 'Abidln, Iftishiah lbn 'Abidin, vol.IV, p.5. See also 
M.Mu~taj, vol.II, p.7 ; Madkhal, p.407. 
61Bada'i', vol.VI, p.132; Ibn Humam, Fat~ al-QadTr, vol.V, p.119. 
621bn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, p.294 ; al-Dardlr, al-Shar~ al-Kablr, vol.III, 
p.321 ; Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.339 ; Mughnl, vol.IV, p.537. 
63 Al-Shawkaru, Nayl al-Awftir, vol. V, p.206. 
(70) 
c)amlin (guarantee) for it. This is treated as being on the same standing as the case 
of default of payment (khalafa wafa) li daynihl). The authority for the estab-
lishment of this debt is that if a person is benovelently willing to pay off the debt, 
the creditor (~ii~ib al-dayn) is allowed to make a settlement. This is very much 
similar to the case where the person gives guarantee for the debtor during his 
lifetime and the latter dies, the dhimmah of the guarantor is not released and his 
liability remains. 64 
The law has also required that the principal debtor (a~Il) is known 
(macrufan) by the guarantor. If the guarantor says: "I give my guarantee to anyone 
of those group of people," the kafiilah is invalid. This requirement is only to 
identify the guarantor to the person guaranteed, his creditworthiness and his 
capabality of repaying the debt. Nevertheless, the debtor's physical presence is not 
required, as the necessity for suretyship will normally take precedence over the 
non-presence of the debtor. 65 
The next subject will be the conditions of a creditor in whose favour the 
guarantee is given. The surety must also know who the creditor is (maczaman) for 
if a surety is giving a guarantee in favour of a person unknown to him, this is 
unacceptable as he cannot deliver the very purpose of kafiilah that is security (al-
tawaththuq). The ij:anafis and Shaficis have the same view on the basis that knowl-
edge of the creditor is necessary because the creditors might have difference in 
their attitude towards the unpaid debt. 66 
64Fiqh /slami, vol. V, p.141. 
65This stand was confirmed by some scholars, among others Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-
Mujtahid, vol.II, p.293 ; Badti.Jic, vol. VI, p.6 ; M.Mu/:ttiij, vol.III, p.204. 
66see Mabsaf, vol.XX, p.9; M.MuJ:ztaj, vol.II, p.200. 
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The Mfililds and I:Ianbalis however, permitted conclusion of a kaflilah con-
tract even without any knowledge by the surety of the creditor. This standpoint is 
based on the the verse on kafalah in the Qur' an67 wherein Prophet Yusuf has given 
a guarantee that whoever comes with a water container (~uwa') belonging to the 
King, will be rewarded with a camel-load of foodstuff. Ibn al-'ArabI is of the 
opinion that in this. verse the identity of the interested party was not revealed. The 
announcement about the reward is not given by the "king" himself, but through an 
intermediary, Yusuf. 68 
Another condition advanced by the I:Ianafis, requires the creditor to be pre-
sent in the session where the contract is concluded. According to the f:Ianafi doc-
trine69, the creditor should be present in the majlis to accept the contract or at least 
to be represented by a representative. Kafalah. is underlined with the notion of 
giving ownership (tamllk) and that can only be accepted by an interaction of offer 
and acceptance. In relation to this condition, it is also required that the creditor is 
mentally sound and enjoys full capacity. This line of discussion within the f:Ianafis, 
between Abu t.Ianifah and Mul:iammad al-ShaybanI and Abu Yusuf, is similar to 
the debate on ~ighah as discussed earlier. 
The secured obligation or the subject of kafalah contract (makftll bihi) has 
at least three conditions. Firstly, the secured obligation must be a liability of the 
debtor (a~rl) whether in form of debt (dayn), object (cayn), person (nafs) and per-
formance (jicl). These liabilities only applies to property which is capable of being 
67 Q, Yusuf (12 ): 72. 
681bn al-cArabi, AJ:iklim al-QurJtin, vol.III, p.1085. 
69opinion of Abu I:Ianifah and Mubammad al-Shaybaru. 
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subject to liability (marjmunan bi nafsihli). It will not apply to property held on 
fiduciary relationships (cuqud amlinah) as it cannot involve in a debt. Secondly, the 
secured obligation must be a kind deliverable by the kafll. This will make the deal 
beneficial. This is the reason why the jurists have categorically rejected kafalah in 
~udad and qi~li~ cases. Compliance to them by a kafll is impossible as the will be 
no representation (niylibah) in undertaking a punishment. After all, the kaflilah 
contract will not del~ver any benefit. Kaflilah is security method {istlthaq) whereas 
~udud is based on "abandonment upon occurance of doubt (shubhlit)", and there 
are not harmonious one to another. There can be no compulsion for a kafalah to be 
given in such cases and if it is so granted, it will only be confined to settle civil 
matters not criminal. Thirdly, the secured debt must be a proper debt (dayn ~a~l~) 
which simply means an obligation that be relinquished by performance (lida)) or 
release from the said obligation (ibrli)). 70 
2.6 Legal Consequences of Kafiilah Contract. 
A conluded kaflilah contract will bring about at least two legal values 
(a~kiim), namely establishing the right to demand from the guarantor (kaftl) of 
what is liable on the principal (a~ll) and right of the guarantor (kaftl) to demand 
from the principal debtor (a~il). 
"The effect of a contract of guarantee is a claim. That is to say, it 
consists of the right of the person in whose favour the guarantee is 
made to claim the subject matter of the guarantee from the 
guarantor. "71 
70Mughnl, vol.V, p.97; Majma', p.271. See also Fiqh Jslaml, vol.V, pp.143-148; 
Kafalah, f~. 75-84. 
Maj. 'Adliyyah, Article 634; Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.1146. 
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What is demanded, at this stage, will depend on the type of the laifolah 
concluded by the parties. If the laifalah involves debt (dayn), the guarantor can be 
required to satisfy the entire debt if he is the only surety. If there are two sureties, 
both of them will share the burden equally provided that there is no specific terms 
on the matter, as both of them are on the same standing as far as the laifalah is 
concerned. The creditor will have to take into consideration the division of obliga-
tion (al-inqisam) by which he has to apportion his right of claim (}Jaqq al-
mutalabah). 72 
On the other hand, if the agreed terms involved laifalah bi )l-nafs, the 
surety is duty bound to ensure the attendance of the makjal, if that can be done. If 
he is not available the lai.ftl can ask for some time until his attendance can be 
assured. If he has not produced the guaranteed person during the stipulated time 
and there is no evidence of his inability to do so, the qarjJ can have him arrested 
him until the satisfactory evidences of his failure based on circumstances, 
testimonies and others can be produced. Then only he will be released and allowed 
deferment until he is in the position to produce the guaranteed person. 73 
p.148. 
"If any person guarantees to produce another at a given time and in 
the event of his failing to do so, guarantees to pay the debt of such 
person, and fails to produce such person at the appointed time, the 
guarantor is obliged to pay the debt. In the event of the death of the 
guarantor, the heirs must produce the persons whose appearance is 
guaranteed at the time agreed upon, or if such person surrenders 
himself in accordance with the contract of guarantee, the guarantor's 
property is freed from all liability. If they fail to produce the person 
guaranteed, or if such person fails to surrender himself, the estate of 
the guarantor becomes liable for payment of the debt. In the event 
12Badti.'i', vol.VI, p.10; Mabsa{, vol.XIX, p.162; Qawanln, p.325; Fiqh /slaml, vol.V, 
13Badti.Ji', vol.VI, p.10. 
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of the death of the ~erson in whose favour the guarantee is given, 
his heir may claim." 4 
The law has anticipated that difficulties may anse as regards secunng 
debtor's attendance, as it is quite natural that he might just hide somewhere so that 
his whereabout is unknown. Hence, it is provided that a guarantor may make an 
application for an order preventing the person for whom he stands surety from 
travelling abroad if there is evidence that caused a fear that the surety will suffer 
loss. 
" A creditor can seek help from the ruler (~likim) when a debtor 
who deferred the payment of debt, if wishes to leave the country 
before the debt falls due, aski~ him to name a surety (kaftl) and the 
debtor is compelled to do so." 
Even though there are few opinions within the ijanafi school as regards this 
issue, the prevalent view adopted by the Majallah is that by endorsing the above 
ruling it protects the right of people from any economic loss and destruction, espe-
cially during this era (fl hadhli al-zamlin). The call of public interest (ma~la~ah) 
arises as a result of declining honesty and ethical standard among merchants. 76Tuis 
phenomenon has been confirmed by Ibn Khaldun that: "Now, (honest) traders are 
few. It is unavoidable that there should be cheating, tampering with merchandise 
which may ruin and delay payment which may ruin profit ... "77 
74Maj. 'Adliyyah, article 642. 
75Maj. 'Adliyyah, article 656. In this event he can ask for other collateral security, and if 
both securities are not fulfilled, the authority may prevent the debtor from travelling. See Durar, 
vol.I, p.691. 
76sh.Atasl, vol.III, p.70. 
771bn Khaldiin, The Muqaddimah [An Introduction to History] translated rom Arabic by 
Franz Rosenthal, Princeton Univ. Press, vol.II, p.342 
(75) 
The majority of jurists 78 said that a kafalah contract will give the favoured 
party a right (}Jaqq) to claim from the guarantor what he is entitled to. This right, 
nevertheless, will not relinquish the right of the creditor to claim from the debtor. 
He can claim from anyone he wishes, or both provided that the claim is within the 
extent of his entitlement. 
The standpoint of the Mfiliki school is demonstrated in a statement by al-
Dardir: 
"The guarantor ({l,amin) should not be demanded i.e [it is not proper 
for ] the owner of the debt (rabb al-dayn) to claim from him [if col-
lecting it is problem-free] from the property of the debtor as he is in 
sound financial standing (musir) and not acting unjustly. This is 
what Malik was referring to (as a qualification) of his saying : the 
owner of the debt is free to claim from either person, even if the 
debtor is not around (ghli)ib) so long as the debt is established 
(thabit) and the debtor's property is available (}Ja{l,ir) and [the debt] 
can be taken from the properety of it without difficulty. However, 
[it is different] if it is stipulated in the contract of {l,amlin that he 
wishes to claim from the surety or there is a term saying that taking 
from the surety is preferred ... 11 79 
Some jurists held that the liability for paying the debt will not shift from the 
dhimmah of the guaranteed person to the guarantor. Instead, both dhimmahs will 
jointly undertake the liability. In that situation, claim (mu[lilabah) can be made 
from anyone of the two parties. The ijanafis, however, ruled that the liability will 
be on the guaranteed person, but the creditor can make his claim from either per-
son. This issue has been debated among the jurists, whether or not the principal 
debtor (a~ll) will be released from the obligation. 
"The person claiming under the guarantee has the option to claim 
either against the guarantor or against the principal debtor. The 
78 Among others are Sufyan al-Thawri, Awza'i, Abii 'Ubayd and the three imams Abii 
l:Ianifah, Shafi'i and Al}mad bin ijanbal. See lbn I:Iazm al-Andaliisi, al-Mu~alla, vol.III, p.526. 
79 AI-Dardir, al-Shar~ al-$aghir bi Hamish Bulghat al-Salik, vol.II, p. l 05. 
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exercise of his right against the one in no way destroys his right of 
claiming from the other. He may claim first from the one and then 
from the other or from both simultaneously. 11 80 
Shafitt is of the opinion that a kafolah with a condition for release of the 
principal from liability is not permitted because it is a condition which contradicted 
the exigency (muqtarj,a) of rj,aman. 81 Malik was reported to have said : "The debtor 
cannot claim from the kaftl except when claiming from the guaranteed person has 
become impossible" . He stresses that rj,amlin is a security ( wathlqah), the satisfac-
tion of the obligation will not be demanded from the surety except when the a~ll 
has failed in doing so. It seems that the two earlier opinions are of the same 
philosophy with some variation in the details. 
Ibn AbI Layla, Ibn Shubrimah, Ibn Sirin, the Zahiris and the Imamiyyah 
held that kafiilah necessitates the release (bara)ah) of the a~Il from liability, and 
the liability will transfer to the dhimmah of the kaftl. The creditor primarily, has 
no right to claim to the a~Il as in the case of ~awalah (transfer of obligation). They 
argued on the authority of Abu Qatadah case, wherein the Prophet has addressed 
him after he paid the debt of the deceased: "May Allah reward you with His bless-
ings and liberate your pledge (in the same way) you have freed the liability of your 
fellow brother. 82 They argued that this is an evidence the marj,man canhu is being 
released from liability. 
The predominant view is kafiilah will not give nse to barii)ah of the 
guaranteed person. Kafalah is the fusion of the dhimmah of a person to another in 
80Maj. 'Adliyyah, article 644. 
81Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.415; M.Mu~ttij, vol.II, p.207. 
82Ibn 1-Jajar said that the authority of this Q.adilh is rather weak. It has been verified that it 
is only a narration of a story about Abii Qatadah. 
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the sense of mutli1abah and barli)ah is contary to it. If kaj'alah is for the purpose of 
releasing one's liability, it is then ~awalah. They are both of different nature as 
evident from the names, eventhough there are some similarities in between them. 
They quoted the l)adith of the Prophet : "The soul of a faithful is adjoining to his 
[liability] until he satisfy it" 83 as well as the saying of the Prophet in the case of 
Abu Qatadah, after knowing that the debt has been paid: "Now, you have soothed 
his suffering 11 84 The willingness of the Prophet to offer prayers to the corpse of the 
deceased debtor is because ¢amiin has served the purpose of satisfaction (wafll)), 
whereas his refusal to do the same is because wafli) has not being fulfilled. This 
shows that the liability remains on the a~ll. 
The second legal consequence, is the establishment of right for the kaftl to 
claim from the person under guarantee. If a claim has been made to the kafil and 
he has paid for, he can demand reimbursement of the amount paid for the liability 
from the guaranteed person. This right is absolute, regardless of whether the 
guarantee was given upon request or without the knowledge and consent of the 
debtor. 85 
Scholars from the Shafici school of law insert a clause that the kafil can only 
be reimbursed if the guaranteed person consented on both the guarantee (¢,aman) 
and repayment(ada;). Otherwise, the guaranteed person is not responsible to reim-
burse him. If the consent is only pertaining to the actual ¢amiin and there was 
83 Al-Suyiiii, al-Jami' al-$aghir, vol.II, p.188 ; Also see Maj ma' al-lilwtfid quoted in 
Fiqh lslaml, vol.IV, p.129. . 
84rn one report the word jildataha is read as jildihi that is in the riwayat of Jabir b. cAbd 
Allah. There is also a report that replaced the word jildataha with qabraha meaning that he will be 
resting in his grave with peace after the obligation has been released from his liability. See Ibn 
l:Jajar, Fath al-Bari, vol.IV, pp.474-475. 
85 Al-Marghlnam, al-Hidayah, vol. VI, p.299. 
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nothing on repayment (ada)), the surety can still reimburse on the basis the loss has 
been sustained (ghurm) and thus liability falls on the principal debtor. Ada) alone, 
without invoking loss, is insufficient to grant reimbursement because it does not 
invoke the cause for gharam is not fulfilled. 86 
Al-Buhufi from the ijanbalI school said that determining factor will be the 
kaftl's intention (niyyah) while paying. If he paid the debt gratuitously 
(mutabarrican) he cannot claim anything. If he has an intention to realize the 
amount he paid, he can do so even if the ¢amlin and qa¢a) are without consent. 87 
The legal consequences will also depend on the nature of kafalah contract 
itself, whether it is unconditional, conditional or suretyship for future undertak-
ings. In the case of an unconditional contract of guarantee, the sum guaranteed 
may be claimed forthwith if the debt is payable immediately by the debtor, and 
upon expiration of the period prescribed for payment, if payable at some future 
date. 
"The result of this term is a condition (taC/lq) which will prevent the 
person subjected to it from (acquiring) the cause (sabab) of the 
effectiveness of the legal ruling. TaC/lq, therefore, has restrained 
kafalah from becoming a cause for its legal consequence, that is 
right of claim (mu{li1abah) instantly (fi )l-IJ1i1) and has postponed it 
until the condition (shar{) becomes available ... In contrast, attaching 
the kaflilah to a future date like: I will guarantee the price of what 
you will be buying from him, as the cause for the execution of the 
law is fulfiled. Here, the tacll~ which is a preclusion to establish a 
causal relationship, is absent. " 8 
However, if the guarantee is concluded subject to a condition, or is to take 
effect at some future date, the guarantor may not be called upon to make payment 
86umm, vol.III, p.230. 
87 Al-Buhuti, Kashshaf al-Qinac can Matn al-lqnac., vol.II, pl45. 
88sh.Atasr, vol.III, pp.35-37. 
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until the condition has been fulfilled and the time has arrived. In a contigent 
guarantee, the guarantor may not be called upon for payment should any person 
prove that he is entitled to the thing sold, until the court has given judgement for 
the return of the price to the vendor. In cases of guarantee of limited duration, no 
demand may be made from the guarantor except during the period of the 
guarantee. 89 
2. 7 Termination of Kalalah. 
A kafalah contract and its legal consequences will come to an end by the 
occurance of certain causes, as prescribed by the law. It will, however, as in the 
preceding discussion, depends on the nature of the kafalah itself. 
In the case of kafalah bi )l-mal, there are two ways by which the contract 
will be terminated. Firstly, repayment (ada)) of the debt to the creditor or at least, 
what is constructed as repayment or satisfaction of it (ma ft macnii al-adii)). It is 
immaterial whether the satisfaction is by the principal debtor (a~il) or the surety 
(kaftl). The right for demanding the given loan by the law is a way leading to 
repayment and if that ends up with the fulfillment of the liability, then the purpose 
of kafalah is accomplished. Therefore, the IJ.,ukm (legal value) of that contract 
comes to an end.90 
Kafiilah will also end when the creditor (da)in) gives away the right of his 
property to either the principal debtor or the surety. A gift (hibah) is equal to adii). 
89For details see Sh.Attisl, pp.38-45. Also see Maj. cAdliyyah, arts. 634 - 639. 
90Fiqh lsltiml, vol.V, p.152. 
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Another example is "something constructed and considered as adli)" is when a 
creditor dies and either the principal debtor or the surety is a beneficiary to the 
estate left by him. By inheritance (mlrlith), he owns the liability which was sup-
pose to falls on him. If the beneficiary is the surety (kafil), the suretyship to the 
creditor is no longer relevant. If, on the other hand, the beneficiary is the 
guaranteed person(makjal canhu), the suretyship is longer relevant. 91 
Secondly, the contract of kafalah bi )l-miil is terminated by way of ibrli) 
(release) or what is considered as ibrli). If a creditor released (abra)a) the surety or 
the principal debtor, kaflilah will ends. However, the, release of the kafil will not 
necessitate release of a$1l. However, the release of the a$1Z will also apply to the 
kafil. The debt is on the a~ll and not the kafil and therefore, the release of a~ll will 
drop the liability from his dhimmah. Consequently, the right to demand from the 
kafil is waived by virtue of the maxim : "If the root (a~l) is waived, so is its sub-
sidiary (far~. 92 
The release of the kafil is a release from the claim against him (mu[lilabah) 
not the debt (dayn), as there is no debt on his part. The waiving of the right of 
mu[lilabah against the surety will not, therefore, waive the liability of the debtor. 
A legal maxim reads: "The waiving of the liability of the subsidiary (far~ does not 
waive the right of claim against the principal debtor (a~il). ,,93 
91 Bada'i', vol. VI, p.11; Also see Majma', p.274. 
92AI-I:Iamawi, Ghartzz. al-'Uyan al-Ba~a'ir, vol.IX, p.91. For conditions of ibra' see 
Maj. 'Adl!J:lah, arts.1561-1571. 
Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.SO which reads: idha saqafa 'l-a$1 saqafa 'I-fare. Cf. arts.1530, 1527, 
662 and 760. See also Sh.Btiz, vol.I, p.40. 
(81) 
/bra) can be executed in a number of ways, among others, by the statement 
of the creditor (da)in) to either the debtor or to the surety like the statement: "I 
give the waiver (and the obligation is now on me)" _94 The ibrli) is given as it is an 
admission (iqrar) for either holding of property (qab¢) or satisfaction (istiftn. By 
saying that, he has make himself the undertaker of the waiver he made. As a 
result, both kafU and a~rl are released as the process of ibra) is equal to satisfaction 
which requires release of both of them. 95 
On a same ground, if the surety or the principal debtor, transferred the 
liability to a third party by way of J;awalah96 and the third party (muf;al) agrees to 
undertake it, kafalah can be ended. Ifawalah is a method by which ibra) can be 
attained, involving both the debt (dayn) and right of claim (mu{alabah). 
Kafalah contract can also be terminated through ~ull; (amicable settlement) 
in the sense that the kafil makes a settlement with the creditor pertaining to the sub-
jects of his claim. By that, the surety and principal debtor can be released in one of 
the two situations: namely, that he said "the guaranteed person(makjal canhu) and 
myself are released from the remainder of the debt" and "I wish to make settlement 
with you on this matter" without putting foward any condition of release. 97 
94Maj. cAdliyyah, art.1561 reads: "If any person states that he has no claim against or dis-
pute with some other person or that he is not entitled to anything from him, or that he has finished 
or given up a claim he had against him, or that he has received complete satisfaction from him, he is 
considered to have release such person." 
95cf.Maj. cAdliyyah, art.1536 defined ibra isqii! as dropping of all claims and ibrli) istifli) 
is a kind of admission consisting of someone admitting he has received his right from another per-
son. 
96 A.Dietrich, "I:Jawfila," E/(2), vol.III, p.283; Maj. cAdliyyah, art.673; Maj.Sharciyyah, 
art.1155. 
97Maj. cAdliyyah,art.1531; Maj.Sharciyyah, art.1616. 
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In the case of kafalah bi )l-nafs, there are three grounds for release98, 
namely handing over (tasllm al-nafs) the person guaranteed, release (ibrii)) and 
death. As regards the guarantee to produce the particular person, it was said: 
"Upon the guarantor producing the person whose appearance was 
guaranteed to the person in whose favour the guarantee was given in 
a place where it is possible to take legal proceedings, such as a town 
or township, he is released from the contract of guarantee, whether 
such person agrees or not. If it has been stipulated that he shall 
deliver him in some specified town, however, and he delivers him 
elsewhere, he is not released from the contract of guarantee. If he 
has agreed to produce him in court, but hands him over in the street, 
he is not freed from the contract of guarantee. If he hands him over 
in the presence of a police officer, however, he is released from the 
guarantee. u99 
The important criterion for this matter is the viability of instituting legal 
action (imkan al-mulJ1ikamah) and that is a requiremant for the cessation of the 
kafalah. Therefore, if the guaranteed is delivered in a place wherein legal action is 
impossible, like in a place where a judicial authority and its supporting staffs are 
unavailable, release of the guarantor cannot be granted.100 
/bra) is also a ground for release in this type of guarantee. This is when the 
creditor releases the guarantor from the kafalah contract. If that is granted, the 
kafiilah contract is ended because the objective of kafiilah is establishing right of 
mufiilabah and if that right is being dropped, the legal effect will cease accor-
dingly. In this circumstance, the a~Il is not exempted from liability as the release 
(ibrii)) is for the kaftl not the a~ll. Should ibra) be granted for the a~ll, both the 
parties will be exempted. IOI 
98Badti)i', vol.VI, p.12 ; Mabsuf, vol.XIX, p.166; lbn Humam, Fatf:z al-Qadlr, vol.V, 
p.393 ; M~ma', p.266 and 274. 





The third ground for termination of kafalah bi )/-nafs is the death of the a~Tl 
(principal debtor). In this situation, making the ~Tl has become impossible and the 
obligation is then released from him. On the same basis, if the guarantor dies, he is 
released from the obligation. Should the person in whose favour the guarantee was 
given died, however, the guarantor is not released from the contract of guarantee, 
and a claim may be made by such person's heirs.102 
2.8 Transfer of Obligation : Comparison between 
Kalalab- and ij:awfilah. 
lf awiilah is a way of extinguishing an obligation by transforming it into a 
new one. lfawiilah, literally, implies transfer. Legally, J;awiilah is an agreement 
by which a debtor is freed from a debt by another becoming responsible for it or 
transfer of a claim of a debt by shifting the responsibility from one to another. 
"The :ijanafis ruled that J;awalah is transfer of right of claim 
(mu{iilabah) from the dhimmah of the debtor (madln) to the dhim-
mah of an assignee (multazim). In that respect, it differs from 
kafiilah as it involves fusion (fiamm) of liability in the process of 
claim (mu{lilabah) and not a transfer. In in J;awiilah deal, the debtor 
(madln) will not be demanded after the contract is concluded. It is 
said in manuals of this school that J;awiilah is shifting (tal;wl/) of a 
debt from the liability of principal debtor to that of a delegated 
payer (muf;al calayh) as a mean of security (tawaththuq). lfawalah is 
a contract permissible in all debts (duyun) but not in goods (acyiin]. 
It is founded on constructive transfer (naql l}ukml) not physical." 10 
102Maj. 'Adliyyah,Article 666. Regarding muror al-zaman (lapse of time) it was ruled that: 
"A right is not abrogated by the lapse of time for an action to be heard." See Maj. 'Adliyyah, 
art.1673 and 1660; Murshid, art.256; Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.2051; Kafalah, pp.127-128. 
103Mughnf, vol.IV, p.83; Nll:[..f?aman, p.163. 
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The legal evidence for that is the l)acfith of the Prophet pertaining to the 
obligation to repay one's debt: 
" Procrastination in paying debt by a wealthy man is injustice. So if 
your debt is transferred from your debtor to a trustworthy rich 
debtor (mal1)), you should agree." 104 
·This l)acfith indicates that the order of the Prophet to accept ~awiilah by a 
rich debtor is a recommendation, as was held by majority of jurists. This contract 
is considered as a worldly beneficial matter and therefore considered as perform-
ance of good deed (i~slin) to the debtor. By doing this, he will release the debtor 
from his legal obligation for the debt.105 
No matter how diversed ka.falah and ~awiilah may be, there are many 
points of similarity in between them and they can, to some extent, become com-
plementary to each other insofar as settlement of loans are concerned. As ka.folah 
in its modern usage became extended to new transactions, so did ~awtilah. 
"The law has ordered giving security for debts (tawthiq al-duyan) 
for variety of purposes like protection of rights, avoiding disputes 
(niwC), guarantee ({lamiin) for payment of the debt and the credi-
tor's right of priority over the estate of the debtor with others pos-
sessing such a right. Methods of security rest in, among others, the 
documentation of the loan (kitiibah), certification of a notary 
(shahlidah), pledge (rahn), transfer of obligation (~awalah) and 
guarantee (ka.falah).106 
It is suggested that the availability of the institution of ~awiilah has 
extended a great deal of facilities to cope with the burden of commercial transac-
104Al-Mundhari, Mukhta~ar Sal},II}, Muslim, vol.II, p.15 cited in Fi'l par, p.27. 
105Qawa'id AIJ,kiim, p.160. 
106MuQ.ammad AQmad Sarraj, al-Awriiq al-Tijariyyah ft Jl-Shari'ah al-/slamiyyah, Cairo, 
1988, p.82. 
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tions and their diversed practices. It can provide new ways of satisfaction of debt 
and giving security which correspond to the currently used negotiable instruments. 
Lieber observed that one of the greatest contributions of the Muslim world to 
medieval economic life was the development of commercial methods based on 
writing and recording. I 07 Some contemporary Islamic scholars I 08 and economists 
have made an attempt to prove that the notion of kafalah and rjaman has been used 
the legal vehicle for the practice of letter of credit (khitlib al-rjamiin) I 09, letters of 
credit, promissory notes and others. Even if these instruments the elements of other 
concepts of Islamic transactions, the role of kaflilah is recognized. Regarding the 
function of a bill of exchange, Lieber quoted a description by Firuzabadi in Gras-
shoff' s work that a suftajah functions in giving capital to somebody, who has capi-
tal in the hand of the giver, who thus profits from the security of the way .110 
2.9 Islamic Rules on Insolvency. 
As a related subject, discussion on loan contracts should also incorporate 
the topic on insolvency. /fllis has been used in the literal sense to denote a state of 
indigence or destitution and lack of obtainment. When a person is being pro-
nounced as a muftis, in the common legal acceptation, it is meant for bankruptcy or 
107 A.Lieber, "Eastern Business Practices and Medieval European Commerce," Economic 
History Review vol.21, No.2 [August 1968), p.231. 
108Kafti.lah, p.132. 
109see al-Mawsa'ah al-'llmiyyah wa )l-'Amaliyyah Li )l-Bunak al-lsldmiyyah, vol.II, 
pp.309-337 cited in Kafti.lah, p.132. 
llOA.Lieber, op.cit., p.233. For details see cAH Al:imad al-Salus, al-Mu'amallit al-
Maliyyah.ft J?aw) al-Sharr'ah al-Islti.miyyah, 1986; clsa cAbduh, al-'Uqud al-Shar'iyyah al-lfti.kimah 
Li )l-Mu'ti.malti.t al-Mti.liyyah al-Mu'li~irah, 1977. Cf. on negotiable instruments R.M.Goode, Com-
mercial Law, pp.427-428. 
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insolvency .111 Bankruptcy is the judicially decreed forfeiture of the debtor's prop-
erty in favour of his creditors, which arises owing to his inability to discharge his 
obligations.112 A bankrupt is reduced to complete indigence because his debts 
exceed the value of his property, upon the demand of his creditors.113 
Every creditor can, by law, prevent his debtor, whose debts are greater than 
his assets from gratuitously alienating any of his property or even to leave on jour-
ney if his debt would fall due during his absence. This process in known as ~ajr 
(interdiction) in Islamic law. However, this can only be operative when the credi-
tor makes a demand for bankruptcy to be declared.114 The main reason for 
bankruptcy is iflas ~aqiqzl 15 or to some simply i.flscholar ifllis !-ahir wa )l-
mumatalah .116 
A bankruptcy order will deprive the bankrupt of the right of managing his 
property, though some restricted that to mere dispositions of property which is 
111Lexicon, vol.II, p.2440. 
112Mukhta~ar, p.177. On this matter, Ruxton quoted a note by Zeys in his Recueil d'Actes 
et de Jugements (Agiers, 1886) stating that the word /alas would be best rendered as 'insolvency 
judicially declared'. The term bankruptcy has, however, been used for the sake of brevity. 
113Minhi1j, p.161. 
114nie Majallah adopted the opinion of Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybaru that the Ruler may 
impose interdiction on the debtors based on the demand of the creditors [Ii 'l-l)iikim an yal)jur cala 
'l-madyiin bi /alab al-ghuramli:ij. Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.959. This has been generally accepted by the 
majority of jurists except Shafici who allows f;ajr to be imposed before it was demanded for and he 
even allowed it if f;ajr is demanded by the debtor himself. See Majabtit, p.403. 
1151t is a situation wherein the property of the debtor is less than his debt. If it is at par, the 
majority of jurists ruled that there is no case for f;ajr yet. Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.321; Mughni, 
vol.IV, p.327. The Majallah, however, ruled that even if the property is equivalent to the debt, let 
alone if more, the creditor can demand imposition of f;ajr, fearing that the debtor will lose the prop-
erty through business, hide it or change its title to another person. See Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.999; cAbd 
al-Ghaffar Ibrahim ~filiQ., al-lfltis ft al-Sharrcah al-lsltimiyyah, 1980. 
116Mti{il al-dayn is a debtor who delayed payment though he is able to do it. He is, 
apparently, like a muftis. Therefore, some scholars opined that in this situation, the creditor can 
demand for a bankcruptcy order. This is based on the Q.adith that : delay [in payment of debt] by a 
well-off debtor is injustice and such is consonant with the philsophy of Islamic law. See al-cAym, 
'Umdat al-Qtiri', vol.XII, p.236; Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.998; Mujabtit, p.404. 
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detrimental to the creditors.117 However, bankruptcy leaves intact purely personal 
rights, such as legal capacity to marry, to repudiate or divorce a wife, to claim an 
application of the law of talion (qi~a~) or to grant pardon in accordance with it. 118 
Concerning commercial transactions, a bankrupt can, of his own accord, return 
goods he just bought on account of redhibitory defects, if such redhibitory profits 
the estate.119 
After the declaration of bankruptcy, the court should hasten to sell the 
bankrupt's property and distribute the proceeds amongst the creditors. Abu I:Ianifah 
strongly disapproves the imposition of ~ajr as that would nullify his capacity and 
this would cause him serious injury. Selling off his property in that manner would 
contradict the ruling on "trading with consent" 120 and trading with "the owner's 
covet" 121. The majority of jurists including Malik, Shafi'T, Ibn I:Ianbal, disciples of 
Abu I:Ianlfah Abu Yusuf and Mu}Jammad al-ShaybanI sanctioned the imposition of 
~ajr on the debtor and selling off his property for settlement thereof. This stance in 
based on the precedence of the Prophet who had imposed ~ajr and selling off the 
117 Mughnr, vol.IV, p.489; Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, p.237; Wajlz, vol.I, 
p.170. Maj.'Adliyyah, art.1002 reads: The interdiction applies to anything likely to destroy the 
right of creditors, such as making gifts and bestowing alms and selling property at less than market 
value. Consequently, any contracts entered into by a bankrupt debtor which are prejudicial to the 
right of the creditors and other dispositions of property and gifts, are invalid in respect of the prop-
erty which existed at the time the interdiction was pronounced. 
118Ibid., pp.161-162. See also Mukhtasar, p.178. 
119 . Ibid., p.162. 
120Q., al-Nis~P (4) : 29. 
121 Based on a l).adith reads : The property of a Muslim may not be legally (transferable) 
except with his consent and freewill, cited in Majablit, p.403.This stance by Abii ijanifah was 
shared by his student Zufar and the 23.hiri school. See lbn Nujaym, al-Ba/Jr al-Ra)iq, vol.VIII, 
p.83; Ma~adir, vol.V, pp.99-106. 
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property of Muca.dh b. Jabal as well as decisions by cumar b. al-Khattab and 
cumar b. cAbd al-cAzlz on the same matter.122 
Some scholars argued that the parameter used to determine the viability of 
the bankcruptcy regulations in Islam is the doctrine of ma#a~ah. In this respect, 
Ibn cAbd al-Salam remarked: 
" An interdiction order against a muftis is a mayhem on his rights. 
Nevertheless, it has become an acceptable norm (thabata) that such 
mayhem is overruled by the ma#a~ah of the creditors (ghuramli)). 
If you like, you can say that the interest of the creditor is given 
priority over the interest of the debtor. Contrarily, his interest as 
regards maintenance of himself and his dependence [from the day 
bankruptcy is declared] until the debt is paid. Therefore, the interest 
of the debtor as regards to maintenance [of himself and his depend-
ants] is given priority over the interest of the creditors." 123 
There appears to be an agreement between schools of law, as regards the 
imposition of ~ajr, based on the demand of the creditors. It must be by court 
order, properly witnessed and notified so as to avoid people from any dealing with 
the bankcrupt.124 The Sharrcah also requires equal treatment amongst the creditors, 
as the proceed from the sale of the debtor's property will be divided between them 
proportionally. 
l22Details on the debate of this matters see Mabsuf, vol.XXIV, p. l 63ff; Badii)i', vol. VII, 
p.169; Malik b. Anas, al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrii, vol.XIII, p.83ff; lbn Rushd, Bidayat al-
Mujtahid, vol.II, pp.235-243; Qawiinln, p.318; Umm, vol.III, pp.189-191; Wajlz, vol.I, 
Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.320; Mughnl, vol.IV, p.455ff. $ublii Mal}.m~~aru notes that majority of 
modem legislation had set regulations on bankruptcy and interdiction. However, some laws restrict 
the imposition to the traders only as in France and Lebanon whereas Islamic and English law does 
not make any distinction between traders or other classes of people. See Majabtit, p.403. 
123Qawii'id A~kiim, p.105. Provisions on the right of a bankrupt to his basic needs see 
Maj. 'Adl~ah, arts.999-1000. 
4Ma~iidir, vol.V, p.137. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has identified an entensive role of damlin in the sense of 
suretyship for the smooth operation of business activities. The personal guarantee 
needed by some merchant could be used individually or in in conjunction with 
other methods of security. The usage of more than one means of security is an 
extra precaution resorted to by the merchant especially where long-distance and 
international trade are involved. The contribution of the Islamic civilization to the 




])AMAN ARISING FROM CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
" People stand in need of trade, gift and hire and other practices in 
their economic life in the same way they need food, drink and clo-
thing. The Sharl' ah has laid down proper guidelines for these prac-
tices. Thus it has forbidden such practices as are corrupt and enjoined 
those that are desirable .... from this it follows that people may engage 
in trade and hire in whatever manner they like, so long as the 
Sharr'ah does not forbid it." 
[Ibn Taimiyah, Majma' Fattiwti, vol.IXX, p.18] 
I;Jaman in the sense of gharamah is another important purpose of its applica-
tion in commerce. The term has been used universally at all stages on the 
contractual relationship, despite it is contextual. During the conclusion of 
the deal, rjaman provides an effective warranty against any physical 
imperfection, lack of the standard quality or even defect in ownership. 
When the defect is being found, rjaman is the available remedy by allowing 
the affected party to exercise his right of option. If any party is found to 
have committed a civil wrong resulted in the other party suffering loss, 
rjaman is the compensantory measure to be applied. 
This chapter seeks to examme this aspect of rjaman which will evolve 
around various Islamic nominate contracts. However, only contracts with a 
commercial element, in the Western sense, will be discussed, whereas those 
which are not strictly of that nature will be omitted. 
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It is obvious that contract (caqd) has been treated in a speacial manner by 
the faqaha) Gurists) in their legal manuals. Discussion of contract has occupied a 
substantial part of fiqh literature, being one of the most important sources of 
obligation (ma~dar Ii inshli) al-iltizam), whether involving debt (dayn), goods 
(cayn), performance of task (carnal) as well as giving security (tawthlq). 1 
In Murshid al-lfayran2, caqd is defined as the connection (irtibat) between 
an offer (ljab) from one of the contracting parties and the acceptance ( qabal) by 
the other party, which will give rise to a legal consequence (athar) on the subject-
matter of the contract. As a result of this legal relationship, each of the contracting 
parties will have an undertaking that has to be discharged and thus form an obliga-
tion on his dhimmah. Even though there have been widespread claims that the gen-
eral theory of contract is not available in the classical sources of Islamic law, the 
subject has been treated on the basis of individual nominate contracts (cuqud 
musammah), recent writings of contemporary jurists3 have tried to proved other-
wise. The departure in the style of writing fiqh, by adopting new styles and 
approches4, for contemporary audiences has witnessed the crystallization of the 
general theory of contract. The availability of a general theory will allow an easier 
and systematic treatment of (/,amlin in relation to contractual relationships. 
IMa~ildir, vol.I, p.40. 
2Article 262. Also see Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.IOI. 
3This is exemplified in Mu~tafa Zarqa>'s Madkhal and his other recent work like Fi'l I;Jar 
as well as books by Wahbah al-Zul}.ayli such as Fiqh /sliiml and his analysis on the extent of .ftqh's 
influence in the Jordanian and UAE civil codes, 'Uqud Musammiih. 
4A comparative approach (muqaranah) is very important in the process of enhancing a bet-
ter understanding of each other's legal system. The Muslim jurists, instead, have tried their best to 
present .ftqh using a simple and straight-foward expression, rather than using the classical Arabic 
which is accessible to a limited number of people. 
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As regards the application of fjaman, caqd is one of the most important 
ground. Mul)ammad Fawzl Fayc;l Allah has classified grounds for c;laman into three 
categories, namely ruling by the law giver (ilzlim al-Shari~, liabilities arising from 
contract (iltiziim bi ;z_caqd) and invoking harm and injury (ifjrlir). This chapter will 
concentrate on fjamiin within the ambit of contractual liability. The first category 
will be completely omitted as it pertains directly to rituals (ciblidlit), whereas the 
third category will be treated in some respect involving some injurious acts but 
strict! y within the scope of commerce rather than on the premise of the law of torts 
(mas)uliyyat taq~Iriyyah)5 
In the course of analysing the manner how fjamiin is being applied, it is 
pertinent to look at the division of contracts. There are four divisions: Firstly, a 
contract designated to grant fjaman by itself. It is the contract of suretyship which 
has been treated in the preceding chapter. Secondly, the contract which is not for 
the purpose of fjamiin but for transfer of ownership and gaining profit. Neverthe-
less, fjaman will be an inherent effect (athar liizim) of the contract. This is known 
as cuqud fjaman in the sense that the holder (al-qabifj) of the property will be liable 
should any damage occur. Thirdly, is the contract wherein the notion of trust 
(amiinah) is the basic motive with profit (rib}J) occasionally becoming an 
accompanying motive. This is called cuqud amiinah in the sense that holding the 
property hold on the holder, as he will not be held responsible in the event of 
damage unless he is negligent. Fourth! y, is the contract with both prescriptions. On 
the one hand fjaman arises, and amiinah on the other. It is cuqud muzdawajat al-
athar based on its attributes. 6 
5. Ntq,.J?aman 'Amm, pp.21-70. Also see Fi'l J?ar, pp.15-67. 
6. Ntq, J?amtin, p.144. This idea is adopted from a modem classification by Mu~tafii 
Alµnad ZarqiP known as "ta~nif al-'uqad bi )l-ntq,ar ilti al-fiaman wa 'adamihi" [classification of 
contracts on the basis on application of fiamtin or otherwise]. See Madkhal vol.I, pp.579-582. 
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In order to distinguish the three divisions of contract in relation to f/,amlin, 
one must look at the nature of the contract. The distinguishing factor is whether it 
is a commutative contract (mucawaff,ah) or otherwise. 
"The determining factor in differentiating caqd f/,amlin and caqd 
amlinah is mucawafl,ah. If the motive (qa~d) from the contract is 
mucawafl,ah [a contract wherein each party will give equal benefit as 
did the other party J7 it is caqd f/,amlin, otherwise it is caqd 
amlinah. "8 
PART ONE: ])AMAN AS A CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
cAqd f/,amlin is the agreement whereby a person holding the property, as a 
result of transfer of ownership arising from a soundly concluded contract, will be 
liable for any damage to the said property. This liability is imposed regardless 
whether the destruction is caused by the holder himself, or by others or even by 
misfortune (iifat samliwiyyah). The main focus would be the contract of bayc (sale) 
as it is the most important form of transaction. The notion of contractual liability 
(mas)uliyyat caqdiyyah) can be discussed from three angles, namely contractual 
wrong (khata) caqdl), injury (fl,arar) and causal relationship between wrong and 
injury. Contractual wrong is a situation whereby the obligor did not perform his 
obligation, whether intentionally, out of carelessness or otherwise. 
7. Mul}ammad Rawas Qalcahjl and ijamid ~adiq Qarul>I, Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqahti', Dar 
al-Nafa>is, Beyrut, 1985, p.438. 
8. Ncq..J?amlin cAmm, p.26. Cf.Madkhal p.231. Mu~tafa Zarq~P said: "The Shan-cab prin-
ciple applicable to distinguish between cuqad al-~amliniit and cuqad al-amliniit is the element of 
mucawa~ah. If the element of mucawa~ah can be established, then the holder of the property is a 
~amin. Otherwise, he is in a position of a trust (amiinah)." The outcome of this principle is the 
three classes of contract as far as ~aman is concerned. 
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As regards contractual wrong, al-SanhiirI said that the question of perform-
ance of contract can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, the obligation of the 
contracting parties to accomplish certain goals (al-iltizam bi ta}Jqlq ghayah) such as 
obligation to transfer of title, transfer of usufruct, goods and others. Secondly, the 
obligation to perform a task (al-iltizllm bi badhl cinllyah) like responsibility to 
safeguard the property of a wadlcah (deposit), ijarah (lease), icarah (lending) and 
others.9 
3.1 l)aman in Bayc (Sale of Goods) 
In the case of sale, fjaman is an important basis in discussion on destruction 
of the object of sale (haliik al-mab1c-y. It is a commutative contract (mucawafjah) in 
which reliance on the protection of fjamlln is essential. Once there is an exchange 
of possession (qabfj) of the goods and payment, fjamlln will be established for the 
purpose of payment (istifa)) or restitution (isti}Jqaq al-ciwafj) arising from it. The 
scope of the subject of fjamlln al-mabic (liability pertaining to object of sale) will 
cover an analysis of the three situations of the damage : haliik kulll (complete 
damage), haliik juzrz (partial damage) and halak al-nama) (destruction of the incre-
ment of the object of sale).10 
9. Ma~tidir, vol.VI, pp.138-168. In analysing these issues Sanhiin appeared to have based 
his theory on the concept of obligation de resultat and obligation de moyen applicable in French 
law. His search for corresponding principles in Islamic law by examining classical writings like 
Mabsaf, Majma' al-J?amtintit and others, is a praiseworthy effort. In doing so, Sanhiiri himself 
clarified that: "It is not possible to say that there is a theory on contractual liability in Islamic law in 
the same manner as perceived in the Western jurisprudence. What is possible is to deduce from the 
Islamic legal precepts what is corresponding to the theory of al-mas)aliyyat al-'aqdiyyah." See 
Ma~tidir, vol.VI, p.138. 
10. For a complete treatment of the subject see Badii)i', vol. V, p.238; lbn c.Abidin, Radd 
al-Mukhtar 'alti Durr al-Mukhtar, vol.IV, p.44. 
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Complete damage means that the mabic is totally destroyed after transfer of 
possession (bacd al-qabrf) to the purchaser. Supposing that the destruction is caused 
by unavoidable natural calamity (afat samliwiyyah) or caused by the buyer himself 
or caused by the mabic itself [like an animal that kills itself] or caused by a third 
party - the contract of sale is not rescinded. The burden of the damage will be the 
purchaser's responsibility (<}amlin al-mushtarl). This is because the mabic has 
already shifted from <}amlin al-ba)i( ( responsibility of the vendor) by the purchaser 
taking possession. The seller has obtained the price (thaman) and therefore <}amlin 
will goes to another person in an event which might require its intervention. 11 
However, if the destruction is caused by the seller, there are a few different 
situations discussed by the faqaha). If the purchaser has taken possession of the 
object with or without the vendor's permission, but he has paid the price or there is 
an agreement for delayed payment (mu)ajjal), the vendor is responsible for the 
damage. But if the purchaser took possession without the permission of the vendor 
and the price is due at present, the vendor has to recover the object. He is also 
liable for that damage in which case he must rescind the sale and return the price. 
There will be a different ruling pertaining to <}amlin if the destruction takes 
place before transfer of possession. If lifat samliwiyyah is the cause, the contract of 
sale is rescinded and the due payment will be waived and <}amlin will fall on the 
11. Nlll- J?aman, p.145. AJ::tmad ibn Naqib al-Mi~ri said: "[The] merchandise is the 
responsibility of the vendor before the purchaser has taken possession of it. If such merchandise is 
destroyed by itself or through an act of the vendor, then the agreement is cancelled and no payment 
is due for it. If the purchaser destroys such merchandise, he must pay its price, and his destroying it 
is considered as having taken possession of it. If a third party destroys such merchandise, the deal is 
not cancelled but rather the purchaser is given a choice to either cancel the agreement or effect the 
deal, paying the vendor." See his, 'Umdat al-Stilik [tr. by Noah Ha Mim Keller], p.397. 
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vendor. The same rules apply in the case of damage caused by the mabic itself or 
by the vendor. 
If the purchaser caused the damage, the contract will remain intact and he is 
responsible for the payment. If the damage is caused by a third party, there is no 
impact on the status of the contract but the rule of khiyar (option) will be applied. 
The rule says that the purchaser can either rescind the contract or continue with it 
by paying the price and making a claim on the third party for ¢aman. 
"If the thing sold is destroyed while in the possession of the vendor 
prior to delivery, no liability attaches to the purchaser, and the loss 
must be born by the vendor.12 And if the thing sold is destroyed 
after delivery, no liability attaches to the vendor, and the loss must 
be borne by the purchaser." 13 
The law on partial destruction is similar to that of total destruction in 
respect of the party liable for it (al-mas)al canhu). If the damage takes place before 
delivery (taslrm) the vendor is liable in the sense that a reduction of price cor-
responding to the damage will be granted. If the destruction takes place after 
delivery, the purchaser(mushtarr) will become liable and should pay the payment. 
In most situations, the common remedy will be the grant of right of khiyar 
whereby the purchaser is at liberty whether to proceed with the deal with a dis-
counted price by virtue of the damage of terminating the transaction completely. 
3.2 Destruction of the Increment of the Object of 
Sale. 
12. Maj. 'Adliyyah, Art.293 
13. Maj. 'Adliyyah, art. 294. 
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Another important issue treated in the fiqh works, using its hypothetical 
approach, is the application of r;Jaman in cases involving the destruction of the 
increase or growth of the property. al-nama) simply means increase (ziyadah) 
which happens before or after delivery. It can either be an increase attached to the 
property (mutta~il) or independent from it (munfa~il). The ziyadah mutta~ilah is an 
increase either by a congenital reason (mutawallidah) like beauty, size, appearance 
and others or a non-congenital reason such as a dyed garment or an erected build-
ing. On the other hand, ziylidah munfa~ilah is understood as an increase which can 
be congenital like offspring (walad), fruit (thamarah) and milk (laban) or non-
congenital like dividends (ghillah) from investment of real estate. The I:Ianafi rule 
on r;Jaman in zawli)id is that it is part of the object of sale by virtue of being the 
subordinate (tlibic-y to the original object of the transaction except for independent 
non-congenital increase.14 
Therefore, a vendor will shoulder the responsibility if before delivery, the 
ziylif:l,ah is destroyed by him which will consequently lead to reduction in the price, 
as if partial destruction has been done. If the destruction is caused by lifat 
samawiyyah there will be no r;lamlin as in the case of dates destroyed by storm as 
they are not the objective of the sale but just a consequence (Ii annahli wa in kanat 
mablcah ilia annahli tadkhul.fi )l-bayc tabcan la maq~udan). 
In this regard, Ibn Rajab has expounded this case on the premise of a 
maxim: "The law of an increment (al-namli)) is according to the law of the original 
[property] in question" [ IJ,ukm al-nama) IJ,ukm al-a~l]. 15 
14 Nlll-.J?aman, p.147. 
15 See Qawa'id, pp.166-167. 
(98) 
"In the case of a contract not intended for any transfer [of owner-
ship] involving a real property (cayn), the increment will not be sub-
jected to any transfer whatsoever. Since the title of the a~l is not 
shifted, the nama) will follow suit. However, the namli.) will follow 
the a~l, when there is such a provision in the contract. As such, will 
the rules on ¢aman be applied to them or not. Indeed, the contract 
involves transfer of corporeal property (cayn), ¢aman is incumbent, 
thus rules on nama) will be identical to that of a# .... " 
Another explanation on this matter has been dealt with by al-SuyiitI in his 
al-Ashbtih wa )l-Naza)ir, wherein he quoted a maxim, originally a ~adlth of the 
Prophet: "An advantage [drawn from a property] will correspond to the liability to 
restitute thereto" [al-kharaj bi )l-{laman]. In some reports, the incident that 
prompted this saying was a case in which a man bought a slave who and stayed 
with him for some time until he detected some deficiencies in him. He then went to 
see the Prophet to lodge a complaint and the Prophet ruled that the slave is to be 
returned to his owner. The vendor argued that his slave had been deployed by the 
purchaser for some time. The Prophet clarified the matter by saying: al-kharaj bi 
)l-{laman. 
Abu cubayd interprets the word II al-kharaj" in the maxim as the yield of a 
property bought by the purchaser. The purchaser has been using the object for some 
time until he discovered a flaw in it and realised that he has been deceived by the 
vendor. He will have to return the object before getting his money back. The pur-
chaer is allowed by the law to obtain the yield of the property by virtue of his posi-
tion as the person holding the property with responsibility. 
" .. . al-kharaj is what is produced by a property in form of yield 
(ghillah), benefit (manfacah) or object (cayn) which goes to [the 
favour] of the buyer in return (ciwafi) for the burdening of ¢aman 
al-milk (liability for possession). Should the property which is in his 
hand suffers damage, he will be liable for restitution, and thus the 
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yield is the price of the liability [fa )l-ghillah ft muqabalat )l-
ghurm] . ... 11 16 
3.3 l)aman in a Void Contract 
The preceding discussions on fl,aman in sale was on the presumption that it 
is a contract concluded validly according to law. Since the validity of the transac-
tion is a basic requisite for the legal consequences to take effect, then the status of 
fl,aman in a void contract ( caqd batil) or holding a property with intention to pur-
chase (al-ma.qbufl, cala sawm al-shira))l 1, will be examined. If the transaction is 
void, the legal effect cannot take place. That will likely cause to disputes and 
eventually, the rules on fl,aman is needed. 
A contract is considered null and void when the basic constituent of the 
contract is lacking or the object of sale is not in accordance with its description. 
This is also explained as a contract which is invalid in both its a# and wa~f It is 
also described as when the pillars of the contract are breached. As such, it is 
treated as ghayr muncaqid (as though the contract has never been formed). Wah-
bah al-Zul:iayl'i has itemized al-bayc al-ba{il as to include bayc al-ma.cdam(sale of 
absent object), bayc ma.c_juz al-tasl1m(sale in which the object could not be 
delivered), bayc,al-gharar(sale with uncertainty) and so on, quite clearly adopting 
the ijanafi's legal manual. 
16. Ashbah.S, pp.93-94. 
17. What meant by al-maqbafi 'ala sawm al-shirtf' is the buyer is holding the property 
after an agreemant on the price but there is no confirmation on the purchase yet. In the classical 
manuals it is mentioned that, the vendor told the purchaser: "Go away with the oject, if you like it I 
will sell it to you for such a price" <fa in raf!Ttaha ishtaraituha bi kadhii). If it is damaged,. the 
holder is liable for the price. Even, if there is no agreement on the price, and the holder takes the 
object and it is damaged, he is still responsible for the price. See Ibn Humam, Fat!; al-Qadrr, 
vol.V, p.187. 
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Al-bayc al-fasid as recognized only in ijanafi law, on the other hand, is a 
contract which is in accordance with the law in respect of its a# not its wa~f This 
is when something in the contract other than a pillar is defective. The contract is 
lawful in essence but not in quality. This includes what has been treated in fiqh 
manuals as bayc al-majhul(sale of unknown object), bayc al-mucallaq cala 
shar{(conditional sale), bayc al-cayn al-ghlHbah(sale of lost object), al-baycatan ft 
baycah(two sales in one) and so on. These are not the only types of transactions 
classified as ba{il and fosid, as the illah (effective cause) can be extended to ther 
modes of new transactions. 
"There exists a scale of legal validity, the widest concept in which is 
mashruc (recognized by the law) which corresponds with the scale. 
According to the degree of this correspondence, a transaction is 
~al}JIJ, (valid) if both its nature (a#) and its circumstances cor-
responds with the law; makrilh (reprehensible, dissaproved)18, if its 
a# and its corresponds with the law, but something forbidden is 
connected with it ; fasid (defective), if its a~l corresponds with the 
law but not its wa~f; ba{il (invalid, null, void), where a# and wa~f 
did not correspond to the rukn and sharf ..... the distinction between 
fasid and ba{il, which are not recognised to the same extent, or not 
at all, by other schools of Islamic law, is often not clearly made ; 
the idea of fasid comes near to that of 11 voidable11 , though it is not 
identical with it, and fasid contracts, even if they are not voided, 
sometimes have only restricted legal effects. To be distinguished 
from the quality as fasid is the right of rescission (khiyar), right to 
cancel ifaskh) or to ratify (imfla)) a contract within a stipulated time 
; this right can be granted by law or stipulated by contract." 19 
Pertaining to a void contract, some I:Ianafi scholars, ruled that property is a 
trust (amanah) in the hand of the puchaser. In that case, the principle of cjaman in 
respect of a fiduciary relationship applies. He argued that the contract is void and 
18. According to Wahbah al-Zul;tayli, types of transactions considered as bayc al-makriih. 
Op.cit., p.147. 
19. Introduction, p.121. Also see MuQammad ijasanayn, Ncq.ariyyah Bu{ltin al-'Aqd Ji 'l-
Fiqh al-lslamiyy: Dirasah Muqaranah bi 'l-Qanan al-Wa~'l, 1988. 
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thus does not bring about any legal effect and that will not caused t/,amlin to be 
applied except if transgression (tacaddi) and negligence (taq~lr) can be established. 
This view is adopted by the Majallah al-Al)kam al-'Adliyyah. 20 
On the other hand, another group of scholars like al-SarakhsI put foward 
another opinion which is derived from Abu ijanifah's disciples, Abu Yusuf and 
ShaybanI, and shared by the Mfilikis, Shafitts and ijanbfilis that the object of sale is 
a liability of the purchaser. The basic objective of the transaction is an exchange 
(mucliwatjah), and the rules of mucliwat/,ah will apply accordingly. The scholars 
drew an analogy between al-bayc al-bii(il and al-maqbut/, calii sawm al-shirii), as in 
the latter case t/,amlin is imposed by unanimous opinion of the scholars. 21 
3.4 Restitution for Default of Ownership 
The vendor (bli)i~ is liable to compensate in relation to any claim (t/,amiin 
al-istil}qliq), in most cases pertaining to ownership, as well as to provide com-
pensation for defect (t/,amlin al-cayb). Since both cases are classified as obligation 
for performance of an objective (iltiziim bi tal}qlq al-ghliyah), whenever a claim 
(for ownership) is_ made or a defect in the goods is proven, the vendor will overtly 
become liable regardless of the reason for the claim or the defect. The non-
possession of the good also will make no difference to him evading the liability. 22 
20. Art.370. 
21. Majma', p.215 ; al-Qurafi, Kitab al-Furaq, vol.II, p.207; Ashbiih.S., p.278. 
22Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.670. Also see Sh.Btiz., vol.I, pp.369-370. 
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This is because his duty is to guarantee that there will be no claim of 
ownership to the object sold and it is free from any defect whatsoever. If either of 
the situation arises, the vendor is considered as abandoning his obligation and 
unable to perform the intended objectives of the contract. I;Jaman in this case will 
be in form of the rescission of a contract of sale. In spite of that, the purchaser will 
not be getting more than the price of the object for which he has paid. He will not 
be compensated on the loss he might have suffered or a profit that he might be 
gaining. The theory of damage and compensation arising therefrom in Islamic law 
has not been extended to cover such compensation. This situation is explained as: 
"If a man bought a garden and worked in it until he yield grapes and 
[other] fruit [and the land is subject to (l,aman al-istiJ:tqliq] he is not 
allowed to take anything from the garden and he is not entitled to 
any wage for the work he has performed. This because, all benefits 
are nothing but at outcome of a contract and he is not a worker but a 
person who is working for himself [and thus unable to draw the 
benefits .... ]23 
I;Jaman al-istiJ:tqaq is also known as (l,aman al-darak which means that a 
contract must intrinsically necessitate that the object of the contract is free from 
any defect and free from the right of others. Whenever the ownership of others to 
the property can be established, the contract of sale will be suspended (mawquf) 
and subjected to the consent of the rightful owner. If he consented to the transac-
tion the object of t~e sale will remain with the purchaser and the rightful owner can 
take the payment from the vendor. Otherwise, the sale is rescinded and the vendor 
is required to return the payment to the purchaser. 24 
"According to the Islamic contractual principles, parties to a con-
tract are equally liable to each other. Firstly, they have to guarantee 
23 Maj ma', p.233. 
24 This kind of guarantee is approved by the majority of jurists on ground of necessity. 
There is a pressing need to have such warranty. If this regulation did not operate, it will inhibit 
trading with a stranger, as it is detrimental to the basic philosophy of the law on sale. See 
MuQammad Mu::;tata ShalabI, Ta'lrl al-A}Jkii.m, p.379. 
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that they have full ownership of the object and payment [and not 
subjected to right of others] and this is known as flamlin al-istil}qliq. 
Secondly, they are also liable if the subject-matter is defective 
within the term of the contract of sale ..... this is called liability for 
defect (flamiin al-(ayb). Failure to provide both liabilities will cause 
the transaction to become a voidable contract. It is up to the 
defrauded party either to terminate the contract or to proceed with 
it. ,,25 
The protection of ownership in Islamic law is clearly manifested in the rules 
on protection of bona fide acquisition. If an object is claimed by a third party 
(istil}qiiq; istirdiid), the party who has sold it becomes liable for the darak, the 
default in ownership, to the amount of the price paid. 26 In such a situation, the sel-
ler is accordingly bound to return to the buyer either the property itself, its price, 
its equivalent (if it is fungible), or its value with the value of such improvements as 
were made by the buyer himself. Jeanette Wakin in her edition of al-Tal).aw'i's 
Kitab Shurilt al-Kabir27 has said : 
"Although the darak guarantee is normally given in favour of the 
buyer and is written into the document only when real property is 
transferred, these application are extended in TaQ.awl's contracts. 
First the function of the clause to protect against incomplete owner-
ship is brought out in several contracts where the buyer becomes 
responsible for the darak if he has had the property in his possession 
and it is, or might be, returned. Since the claim of a third party does 
not enter in unless the buyer himself turns the property [over] to 
another, formulas singling out the buyer as the only source of a fault 
in ownership [are] added." 
Al-TaQ.awT farther points out that shurilt scholars do not ordinarily write a 
darak formula into the contract except in the sale of immovable property ((aqariit) 
and his sense of precaution can be ascertained by his saying "there is no harm if 
you write it in". Certainly the seller of movables was obliged to undertake the 
25. NG?..I?aman, p.237. 
26 Qawanfn, pp.286-287; Introduction, p.139. 
27 See Wakin, op.cit., p.61. 
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same guarantee, but movables are generally of less value than real property, and 
this is probably the reason darak clauses could be omitted in such contracts. Only 
if the transaction involves a considerable value, is the darak formula carefully 
included in the contract. In the case of property to be delivered at a later date, 
darak does not appear in the contract. Instead, a separate document of shahadah is 
drawn up after delivery takes place. 28 
In the later development of the final settlement clause, al-TaJ:iawI also 
inserted a clause denying rights and claims in contracts. Those acknowledgements 
purported the relinquishment of future rights and claims. The acknowledgement 
reads: 
"Fulan, the buyer, has no rights in this property [whose boundaries 
are] defined in this document, nor in any part of it, neither its land 
or any building constructed on it. He has no right of claim (da(wa) 
nor can he make any demands (faliba) by reason of [alleged] owner-
ship, sale or anything else, for any cause or reason whatsoever. Any 
legal claim he might put forward concerning this property .... , any 
part of it, its land, buildings, and anything else besides, or any 
claim that someone else might put foward on his behalf, witnesses 
who might testify to that [action] in his favour, any document he 
might produce, any proof he might bring to bear, any judicial oath 
he might offer fulan [the seller] to swear in court, any claim, dis-
pute, litigation or vindication (mufalabah, munaza(ah), all that [shall 
be considered] false and invalid, a fiction and arbitrary proceeding 
(fa dhalika kulluhu zur wa bafil wa ifk wa !,Ulm). And fulan [the sel-
ler] is declared exempt from all [such actions] and is free to dispose 
of that over which he has power (ji ~.illi wus(ihl) both in this world 
and the next, because fulan [the buyer] knows and is cognizant of 
the fact that he has no right of claim over that property, nor any part 
of it, nor has anyone else the right of claim due to his initiative, 
without its being an offence against the law and wrongful action. "29 
28. Ibid., pp.62-63. This standpoint is also shared by lbn Abi al-Damm as be remarked : 
flaman al-darak pertaining to the property sold by the vendor, in favour of the purchaser, is 
obligatory [as an implied term] by virtue of the sale, even if there is no expressed terms on it. 
Despite that, the notaries write it down so as to magnify the importance of the guarantee. This is 
also to make things clearer and avoid any unclear outlook. See Adah al-Qaflii), pp.376-377. 
29. Wakin, ibid., p.64. 
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3.5 Restitution for Defects 
cAyb is a latent defect which exist in the goods at the time of the contract, 
which is material to the purpose of the contract and substantially impairs the value 
of the goods to the recipient. 30 These criteria are determined by normal commercial 
usage (culj).31 The classical writings have defined cayb in detail, possibly because 
the understanding of it is so important in order to allow the smooth operation of 
settlement of civil disputes related thereto, be it judicial or extra-judicial. 
In Fat}) al-Qad1f32, cayb was defined as anything that will call for reduction 
m value (nuq~an al-thaman) as recognised by customary standards of the mer-
chants (fi ca.dat al-tujjar). The noted ij:anafi text, Bada>ic al-$ana>ic by al-KasanI 
accepted a similar definition, except it indicated that such a decreasing value had 
an absolute effect, whether it was gross (jahish) or insignificant (yaslr). On the 
same premise, the Majallah has embodied this concept in its code by regulating 
that cayb is any reason that will cause reduction of price as determined by the 
traders and professional in the field (al-tujjar wa arbab al-khibrah). 33 Hence, it is 
evident that, cayb is what will hinder the original purpose of the buyer (ghararj 
~aJ:tl/:t Ii >f-mushtarl) provided that the similar goods available in the market are 
predominantly without such deficiencies. It is even spelled out in Fatawa al-
Bazzariyyah that if a person bought a khuff (leather boot), a qalansuwah (headgear) 
or a thawb (shirt) and he found that it is too small for him, it is cayb. 34 
30Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.336-339. 
31. Commercial, p.65. 
32. lbn Humam, Fat!} al-Qadir, vol.V, p.274. 
33. Maj. 'Adliyyah, Art. 338. 
34. Sh.Baz, p.182. 
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"The [rationale] for the decision is that since the merchandise does 
not serve the purpose of his purchase, that reason is accepted to rule 
the object of that transaction as "defective". This will necessitate the 
return of the merchandise ..... it was however argued that this 
indicator of the defect (t/libit az-cayb) seemed not to be ultimate 
(ghayr jlimic wa mlinic-y. Firstly, it the case of khuff, qalansuwah or 
thawb, if they are not suitable for the buyer, they likely be suitable 
to other people without the price falling. In the case of a transport-
ing animal (dabbah), its clumsiness or old age will reduce the price, 
eventhough it is not strictly cayb. Therefore, it is incumbent to have 
a clearcut criteria of cayb as required by the Shafi'T school. In 
Fatliwli Qadzkhlin, it is said that if the merchants are having dif-
ference of opinion, the law on cayb will not operate ... 35 
Mu~tata Zarqa's definition seem to fill this gap as he said that cayb as per-
ceived in Islamic law in the context of (l,amiin al-cayb is what will diminish the 
[natural liking and satisfaction] of the merchandise and reduce the price accor-
dingly. It can be strenghthen with al-MarghinanI's definition as translated by 
Hamilton as: "A failure of a contract to achieve the purpose for which the contract 
is made". To allow the recipient to rescind the contract upon discovery of such a 
fault means that there is a condition of marketability of the goods implied in every 
contract of sale. It is the duty of every vendor to provide full disclosure in this 
regard, which is the case in English law only in the restricted field of contracts 
uberrimae fidei. 
"It has been an accepted principle in Islamic contract law that the 
parties to the contract are bound by law to disclose all defects, 
within their knowledge concerning the object, even if such dis-
closure may stop the other party from entering the contract or will 
cause the fall of price, for freedom from defect is one of the 
requisites in all kinds of contracts. "36 
35. Sh.Baz, p.182. 
36. Mohd.<AII Baharum, Misrepresentation : A Study of English and Islamic Colltract 
Law, al-Ral}.maniah, Kuala Lumpur, p.119. 
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The Prophet himself is reported to have written to one Adda b. Khalid 
which reads : This is a written affirmation by which Mul)ammad the mesengger of 
God, has made a purchase from Adda b. Khalid, the barter of a Muslim with a 
Muslim. There is no defect in it nor any deception nor any evil. 37 
Practically, the duty to disclose defects exists during the pre-contractual 
negotiations. The duty to disclose is a tortious duty not a duty arising from the 
contract. Concealment of defect, if any, or restraint or unwillingness to clarify it, 
is regarded as fraud, which will form a separate ground for fjamiin . 38 Failure to 
disclose will make the contract voidable and the defrauded party may either rescind 
or affirm the contract for the full price. The right of option is given on the premise 
of option for defect (khiyar al-cayb) rather than option for fraud (khiyar al-tadlis) 
eventhough both are quite similar in their purpose to restore the defrauded party to 
the position he was in before the contract was concluded. 39 
However, having knowledge of a defect and failing to disclose is not treated 
as a prerequisite for granting rescission, for the right of rescinding or affirming the 
contract is still available even if the vendor did not realise the defect at the time the 
contract was concluded. On this basis it is established that rescission can be made 
solely on the basis of the defect and the duty to disclose seem to be a moral rather 
than a legal obligation. 40 The Malik! school apparently requires that only serious 
defect will be entertained, whereas other schools ruled that defect is an absolute 
ground to obtain the available remedy. 41 
37. Al-Bukhari, $a~i~ al-Bukhari, vol.IV, p.20-21. 
38 Majabtit, p.60. 
39 Mohd.cAll Baharum, op.cit., pp.119-120. 
40 Mughnr, vol.IV .,p.238. 
41 The Maliki's standpoint can be ascertained from one of its reputed text by lbn Juzay al-
Gharnafi. See QawtinTn, p.267. 
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cAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhiirl has outlined that cayb in a corporeal property can 
only be established upon four conditions namely, the cayb must be material to the 
price or value of the good, it must be prior (qadlm)42 , it must not be known to the 
purchaser and the vendor should not have stipulated exemption from the defect (al-
bara)ah min )l-cayb). 43 
As the issue of the standing of cayb in affecting the level of price has been 
dealt with earlier, next there will be a discussion on the requirement that cayb must 
be perpetually pre-existing. Fiqh texts speak about the fact that cayb must exist dur-
ing the conclusion of the contract of sale or afterward but before delivery. If cayb 
took place after delivery, the right of option in this case will not arise at all 
because such a right is based on the fact that a defect has occured in the object of 
sale prior to the conclusion of the contract or delivery of the object. 
3. 6 Restitution for Misrepresentation 
The commonest term used to described misrepresentation is taghrlr, which 
1s synonymous with ghurur. Malik! jurists as well as some scholars from other 
schools use the term tadlls instead of taghrlr. It is observed that traditional jurists 
has used ghurar whereas the term taghrlr seem to represent the trend of con-
temporary Islamic jurists. 44 
42Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.339. 
43see Ma~tidir, vol.IV, pp.245-257. 
44 Mohd.cAli Baharum, op.cit., p.10. 
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No exhaustive definition of misprepresentation which covers all types of 
misleading statements or conducts can be found in the text of Islamic law, both 
classical and modem. Misrepresentation is predominantly defined according to its 
specific types of transaction. Badran Abii )1-Aynayn defined misrepresentaton as a 
statement by which another party is induced to enter into a contract with the 
expectation that he could secure maximum profit out of it, but unfortunately it was 
otherwise. 45 The Majallah defined it as "representing the attributes of a contract's 
object to a purchaser with an unreal attribute". 46 
This definition clearly does not convey the exact scope of misrepresentation 
as perceived by Islamic law. This is due to the fact that it is only confined to mis-
representation by statement and covers neither active fraud nor concealment of 
defect. In term of its treatment, it is seemingly exclusively confined to contract of 
sale and assumes that the misrepresentor will always be the vendor. However, mis-
representation does not only occur in contracts of sale but in other kinds of contract 
and the misrepresentor can either be the purchaser or the vendor. In this respect, it 
may be suggested that misrepresentation can be better defined as : a false assertion 
of fact, either by act or word, or the prevention from disclosure of an existing 
defect in the object by which another party is induced to enter into a contract. 47 
Misrepresentation is classified in Islam under three headings, namely active 
fraud, false statement and concealment of defects. The rules on active fraud are 
45 Badran Abii >I-Aynayn, al-Sharr'ah al-Isliimiyyah, p.457. 
46 Art.164. 
47 Mohd.<Ali Baharum, op.cit., p.11. 
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derived from the leading case of ta~riyyah48 which is then extended by qiyas (anal-
ogy) to other fraudulent acts such as habs mli) al-qanat, an active fraud in land 
transactions. It means that there is a genuine absence of water in a plot of a land, it 
is watered with the intention of making the other party believe that the land is fer-
tile and productive and thus valued at a high rate, when this is not the case. 49 It has 
also been extended to the case of fraud of beautification (al-shamta)) whereby a 
vendor may create positive or attractive peculiarities in an article with an intention 
of deceiving the other into expecting that the article is new or in good condition. 50 
False statement in Islamic law covers the contract of mustarsil, najash, 
ghubn and talaql al-rukban. Mustarsil is the contract of an easy-going customer 
who does not bargain and who is ignorant of the market price. It is an uberrimae 
fidei contract whereby the purchaser believes what he is informed by the vendor 
about the real value of the particular article. It becomes an uberrimae fidei contract 
because the parties to the contract have a fiduciary relationship, in which the 
vendor is entrusted with the purchaser's confidence that he will tell the truth or 
reveal those facts which he possesses. 51 
48. Ta~riyyah is also known as mu~amit. It is an act of refraining from milking an animal 
for several days before a sale, with the intention of to making the teats bigger [indicating high yield 
of milk] and eventually thereby inducing the other party to contract. Another example always 
quoted in classical works on misrepresentation is al-najash, wherein an accomplice of the vendor 
raises the price of an article in an auction by "bidding up", even though he has no intention of 
buying it. 
49. Al-Bajirm1, Hashiah al-BajirmI, vol.III, p.222. 
50. Classical examples of this type of misrepresentations are [ 1] mixing a commodity of 
poor quality with one of good quality ; [2] dyeing an old shirt to make it look new; [3] dyeing the 
hair of a girl slave or using cosmetic for her rough face. These examples are archaic and no longer 
applicable but instructive as to the Islamic principle on active fraud. 
51 Ibn Rushd, al-Muqaddimlit al-Mumahhidat vol.III, p.338 cited in M.A.Baharom, Mis-
representation: A Study of Islamic and English Contract Law, p.126. 
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The issue of ghubn, whether a gross (ja}Jish) or an insignificant one (yasir) 
is closely related to talliqi al-rukhlin. The similarity rest in the pricing factor as in 
both cases, the way and extent of profit making through misrepresentation is dealt 
with. In all Islamic classical text, laesio enormis is broadly discussed in the context 
of the contract of sale as well in other types of transactions. It has been defined as 
charging a price for an article which is excessively greater than the valuation of a 
surveyor, based on market price and real value. 
" ... the demarcation mark between laesio enormis (ghubn fa}Jish) and 
simple laesio (ghubn yaslr) is based on the valuation of the sur-
veyor. It is simple laesio if the price is below their valuation rate 
and laesio enormis if it goes beyond that. 11 52 
Talaqi al-rukhan is trading between businessman from the town and those 
coming from outlying districts, which is common throughout the history of human 
civilization till our present time. Such trading may take place in the town when 
goods are brought by the outside traders to the open market in which all transac-
tions run in accordance with the normal price. Alternatively, it may take place 
somewhere outside the town when the urban traders intercept those from outside 
areas, and buy the bulk of their goods at a much lower price than the ordinary 
market value in town. This is due to the outside traders' ignorance of the market 
value in the town. 
"On the authority of Abu Hurayrah, the Messenger of God said: Do 
not go out to meet the caravans for trade, do not bid against each 
other, outbidding in order to raise the price; and a townsman must 
not buy on behalf of a man in the desert ....... ,,53 
There are different interpretations among the jurists as to the reason why 
Islam prohibits meeting outside traders in that manner. According to al-Kasan'i, at 
52. Bada'i', vol.VI, p.30. Cf. Willy Mansbach, "Laesio Enormis in Muhammadan Law," 
BSOAS vol.X [1940-1942], pp.877-884. 
53. Al-Nisabiiri, $aJ:zIJ:z al-Muslim, vol.III, p.1155. 
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least two reasons can be suggested. First, the prohibition will protect the con-
sumers from being subject to a monopoly by a certain group of traders who have 
intercepted the goods from outside traders, bought them at lower price and resold 
them at market price or even been able to create price instability. This will cause 
hardships and difficulties to the public. 54 
3. 7 Restitution for Failure of Delivery 
The delivery of the object of sale is an important duty of the vendor upon 
valid conclusion of the contract of sale. On the same basis, the purchaser is duty 
bound to surrender the price. This mutual exchange is incumbent upon both 
parties, as it is the essence of the contract. 55 
The jurists have highlighted some matters in this respect. Among them are 
the question of who should deliver first, the vendor's right to hold the property 
(1Jabs)56 and the manner the delivery is accomplished. The relevant issue to the 
present discussion is the right of the vendor who is in possession of the goods to 
retain possession of them until payment or the tender of price. 
"The consequence of the purchaser's obligation to pay the price is 
that, in return, the vendor enjoys the right to retain possession of the 
goods until the buyer finishes the payment, whether the whole or 
half of it. II 57 
54. Proper treatment on consumer protection regulations in Islam, based on the idea of 
~amlln, will be dealt with in a later chapter. It will outline the Islamic standpoint on the subject 
with special emphasis on the govermental official institutions for the purpose inherent in the institu-
tion known in Islamic civilization as Hisbah. See Chapter V, supra. 
55 . 
Fiqh /slti.mf, vol.IV, p.413. . 
56Tbis concept is quite similar to that of lien in English law as later adopted by Malaysian 
law. See section 46 and 47 of the Malaysian Sale of Goods Act (1957). 
57Mabsaf, vol.XII, p.192. 
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The right of the vendor for lien is subject to satisfaction of certain condi-
tions. Firstly, it must be an exchange between corporeal property (cayn) and a 
financial liability (dayn). If it is an exchange between two cayn or two dayn, the 
right of lien cannot be established. Secondly, the payment of the price must 
become due immediately. The right of lien will not apply in the case of deferred 
payment. The agreement by both contracting parties for deferred payment stands as 
a waiver to the right of lien. 
The jurists has come up with different interpretations on this issue, namely 
whether or not the vendor has an exclusive right of lien (}Jabs). Malik said: "The 
vendor is authorized to detain the object of sale (ma.blc-y until he secures the 
price." 58 The ij:anbal1 ruled that the vendor is not allowed to retain the property. 
Delivery (tasllm) is an integral part (muqtarj,ayat al-caqd) of a contract. If there is a 
dispute between the vendor and the purchaser as regard to tasllm, wherein the 
vendor demanded that he would not deliver the ma.bic until he received the pay-
ment, and the purchaser also ruled that he would not give the payment until he 
received the price of the object of sale, the vendor can be compelled to deliver the 
subject-matter. Thereupon, the buyer can be compelled to pay the price. 59 
If the purchaser placed the price (thama.n) as a pledge (rahn) or a security 
(kafalah), it will not terminate the right of }Jabs. Both rahn and kafalah will neither 
discharge the price from the buyer's dhimma.h nor the right to be claimed (IJaqq al-
mutalabah). Right of lien will remain as a mean of securing payment. 
58Qawanrn, p.247. 
59Mughnr, vol.IV, p.198. 
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On the other hand, the application of ~awlilah on the price of sale will 
render the right of ~abs being forfeited, according to Abu Yusuf, no matter how 
the assignment of the liability takes place. The right of ~abs is connected with the 
persistance of the liability on the dhimma.h of the purchaser (mushtarl). His dhim-
ma.h is relieved from a debt he owed to the assignor (mu~Il) by ~awalah and his 
right for })abs is thus eliminated. Mul)ammad al-ShaybanI, on the contrary viewed 
that ~awalah from the purchaser will not invalidate the right of ~abs. The vendor 
can still hold the article sold until he secures the payment from the assignee (mu~lil 
calayh). This is depending on the nature of the ~awalah itself, whether it is 
executed by the vendor by an undefined assignment of obligation (~awalah 
mutfaqah) or by a defined one (~awalah muqayyadah), as the right of ~abs will 
remain intact in the former but not in the latter case. 
In the fiqh literature of various schools of law, the question of delivery is 
explained in great detail, in order to supply a comprehensive understanding of the 
subject. Delivery of immovable property (caqar) is effected by the vendor giving 
up possession (takhliyah), whereas delivery of movable chattels (ma.nqul) is 
effected in accordance with local custom. 
"In a perfect sale, the ownership of the object and the risks pass to 
purchaser, by mere consent of the parties, except where the vendor 
withholds the object on account of non-payment, or where it has 
been seized as a result of a judicial decree. In these two cases the 
vendor's responsibility is on a par with that of a pledgee. The 
vendor is equally responsible in the sale of unascertained goods (that 
is goods which have not been viewed) until delivery. 60 
60Mukhta~ar, p. 166. 
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A situation akin to that of the right of the unpaid vendor arises in the Majal-
lah, with regards to the purchaser's insolvency. 
"If the purchaser dies bankrupt after having taken delivery of the 
object sold, but without having paid the price, the vendor cannot 
demand the return of thing sold but becomes one of the creditors". 61 
Thus, the thing sold is disposed by the court and if the sum realized is suffi-
cient, the amount due to the vendor is paid in full, any surplus being paid to the 
other creditors. If less than the sum due to the vendor is realized, the full amount 
thereof is paid to the vendor, and the balance still remaining due is deducted from 
the estate of the purchaser. 62 However, if the purchaser dies bankrupt before 
delivery of the object sold and payment of the price, the vendor has a right of 
retaining the object sold until payment has been made from the estate of the pur-
chaser. 
PART TWO: QAMAN IN FIDUCIARY RELATIONSIDP 
'Aqd amlinah is a type of legal relationship wherein the property concerned 
1s the property is hold in the hand of the possessor (yadd al-qabir!) as a trust 
(amlinah). 63 His position as a trustee has excluded him from liability except if his 
transgression (ta'addi) and negligence (tafrit) whilst the property is in his hand is 
61. Maj. 'Adliyyah, Art. 295. 
62. Maj. 'Adliyyah, Art. 296. 
63 Art.762 of Maj. 'Adliyyah reads: "Amanah is the thing which is existing with the trustee, 
whether it is a trust based on a contract of safekeeping (istiJ:zftq,) like wadeah or a trust falling under 
a contract like the contract of hire and lending or it becomes a trust in the possession of a person 
without any contract nor intention ... " For details see Sh.Atiisi, vol.III, pp.220-222. 
established. 64 This is different from caqd cj,amlln, as discussed earlier, as in that 
case the property in possession is a liability of the holder. 
This ruling is directly extracted from the sunnah of the Prophet: "There 
will be no ~amiln on the depositee (mustawda~ and borrower (mustaclr) who does 
not betray the deal". 65 In another l)adith, it was reported that the Prophet ruled: 
"He, to whom a thing is entrusted, should return it". More numerous are hadith 
which relate to compensation when the property deposited has been lost or has 
perished, wherein there will be no liablility. 66 This is due to the fact that the 
depository is regarded as a person worthy of confidence. There are also l)adiths 
dealing with the situation of forfeit, because the depository has not observed the 
necessary care or has acted illegally. 67 
"This concept of trustee pervades the whole of Islamic Jurispru-
dence, particularly with a view to limitation of liability ... "6 
Mul)ammad Fawz1 FaycJ Allah notes that cuqud amilnah that fall under this 
category includes contract of safe-keeping or deposit (wadlcah), loan of fungibles 
(iCiirah), partnership (sharikah), agency (wakalah), bequest (wa~liyah) and gift 
(hibah). Clearly, this present study will exclude the last two contracts namely, 
bequest and gift as they are not strictly commercial dealings. 
64Maj. cAdliyyah, art.768 reads: [al.-amiinah la takun 11lO{imiinah yacnr idha hal.akaJ aw 
{iiicat bi la $Unc al.-amln wa la taq$lr mi.nh la yal.zimuhu al.-{lamiin]. 
65This }J.adlth is reported by al-Darqutni and al-Bayhaql in their respective sunans. See al-
Zaylacl, Na~b al-Rtiyah, vol.IV, p.115. The term used in the }J.adlth is "al-mughill" which means 
"al-khti)in" (faithless, unreliable and traitorous). 
66. See Ibn Majah, Sunan [Kitab Sadaqat], bab 7 ; Kanz al-cUmmtil, vol.VIII, no.5443, 
5444, 5448, 5449, 5450]. . . 
67. Otto Spies, "Wadita", El(l), vol.IV, pp.1079-1081. 
68M . . 58 arltlme, p. . 
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3.8 Contract of Deposit 
Deposit (wadl(ah) is a contract whereby a property is remitted to a trustee 
to be kept, often gratuitously by the latter, and later returned to its owner on 
demand. The property so remitted is held in trust (qabtj amlinah). A trustee is 
liable for the loss or misappropriation in that property, only if he commited an act 
of transgression (ta(addz)69 such as using the property for his own use or 
negligence (tafrlt) such as storing the property in an unsafe place from where it 
was stolen. 70 
Despite the fact that the act of transgression is more serious than that of 
negligence, Islamic law does not make a distinction when it comes to the remedy it 
advocates. In either case, a disgraced trustee becomes liable (~amin), for the same 
damage normally owed by a usurper (gha~ib). Nevertheless, it is only fair to note 
that al-Kasanl has perceived that a trustee's liability does not always rest on one 
and the same ground. 
"A trustee is transformed into a guarantor if he neglects custody, but 
if he makes personal use of the property entrusted to him, he per-
verts the essence and objectives of the contract of deposit and 
becomes liable for damages on that account. ,,71 
69Ta'addl in a wadl'ah is committing something which the depositer dislikes other than 
lack of talcing care of the property like the depositee utilising the property for his own benefit. 
There are some scholars who have included lacking of talcing care of the property to be the primary 
meaning of ta'addl like a caretaker at the public bath (f:zammam() who had slept or disappeared 
when he is suppose to be working and the users' clothes were stolen. See Sh.Atlisl, vol.III, p.244. 
The Mfililds ruled that the ground for fiamiin in wadl'ah is taq~rr, are listed under six grounds 
namely: 1. Redepositing it to another person; 2. Moving the property from one country to another; 
3. Mixing the property until it is not distinguishable; 4. Deriving benefit; 5. Lost or destroyed and 
6. Breach of the agreed methods of the safekeeping. See Qawanln, p.321. 
10Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.777. 
71 Bada'i', vol. VI, pp.211-212. 
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A depositee is duty bound to take care of the property in his custody until it 
is returned to the owner. 72 It is a kind of obligation to provide meticulous care 
(iltizlim bi badhl al-cinayah) rather than to achieve a certain task (iltizlim bi talJ,qlq 
al-ghayah). In doing so, he is expected, during his wadrcah undertaking, to offer 
the depositor a standard level of care affordable by a reasonable person ( cinayat al-
rajul al-mu ctad). 73 Deviation from this standard will render him as infringing the 
trust and thus liable for flamiin. His accomplishment of the said duty will uphold 
his position as an amln and exempt him from liability if any hallik take place. 74 
Cases on deviation from a standard duty and care which give rise to flamiin 
have been illustrated clearly by al-Baghdad!. Among others, in the case of 
redepositing the property to another party : 
"It is not permissible for the depositee to give the wadrcah property 
to another party without the owner's permission. The claim about 
permission (dacwa )l-idhn) is admissible only with an evidence 
(bayyinah)15. To place a wadrcah property in a safe place (/:lirz) of 
another party is [considered as] fresh ldlic except when the depositee 
rents the safe and he is still taking charge of the wadrcah him-
self .... should he deposit the property to another party without 
permission and it is damages, the owner should claim flamiin from 
the first depositee, not from the second, according to Abu ijanlfah. 
According the two imams [Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybanl] the owner is 
at liberty to impose fl.amiin on either party. If the first depositee pays 
compensation, he should not claim from the other party and vice 
versa. According to al-Hidayah, a depositee should not give the 
wadrcah property for hire (ijlirah) or to place it as a pledge (rahn). 
A deposited property should not be redeposited, given on loan, 
leased or pledged. If any one of those is performed, the depositee is 
liable. "76 
12Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.781-782. 
73The Majallah used the term the standard earnest (IJ,irz al-mithl) for this concept. See 
Maj. 'Adl!fliah, art.782. 
Ma~tidir, vol.VI, pp.156-157. . 
75 Although it was mentioned in general, it is presumed that what is required here is a writ-
ten evidence or an oral evidence supported by a witness. 
16Majma', p.69. See also Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.784. 
(119) 
Apart from tacaddl, tafrlt is another ground for tjaman in wadrcah contracts. 
Tafrit is the situation when the depositee does less than he ought by omitting the 
necessary care. This take place when he does not prevent damage to the deposited 
property, for instance he neglects the usual way of preserving it and does not 
observe the instruction of the depositor. 
Al-Baghdadi also pointed out that, one of the common deviations in 
wadrcah that give rise to <famiin is breach of the agreed terms of the wadrcah con-
tract. He explains : 
"Whenever the depositor stipulates a condition which is beneficial 
(shartan muftdan), the depositee is bound by it. If the depositor 
ruled that "keep it in this house" and the depositee instead kept it in 
another house, he is liable, as there is an inevitable disparity 
(taftiwut) between the two houses in terms of their safety and the 
condition is upheld. It is also opined [by someone] that the depositee 
is not liable if the other house is better it terms of its safety or at 
least has not been on a par with the first house. There is also an 
opinion saying that if there is no need to move it to another house, 
the depositee is liable and contrariwise, he is not liable if moving it 
is needed but mentioning it at that moment will be meaningless as he 
is not required to execute his duty by any means he cannot 
undertake. Similarly, if it stipulated "do not take the wadlcah with 
you [on a trip] to another place" but the depositee break that condi-
tion, he is liable. The condition is valid as the cost of care in Egypt 
could be costly. If the condition [attached to the contract] is not 
beneficial, it can be ignored. For instance, if it is required that [it 
must be kept] in certain box in certain a house ... "77 
As has been pointed out earlier, the act of transgression will convert the 
status of the depositee from amanah to tjamanah. Al-Baghdad! has briefly com-
mented on this matter by making a note: "If the depositee trespasses the nature of a 
wadrcah contract, he shall be liable." Among other examples quoted to illustrate 
77Majma', p.70. 
(120) 
the transgression are a dabbah (transporting animal) that has been used by him, a 
garment he has worn or a slave from whom services have been received. 78 All 
cases mentioned can be classified as utilizing the wadicah for personal satisfaction 
without any consent from the owner, and taking advantage in that manner is treated 
as an infringement of the right of the depositor. 
Another possible situation in wadlcah is the mixing of the wadlcah property 
with the depositee' s own similar property, to the extent that is impossible to distin-
guish the two properties . The classical works, usually refer to mixing of silver 
coins (darahim) or more importantly, mixing of grains like wheat, barley and 
others, as well as mixing of vinegar with oil or oil with oil. In this case, there are 
two separate rulings. Firstly, if the two properties are of the same genus, it can 
become a shared property, if both parties agree. Secondly, in the case of the prop-
erty of two different genus and the mixing has spoiled both properties, the 
depositee is liable. 79 
There also instances where the depositee, for some reasons, failed to return 
the property as requested by the depositor. The test that is applied by the law in 
deciding such a case, is whether or not he is legally capable of meeting the request. 
Should there be no impediments justified by law, he is liable. 80 It is further ruled 
that: 
"If the depositee refuses to return the article without reason, the 
degree of liability increases, if the thing deposited deteriorates. 
While the depositee is generally not responsible for any casual 
deterioration, he is now liable for casual deterioration, since he is 
delaying restitution. 11 81 
18Majma', p.73. 
19Majma', p.82. 
80Majma', p.84.Cf. al-Wansharis1, al-Mi'yiir al-Mu'rib, vol.IX, pp.87-88. 
81. Otto Spies, op.cit., p.1080. 
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The contract of wadrcah is terminated by the return of the thing deposited. 
Both parties have the right to dissolve the contract when they please. The restora-
tion can therefore be made at any time and at the wish of any party since the con-
tract is caqd jli)iz. If one of the two contracting parties dies or becomes insane, the 
agreement is automatically terminated. The property will remain in its original 
position until the wadrcah transaction is ended by the return of the amlinah to the 
rightful party. As a conclusion, it is clear that, apart from its purpose of limitation 
of liability to trustees, wadrcah manifested a distinction to that of amiinah that 
implies obligation of good faith, without a binding agreement. 
3.9 Contract of Agency 
In the course of doing business, a merchant may have to seek help from 
another party to perform certain tasks. An important aspect of this waklilah or 
giving a mandate to an appointed agent (wakrl). lbn cArfah said that agency arises 
when one party authorizes another to replace him in the exercise of civil dealings. 
In that sense, an agent may be entrusted with all acts which can be done by a rep-
resentative, such as concluding a contract, collecting a sum due, assigning a debt 
or discharging a debtor and others. 82 
In the manuals of Islamic law, wakiilah (or alternatively wiklilah) is 
explained as a legal relationship in which an agent is authorised by the principal to 
82Mukhta~ar, p.201. Cf.Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1449 and Maj. Shar'iyyah, art.1186. 
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execute a permissible and determined right of disposition (ta~arruf jli)iz maczam). 83 
Al-Shafi9"'s elaborates this in the following way: "Agency is [a contract] when a 
person delegates [the function] he is supposed to execute, to an agent in matters 
where delegation is allowed (min mli yaqbal al-niylibah) due to be performed dur-
ing his lifetime." 84 
As regards conditions of agency, it is required that the agent must be of 
sound mind and understanding. Pertaining the commercial practices that can be 
delegated, it is established that any person may appoint any other person as his 
agent to perform any act which he can himself perform. For instance, a principal 
can appoint an agent for buying and selling, giving and taking hire, giving or 
taking a pledge, giving and taking a deposit, receiving payment of debt and others. 
What is important is that the subject-matter of the agency must be known. 85 
As in other transactions, the parties will have to observe the usual for-
malities of ijlib and qabul to establish a legal relationship between them. That 
process will allow the principal to inform the agent he has appointed him as agent 
for a certain purpose by using any expression indicating that intention. Offer can 
be treated as valid if it is only in the form of permission and ratification. The 
extreme case is the fafl,ull, wherein subsequent ratification of a sale is accepted as 
having the same effect as a previous authorization to act as agent. 86 
83 Badti'i', VI, p.19 ; Ibn cA.bidin, Radd al-Mukhtar 'ala Durr al-Mukhtar, IV, p.471 ; al-
Zaylacl, ~4byln al-ljaqli.Jiq, IV, p.254. 
M.Mul:ztaj, II, p.217. 
85Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts. 1458-1459; Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.1200. 
86Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.1451-1454. See earlier discussion in Chapter I, infra. 
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Whenever a waklilah contract is concluded, the agent will hold the status of 
a trustee (amln) as regards the delegated undertakings. He will not be liable for 
t;lamlin except in the case of tacadd1 and tafrl{, similar to that of wadrah. On that 
basis, his testimony is admissible. 87 Another aspect which is worth noting is that 
the waklilah may be unspecific (tafwl{i climm) or a specific delegation (tafwit;l 
khli~~) as that will be an important characteristic for the determination of liability. 
"Tafwlt;l climm includes what is susceptible for delegation (niyiibah) 
in financial matters (al-umiir al-miiliyyah), marriage, divorce ...... al-
Shafi'l said tafwid climm is not valid. Tafwlt;l khli.~~ is meant for what 
is delegated by the principal to the agent in respect of taking posses-
sion [of property] for selling or in litigation. "8g 
a] Wakfilah in sale. 
In the case of wakalah in bayc, if it is concluded without any clear instruc-
tion in respect of price or mode of payment, the wakll is not allowed to sell the 
merchandise except at a standard market price (thaman al-mithl) though he cannot 
be selling by instalment (mu)ajjalan). Even if sold, the merchandise in a manner in 
which no reasonable person could be defrauded but he sold it by deferment, the 
sale would not be allowed unless it was later endorsed by the principal (muwakkil). 
This is decided so on the basis that the wakll's action is likely to infringe the 
muwakkil' s interests and thereby his approval needs to be sought. 
The principal' s unspecific delegation does not amount to allowing the agent 
total freedom in his actions but rather it expects that the agent will discharge his 
duties guided by the accepted customary commercial practices and what is benefi-
87sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, vol.III, p.299. 
88Qawanln, p.281. 
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cial and favourable to the principal. The view is the preferred one even though 
there are dissenting views which hold that the delegation should be treated as 
totally unspecific and thus can be executed accordingly. Above all, it is suggested 
that if waklilah in bayc was given as wakiilah mutzaqah, it should be accepted as 
such. 89 
On the contrary, if the terms and conditions of the contract are well-defined 
(wakiilah muqayyadah), the wakrl is bound by the prescription set by the principal. 
He is not allowed to go against them unless that would be advantageous to the prin-
cipal. For instance, if he was instructed to sell at a certain price but sold it at a 
higher price or he sold it with immediate payment even though he was asked to sell 
it by instalment - the transaction is valid. The ijanball' s appeared to be offering a 
very practical remedy by ruling that if the wakrl is selling without thaman al-mithl 
or the price set for him, the transaction is valid but he is liable for rj,aman al-naq~ 
(compensation for reduction). 90 paman al-naq~ is said to be the difference between 
the actual price and the lower sale price by the wakrl or the difference between sale 
in ordinary situation and the situation where ghubn(laesio) has taken place. 
Al-Shafitt ruled that if the variation goes against the principal, the wakrl's 
transaction is void. The I:Ianafis, quite contrarily, has treated such a case asfurj,ulr, 
wherein the status of the transaction is suspended (tawaqquf) subject to the ratifica-
tion of the principal. If he ratifies, the sale is valid. Otherwise the transaction is 
invalid. 
89Ibn Qudamah al-MaqdisI, al-Sharh al-KabTr, vol.V, p.86. 
90 . 
Ibid. ,vol.V, p.78. 
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The waklilah is not unlimited. The wakll is authorised only to exercise what 
has been demanded by the principal or at least within the immediate legal con-
sequences of a contract, though nothing specific is mentioned. lbn Qudamah al-
MaqdisI suggested that if a principal authorises the sale of an article, that will 
include tasllm (delivery) as the authorization for sale will include delivery as part 
of the legal effect of the said contract. However, he is not allowed to authorise 
ibra) (release from liability) or anything similar, unless there is an express permis-
sion for it. 
b] W akfilah in Purchase 
In waklilah fl )l-shira), the principal is required to state the nature of the 
merchandise to be purchased and the price of it. As in the case of bayc, the agent is 
bound by the conditions attached to the contract. If the agent acts in contravention 
of the principal' s instruction as to the nature of the merchandise purchased, the 
principal is not bound thereby, however more advantageous the thing may be. The 
agent is considered to have bought the property for himself and not for the princi-
pal.91 
A precedent from the Prophet can be cited to demonstrate the opposite 
situation wherein any contravention that brings about advantages to the principal is 
permitted. It was reported from 'Urwah al-BarqI that the Prophet had given him 
one dinar to purchase a sheep but 'Urwah managed to buy two sheep with the same 
91Maj. cAdliyyah,. art.1471 : if the principal instructs the agent to purchase a ram and he 
buys a sheep, the principal is not bound thereby, and the sheep belongs to the agent. 
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amount of money. He then sold one of the sheep to someone for a dinar and 
returned to the Prophet with a sheep and a dinar. The Prophet offered a prayer for 
him so that he would gain the blessing from God for that transaction. 
3.10 Position of a broker (dalUil or simsar) 
From the historical sources, it is established that commercial agency and 
distributorship known in modern commercial law terms, in the strict sense of the 
term, is less practised in the medieval Islamic trade. The traders were more 
accustomed to sell directly to the public the products that they themselves had 
manufactured. Distribution by a party acting as commercial agent and distributor as 
practised in modern society on a large and systematic scale was quite unknown. 92 
The concept of an intermediary in commerce is well recognised in Islamic 
law, though the size of the treatment in the legal manuals is very limited. Most of 
the scholars have quoted a l:iad!th on freedom of stipulation in support of the prac-
tice. The l:iad!th reads: "Muslims are bound by their stipulations except when they 
92Maxime Rodinson, "Le marchand musulman" in D.S.Richards (ed.), Islam and Trade in 
Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford and Pennsylvania University Press, 1970, pp.22-24. In the 10th 
century, merchants who freighted ships used to placed their goods with an agent called wakil .ft 'l-
markab, who was instructed to sell the goods and purchase whatever the merchant stipulated. See 
Ibo Shahriyar, Kittib 'Ajti'ib al-Hind, Leiden, 1883-86, p.144. Later, agents became known as 
"accompaniment of trade" (tawabi' al-tijtirah) according to Abraham Udovitch, "Commercial Tech-
niques in Early Medieval Islamic Trade" in Islam and the Trade in Asia, op.cit., p.56. In the course 
of East Indian trade, the concept of agency has been broadened to include an officer called wakll al-
tujjtir (representatives of the merchants) whose function was similar to that of the later foreign con-
suls. He was at the same time both the legal adviser and bank exporters. He also set up warehouse 
facilities (dtir al-wiklilah) for the storage of his client's goods. See J.de Somogyi, "Egypt's Trade 
and Transport Relations with other Islamic Lands : A Historical Survey" in Studies in Islam, 
vol.XV, July 1978, pp.164-165. For modem legal survey on the subject, particularly in the Arab 
jurisdictions, see Samir Saleh, Commercial Agency and Distributorship in the Middle East, Graham 
and Trotman, London, 1989, p.4-9. 
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permit the unlawful and prohibit the lawful. ,,93 They also quoted Ibn 'Abbas as 
saying that there is no objection if a person says, sell this garment, for whatever 
exceeds your price. Ibn Sirin opined that if a person said, sell [this good] for such 
a price and any profit accruing from it is either yours or to be divided between us, 
this is allowed. 94 
This little respected middle-man has emerged in various small businesses in 
an isolated way for the purpose of mediating between the buyer and the seller. 
Although called "broker" in Western terminology by many authors, the role of 
dallal is much broader than that of the broker in the Western meaning, which is 
restricted to an intermediary who brings together two persons wishing to enter into 
a contract without dealing directly with the goods. By contrast, the dallal plays a 
role similar to that of commission merchant or agent. He holds the goods on behalf 
of the seller, mediates between seller and buyer, and sells for a fee often taking the 
form of a commision. The factual description of a dallal's activities and his rights 
and duties confirms that the dallal under the Sharlcah holds the goods on an agency 
basis, with the main consequence that the principal is entitled to any sum in excess 
of the stipulated price and the dallal is not entitled to anything more than his 
brokerage fee.95 His position in certain Muslim community is described as : 
"In the Muslim West, the dallal is exclusively an intermediary, who 
in return for remuneration, sells by public auction objects entrusted 
to him by third parties. In large towns the dallals are grouped in 
specialized guilds, supervised by a syndic (amln) who compels them 
to give a guarantee of good faith (fiamin). They chiefly concerned 
themselves with manufactured goods sold by artisans to shop-
keeper~, industrial raw materials, commodities sold in bulk and 
others. 96 
93The text of the Qadlth reads in Arabic : al-Muslimiin calii shuru{ihim illii al)alla 
l)arliman wa l)arrama l)aliilan. Some other reports reads : al-Muslimiin cinda shurii{ihim. 
94sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, vol.III, p.141. 
95samir Saleh, op.cit., p.10. 
96G.S.Colin, "Dallfil", EI(l), p.103. 
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MuJ:iamad cAbd al-Jabbar Beg, in analysing the institution of brokerage said 
that dalliil is not fully accepted in Islamic law and if so accepted will be subject to 
strict monitoring by the authorities, as it was generally criticised as making profit 
which is incommensurate with his efforts and amounting to ?-Ulm (injustice). These 
brokerage activities were considered likely to maintain undue high levels of price 
for certain commodities which would normally be obtained at lower price in a 
market where direct transactions were the rule. 97 Al-Thaclabi, an eleventh century 
writer, is followed by a writer of the post-cAbbasid period, criticised the dallal by 
saying: "Everyone needs capital [in trade] but the capital of a broker is lying. "98 
The "lying broker" (kadhib al-dalliil) was proverbial in medieval clraq. Al-
Dimashq"i, a Syrian writer of the twelfth century, described vividly the deceitful 
practice of the brokers, who did not hesitate to hoax even their next-door neigh-
bours and dear friends. 99 
Despite a negative assessment of brokers, their role as intermediary in a 
broad sense that includes commercial agency and distribution undoubtedly becom-
ing more important. The role of the markets supervisors as part of the institution of 
97M.A.J.Beg, "The Status of Brokers in Middle Eastern Society in Pre-Modem Period" 
MW, vol.67, no.2, April 1977, pp.87-90. 
98Abii M~iir al-Thaclabl, Thimlir al-Qulab, Cairo, 1908, pp.193-194 cited in M.A.J 
Beg, ibid. 
99 Al-Dimashql, Kitlib al-lshlirah, p.95. He said: "The brokers sometimes described the 
excellence of the merchandise and had even tricked the expert with it. Sometimes he mentioned the 
scarcity of the merchandise and its unavailability in the area and some of them have been sold, other 
than what he had in hand. He also said that price will rise and demand for it is tremendous ..... " 
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IJ,isbah was seen to be an effective way to control the practice. I oo The government 
would have to intensify the enforcement of the law by price control policy (tasclr). 
All these issues will be treated in further detail in the forthcoming chapter on con-
sumer protection in Islam. A better practice of brokers can be supplemented with 
the formation of guilds of brokers which can stand surety for the smooth and 
honest operation of its members. 
3 .11 Contract of Partnership (Sharikah) 
Partnership or shirkah originally implied simply that a thing belonged to 
several persons in common in such a way that each one had ownership in every 
smallest part of it in proportion to the share allotted to him. The jurists therefore 
understand primarily by shirkah common property (shirkat al-amlak) which arises 
for example through inheritance, gift or indissoluble combination. IOI Whatever its 
original application, the term shirkah (or sharikah) as understood by the earliest 
jurists was not primarily common property, but commercial partnership. Discus-
sion of partnership in all schools except the Shafi9"s, while covering the topics of 
joint ownership and common property, are concerned almost entirely with com 
mercial forms of partnership. 
lOOnie broker was antagonistic to ljisbah. Al-Khatib al-Baghdad! recorded that the broker 
even abuses the muJ:ztasib by alleging that he has imprisoned such and such man and woman and so 
on. The muJ:ztasib it appears, rode around the city on horseback to find out the evil-doers and those 
who caused public nuisance in the city. To some extent, the muQ.tasib can be described as a 
municipal official supervising affairs of the markets. The dalliil's criticism on ljisbah is significant 
for the officials of the ljisbah were ever on the watch for the fraudulent practices of the brokers; 
hence, the dalliil abuses the muJ:ztasib. See Al-Khatib al-Baghdad!, Kitiib al-Ta!fil, pp.83-84 ; Abu 
>J-Faraj b. <All b. al-Jawzl, al-MuntG?,am ft Ta'rTkh al-Mulak wa 'l-Umam, Heyderabad, 1938-39, 
X, p.223 ; Claude Cahen and M.Talbi, "I::Iisba", E/(2), vo.III, pp.485-488. 
101 W.Heffening, "Shirka", El(l), III, pp.380-381. 
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"The primary connotation of the term shirk.ah or sharikah for the 
ijanafi and Milli.Id jurists was a contractual partnership involving 
joint investment and joint sharing of profits and risks. Propriety 
rights appears almost as a peripheral notion ..... the essence of pro-
priety partnership is common ownership of property." 102 
It is clear that the present investigation will subscribe to this notion as the 
primary concern of it is application of ¢aman in commercial dealings. Propriety 
partnership is excluded for it is a subject for consideration in a general discussion 
on Islamic mu camalat or under Islamic Property law. As far as partnership is con-
cerned, it is likely that the treatment will not be confined to strict sharikah only, 
but also to contracts of mu¢arabah, musaqah, mugharasah and the like. The main 
emphasis will be on the maintenance of justice in partnership as advocated by Ibn 
Taimiyyah: "Profits is an increment (nama)) gained from the use of one man's 
labour and another man's capital (mal). It should be divided among them as any 
increment resulting from two factors." He further said that, if there is any mis-
conduct on the part of the partners by doing something which was permitted nei-
ther by law, nor by the capital owner explicitly or in the usage of custom (cur/), 
then he will be held responsible for his misdeed.103 
Commercial partnerships according to ijanafis are divided into two types, 
firstly the mufliwa¢ah that is a universal or unlimited investment partnership and 
secondly, the cinlin which can be best rendered as a limited investment partnership. 
The present-day designation "limited" and "unlimited" for a partnership or com-
pany denotes the extent of the company's and each of its member's liabilities 
towards individuals and groups outside the partnership with regard to the obligation 
102Partnership, p.24. 
103Fatawa, vol.30, p.87. Also see Abdul cA~m Isiahi, Economic Concept of lbn 
Taimlyyah, p.158. 
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incurred in the course of conduct of the company's business. In an unlimited part-
nership, the company is liable for complete fulfilment of all its obligations, and 
each partner is liable proportionally to his share in the company's assets and in 
accordance with the contractual stipulations governing his share of profits and 
losses. Contarily, in a limited partnership, as the term implies, there is a limit to 
the amount for which the partnership and its members can be held liable.104 
In Islamic law, particularly in the ijanafi school, the liability of all partners 
is unlimited. In the partnership, the partners are liable in proportion to their share 
of the total investment. There is no limit whatsoever on the amout of the partner-
ship's liability. Each partner is responsible for his share of the partnership's 
indebtedness regardless of what it amounts to, or by how much it exceeds the value 
of his own share of the company's assets. It is suggested that the nature of liability 
in various forms of Islamic partnership is distinguishable on the basis of jointness 
and severalty and not on limitation or non-limitation. In this respect, it appears that 
liability cannot serve as in modem law, as a basis for classifying partnerships in 
Islam. It is rather from the perspective of the investment, both its extent and its 
form, that the different partnership forms are distinguished.105 
Application of rjaman in these partnerships will depend on the nature of the 
relationship between partners. For instance, in a muftiwarjah partnership which is 
essentially based on three features - complete equality of the partners in all respect, 
the inclusion of all trade activities within its scope, the mutual agency and surety of 
104Partnership, p.40-41. 
105 Bada)i', VI, pp.56-57; 
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the partners.106 Complete equality in all financial matters is an indispensable condi-
tion of the unlimited investment partnership. Any deviation from this rule, whether 
in respect of each partner's contribution to the joint capital, or to the share of prof-
its and losses assigned to him, immediately renders the mufawacjah invalid.107 
"Two people contracted a mufliwacjah partnership and we wrote a 
contract between them in which we stated : (a) That by this contract 
they have become partners in all things, both large and small; (b) 
That this is a mufawacjah partnership; (c) That their common capital 
ammounts to such and such and that each has contributed half of it 
and entitled to half the profit; ( d) That each partner can trade in any 
manner he sees fit. If they negotiate a partnership on this basis, they 
are indeed a mufliwacjah partners........... If one of the partners 
retains for himself the ownership of some capital which is eligible 
for the partnership, then, because of the breach of equality, the con-
tract will not constitute a mufliwacjah partnership. However, if the 
property retained by one of the partners is in the form goods, or a 
debt owed to him by another person, then the partnership between 
them is not mufliwacjah. This is so, because goods and debts are not 
a suitable form of partnership investment; they are comparable to 
the personal circumstances of each partner with respect to wife and 
children, which are exempt from consideration of equality in 
mufliwacjah partnership.108 
From a practical point of view, the Majallah suggests that partnership with 
complete equality is rare.109 Al-ShafiCJ:'s denunciation of mufliwacjah has been asso-
ciated with the possibility that one partner might be able to derive an unjustified 
106 Al-Sarakhsi's neat definition of muftiwaflah suggests that it is derived from the idea of 
delegation of authority (tajwrfl) for each partner empowers his colleague to act freely with the entire 
partnership. It has also been said that it is from the idea of dispersal (fromftifla-yasta.fiflu) meaning 
distributed widely since this contract is based upon the dispersal of authority for all transactions. It 
is also been associated withfawfla which means equality, and since this contract is based on equality 
of investment and profit, it is called muftiwaffah. See Mabsar, II, p.152; Lexicon, part 6, p.2459 ; 
R.Dozy, S11tlement aux Dictionnaires Arabes, 2nd ed., vol.II, p.289. 
10 Mul;iammad al-Shaybam, Kittib al-A# [under Kitab al-Sharikah], fol. 68b, II, pp.15-17 
cited in Partnership, p.48. The only dissenting view is that of lbn Abi Layla who holds that a slight 
inequality in the investment does not invalidate the muftiwaffah contract. This is probably due to 
difference in construction of the term muftiwaffah.Cf. Abii Yusuf, lkhtiltif Abl ljanrfah wa lbn Abl 
Layla, Cairo, 1938, p.93. 
108Mabsar, vol.XI, p.177. 
109Maj. 'Adliyyah, art. 1331. See Civil, p.342. 
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and undeserved benefit from the extra-partnership income of the other. I IO The term 
"can trade in the manner he sees fit" can be construed as an authorization and thus 
conferring on the partners the position of amln similar to that of wadlcah and 
wakiilah. On this premise, if anything goes wrong in the trading, the negotiator 
will not be solely responsible. However, this objection seems to be rather 
insignificant because at the same time the person concerned holds the status of a 
kaftl as one pillar of mufliwacjah contract, which carries the cjamlin pursuit.111 It 
may concluded that, as the debate of mufliwacjah is by itself rather ambigous, sur-
vey on the viability of cjamlin will, to some extent, be characterised by this reality. 
Nonetheless, cjamlin can still plays its role in protection of rights, but very 
much depending on sorting out clear terms and conditions of the contract. This 
matter has been spelt out by al-SarakhsI by devising some methods to ensure the 
smooth progress of the venture. Written agreement is strongly advocated and 
making clear terms about fidelity (amilnah)112 and the role of imiln (expressed as in 
a God-fearing manner) has been included therein. The suggested formulae is : 
"This is a document stating the agreement upon which X the son of 
Y and A son of B have entered into a partnership. They have 
entered the partnership in a God-fearing manner and with mutual 
fidelity. They have become partners in all things, acquisitions and 
skills, in a universal partnership. They may sell for cash or credit, 
and they may buy for cash or credit; each of them may operate in 
these matters according to his judgement. Their capital is such and 
110umm, vol.III, p.206. 
111Maj.'Adliyyah art.1334 reads: "A mufawa¢ah partnership also contains a contract of 
suretyship. Therefore, it is a condition that partners on equal terms should be competent to make a 
contract of suretyship." 
112A property attached to a partnership is an amanah. When something is entrusted to a 
person is amanah, he is not liable for the loss except in the case of transgression or violation. For 
instance, if the joint capital was in the care of one of the partners and all or part was lost in transit 
or as a result of a legitimate but unfortunate business transaction, that partner would not be obliged 
to restore the loss. If, however, the money was lost in an activity outside the realm of aceeptable 
business conduct such as gambling, then the partner responsible would be liable for the restoration 
of the entire amount of his colleague's share of the lost capital. 
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such, belonging equally to both of them and all of it is n their pos-
session. Whatever benefit God grants them is to be shared equally 
between them; whatever loss or setback overtakes them is to be 
borne by them in equal shares. They have entered into a partnership 
on this basis in the month so and so of the year so and so." 113 
ijanafi writers keep emphasizing that the conduct of a partnership is 
presumed on the customary practices of the merchants ( cadlit al-tujjlir). For this 
reason: 
"Each partner has the right to deposit goods belonging to the part-
nership; for depositing is one of the customary practices of mer-
chants. It is also one of the necessities of trade and one which is 
indispensable to the merchant. He has need of this transaction in 
many situations which are likely to occur. Since a partner has the 
right to pay a fee to have a deposit taken care of, he has this right 
when no compensation is involved. "114 
The notion of cadat al-tujjiir has also been used as an argument to justify 
some practices in mufliwar)ah contracts. Those cases are like the case of pledge 
(rahn) which is governed by the same rules as those of the deposit, the case of loan 
whether in form of ciiriyyah (loan for use) or qarr) (loan for fungible commodities), 
practice of purchase, sale and debt and expenses for the execution of mufliwar)ah 
operations. 115 
a] l)aman in 'loan Partnership 
Unlike the mufliwar)ah, ciniin can take on a variety of forms in respect of 
the partners' contribution to the common capital and the share of profit and 
113Mabsa!, vol.XI, p.156. 
114Bada'i', vol.VI, p.68. 
115For details Partnership, pp.104-112. 
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liability alloted to each, as well as to the categories of trade and merchandise which 
it comprehends. It is not only its structural features which distinguish the cinan 
from the mufawarjah partnership. Each of the mufliwarjah partners is both wakll 
and kafll for his colleague. In cintin partnership, the relationship of the partners to 
third parties and among themsselves are based exclusively on the principle of 
agency. 
"As for a limited investment partnership (cintin), it is contracted on 
the basis of mutual agency, but not mutual surety. It is valid in the 
case of a disparity between each partner's investment,and it is valid 
when they invest equal! y, but share the profit unequally. It is further 
permissible for either of the parties to invest only a part of their 
property, while the rest remains outside the partnership. The form 
of capital with which it is permissible to contract a limited invest-
ment is the same as that which was indicated permissible in 
mufawarjah ..... the price whatever either of the partners buys for the 
partnership can be claimed from him alone. He may then demand 
remuneration from the other partner for the latter's share in it. If the 
entire partnership capital, or the capital of one of the partners is lost 
before everything is bought, the partnership is nullified. However, if 
one of them purchases something with his own share of the capital 
and the other partner's share is lost before anything is purchased 
with it, the purchased merchandise is common property in accord-
ance with their partnership agreement. The one who laid out the 
money may demand remuneration from his partner for the latter's 
share of its cost.116 
Pertaining to distribution of profit and loss in cintin contract, ijanafi law 
permits some flexibility but is absolute! y rigid in regard to the contractual stipula-
tion affecting distribution of liability. In all partnerships forms, as well as in other 
forms of commercial association, such as commenda, responsibility for losses is to 
be assigned strictly in accordance with the size of each party's investment. Any 
deviation from this rule invalidates the contract. This principle is based on 
numerous legal traditions and is epitomised in one attributed to the fourth Caliph, 
116 Al-Qudiiri, Mukhta~ar, Istanbul, 1901, p.53 cited in Partnership, p.105. 
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'All b. AbT Talib: "The profit follows the conditions agreed upon, and the loss fol-
lows the capital. " 117 
The principle of mutual agency as which the cinan partnership is based 
determines the freedom of action of the cinan partnership with respect to the joint 
capital, his relations with his associate and with the third parties. By virtue of 
mutual agency upheld in this type of partnership, each of the partners does not 
become liable for that which is owed by his colleague.118 The liability of the part-
ners towards third parties is several but not joint. Within the partnership recognised 
in I:Janafi law, liability for obligations arising from partnership affairs is joint. This 
principle covers all transactions on behalf of the company in which its members are 
free to engage. These rights and obligations of cinan partners have been 
appropriately compared with those of a commenda agent (mu(iarib, muqarirj). 
"Abu I:JanTfah said : The cinlin partner has the right to enter into a 
bi(iacah association and to entrust the capital as a commenda, even if 
his partner does not expressly permit him to do so. He is permitted 
to engage with their partnership capital in all those transactions in 
which a commenda agent may engage. This is also the opinion of 
Abu Yusuf and Mul:iammad (al-ShaybanT). "119 
A commenda agent is free to trade with the capital entrusted to him in any 
manner intended to bring profit to the venture; all accounts, expenses, profits and 
losses are settled between the agent and the investor. Obligation incurred by the 
agent towards third parties cannot be claimed directly from the investor. The third 
party need not even know of the latter's existence. The same is true of cinan part-
nership.120 
117Ibid. 
118Mabsa{, vol.XI, p.174. 
119Ibid. 
120 Partnership, p .135. 
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b] l)aman in Labour Partnership 
Labour or work partnership, as introduced by the ijanafis, consists 
primarily of the labour of both partners. The type of labour envisaged is usually a 
skill in certain kinds of manufacture such as tailoring, carpentry, dyeing, weaving 
and the like.121 The classical works have attributed this type of ventures in several 
ways such as sharikah ft carnal bi aydihima (a partnership of work with their 
hands), al-sharikah bi ;z_camal (a partnership in work), sharikat al-abdan (a part-
nership of bodies), sharikat al-~ana)i( (partnership of crafts) and sharikat al-
taqabul (a partnership of acceptance).122 Therefore, it can be said that a partnership 
of acceptance is when two craftsmen form a partnership in the acceptance of work 
such as tailoring and the like. It is also designated as the partnership of bodies 
because they work with their bodies in a partnership of craft because their craft is 
their capital. 
Al-SarakhsI has articulated the arguments in favour of labour partnership. 
He argues that the element of agency (wakiilah) is realizable and can serve as the 
basis for the validity of such a transaction. The concept of agency is the corner-
stone of contractual partnership in ijanafi law which is equivalent to that of joint 
ownership in Shafi9: partnership law. Any commercial transaction for which the 
121 Partnership, p.65 
122Bada'i', vol. VI, p.56; Mabsaf, vol.XI, p.152. Prof.Schacht has suggested that the 
translation of the term taqabul for partnership is inappropriate. Instead, the contextual meaning of 
"taqabbala" in connection is the acceptance by one of both the partners of some raw material 
belonging to a third party for the purpose of undergoing some process of manufacture like a tailor 
accepts cloth belonging to his customer in order to cut and sew it into a garment. 
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appointment of an agent is valid is also valid for the formation of partnership.123 
He further asserted that labour can be equated with money as a source of profit. He 
establishes a qiyas on the basis of mufl,arabah, to justify his opinion, as there is a 
common cillah in the two cases, that claiming profit based on one's work and craft 
has a cogent legal foundation. A historical evidence has also been adduced in sup-
port of the two preceeding theoretical arguments. SarakhsI contended that: "From 
the time of the Prophet Mul)ammad, people have practiced this form of partnership 
without criticism or admonition." The implication here is that if there were any-
thing legally objectionable in a labour partnership, the Prophet would have out-
lawed its use. 
For the purpose of analysing the role of fl,aman in such a relationship, it is 
essential to survey the nature of the rights and liabilities supplicated in labour part-
nership. In this respect, al-KasanI offers his view : the reward in this labour part-
nership derives from the liability for the work undertaken, and not from the execu-
tion of the work itself.124 This standpoint, according to Udovitch is a refinement of 
Sarakhsl' s ideas on the issue of the communality of the labour partnership wherein, 
distribution of profits and losses need not bear any relationship to the distribution 
of actual labour. This principle is rather ambivalent as the method of measuring 
investment in a labour partnership is not expressed in terms of amount or quality of 
work invested but the extent of liability undertaken by each partner. Despite that, 
as a flexible school and being responsive to the the practical need of trade, the 
I:Ianafis exercise their ijtihad to off er practical solutions to people. 
123Mabsar, vol.XI, p.155. 
124Badti)i', vol.VI, p.76-77. 
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One of the cases dealt with is the association between a craftman and a 
stall-owner. This explanation of it reflects the ijanafi's jurisprudential outlook in 
dealing with a situation of dilemma between legal impediments and practical need 
and the extent of the role of u~al al-fiqh: 
"If an artisan takes another man into his stall with the intention of 
assigning all the work to the latter on a half profit basis, this 
arrangement is, by analogy, invalid. This is so because the invest-
ment of the stall-owner consists intangible property and intangible 
properties are not suitable for partnership investment. If it is the 
stall-owner who accepts the work, the artisan is his hired man on a 
half profit basis. This last sum, however, is indefinite, and 
ignorance of the wage invalidates a hire contract. If on the other 
hand, the artisan himself accepts the work, he becomes a lessee of 
the stall to the extent of one half of the proceeds of his work. This 
sum again is unknown, and the lease contract is therefore invalid. 
By exercising juristic preference (isti}Jslin), he (referring to 
ShaybanI) permitted this arrangement because of its continous use in 
the affairs of men without any disapproving voice raised against 
it.. ... For example, if an artisan arrives in a certain town, its 
inhabitants will not know him and will not entrust him with their 
merchandise. They will, however, entrust their merchandise to a 
stall-owner, whom they know. As a rule, the stall-owner will gratu-
itously provide the likes of his service to an artisan. The validation 
of these services achieves the desired end of all parties concerned. 
The artisans receives compensation for his labour; the people derive 
the benefits of his services; and the stall-owner receives compensa-
tion for the use of his stall. The contract is permissible ..... the basis 
for the permissibility is like that underlying the permissibility of 
salam contract the requirements of the law is abandoned in face of 
the people's need. "125 
3.12 l)aman in the Contract of Mu(lifrabah (Commenda). 
Mu<Jarabah126 or commenda is a contract that combines resources, both 
financial and human, for the purpose of trade. This legal instrument has been prac-
125Mabsaf, vol.XI, p.159. . 
126-rhe word mufiarabah is synonymous to qirafl and muqarafiah, and has been used inter-
changebaly, with no essential difference in the conceptual meanings. The geographical factors are 
the likely reason for the divergence. In the Arabian peninsula, this type of transaction is known as 
qirafi whereas in the clraql provenance the term mufiarabah is used. See Sales, p.227. 
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tised from the time of the Prophet by the evidence that the Prophet himself was an 
agent-manager (mufl,lirib) of Khadijah's property. A tradition attributed to the 
Prophet Mul:iammad conveyed an unequivocal endorsement and approval of those 
engaging in trade by means of a mufl,lirabah. The Prophet was sent at a time when 
people were using mufl,arabah in their dealings and he confirmed them in this prac-
tice. 'A'ishah and 'Abdullah b. 'U mar were reported to have invested money of 
orphans and other money left in their safekeeping in mufl,arabah. Ibn Mas'iid, a 
prominent Companion of the Prophet, and 'Abbas b. 'Abd al-Muttalib, the uncle of 
the Prophet, engaged in mufl,arabah trading, the latter having obtained 
Mul:iammad' s approval for the conditions he imposed upon agents to whom he 
entrusted his money.127Practising mufl,arabah increased in the Muslim world espe-
cially during the medieval period.128 
"It appears very likely that the commenda was an institution to the 
Arabian peninsula which developed in the context of the pre-Islamic 
Arabian caravan trade. With the Arab conquests, it spread to the 
Near East, North Africa and ultimately to Southern Europe. The 
commenda was subject of lenghty and detailed discussion in the ear-
liest Islamic legal compendia (late eighth century). Its legal treat-
ment in these early treatises bears the hallmark of long experience 
with the commenda as an established commercial institution." 129 
Trading ventures in mufl,arabah are an arrangement in which a capital 
provider or investor (fl,arib) or a group of investors entrusts capital or merchandise 
121Mabsaf, vol.XXII, p.18. 
128This holds true not only in the medieval Muslim world but also in medieval West. It has 
been proven that in Islamic law and in Western commercial practice these two institutions were the 
chief methods for pooling capital and bringing together investors and managers. See Robert S. Lopez 
and J.W.Raymond, Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World, New York, 1955, p.175. For 
specific discussion on medieval Islam see S.D.Goitien, "Commercial and Family Partnerships in the 
Countries of Medieval Islam," /S3 (1964), pp.315-337. 
129Partnership, p.172. Also see Udovitch account on various commercial operations 
known in Islamic law in his "Commercial Techniques in Early Medieval Islamic Trade," in 
D.S.Ricards (Ed.), Islam and the Trade of Asia : A Colloqium, Oxford and Pennsylvannia, 1970, 
pp.37-39. 
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to an agent-manager or entrepreneur, who is to trade with it and then return to the 
investor(s) the principal and a previously agreed share of profits. The agent-
manager will receive a certain share of the profit as a remuneration for his labour 
and skill. The agent's complete freedom under normal trading circumstances from 
any liability for the capital in the event of partial or total loss and the disjunction 
between the owners of the capital and third parties are novel and distinctive fea-
tures of mufl,iirabah which made it a particularly suitable instrument for long-
distance trade.130 A merchant in one city might have agents in another and 
although organised banks did not exist, there were various ways in which credit 
could be given over long distances, for examples by drawing of bills.131 
The nature of responsibilities concerning a mufl,iirabah transaction is sum-
marised by cAli ij:aydar: 
"Mufl,iirabah has seven regulations, [viewed] from different perspec-
tives. nn some instances] the mufl,iirib (agent-manager) is a 
trusteel32. He is also [treated as] the wakll (agent) of the investor by 
virtue of his use of the capital. As far as the rib}J (profit), he is a 
sharlk (partner) if such is being achieved. If he breaches the terms 
and conditions set by the investor, he is like a gha~ib (usurper). If it 
is stipulated that he will take all the profit, he is seen as mustaqrifl, 
(a person seeking for loan). However, if the investor stipulates 
taking all the profit, the mufl,arib is a mustabfl,ic (caretaker). In the 
situation where a voidable mufl,lirabah is concluded, the mufl,iirib 
would become an ajlr (employee)." 133 
In looking into the question of ¢aman, it is important to analyse the nature 
of the mufl,lirib's position in the transaction. His holding of the mufl,iirabah capital 
is treated on the same basis as in the case of wadlcah, in certain respect such as his 
130 Partnership, p .171. On the role of commenda in the expansion in the expansion of 
medieval Mediterranean trade see Udovitch, "At Origins of the Western Commenda : Islam, Israel, 
Byzantium?", Speculum (1962), vol.XXXVII, pp.198-207. 
131Afbert Hourani, A History of the Arab People, p.112. Cf.Chapter IV and V, supra. On 
the use of negotiable instruments see Chapter II, infra. 
132Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1413. 
133Durar, vol.III, pp.462-463. 
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non-liability for any destruction without his transgression and negligence. 
However, the exception is, the mu(l,iirib is allowed to deposit the capital with 
another party, unlike in the case of wadlcah.134 His other role as an agent has given 
him the authority to make such a decision. If the capital is destroyed without his 
transgression or negligence, he is not liable as he is in the position of an amln. If 
the capital is destroyed before any work is done, the mu(l,iirabah contract is anulled 
and the testimony of the mu(l,iirib together with his oath is admissible, as far as the 
destruction is concemed.135 As regards to the consumption of the capital by the 
mu(l,iirib when he has spent it on another person or he has given it to someone else 
who spent it, he is not allowed to purchase anything associated with the mu(l,iirabah 
until the money used has been replaced.136 
a] Conduct of the MucJarabah 
To judge from the considerable attention they receive in the legal sources, 
the most problematic aspects of the operation of mu(l,iirabah are those concerned 
with the agent's conduct of the mu(l,iirabah trade. By far the largest portion of the 
legal discussion is devoted to elaborating and defining the extent of the agent's 
freedom of action and to clarifying his relationship to the investor and to third 
parties. 
134cf. art.790 of Maj. 'Adliyyah on the matter. His position as a trustee is by virtue of the 
permission of the investor for him to hold the property. The transaction is not for any other purpose 
like in the contract of exchange (mubadalah) or in the contract of security (tawthlq). See 
NQ?,.f?amli.n, p.158. 
135 NQ.?,.f?amli.n, p.159. See the relevant maxim: "Al-qawl qawl a/,-wakll ft nafy a/,-{lamiin 
wa l~iil a/,-amiinah Li ~iil)ibiha" cited in MaQ.mud I:Iamzah, al-Fara'id al-Bahiyyah, p.99. The 
I:Ianballs Maj. Shar'iyyah art.1878 however ruled that: "The testimony of the agent about mistake, 
deceit and forgetfulness is inadmissible." 
136Majma', p.303; Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.388; Mughnl, vol.V, p.69. Also see 
NQ?,.f?aman, p.159. 
(143) 
The explanation takes place within the same framework as those concern-
ing the rights and duties of a partner in his conduct of partnership business. Like 
partnership, the mu<jarabah is classified as a contract of fidelity (caqd al-amlinah). 
Like a partner, the agent is considered a trustworthy and faithful party (amln) with 
respect to the capital entrusted to him and therefore not liable for any loss occuring 
in the normal course of business activities; and like a partner, the agent becomes 
liable for the property in his care as a result of any violation of this fidelity 
(amlinah).137 
It is interesting to note that there has been a number of guidelines on the 
agent's freedom of action which will be the strongest criterion should <jamiin need 
to be applied. Generally, his actions must be consonant with the over-all purpose 
of the contract, namely, that of achieving a profit and they must fall within the 
bounds of recognized and customary commercial practice. More specifically, his 
freedom of action depends on the type of mandate he recieves from the investor 
and on whether or not any specific condition or limitation are imposed at the time 
the contract is negotiated. It can be in the form of a limited or unlimited mandate. 
As far as an unlimited mandate is concerned, the investor has authorized the 
agent to act completely at the latter's discretion in all business matters. Such 
authorization is conveyed by the investor's statement to the agent : "Act with it 
(the investment) as you see fit (icmaz .fihi birayik)". Al-Sarakhsl analyzes this as 
follows: 
137 Partnership, pp.203-204. 
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"If the investor says to the agent, "act with it as you see fit," then 
he may practice all of these things except the loan.138 For the 
investor has consigned the control of his capital to the agent's dis-
cretion in a comprehensive way; and we know that his intention is 
the inclusion of all the customary practice of the merchants. The 
agent, thereby, has the right to engage in mu¢arabah, a partnership 
and to mingle the capital with his own capital because this is of the 
practice of the merchants." 139 
U dovitch has suggested that this comprehensive and unrestricted mandate 
permits the agent the widest latitude vis-a-vis the techniques of commerce he may 
employ in the pursuit of profitable trade. He is free to transmit this unrestricted 
mandate to a second agent and the second agent is equivalent in this respect to the 
original agent. In the absence of any blanket authorization, the agent's freedom of 
action is somewhat restricted, especially with regard to transactions with third 
parties. If the investor does not use the phrase "act according to your judgement" 
or a substitute phrase conveying the same intention, the agent may not engage in 
any practice involving mingling the capital with his own resources, g1vmg 
mu¢arabah to third party and to invest the capital in a partnership with a third 
party.140 
138There are nine types of freedom given to the agent: I .To buy and sell all types of mer-
chandise as he sees fit; 2.To buy and sell for cash and credit; 3.To give goods as bifia(ah i.e leaving 
them as a deposit or pledge; 4.To hire helpers as needed; 5.To rent or buy animals and equipment; 
6.To travel with capital; 7 .To mingle capital with his own resources; 8.To give the capital as a 
mufiarabah to a third party and 9. To invest the capital in a prtnership with a third party. A loan is 
excluded from this list as it is not treated as practice of merchants. It is viewed as a favour on the 
other part of the lender and not as a commercial transaction from which some advantage can be 
expected. Cf. Maj. (Adliyyah, art.1414 and details in Durar, vol.III, pp.465-469. 
139Mabsa{, vol.XXII, p.39-40 as cited in Partnership, p.204. 
140For details see Partnership, pp.204-205. Wahbah al-Zul)ayll said: "The liability will 
not fall on the agent, neither by virtue of the handing over of the capital to a second mufiiirib nor by 
the use of the capital by the second agent until he secures profit. . .if he secures profit, then the first 
agent is responsible. This is the opinion of Abii ijanifah. Zufar opined that liability arises by mere 
handing over of the capital. Abii Yusuf and Mul)ammad al-Shaybarn [whose opinion is considered 
the most preferred within the school] ruled that: "Whenever the second agent started working with 
the capital, regardless of attainment of profit, the first agent will be liable. This is because the sec-
ond agent is disposing the property of another without the owner's permission (fa qad ta~arraf bi 
ghayr idhn al-malik). The investor has the right whether to impose fiaman on the first or the second 
agent. The first agent is liable by giving the capital to the second agent whereas the second agent is 
liable by virtue of possessing the capital. If the first agent accepted responsibility, he will have to 
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On the other hand, the Mfilikis ruled that the agent is entitled to give the 
capital to any other party on mucji'irabah, only with the permission of the investor. 
"Mfilik spoke about an agent who took qirlicj money from a man 
[the investor] an then gave it to another man [the second agent] to 
use as a qirlicj withou the consent of the investor. He said, "The 
agent is responsible for the property. If it is decreased, he is 
responsible for the loss. If there is a profit, the investor has his 
stipulation of the profit and then the agent has his stipulation of what 
remains. " 141 
The Shaficis have similar regulations on the question of the two-tier 
mucjarabah. The agent is not allowed to enter into a mucjlirabah agreement with 
another party without the permission of the investor. If this has been done, the 
contract becomes void.142 Despite the general trend within the school to disallow 
this kind of arrangement, there are certain Shafici jurist like al-Shiraz1143 who 
opined that such practices should be allowed.144 
In a limited mandate mucjlirabah contract, the agent's freedom of action is 
regulated by the terms and conditions set by the investor. The agent must respect 
those restrictions. However, it is required that the restriction must be beneficial to 
the investor. If the agent goes beyond what is permitted or acts contrary to the 
undertake it. However, if the second agent accepted the responsibility, such responsibility is 
reverted to the first agent, as he had deceived the second agent about the capital. This is in line with 
the decision of the Malikls, the Shafi.els and the ijanballs that fiamiin is affirmed by the outcome 
(natljah) i.e. when the capital is destroyed without any infringement, the liability is on the first 
agent if the second agent is not aware that the capital does not belong to the first agent." See 
Ncq,. J?amlin, pp .142-143. 
l41Muwatta', p.284. 
142 .. 
Wajrz, vol.I, p.223. 
143see his Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.390. 
144s·dd. · · 52 1 1q1, op.cit., p. . 
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conditions, he becomes a gha~ib. As a result, the profit and loss from the venture 
falls on himself. If the capital is lost, he is responsible.145 
While commenting on business methods, al-DimashqI said, concerning 
murj,arabah: "The agent is not bound to indemnify the investor for accidental loss 
of the investment so long as he does not go beyond the localities agreed upon." 146 
This did not apply to all murj,arabah; it was only true for cases in which a 
geographical limitation on the agent's activities was specifically included in the 
agreement. This was but one of a variety of specific restrictions that the investor 
could impose on the agent. These specific restrictions could appear in a limited as 
well as in unlimited mandate murj,lirabah and could relate to the place, object and 
method of trade. The only requirement was that the -restriction be what al-SarakhsI 
terms a "beneficial stipulation" that is, a useful and beneficial condition from the 
investor's point of view. He said that imposition of a geographical restriction ful-
filled the notion of "beneficial stipulation" (shart muftd), since the investor might 
have considered it desirable to have quick and direct access to his capital. In such a 
case, the agent may not move the capital out of the restricted area or transfer it to 
anyone else who would do so. If he does so, he becomes liable for any loss. 147 An 
explicit restriction to work only in a specific market or a specific place in the 
market, is normally construed in an economic and not strictly geographical sense 
that is as an injuction to trade only at the general price level of that market. 
"If the investor entrusts him with a mudtirabah on the condition that 
he works with it in the market of Kufah, and the agent works with it 
in Kllfah but not in that place, then according to analogy he is a 
violator and liable because he violated a stipulation imposed upon 
him by the investor. But by isti~san, his transactions are effective in 
145Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.1420-1421. 
146see his Kitab al-Isharah ila Mahasin al-Tiiarah, pp.1-30. 
147 . 'J 
Mabsa!,op.cit., p.40. 
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the mu¢arabah and he is not liable. Because a stipulation which is 
not beneficial is not taken into consideration and there is no benefit 
in confining his transactions to the market. For the investor's inten-
tion applies to the price level of Kiifah, not the market place itself; 
any place in Kiifah in which he transacts business, his transactions 
conform to that which the investor stipulated. Do you think that if 
the investor instructs him to work in the house of fula.n and he 
works in some other place that he will be liable ? He will not be 
liable for anything in this connection by reason of the unity of the 
city.,, 148 
In this regard, Udovitch pointed out that the imposition of geographical 
restriction in a mu¢arabah contract transforms its function from that of an instru-
ment primarily facilitating long-distance trade into a means of investment for local 
trade. It permitted the investor quick access to his capital instead of waiting for the 
agent to return from a journey of undetermined duration. The investor could at any 
time instruct the agent to convert the investment into cash, retrieve his capital and 
hopefully some profit and then invest it elsewhere. It would also involve less risk 
and uncertainty since trade would be carried on in economic circumstances and 
within a price structure with which the investor was familiar. Conversely, the rate 
of profit would undoubtedly be lower; nevertheless, the mu¢arabah with a 
geographical restriction could transform the mu¢arabah into a satisfactory means 
for short term investment.149 
b] Distribution of Liabilities 
Another feature of mu¢arabah which has been considered an innovation and 




ticed in the medieval Islamic world, was its treatment of the distribution of liability 
between the parties to the contract. Some legal writers pointed out that the joint 
capital may be missing in this type of venture. Consequently, one party, the agent 
was not liable for any part of the investment in case of loss and the other party, the 
investor, except under exceptional circumstances, did not become jointly liable 
with the agent in transactions with third parties who need not even have known of 
the investor's existence. Since it can always be assumed that mu(/,lirabah found its 
most frequent employment in long-distance trade, which of necessity geographi-
cally separated two parties for most of the contract's duration this distribution of 
liability between parties would appear to have been ideal for this purpose. 
With their customary thoroughness, the Islamic lawyers probed all aspects 
of the principles governing liability distribution in the mu(i,arabah by confronting 
them with numerous hypothetical situations. While the specific cases constructed 
by the lawyers may have had little or no significance in actual commercial prac-
tice, they are noteworthy for the light they shed on the relationship between the 
agent and outside third parties as well as between the agent and investor to each 
other.150 
The concept of the agent as a trustworthy party (amln) is the cornerstone 
upon which the structure of equity within the mu(i,arabah contract rests. Any 
arrangement involving the agent's liability for the investment was by definition dis-
qualified as a mu(l,arabah contract. On the other hand, the investor, who does not 
work with the capital, was entitled to a share of the profit only by virtue of the risk 
l50Partnership, p.238. 
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of possible loss which he faced.151 Therefore, the investor risks only his capital and 
the agent risks only his time and effort. 
"For everything the agent takes from the investor is part of the 
mutjarabah investment. And since the capital in the agent's posses-
sion is part of the mutjarabah, he stands in relation to it as a 
trustworthy party (amln). For mutjlirabah capital cannot be a source 
of liability (matjmunan), if it is a source of liability to him, the con-
tract will not be a mudlirabah and the investor will have no claim 
for a share in the profit. How can the investor claim a share of the 
profit while the agent is liable for the capital." 152 
In the case of repeated loss when the investor has to provide an additional 
sum to that of the original investment to allow the agent to restore the total invest-
ment capital, obviously the investor will have to face a greater risk as represented 
by the increased extent of his financial involvement. Nevertheless, this is parallel 
to the increased time and effort required from the agent before he could hope to 
realize any profit.153 
If the loss of the capital took place after the agent had succeeded in parlay-
mg the original investment into a larger sum, the procedure of distributing the 
liability would be different, as in the case of loss at the initial stage. Once the 
original investment has increased as a result of the agent's activities, the latter is 
l5lMaj. 'Adliyyah art.1425 provides that the mufiarib is only entitled to profit as the equi-
valent for his work. In art.1426, it was mentioned that the right to profit of the investor is from his 
property. 
152In the event of loss of the muflarabah property, it is suggested that it should be covered 
from the profit that might be achieved not from the capital. However, if it exceeds the amount of 
the profit and is set against the capital, the mufiiirib is not responsible for it. In every case of 
damage or loss of value, the investor will have to bear them. Even if a condition has been made that 
the muflarib has to share the loss, no attention is paid to the condition. See Maj. 'Adliyyah, 
arts.1427-1428. Ibn Rushd is quoted to have said [in his Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, p.140] that 
there has been a consensus among the jurists on the matter. He also stressed the importance of utilis-
ing the profit first of all to offset the loss incurred before resorting to other options. See 
M.N .Siddi~i, Partnership and Profit-Sharing in Islamic Law, p.30. 
15 Partnership, p.241. 
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considered part owner of the capital even if the mucjarabah is still ongoing. His 
ownership consists of that sum which would constitute his share of the profit were 
the mucjlirabah to be concluded at that moment. Consequently, in the event of loss, 
the agent and not the investor, would be liable for that share.154 
As a matter of precaution, in the pursuit of protecting the investor's right, 
the agent is put under certain trading restriction. He is not permitted to engage the 
mucjarabah for any sum greater than the sum in hand. If he exceeded these bounds 
in any way, the agent became liable for any sum in excess of the mucjarabah capi-
tal. The prohibition against istidlinah (incurrence in debt), the commercial commit-
ment of the mucjarabah by the agent in excess of its capital, carried along with 
several corollary restriction on the agent's activities. For instance, he is not 
allowed to amplify his working capital by negotiating a loan for the mucjarabah. 
Nor could he, at the mucjarabah expense, alter or improve any of the goods he 
purchased if their acquistion alone had required all the available capital. 155 
Istidanah is only allowed with an express authorization by the investor that 
is for the agent to incur debts in excess of the mucjarabah. However, there is a dif-
ference in the status of the goods bought with the actual murj,arabah investment and 
those procured over and above that amount. Goods acquired by the agent on credit 
above and beyond the amount of mucjarabah capital are not subject to the principle 
of ownership and liability obtaining in a mucjarabah agreement. The ownership, 
risk and profit are shared jointly by the agent and the investor, thus in practice 
constituting a credit partnership.156 The combination of contracts provided for a 
154 Partnership, pp.241-242. 
155Mabsaf, vol.XXII, p.75. 
156This has created a conjunction between two separate Islamic forms of commercial asso-
ciation that is mufiarabah and the credit partnership. See Partnership, p.244. 
(151) 
considerable extension in the scope of the murjarabah' s commercial effectiveness. 
Armed with the investor's authorization to engage into istidanah, the agent would 
be in a position to take advantage of various promising commercial opportunities 
that might require a larger volume of capital than that furnished by the investor. By 
using the actual murjarabah as a base, he would probably find himself in a more 
favourable position to obtain credit and thus to increase the profitable returns of the 
venture.157 
Any invalid murjarabah is treated as a hire contract (ijarah). All profits 
accrue to the investor and all losses are borne by him. The agent's personal expen-
ses, but not his business expenses, are borne solely by the agent, who in turn, as 
an employee, is entitled to an equitable wage.158 The grounds for declaring a 
murjarabah invalid are numerous and can be connected with almost every aspect of 
the contract. These include provision for a non-proportional division of profit; non-
alienation of the investment on the part of the investor and the agent's violation of 
a legitimate restriction placed on him by the investor. In all such cases, the nature 
of the contract has been transformed. The investor's position becomes that of an 
employer, responsible for his goods and property and fully entitled to all profit 
from it. The agent's role is changed to that of a simple employee, entitled to 
remuneration for his time and effort regardless of whether his exertions on behalf 
of his employer are successfuI.159 
157 Partnership, pp.244-245. Also see Udovitch, "Credit as a Means of Investment in 
Medieval Islamic Trade", JAOS, 87 (1967), 260-264 and "Reflections on the Institutions of Credit 
and Bankin~ in the Medieval Islamic Near East" SI, 41 (1975), pp.5-23. 
15 Mabsat, vol.XXII, p.67; lnroduction, p.156; Maritime, p.88. 
159 . Durar, vol.III, pp.462-463. 
(152) 
Although mu(i,arabah could be terminated by the will of either party at any 
point, no time limit for the duration of the agreement could be stipulated at the out-
set.160 It was envisaged that mu(i,tirabah would be normally be concluded when the 
agent returned from his travels or when he completed his series of transaction prof-
itably. At that time, he returned his capital to the investor and the remainder, that 
is the profit, would be divided between them according the proportion agreed upon 
at the initiation of the contract. The mu(i,arabah was then considered dissolved. 
Udovitch has prudently said: 
"The return of the capital to the investor is crucial. In this respect, 
there is a kind of symmetry at both temporal poles of the contract. 
Just as mu(i,tirabah could not begin without the investor relinquishing 
control over his capital and handing it over to the agent, so too, did 
its conclusion depend on the agent's restoring it in full to the physi-
cal possession of the investor. If for some reason, the investor and 
the agent divided only the profit, while the amount equivalent to the 
investment remained in the agent's hand and the latter continued to 
trade with it, the original mu(i,arabah was considered as continuing 
in force. Were the agent subsequently to suffer any business 
reverses, he would be required to return part or even the entire 
amount of his share of the profit until the amount of the original 
capital was entirely made good to the investor. "161 
On this matter, Siddiqi pointed out that the parties in a mu(i,arabah can 
claim their share of profit only when those who supplied the original capital have 
had their investment returned to them in full, whether in the form of cash or in the 
form of legal transfer. He further said that the notion of "restoration" of the 
original capital theoretically means where the original capital is handed back to the 
investor and it is the most preferable practice. Another form is where the original 
capital is available as cash but not actual transferred to the investor's hand, but 
under his control. As such, control is the real meaning of ownership as most jurists 
160M.Mu~taj, vol.II, p.312; Wajlz, vol.I, pp.221-222. 
161 Partnership, p.246. 
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have understood it as equivalent to proper restoration. However, a de Jure return of 
the original capital to the investor, the distribution of profit and loss of the venture 
becomes final and complete.162 
Muzaracah (sharecropping) is a kind of partnership, where the land comes 
from one party and the cultivation of it will be carried out by another party, 
wherein they will share the crops among themselves.163 It was suggested that 
muzaracah could be classified as a quasi-mufl,tirabah contract, because it has some 
features and characteristic of a mutjarabah.164 Therefore, in looking into the ques-
tion of fl,aman, the preceding discussion on mutjarabah could be used. A}Jmad ibn 
ijanbal, according to Ziaul Haque, unlike the imams of other schools, strictly 
applied the method of analogy of mutjarabah. on land and concluded that 
muzara cah for one third or one fourth of the crop is valid. In this case, the seed is 
supplied by the landlord and the dtikhil (tenant, sharecropper) contributes his 
labour and draught animals, similar to the case of mutjarabah.. As a consequence, 
the tenant is responsible for his labour, his ancillary apparatus and animals, 
whereas the landlord provides the land and seed.165 It is a condition that the land is 
fit for cultivation and is handed over to the tenant for the work to be carried out. 
Failing the fulfil the said conditions will render the muzaracah as invalid.166 In 
162siddiqi, op.cit., p.36. As regards the returning of the capital and the profit, there is a 
possibility of dispute between the parties involved. Based on his analysis of classical sources, Has-
san that if the agent claims that he has brought the profit with the capital, without any evidence, the 
testimony of the investor who has otherwise claimed, is admissible. Only upon the producing of the 
evidence, the testimony of the agent will be accepted. See the discussion in Sales, p.242. 
163Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1431. 
164sales, p.255. The question of muzara'ah is quite complicated as it has been associated 
with various kinds of other types of agricultural sharecropping. For detail treatment on the develop-
ment of the substantive law of muzara'ah see Ziaul Haque, La.ndlord and Peasant in Early Islam, 
pp.310-346. 
l65Ibid., p.336. 
166Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.1436-1437. Cf.Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.1990. 
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such a situation, the harvest, if any, belongs entirely to the owner of the seed. If 
the other one is the landlord, he takes the rent and if he is the tenant he takes a fair 
wage.167 
PART THREE: ])AMAN IN CONTRACTS OF MIXED ELEMENTS 
This is the third class of legal relationships wherein c)amiin has been 
adopted as an integral part especially in the situation where remedies and settle-
ments are needed. As in the aforementioned transactions c)amiin is based on con-
tractual obligation and the fiduciary relationships between parties, the caqd al-
muzdawaj al-athar combines both of them together. This class of contract, in this 
respect, will be mainly concerned with the contract of hire (ijarah) and the contract 
of pledge (rahn). 
3.13 Contract of Lease or Rent 
Literally, ijarah is a derivative of ajr or ujrah (rent or salary) which means 
substitute, compensation, recompense, indemnity, consideration, return or counter 
value (ciwaef). Technically, ijarah is a contract of proposed and known usufruct 
with a specified and lawful return or compensation for the effort or work which 
has been initiated.168 However, it is clear that the variety of terms used is due to 
variety of economic purposes involved. It represents, as Schacht has shown, a 
161Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1439. Cf.Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.1994. 
168There are a few other terms used to denote the practices similar to that of ijarah. 
According to Schacht the term kira' has been used as it corresponds the Roman locatio conductio 
rei. See Introduction, p.21. According to Emile Tyan, the terms isti'jar and kira' has also been used 
but they are less popular. See E.Tyan, "Jjarah", El(2), vol.III, p.1017. 
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combination of three formerly separate transactions, kira) the renting of real prop-
erty, ijarah the hiring of salaried labour and jucz the rendering of services.169 
Ijarah has been practised in the Jahiliyyah time, and there are various his-
torical evidences for it. It has been reported by Ibn Hisham, that 1-;Ialimah al-
sacdiyyah has been hired as wet-nurse to the Prophet. Before his prophethood, the 
Prophet has been employed as a shepherd with his foster brother, among the tribe 
of Bani Sacd.170 Its legality has been mentioned in various places in the Quran, 
inter alia, God said in affirming the ijarah law that had been practised during the 
time of Prophet Musa : 
"Said one of the (damsels): 0 my (dear) father, engage Him on 
wages, truly the best of men for thee to employ is the (man) who is 
strong and trusty. He said : I intend to wed one of mu daughters to 
thee on condition that you serve me for eight years.171 
The Quran also speaks about the permissibility of wet-nursing : "And if 
they suckle your (off-spring) give them their recompense" 172 Similarly, another 
verse reads: "There is no blame on them if ye decide on a foster-mother for your 
off-spring, there is no blame on you provided that you pay (the mother) what you 
offer on equitable term." 173 Since ijarah has been allowed in such a trivial matter, 
it should similarly be sanctioned by the law in a more complicated transaction.174 
169Introduction, p.21. Also see Barber Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rem: 
The Peasams' Loss of Property Rights as Interpreted in the ljana.fite Legal Literature of the Mamluk 
and the Ottoman Periods, pp.1-12. 
1701bn Hisham, Srrah Ibn Hisham, pp. 150-154. 
171 Q, al-Q~~ (28) : 26-27. 
172Q., al-Talaq (65) : 6. 
113Q., al-Baqarah (2) : 233. · 
114BadtH', vol.IV, p.173. Also see Sharaf cAll al-Sharif, al-Ijarah al-Waridah 'ala 'Amal 
al-Insan : Dirasah Muqaranah, pp.36-37. 
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The Sunnah has further affirmed the Quranic injunctions on ijarah, either 
by the Prophet's sunnah in form of deed, statement or his tacit approval. In one 
l)adith, cA.ishah said: "The Prophet and Abu Bakr hired a man from BanI al-Dayl, 
who was an expert on the (alternative) route (to Madinah).175 There is a l)adith 
reported from the Prophet in which he was reported to have said : "Give the 
employee his wage before his sweat dries" .176 In practice, it has been witnessed 
that the Prophet saw ijarah being practiced during his time and he had no objection 
to it.177 
Ijarah has also being sanctioned by ijmli c of the first generation of Islam 
(salaf al-~alilJ min al-~alJ,abah wa al-tabiczn) and all the faqaha) of that era as well 
as the later generation of leading madhahib formed in the later part.178 Al-KasanI 
declares that there has been an ijmlic (consensus) on the matter before the 
emergence of al-A~am 179, wherein they believe that the contract of ijarah from the 
time of the Prophet until now was without objection. God has legalised various 
contracts to meet the need of people and their need for ijarah is overwhelming. I SO 
An on going polemic concerning ijarah rests on the nature of its legalisa-
tion, whether it is on the basis of khilaf al-qiyas (against the established principle) 
or wifq al-qiyas (corresponding to the established principle). The first group argues 
on the notion of bayc az-macdam (sale with absent object of contract)181 as it is 
1751bn I:Iajar al-cAsqalaru, FatJ:z al-Bari bi SharJ:z $aJ:zrJ:z al-Imam al-Bukhari, vol.III, 
pp .442-443. 
176al-ZaylacI, Na~b al-Rayah Li AJ:zadrth al-Hidtiyah, vol.IV, p.129. 
177 Bada)i', vol.IV, p.174. 
1781bn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, p.183. 
179He is Abu Bakr al-A~am, one of the member of a group opposing the legality of ijarah 
on ground of gharar. 
180Badli)i', vol.IV, p.174. 
181some scholar has translated bay' al-ma'dam as sale of a non-entity. See Kamila Tyabji, 
Limited Interest in Muhammadan Law, Steven and Sons Limited, London, 1949. 
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unacceptable in Islamic law by virtue of the l)adith [la tabic ma laysa cindaka] 182 
The dissenting group's argument lies in the fact that ijarah is not a contract of sale 
in the strictest sense of the word. This is because in ijarah is not contracting on 
physical object of contract but rather a usufruct (manfacah), the presence of which 
in a contract of sale is impossible. Despite the jurisprudential debate, it can be 
easily seen in light of the IJBanat al-tashrlc that permission for ijarah is a sign of 
God's mercy to mankind and suitable for the needs of human society. God said in 
the Qur3an, in affirmation of the idea of avoiding burden (qillat al-taklif): "God 
intends every facility (yusr) for you. He does not want to put you to difficulty 
(cusr)" 183. He further said : "He has chosen you and has imposed no difficulties on 
you. "184 
a] Classification of ljarah Contracts 
The classical texts of Islamic law have classified ijarah into two different 
types, namely ijarat al-cayn (hire of property or corporeal asset)185 and ijarat al-
shakh~ (labour, employment or service)186 It has been embodied in the rules of 
ijarah that it must be contracted with the consent of both parties who have absolute 
knowledge of the usufruct. As it is a type of sale, the general principle of contract 
has categorically prohibited gharar transactions.187 Hired goods or work must 
become possible for delivery or executed legally and practically at a certain time. 
182al-Shawkaru, Nayl al-Awftir, vol.V, p.175. 
183Qur'an, Surah al-Baqarah (2) : 185. 
184Qur'an, Surah al-ljajj (22) : 78. 
1851t is also referred to as manfa'ah al-'ayn. See Sales, p.423. 
186The term manfa'ah al-'amal is also used to signify this concept. See Emile Tyan, ljtira, 
E1[2], vol.III, p.1017. . 
187 al-~iddiq Amin al-l;:>arir, al-Gharar wa Atharuh ft )l-Fiqh al-Isltimiyy, 1976. Also see 
Sales, p.424. 
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In other words, the capabality of handing over the hired goods fully or completely, 
for usufruction is an essential requirement in ijarah.188 Further, the law also 
requires that the usufruct must be lawful and contracted for legitimate purposes. 
The price or rate of hiring or renting of a property should be made known to the 
other party and the amount of rent or salary should be in accordance with the con-
vention of the locality and must be just and acceptable to both parties.189 
b] Liabilities of Parties in Ijarah 
As a general rule, once the contract of ijarah is concluded, as in other con-
tracts, both party will be liable for the performance of what has been agreed. In the 
case of ijarat al-cayn, like in bayc, the lessor (mua]jir) is under obligation to shift 
the property with which usufruct (manfacah) can be enjoyed and hand it over the 
lessee (musta]ir). Similarly, the lessor will also be responsible for fl,aman al-
tacarrufl, (guarantee against fault in ownership) and ff,aman az-cayb (guarantee 
against defects). Both liabilities, on the part of the lessor, are known as iltizam bi 
tal]qlq ghayah (liability to accomplish a pursuit). On the other hand, the lessee is 
responsible for a counter-action to the lessor that is paying the fee or price of the 
lease ( da.f al-ujrah) and taking due care of the leased property (mul]afcq,ah caza )z_ 
cayn al-mua]arah). This is known as iltizam bi badhl al-cinayah (liability to grant 
care). In the case of ijiirat al-ashkha~, the employer is liable to pay the wage when 
188classical works has given a well-known example to illustrate this in the case of hiring of 
a runaway riding animal or usurped merchandise as they amout to gharar. Gharar is an uncertain 
situation as regards to the availability of the goods on which the contract is made which will be a 
potential cause for inability for the execution of ijiirah and thus bring about various consequences 
such as dissatisfaction, request for termination of ijarah, claiming damages and others. See Minhiij. 
189 Badtei', vol.IV, pp .193-194. 
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the task is being performed or after it has been completed. The employee, in 
return, has to perform the specific task (al-qiylim bi carnal al-mucayyan) as stipu-
lated. He is referred to as being as responsible to ta~qlq ghliyah mucayyanah (for 
accomplishing a specific pursuit) .190 
If handing over of the usufruct has become impossible, the mua]jir is con-
sidered to have failed to execute his responsibility and the musta]ir is not liable to 
pay the fee (ujrah). If the cause of the failure is a force majeure (quwwah 
qahirah), like damage of the leased property before handing it over, ijlirah is 
terminated and the musta]ir is not liable to make any payment. This is simply 
because of the impossibility of performance of the ijarah. 
There are instances where impossibility occurs while the lessee is in the 
midst of enjoying the usufruct (athna) al-inti/a~, whereby the liability for ujrah 
will be renounced for the remaining period though the payment for the period prior 
to the impossibility is still due. The case of ijlirat al-~ammlim (rent of washroom) 
"If a person hires a washroom (~ammiim) in a locality and a (fright-
ening event take place) in it and he has to move from it, he is not 
duty bound to pay the rent. If only some people are leaving, the rent 
is not waived .... [In the case of renting a house] if part of the house 
is destroyed, the ij:anafis upheld that the rent will be waived accord-
ing to the extent of the damage. Ibn al-Shal)nah said : based on the 
'.?ahir al-riwayah, the rent is not exempted from him by the destruc-
tion of a room or a wall of the house .... " 191 
The obligation for fjaman al-tacarrufj will also fall on the lessor together 
with fjamlin al-cayb. If the lessee is being deprived of the usufruct like by being 
l 90NG?-.J?amlin, p.239. 
191 BadliJic, vol.IV, p.196. 
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restrained by a third party from benefiting from the maJur (rented property), the 
lessor is a responsible (fitimin) and the lessee is exempted from liability to pay the 
rent. The case of gha~b of the rented property is an example of such situation. 
"If the rented house has been wrongfully appropriated (gha~b) by a 
usurper, and the mustaJir is unable to remove the usurper's inter-
vention, despite his effort to do so, he is not liable to pay the rent 
after the gha~b, by virtue of his inability to enjoy the usufructed 
property. It is treated as having a similar circumstances as the 
demolished house (kharab al-dar) .. . he is only liable to pay the rent 
for the period prior to the gha~b. "192 
Another situation which prompted application of f)amiin are when defects 
are proven on the rented property, which has impeded the enjoyment of benefit 
from it.193 This can be in the form of impossibility or formidable difficulty in per-
formance of the ijlirah contract, such as is caused by the disappearance of the 
property or when some deficiencies have affected it. 
"In a contract of hire, the circumstance which creates an option on 
account of defect is something which causes complete loss of or 
interference with the benefits sought to be obtained. Example : A 
house is entirely destroyed; the utility of a mill is prevented by 
water being cut off (inqi{lic mii) al-ral]y); the frame of a roof of a 
house sinks; a place is knocked down so as to be unsuitable for 
habitation; the back of a horse which is hired is injured by galling. 
In all these cases there is an option for defect, if they are taken on 
hire, on account of the benefits sought to be obtained being 
destroyed. But defects which do not interfere with the benefits 
sought to be obtained give no right to an option for defect in the 
case of a contract of hire, as where the plaster of a house falls off, 
but not to such an extent that rain and cold can enter; or where the 
mane or tail of a horse is cut." 194 
192Bada)ic, vol. VI, p. 196. Also see lbn cA.bidin, Radd al-Mukhtar wa al-Durr al-
Mukhtar, vol.V, p.53. 
l 93The defect that prevents benefit (al-cayb alladhl yakhilla bl )l-imifti~ means: "The exist-
ence of the defect has rendered the enjoyment of benefit as impossible and the intended purpose of 
the ijarah contract has been ruined." See Nllf,.I;Jaman, p.241. 
194Maj. cAdliyyah, art.514. See Civil, Vol.I [The Mejelle], p.118. 
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In such circumstances, the lessor is responsible for the unforeseen defect 
(cayb tarVi and the lessee is granted right of option, either to rescind the contract 
or continue with it, accepting it even with the payment of full price. 
"If a defect occurs in the thing hired, the person taking the thing on 
hire may exercise an option. He may either put the thing hired to the 
use for which it was hired in spite of the defect, in which case he 
must pay the whole of the rent or he may cancel the contract of 
hire. "195 
The lessee in the case of ijarat al- cayn is also liable for due care of the 
hired property. He is expected to exercise the standard care applicable (al- cinayah 
min al-rajul al-muctad)l 96. If he fails in that, he is considered as negligent and 
therefore become liable for fjaman. The property is a trust in the hands of a lesses 
and his neglect has make him responsible for any damage to the property. It can be 
in form of utilizing the property in an unconventional way I 97, in contradiction of 
stipulated conditionsl 98, improper use and the like, which constitute liability. 
Among exemples cited to illustrate this situation, is using a building meant for 
195 Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.516. See Civil, p.119. 
196The discussion of al-'intiyah al-maflubah (the required standard of care) has given rise 
to a debate in the I:Ianafi school as to what level of care is expected out of the a)Tr. Abu I:Iarufah 
maintained that the ajlr is not considered as negligent if the damage to the property is caused by a 
third party. Abu Yusuf and Shaybaru, however, set a stricter regime by ruling that destruction by a 
third party is insufficient to be a waiver for liability. They require that only in the case of al-halak 
la yumkin al-il:ztiraz 'anhu (damage which beyond one's care and control) like a big fire, then only 
can the liability be established. See Ma~<idir, vol.VI, p.150-151. 
l 971t has been illustrated that any action that the musta'jir has been reminded not to carry 
out, he is liable if damage happens because of that action. It is not only confined to the case of 
musta'jir only but it is universal to other similar cases. If a dabbah is hired for transport and was 
not meant for specific person, any other person can ride it. However, if it is meant to be used by a 
specific person and someone else has taken a ride, is liable if a damage happens. See Majma', 
pp.13-16. 
198 A case whereby the musta'jir hired a dabbah to carry goods which type and weight has 
been notified [like one saying five hundred aqfizah of wheat, he is only allowed to carry what 
similar to wheat in terms of garar or less like barley. He is not allowed to carry something with 
more <jarar like salt.. .. See al-Baghdadi, ibid. 
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residence for manufacturingl 99, overloading a carriage or refusal to return a hired 
property200 and the property is damaged during that interval. 
c] Contract of Work 
Discussion on ijlirat al-ashkhii~201 is complicated and thus calling for a 
more rigid interpretation of the law. In a contract of work or service, it is essential 
to distinguish between the two class of ajlr as they are undertaking different 
responsibilities and are answerable to a different class of people. Ajir Khii~~ or a 
hired servant is a person whose services are retained by one employer only as in 
the case of a servant paid a monthly wage. Ibn Qudamah defined ciimil khli~~ as : 
an employee who is imposed by the ijiirah contract to work for a definite period of 
time wherein the employer is entitled to derive full benefit, like a person employed 
to serve or work in a building, to sew or to guard, for a day or a month. He is 
called ajir khli~~ because his service is exclusive for the musta]ir alone. 202 
199see Majmac, pp.25-26. 
200see Majmac, p.19. Also see Ma~lidir, vol.VI., p.155. 
201 It has also been called ijarat al-dhimmah, ijlirat al-camal or ijlirat al-khidmah. The 
Malik.is have distinguished the usage to the term ijarah from that of kirli) as ijarah is used when 
involving services from human being (istr'jar al-insii.n), whereas kirli) is used when involving rent 
of animals and merchandise. One of the clear example is a treatise of Ibn Ahl Firas entitled Kitlib 
Akriylit al-Sufun which has been treated in Deborah Anne Rice-Noble, Principles of Islamic Mari-
time Law, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1988. Al-Ghamail further said: "ljiirah 
applies to cases involving buying of benefit that can think [manfacah ca.qi!] and ijiirah as well asjucl 
are applied to a mucawa~ah transaction in respect of services from man [ al-mucliwa~ah ft khidmat 
al-adaml] .See also Mal)massaru's analysis on the decisions by Qa~ff ShurayQ who give a dictum that 
the wage fo~d includes liability in his al-Mujtahidan.fi )l-Qa~li), p.222. 
Mughnl, vol. VI, p.105. 
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The scholars of the J:Ianafi203, Malik(l04, ShafiCJ205and J:Ianbafi206 schools of 
law together with Ibn I:Iazm al-Zahin207 arrived at a consensus that ajlr kha~~ holds 
the position of trust (amln). He will not be held liable except in occassion where 
the damage is a result of his violation (tacaddi), or neglect (ihmal). 208 As he has 
been entrusted to execute the task and given the required equipment, he is then 
permitted to act (ma)dhanan bi al-ta~arruf) as a deputy (nlHb) of the employer. 
He will not be held responsible for any damage caused by external factors in which 
he has no role. However, if the damage is due to the camil' s negligence such as 
abandoning the equipment without it being maintained, being careless, reckless and 
irresponsible which resulted in unsuccesful execution of the work or damage to the 
equipment, he is liable. This is in line with the concept of justice proclaimed in the 
Sharlcah, as <jarar must be removed209 and each person is responsible for his 
deed.210 
In contrast, ajlr mushtarak or self-employed artisan is a craftsman who has 
the right to work for more than one employer. The notion of "mushtarak" seems to 
signify that he is able to work for any member of the society who has need for his 
service. He is obliged by the contract of ijarah to carry out a certain task like 
making a garment or erecting a building or transporting a merchandise from one 
203 Bada'i', vol.IV, p.210; Durar, vol.I, pp.598, 603, 605 ; Ibn cA.bidin, lfiishiah Radd al-
Mukhtar, vol. VI, p.67. 
204Mul:iammad cArfah al-Dusiiqi, Hiishiah al-Dusaqr 'alii al-Sharh al-Kabir, vol.IV, p.26. 
205 . . 
Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.415. 
206Mughnr, vol.VI, p.106. 
2071bn ijazm, al-Mul:zallii, vol. VIII, p.201. 
208sharafb. cAli Sharif, al-ljarah al-Wiiridah 'ala 'l-'Amal al-/nsiin, p.251. 
209The maxim reads: al-{larar yuz:iil. See Sh.'Zarqii', pp.179-183. 
210niis is evident in the Qur>amc rule which reads : [kullu nafs bi ma kasabaJ 
rahlnah](every individual is responsible for whatever he does). See Q., al-Muddaththir: 38; al-
Baqarah : 286 in which God said: [la yukallif Alliih nafsan illii wus'ahii] (a person is not burdened 
with responsibility except what he has done). This is supported by a tradition: [Iii {laman 'alii 
mu'taman]. 
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place to another in a period during which the musta]ir could not derive exclusive 
benefit. For instance a doctor may have to treat many patients at one time; he is 
rendering his service to them and they are sharing the manfacah.211 The wage of an 
ajlr mushtarak is due when the task has been accomplished whereas the wage of an 
ajlr kha~~ will only become due if he is ready to work during the period for which 
his services were hired. 
cumar b. al-Khattab and cAli b. Ab! Talib were of the opinion that the 
hireling, labourer and employee (ajlr) including a producer, a manufacturer 
(~llni~, guard (IJ.aris), caretaker(IJ..ti.fi;Z), or racr), porter (IJ.ammal), bleacher 
(qa~~llr), goldsmith or jeweller (~ll)igh) were liable to replace any property which 
had been damaged as a result of their transgression or negligence. This standpoint 
is taken for safeguarding the owners' rights and interests. cAli further added that 
the rule also applies to the washer (ghassal), the dyer (~abbagh), the tailor 
(khayyat) and the like. 212 
The important decision on the matter has been supported by the opinion of 
lbn Rushd in his Muqaddimat which is the basis of the discourse of Abu ijassan b. 
Ra.Ql)a.I al-Macdanl on tafjmrn al-~unnac. 
"Ibn Rushd said in his Muqaddimat : the orginal ruling is that there 
is no fjaman on the artisan. They are in the position of trust as they 
are [in the same category as the] ajirra). The Prophet has waived 
cjaman from ajirrll). The scholars have severed ~unn11c from this 
21 lMughnl, vol.V, p.105. 
212Discussion on ta¢mln al-~unnti' which relied its authority in which it has been reported 
that cAll b. Abi Talib has been questioned by al-Shafici: Shafici said : It has been reported, in the 
unusual manner from cAll b. Abi Talib had said that a washer (ghasstil) , a dyer (~abbagh) are 
¢amin and mankind will not attain [their prosperity] without it... It has been reported from cAli b. 
Abi Talib that he never imposed cJaman on any of the workers (ajirrti'). See Umm, vol.VII, p.88. 
Also see Mu}J.ammad sacid RamacJan al-Bii~i, J?awtibi! al-Ma#a!J.ah ft al-Shari'ah al-Isltimiyyah, 
p.356; Mu}J.ammad Mu~atafii Shalabi, Ta'lil al-AIJ.kiim, p. 379. 
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general rule and imposed (i,amii,n on them based on the ijtihad and 
the need of people. This has been a matter of overwhelming need 
for protection. Malik said that they should undertake (i,amii,n on 
property [lost or damaged] when they admitted being responsible for 
the damage. "213 
This standpoint, has been reinforced by lbn Farl)iin's Tab~irat al-lfukkam in 
which he emphasized the importance of implementing a strict regime on ta(/,m1n al-
~unna( as a Shar1(ah oriented policy (siyasah shar(iyyah) to a government. The 
~ani( cannot simply insert an exemption clause in the contract to escape liability, 
and if he does that, it is legally ineffective. Similarly, the ~ani( cannot make a 
defence from responsibility on the safety of the property with the excuse that his 
manufacturing premise has destroyed together with the property. If his manufactur-
ing premise was destroyed by blaze, or being robbed, that cannot serve as a ground 
for exemption of liability. 214 
Analysis on liability of ajlr mushtarak is not complete without including a 
discussion about the contract of isti~na( (manufacturing)215 , a rather sophisticated 
legal relationship compared to that of a straightfoward ijarah. Isti~na( is usually 
treated as a contract on a material [attached to the dhimmah of the manufacturer] in 
which it is specified thaat the manufacturing (~un(ah) of the said material should be 
carried out. This is a ijanafi definition based on the premise that isti~na( is a 
nominate contract in its own standing. There is an alternative definition by the 
Shafi'Ts, Mfilikis and ijanballs basing their analaysis on the fact that isti~na( is 
213Ta¢mln, pp.2-3. 
214Tab#rat, vol.II, pp.323-326. 
215see Kasib cAbd al-Karim Badran, 'Aqd al-lsti~mi.'.fi )l-Fiqh al-Islii.ml, n.d. 
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nothing but a subsidiary of bayc salam216 or al-bayc bi al-~ifah. Salam is defined as 
sale of well-defined object [on the dhimmah of the obligee] with a counter-value of 
a different genus and a ~uncah is required. The isti~nac arrangement can be shown 
in the following quotation: 
"Tailors must be ordered to cut out properly and shape the neck 
well, to make the ornamental border wide, the sleeves of equal 
length and the skirts even. Raised seams are better than tacking. The 
needle is to be fine and the thread contained in the eye short - a long 
one frays and weakens. A valuable piece of cloth must be measured 
before it is cut out. Valuable cloth like silk or brocade must be 
accepted by weight only. What is left after the garment has been 
made is to be returned to the owner. "217 
This example represents a typically rather simple contract of isti~nac which 
normally practiced in the society. The extension of the business activities of the 
Muslims has given rise to various new problems related to isti~na.c, one of which is 
al-shart al-jaza>r. It is a term agreed upon by the parties in the event of non-
performance (cadam al-tanjldh) or delay in performance, in which compensation 
(tacwl(i) has become due. It is a foreign element alien to Islamic law, but has been 
absorbed within the broad term of freedom of contract and attaching conditions 
thereto as advocated by certain schools of law. 218 The notion of al-caqd sharlcat al-
muta caqidayn (a contract is a binding force on the contracting parties) is another 
216 Bay' salam is also known as bay' salaf or bay' mufalisah is a sale in which advance pay-
ment is made to the vendor for deferred supply of goods. This is contrary to bay' mu'ajjal in which 
payment is deferred. It was narrated by Bukhari that :"When the Prophet came to Madlnah, people 
used to do salam for two and three years". On this, the Prophet said : "whosoever does salam in 
anything he should do so in a well-defined measurement and weight and for a fixed period". See 
Bada)i', vol.V, p.201. Also see S.M.Hassanuzzaman, "Bayc Salam: Principles and Their Applica-
tions," in Sheikh Ghazali Sheikh Abod et.al., An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Kuala Lumpur : 
Quill Publishers, 1992, pp.225-243. 
217 Ma'alim, p.44. 
218Freedom of contract and freedom of making conditions were championed by the ijanball 
school, founded on the premise of the verse: "O you who believe, fulfill your undertaking" and the 
Qadlth: "Muslims are bound by their stipulations except when they legitimize the forbidden and 
vice-versa". For details see Mul)ammad Yusuf Musa, "Freedom of Contract and Stipulations in 
Islamic Law," IC [1955], pp.156-170. 
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premise on which al-sharr al-jaza>r. was founded. The nature of commercial trans-
actions has undergone some transformations and thus there is need for legal 
mechanism which corresponds to the changes. In this case, the jurists have 
exercised their own ijtihad. 219 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the liability in ijarat al-ashkhli~ will rest 
on the ajlr mushtarak who is in the same position as a debtor (madin). An ajir 
kha~~ will be exempted from liability by virtue of the nature of his employment. 220 
In the case of ajlr mushtarak, the liability will be determined according to the 
effect of the work on the property involved. If the work has a great impact on the 
make-up of the property like khiyli{ah (tailoring), ~ibaghah (dying) and the like, he 
is only entitled to payment by handing over the finished article. What has been 
agreed upon in the contract is that the cloth will be transformed into a garment and 
will be handed over to the mu)ajjir at the end of the work. Even if the garment is 
ready but tasllm has not taken place, the tailor is liable if any damage took place 
while the merchandise is his possession. 
Contrarily, if the work has no effect on the property like in the contract of 
carriage of goods, payment is due if the work is accomplished even if the property 
219Ma~t1dir, vol.I, p.21-23. 
220He will be entitled to his wage upon completion of the assigned work. If the work is not 
completed or done half way, he will get payment to the extent of the work done. The property is 
then returned to the owner and he is entitled to claim for his wage. If his work is hampered by 
impossibility, the wage is forfeited by virtue of the event. See NG.1-.J?amiin, p.168. Regarding the 
liability of the servant of an ajlr mushtarak, the jurists hold that he is not liable. The employer is 
liable as the fault of the servant is the fault of the employer because the employer is the guarantor 
(¢limin) or surety (kaftl) for the servant. It was argued on the basis that the principal (matba~ asks 
for the work of his subordinate. There exists a contract of employment between them and the 
damage occurs as a result of the servant in the course of his work in the situation when general 
custom is being observed. See NG.1-.J?amlln, pp.256-257. Rice-Noble in her analysis, confirms the 
existence of the doctrine of vicarious liability in Islamic law. See Maritime, pp.162-170. 
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is not handed over to the owner. In this case, payment is the remuneration for the 
work itself not the finished article (athar al-camal) as in the first case. If the dura-
tion of an ijlirah contract has ended and the work has been carried out, and fin-
ished article is ready to be collected by the owner, there will be no liability on the 
ajlr afterwards. 221 If the performance of contract is hampered by impossibility, the 
wage is charged to the employer according to the event that has happened. If a 
transporter died before any of his contract had been carried out, the whole payment 
is waived. If he died during the course of the transportation, he will be paid 
proportional! y. 222 It is obvious that the person who will undertake the responsibility 
22l Ibid. 
222Jbn Nujaym, one of the writers of the rasti)il [collection of fatawa on fresh cases in 
which there is no textual authorities] of the I:Ianafi school, has spelt out the division of liabilities in 
the case of carriage of goods by sea. The full text reads : "I was asked on [the liability] a person 
who hires a ship [according to the Sharr'ah rules] to be used to transport goods (al-J:zaml) from 
Suez to Jiddah al-Ma<murah. He travelled with it and the ship sank during the voyage. The ship and 
the goods in it damaged. I was asked whether he is liable for the price of the hire or he only pay up 
to that time. I replied: He is liable to pay in terms of the distance that he has travelled as the ma'qad 
'alayh (object of contract) was manfa'ah (usufruct), not an accomplishment of work such as suknti 
al-dtir (benefit of abode), isti]tir al-dtibbah Li )l-rukab (hiring animal for riding) and the like. On 
the same issue, al-Zayla<r said: The mu)ajjir is not entitled to part payment except in suknti al-dtir 
and qaf' al-masafah (shortening the distance) as the ma'qad 'alayh in the contract is a benefit which 
is deliverable to the owner by the delivering of it. On the contrary, if the ma'qad 'alayh is 'amal 
such as khiyafah (tailoring), J:zaml (carriage of goods) and qa~r (bleaching) - the ajfr is not entitled 
to any payment at all. Payment of any fee will only take effect by completion of the work and hand-
ing it over to the owner. I mentioned that it has been cited in Fatliwli Qtiri) al-Hidtiyah that: If a 
sa.finah (carrier) sank or was damaged without any deed of the owner, he is not liable for {famtin 
neither is he entitled to any remuneration. I said: That is true in the case whereby a shipowner 
agreed to transport such goods to such a place. The ma'qad 'alyh is the obligation to transport 
(J:zaml). In the case with us now, the ma'qad 'alayh is benefit (manfa'ah). In Qari) al-Hidayah the 
case arose of whether the malltiJ:z employed by the shipowner was entitled to any payment if the 
ship sank. It was replied that he is entitled to payment in proportion to the work done. The malltiJ:z 
will be in the same position as rabb al-sa.finah because the ma'qad 'alayh is benefit. Al-MalltiJ:z 
could be an ajlr kha~~ in one occassion and ajfr mushtarak in another. If the malltiJ:z is meant for 
~ahib al-saftnah he is ajlr mushtarak. If it means that he is an employee in the ship, he is thus ajfr 
khti~~. It has appeared in al-Si raj al-Wahhtij that al-malltiJ:z is ~tiJ:zib al-sa.finah himself. In al-
Mi~btiJ:z, al-mallaJ:z is a shipbuilder or a shipwright (al-safftin). In al-Qamas, al-malltiJ:z is a salt 
trader, a mariner and a seafarer (nawtf). Al-Nawtf (as he sometime might be called) is both rabb al-
sa.finah and an ajlr. See lbn Nujaym, "Risfilat fi >1-Safinah .... ", Ms.Or.11338.20 fols. 56a-57b, 
London : British Library's Oriental Collection. This risalah has also been published in Rasti)il lbn 
Nujaym [edited by al-Shaykh Khalil al-Mis], Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-cllmiyyah, 1980. The subject 
of carriage of goods by sea has also been treated in Maritime, 1988, in which an edition of a manu-
script of lease of ships "Kitab Akriyyat al-Sufun" of Ibn Ahl Firas al-Malik.I has been done. 
(169) 
for damage (tabcat al-halak) is the madln who is the ajlr. This has been a standard 
rule in other contracts like sale (bay~ and partnership (sharikah) that in such a 
situation, the possible way out is the recission of the contract. 223 
3.14 Contract of Pledge (Rahn) 
Rahn consists of setting aside property from which it is possible to obtain 
payment or satisfaction of some claim.224 This subject has been dicussed in the 
preceding chapter in the realm of tawthlq al-dayn (security for debt). In this chap-
ter, the issues to be discussed relating to rahn is more on the ancillary matters 
which have something to do with liability and restitution. 
a] Liability as Regards Pledged Property. 
Rahn is conceived in certain schools of law as rjamlin from one side and 
amiinah from the other. This has been made the basis for determining the position 
of the pledgee (murtahin) as regards liability. The pledged property is a security 
for the creditor to the extent of the debt and what is beyond that is a trust on him. 
The J:lanafis ruled that the pledgee is a trustee (yadd amiinah) as regards the sub-
stance of the pledged property, eventhough at the same time he is considered as 
yadd al-istifa) (possessor of the right of redemption) as regards the value of it 
223For details see BadiiJic, vol.IV, p.203 ; al-Zaylacl, Tabyln al-lfaqii)iq, vol.V, p.109 ; 
Ibn cAbidln, Radd al-Mukhtar wa )I-Durr al-Mukhtar, vol.V, p.12. See also NG.?-.fJaman, p.169. 
224Maj. cAdliyyah, art.705. 
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(mliliyat al-marhan). 225 If the pledgee refuses to return the property to the pledgor 
because of damage or other reasons, the pledgee can regard this as redemption of 
his debt and thereby his privilege for (/,amlin is renounced. However, if the value 
of the property exceeds the debt, the remainder is a trust on the pledgee whereby 
all regulations on trust will apply. This standpoint was founded on the authority of 
two I:iadiths, one of which the Prophet said: "The pledge is set-off against the debt 
it is for"226. The other one was narrated from cAta? concerning a man who had 
pledged a horse, and it died while in the care of the pledgee. The pledgee went to 
see the Prophet and told him about the incident and the Prophet ruled : "You lose 
your right [to the debt]". 227 Based on these two I:iadiths, it is suggested that the 
pledgee will undertake the responsibility for any damage of the pledged property 
which will result in him loosing his claim for the debt. However, his liability is 
restricted to the extent of the debt owed to him by the pledgor. 
The dissenting view is backed by the Shafi'Is, Malikis, ijanbalis and the 
Shicah Imamiyah in which they held that the pledgee is in the position of a trustee 
and the same rules apply in the case of wadl(ah. Their argument is based on a 
l:iadith narrated by Abu Hurairah in which the Prophet said : "The pledged prop-
erty should not be barred from the owner, he will enjoy the benefit and shoulder 
the responsibility". 228 This view is closer to the spirit of the pledge itself as impos-
225 Nll?,.I;Jaman, p.170; Fiqh /sliiml, vol. V, p.267. 
226The text in Arabic reads:[ al-rahn bi mafih] or [idhii cummiya 'l-rahnfa huwii bi ma 
.fih] 
227This Q.adlth has been examined by Abii Dawiid in his Martisil and lbn Abi Shaybah in 
his Mu~naf This Q.adith is categorised as mursal (disconnected chain of narrators) and fia'if (weak). 
See Nll?,.Daman, p.171. 
228The text reads in Arabic as : [Iii yughlaq al-rahn min $iil}.ibih alladh'i rahanah, lahu 
ghunmuh wa calayh ghurmuh] There is a legal maxim akin to this Q.adith : [al-khariij bi 'l-{laman] 
which means : The enjoyment of a thing is the compensating factor for any liability attaching 
thereto. In the event of a a thing being destroyed, the person to whom such a thing belongs must 
suffer loss and conversely he may enjoy any advantages attaching thereto. See Maj. 'Adliyyah, 
art.85. 
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ing the pledgee with the liability will jeopardise his right in the whole rahn transac-
tion. If the debt is waived with the destruction of the pledged property, it will con-
tradict with the nature of tawthiq. The property lies in the hand of the pledgee by 
consent of the owner-pledgor. The consent reflects the agreement to appoint the 
pledgee holding the property on trust similar to the case of wadrcah. 229 
However, despite the previous view attributed to the Mfilikis, Malik him-
self is said to have further set a precaution by ruling the imposition on liability of 
the pledgee (tarfmin al-murtahin) when a dispute arose. This is true if the pledged 
property is of the type which is of transitory nature and it is quite difficult to 
prove transgression, negligence and any other fault if any damage or theft occurs. 
This is the reason why the law allows both parties to arrive at an agreement to 
deposit the pledged property with a third party known as al-cadf230. It is an alterna-
tive method to avoid any difficulties when any unwanted incidents took place. 
Some of the pledged property may be borrowed by the pledgor from some-
one else. The lender of property which has been given as security for. a debt may 
not claim such property from the pledgee until the debt in respect to which it has 
been given as security has been repaid.231Jn the event of the death in the state of 
bankruptcy of a person who has pledged borrowed property, such borrowed prop-
erty continues as a pledge in the possession of the pledgee and cannot be sold 
without the consent of the lender. Should the lender of the pledge seek to repay the 
debt by means of the sale of the pledge, such a pledge shall be sold independently 
229NGJ,.'f?amlin, pp.171-172. 
230He is a person to whom both the pledgor and the pledgee give their trust to hold the 
pledged proferty, taking care of it and maintaining it. 
23 Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.735 
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of the consent of the pledgee, provided that the value thereof is sufficient to meet 
the debt. If the value of the pledge is not sufficient to meet the debt, however, such 
pledge may not be sold without the consent of the pledgee. 232 
Another important issue which needs to be discussed is the question of the 
cost of maintaining the pledged property. It has been a unanimous agreement 
among the jurists that the owner-pledgor is responsible for the said cost by virtue 
of the legal maxim: "lahu ghunmuh wa (alayh ghurmuh." If the pledgor refused 
to pay the maintainance and the pledgee has to used his own expenses, he can 
claim from the pledgor. If the cost exceeds the value of the property, it is a debt on 
dhimmah of he pledgor, regardless of whether that is carried out by consent of the 
pledgor or otherwise. The Shafi9"s ruled that the pledgor can be forced to pay the 
maintenance if he is available and can afford the cost. If his whereabouts are 
unknown, the qtujJ can order maintenance of the pledge from any of his property 
available. If he is in financially difficult circumstances, the qa(jJ can give him a 
loan, sell part of the property or he can order the pledgee to maintain and the cost 
is a debt on the dhimmah of the pledgor. The pledgee can claim the cost of 
maintanance if it is executed by permission of the qa(jJ or at least witnessed by 
him.233 
b] Deriving Benefits From the Pledged Property 
When a property has potential of yielding benefit, the benefit needs to be 
utilised. Otherwise, it will be a waste which is prohibited by the law. The question 
232Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.736. 
233M.MulJ.taj, vol.II, p.136. 
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is, who is entitled to enjoy the benefit. The majority of jurists other than the 
Shafitts held that the pledgor (rahin) is prohibited from doing so. The Shafitts 
argued that benefitting is allowed so long as that does not jeopardise the right of 
the pledgee. The ijanafis requires that benefitting by the pledgor in use 
(istikhdiim), riding (rukub), wearing (labs), staying (suknii) must be permitted by 
the pledgee. The ijanbalis held the similar opinion that permission and consent 
need to be sought. The Mfilikis seek a stricter line arguing that if the pledgee con-
sented to the benefitting by the pledgor, that will disqualify the pledge, even if no 
actual benefit has been derived. On the contrary, the Shafitts held that the pledgor 
can benefit from the pledge which does not diminish by its use. However, the 
benefit and the increment of the pledge belong to the pledgor. If the use involves 
reduction of the value of the property like erecting a building or cultivating the 
pledged land, the pledgee's consent is needed in order to safeguard his rights.234 
Benefiting by the pledgee has been subject to a thorough scrutiny. The 
majority of jurists except the ijanbalis ruled that the pledgee is not allowed to 
benefit from the pledge. They have construed the authorities235 allowing gaining 
benefit in terms of milking (ma};lab) and riding (markab) to the extent of the cilaf 
(cost of maintenance mainly feeding) as exclusively applied to the case of pledgor's 
refusal to pay the cost of keeping the pledge. It appears that there is no contradic-
tion on this matter as the ijanbalis themselves allowed such benefitting in a 
restricted manner, wherein only riding and milking to recover the feeding cost are 
allowed. 236 
234Fiqh al-Islaml, vol.V, p.245. 
235 A report by al-Darqu~nI and I:Iakim reads : [al.-rahn markub wa mal)lub] means a 
pledged property can be rode and milked. Another report by al-Bukhari reads : [a/.-µzhr yurkab bi 
nafaqatih idhii kiinii marhunan] which means that : (the back of) a pledged riding animal can be 
ridden in return for the cost of maintenance]. See M.Mu~taj, vol.II, p.131. 
236Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihtiyat al-Muqta~id, vol.II, p.273. 
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The ij:anafis held that the pledgee is not allowed to benefit in any form 
except with pledgor' s permission. His right inherent in the property is merely the 
right of retention (IJ,aqq al-IJ,abs) and not right to gain benefit. If he actually gains 
benefit and the property suffers loss during such practice, he is liable as his stand-
ing is treated as similar to that of a usurper (gha~ib). Some ijanafis held that the 
permission granted by the pledgor to the pledgee to benefit made such benefit legit-
imate. Another group of ij:anafi scholars held that such practice is riba and thus 
prohibited it. Mere consent could not legitimise riba. Another opinion maintained 
that it is prohibited if benefiting has been made a condition of the contract. Other-
wise, it is permitted and such allowance is considered as a good gesture of the 
pledgor. The last opinion, according to Ibn cA.bidin is in line with the spirit of the 
legislation as it has been operating in that direction in the society and has been cus-
tomarily accepted. Despite that, it has been suggested that precaution (i}Jtiyaf) is 
vital in such matters as advocated by Islam. Any loan that derives benefit ( qartj 
jarra na.f an) attached to the contract as a condition (mashrufan) or as an accepted 
custom (mutacarifan) is riba.237 
The Mfilikis have come up with a similar but refined standpoint saying that 
benefiting by permission of the pledgor or by a condition attached by the pledgee 
to the contract is allowed if the debt in question involves a bilateral transaction 
(mucliwatjlit) like sale. In this respect, the duration involved must be spelt out so as 
237 Ashbiih.N, p. ??? In the Fatliwa Tatarkhaniyyah the text concerning this matter reads : 
"If a person asks for a loan (qaref) and surrenders his donkey to the creditor for use for a period of 
two months until the debt ie repaid or gives his house to be inhabited by him, it is treated as a 
voidable lease (ijlirah ftisidah) in which he has to pay a standard prevailing rent (ajr mithl). It does 
not by any means fall under the category of bayc al-wafli) which has some ground for exceptional 
rules, as the required characteristic of it is untenable. See NO?-.J?aman, p.257. 
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to avoid ignorance about the facts of the deal that might destroy ijarah as they are 
both sale and hire. What is allowed according to al-Dardlr is that the pledgee may 
gain benefit for himself free of charge or he will deduct it from the debt in order to 
gain earlier settlement of the debt. However, this is not allowed if the debt is a 
loan (qarr/) as it is a loan that derives benefit.238 A gift from a creditor is not 
allowed and has been prohibited by the Prophet in a l:tad1th : "If one gives a loan, 
he should not accept any present (before settlement of it). "239 
The standpoint of the Shafitts on this matter is similar to that of the 
Mfilikis. Their argument is based on the l:tad1th : "the pledged property should not 
be barred from the owner, he will [continue] enjoying the benefit and shoulder the 
responsibility. "240 The term ghunm signifies all sort of increments whereas ghurm 
signifies damages and depreciations. Therefore, the term ghunm in this context 
shows that all types of benefiting is an exclusive privilege of the pledgor-owner. If 
the pledgee stipulates any clause that will jeopardized the pledgor' s right, such is 
not legally recognized and it violates the I:iad1th : "any stipulation which could not 
be found in the Book of God is void". The contract is void because it contradicts 
the very essence of the transaction such as a stipulation which is detrimental to the 
pledgor' s interest. 241 However if the benefit is clearly indicated and spelt out, 
stipulating that the pledgee is allowed to benefit from the pledge, it is permitted 
provided that rahn is a condition in the sale. This is a combination of bayc and 
ijli.rah in one transaction such as a person saying: " I sold my horse to you for a 
238Al-Dardlr, al-Shar~ al-Kablr, vol.III, p.246; Ibo Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, 
p.273; Qawtinin, p.334. 
239This Q.adith is reported by Anas b. Malik in which the Prophet said : [ldhii aqrat)afa/.ii 
ya'khudh hadi.yyah]. See al-Shawkaru, Nayl al-Aw{tir, vol.V, p.231. 
240see notes supra, p .119. 
241Muhadhdhab, vol.I, p.268. Also see Ma~adir, vol.III, p.121; Sue Rayner, The Theory 
of Contract in Islamic Law, p.352. 
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hundred pounds provided that you will put your house as a pledge to me and I shall 
benefit from the house for a year. Some part of the horse is a sold property and 
some part provides the payment (ujrah) for the benefit derived from the house. "242 
The f:lanballs opined that in cases other than the one involving animals in 
which food is not needed to keep it, the pledgee is not allowed to benefit except by 
permission. Benefiting with a consideration (ciwafi) in the case of a loan is allowed 
by which a standard prevailing payment (ajr mithl) is payable to the pledgor, other-
wise it will be a prohibited loan that derives benefit. If rahn is given in form of 
price of a merchandise (thaman mabl~, rent of a house (ajr dar) or debt which is 
not a loan (dayn ghayr al-qarfi), the pledgor's permission will render gaining bene-
fit out of a pledge as lawful. One significant difference is that the f:lanballs allowed 
benefitting from an animal if it can be ridden or milked to the extent of the cost of 
feeding.243 Regarding this, Ibn al-Qayyim said in his /Clam al-Muwaqqicln that, the 
conventional requirement of complete equivalence in between the two objects of 
such a reciprocal transaction, is disregarded as that is difficult and God will excuse 
it. Other schools rejected this opinion as they argued that the badith that the 
f:lanbalis are relying on has been abrogated by a badith : "You should not milk an 
animal which belongs to others" .244 
c] Transactions Involving the Pledged Property 
242umm, vol.III, pp.146-148. Also see M.Mu}Jtaj, vol.II, p.121. 
243Mughnr, vol.IV, p.385; al-Buhufi, Kashshtif al-Qinlic, vol.III, p.342. 
244-rbe text reads : [/ii tal)lub miishiat imri'in bi ghayr idhnih] See al-$ancaru, Subul al-
Salam, vol.III, p.52 in which this l)adith has been verified by al-Bukhari under Abwab al-M~im 
can lbn cumar. Also see NG?..f?amiin, p.259. 
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Another issue is al-ta~arruf fl )l-rahn (right of disposition of the pledged 
property). Firstly, if the disposition is executed by the pledgor-owner, there legal 
standing of it will depend on whether the disposition takes place before or after 
tasllm (delivery), the point where all the legal consequences of rahn commence. 
The ij:anafis, Shafi 9"s and ij:anbalis agreed that if the transaction is made before 
tasllm and without the permission of the pledgee, it carries legal effect. This argu-
ment is based on the fact that the property is not yet attached to the right and inter-
est of the pledgee. The Mfiliki's differing argument lies in the fact that according 
to their doctrine rahn will take effect by the connection of offer and acceptance. 
Immediate! y afterwards, the pledgor is obliged to surrender the property. But they 
still held the transaction as valid and the price of the transaction is due to replace 
the pledge. However, if there is any deal to be made after tasllm, the consent of 
the pledgee needs to be sought as he has an inherent right in the pledged property. 
The ij:anafis said that the sale will be treated as mawqaf (suspended) until the 
pledgee gives his consent or the debt is repaid or the pledgee has released him on 
the basis of ibrii).245 
On the contrary, the pledgee is not allowed to proceed with any disposition 
without a consent from the pledgor-owner as the property is not his. The ij:anafis 
said that the pledgee's disposition be it a sale, gift, donation, lending and the like 
is suspended until the pledgee has consented. Otherwise, the transaction is 
invalidated. If the property is damaged during the execution of bayc (sale), hibah 
(gift), ~adaqah (donation) or cliriyah (lending), the pledgor has the right of option 
(khiyiir) whether the pledgee is liable for rjamiin in which no other individual will 
get involved, or the liability will fall on the party involved in the said disposition 
245 Fiqh Jslami, vol. V, pp.260-266. 
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(al-muta~arraf ilayh). In the latter situation, their knowledge about the breaking of 
the rules on pledge is immaterial in order to establish liability. In the case involv-
ing ijarah (lease), wadicah (custody) or another rahn (pledge) where damage took 
place therein, they will resort to option. The pledgor can choose whether to claim 
<f,amiln from the pledgee or from the muta~arraf ilayh. Nevertheless, in fact the 
liability still goes back to the pledgee as the muta~arraf ilayh is working for the 
pledgee in all those cases mentioned. The muta~arraf ilayh will be liable if his 
violation can be proven. 246 The Mfilikis shared the same line of argument as the 
ijanafis. 
Conclusion: Through this chapter, <J,aman is seen as the general notion of 
guarantee given to the contracting parties in their transactions. Its important role as 
inherent warranty in a contract (termed by some as <J,amiin al-caqd) and the remedy 
if such is needed, has provided a way out of any dispute that might arise. It will 
regulate the commercial dealings, whereby fair trading could be achieved. 
Businessmen are happy with the smooth running of the trading and the consumers, 
on the other hand will be satisfied and get a good deal. Furthermore, its function in 
regulating a fiducairy relationship is significant. The interested party will be pro-
vided with an assurance that his property will be safe or a least his right in it will 
be protected. If any wrongdoing is inflicted against him, the law will put it right, 
as far as it can, by awarding the affected party with an equitable remedies. 




METHODS AND PROCEDURES IN THE APPLICATION OF ))AMAN 
"The maxims of fiqh refer to the body of abstract rules which are 
derived from the detailed study of fiqh itself. They consist theoretical 
guidelines in the different areas of fiqh such as evidence, transactions, 
matrimonial laws, etc. As such, they are an integral part of fiqh and 
are totally separate from u~al al-jiqh." 
[M.Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p.5.] 
Treatment of the methods (qawiicid) and procedures in the application of 
<f,amlin is indispensible, in order to complement the theoretical discussion dealt 
with earlier. In order to deal with the subject of <f,amlin, it is necessary to 
understand the qawacid so that there can be a proper evaluation of the rulings in 
order to assess the actual transgressions and infringement that have taken place in 
human life. Accordingly, the violation of rights of others will give rise to the issue 
of compensation in the form of property (tacwi<f, mlili), settlement of disputes ifa# 
al-muna:zacilt), release from liabilities (al-takhallu~ min al-iltizilmlit) and so on. 
Such matters have become standard in the courts of law where people come to seek 
adjudication and remedies of their problems. 
Procedure (ijrii)lit) is the formal manner m which legal proceedings are 
conducted. The substantive law, the part of the law that deal with rights, duties and 
all other matters that are not purely of practice and procedure, need an efficient 
procedural principles to implement the law. Majid Khadduri notes that procedural 
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justice is the external aspect of the law of which substantive justice is realized. 
This aspect of justice, often called formal justice, is manifested in the degree of 
regularity, meticulousness and impartiality in the application of law .1 
4.1 Legal Maxims Associated with I)aman 
One of the means by which Islamic jurisprudence has sought to indicate the 
methods and procedures for the application of justice has been through what are 
called as legal maxims (qawlicid fiqhiyyah). Qacidah literally means foundation, 
essential or rudiment. This has been referred to in the Quran as God said : "And 
when Ibrahim and Ismacn had established the foundation of the House (of God). 
The grammarians uses the term qlicidah in the sense of al-~libi[ which means gen-
eral rule of Arabic grammar (nalJw). The fuqaha) defined the term qlicidah as the 
predominant ruling which is applied to the greater part of its particular [l/ukm 
aghlab;; yantabiq cala mu ~Zllm juz'iyyatih]. 2 Mu~ta.Ia Zarqa) put foward a com-
prehensive definition of qlicidah fiqhiyyah as: "The root maxim of fiqh, dedicated 
in concise text with regulatory nature, containing general rules of law on the issues 
that transpire under its theme" [ U~iil fUJhiyyah kulliyah ft nu~ii~ miijawh 
dustiiriyyah tata{lamman ahkaman tashficiyyah cammah ft 'l-IJ,awadith allafi 
tadkhul ta}J,ta mau{lii ciha] . 3 
1Justice, p.144. 
2AI-I:Iamawi, Ghamz, al-'Uyan al-Ba~teir cited in Sh.Baz, vol.I, p.2. 
3sh.Zarqte, pp.33-34. Also see his Madkhal, p.37. Al-SuyiiWs definition reads: "a general rule 
which applies to its particulars". See Ashbah.S, p.5; Falsafat, p.151. 
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Historically, the maxims of Islamic law were not articulated all at once. 
The concept and wording of the maxims have been developed gradually4, espe-
cially during the pinnacle development of fiqh, by great scholars who are qualified 
as ah! al-takhri)-5 and as ah! al-tarjllJ,. 6 This process draws its sources from the gen-
eral provisions of law (nu~a~ tashrlciyyah cammah), principles of Islamic jurispru-
dence (u~al al-fiqh), legal reasoning (cilal al-alJ,kiim) as well as from logical 
reasoning (muqarrarat caqliyyah).7 In terms of its actual wording (~Ighah), the 
maxim originates in some instances from the prophetic sayings or dictums regu-
larly used by the imams of the schools and their disciples. The final established 
maxim would gain prominence after a long process of discourse, evaluation and 
refinement. 8 
4.2 Analysis by Various Scholars of the Maxims 
4rt was recorded that the Caliph cumar b. al-Khattab sent a letter to Abii Musa al-Ashcan in which 
he commanded him saying, "know the semblances and the similitudes and collate matters to their 
likes [in giving judgements]." This shows that despite the statement made in the early days of 
Islamic caliphate, only later is the discipline of qawa'id fiqhiyyah is fully developed. See Ibn 
Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p.192. 
5 A person who is qualified in deriving the 'illah (legal effective cause) from a settled legal text. See 
Mu]am Lughat al-Fuqaha', p.125. 
6 A person who is qualified to examine various authorities on certain issue and able to evaluate and 
eventually set the order of preference among the authorities or opinions, ibid., p.128. 
7The I:Ianafis are considered the pioneers of this genre of legal sciene which was later followed by 
other schools. Early writings on the subjects are, among others, Ta'sis al-Na;.ar by Abii Tahir al-
Dabiisi, scholar of third and fourth century - from whom Abii Sa'id al-Hurawi of the Shafi'! school 
has taken the techniques of using the maxims and Qawti'id al-Imam Abi 'l-ljassan al-Karkhi, a 
prominent I:Ianafi's of the first generation of jurists. Later, each school has its own text on qawti'id 
.fiqhiyyah : [a] I:Ianafi : al-Ashbtih wa 'l-Na;.a'ir by Ibn Nujaym ; Majami' al-ljaqa'iq by 
Mul)ammad Abii Sacid al-Khadinii [with a commentary known as Manti.ft' al-ljaqii.'iq] ; Majallat al-
AJ}kam al-'Adliyyah ; al-Farti'id al-Bahiyyah ft 'l-Qawa'id wa 'l-Fawti'id al-Fiqhiyyah by Shaykh 
Malµniid l:lamzah [b] Shafi'! : al-Manthar ft Tartlb al-Qawa'id al-Fiqhiyyah by al-Zarkashi ; al-
Ashbtih wa 'l-Na;.a'ir by both Taj al-Din al-Subki and Jalfil al-Din al-Suyiiti ; Qawa'id al-AJ}kam ft 
Ma~tili~ al-Antim by Cizz al-Din CAbd al-CAziz b. CAbd al-Salam [c] Mfiliki : Kitii.b al-Furaq by 
Shihab al-Din AIJ.mad b. Idris al-Qurafi [d] I:Ianbali : Kitab al-Qawa'id ft 'l-Fiqh al-Islii.miyy by 
~bii >J-Faraj cAbd al-Ralµnan b. Rajah al-l:lanbali. See Madkhal, pp.37-44. 
Madkhal, p.36. 
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Applying to l)aman. 
There are a number of Islamic legal maxims which are crucial in treating 
the subject of fl-amiin or the process of taf/,mln occuring in various legal texts. Wah-
bah al-Zul)ayll has analysed the maxims as follows, according to the major issue 
involved, based mainly on the maxims embodied in the Majallat al-Al)kam al-
cAdliyyah9 : 
1] If a person perform any act personal! y and is implicated therein with the 
person who is the cause thereof, the person performing such act is 
responsible therefore [article 90] .1 O 
2] A person who performs an act is responsible, even though not inten-
tionally, and is liable to make good any loss caused thereby [article 92].11 
3] A person who is the cause of an act being performed is not liable to 
make good any loss caused by such act unless he has acted intentionally 
[article 93].12 
9The advantage to be gained from the maxims, according to the Majallah, is to facilitate the 
understanding of problems and principles and nothing more. Therefore, a judge may not base his 
judgement upon them unless they are endorsed by specific provisions in the traditions. See Falsafat, 
p.151. Cf. provisions in Maj.Shar'iyyah on ~aman found in the maxims from arts.1-160. These 
maxims are summary of lbn Rajah's al-Qawa'id. See the introductory notes of the edition 
Maj.Shar'iyyah by Abd al-Wahhab Abu Sulayman and Mul)ammad Ibrahim Al)mad <Aff, 1981, 
\'.31. 
0-rhe maxim reads : [idha ijtamaca 'l-mubashir wa 'l-mutasabbib yu{iiif al-IJukm ila 'l-mubashir]. 
Cf. Maj. Shar'iyyah, art.127. Direct destruction is the destruction of a thing without the intervention 
of any cause between the act and the result. Indirect destruction is doing something to one thing 
which would ordinarily lead to the destruction of something else; the destruction would then be the 
ordinary and patent result of the act. See Malµn~~arn, "Transaction in the Shan-cab," in Law in the 
Middle East edited by Majid Khadduri and Herbert Liebesny, pp.190-191. 
11 The maxim reads: [al-mubashir {iiimin wa in lam yatacammad] 
12The text reads: [al-mutasabbib la y<l{lmin ilia bi 'l-tacammud] 
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4] The responsibility for an act falls upon the author thereof ; it does not 
fall on the person ordering such act to be performed, provided that such 
person does not compel the commision thereof [article 89] .13 
5. Injury [must be] removed [article 20].14 
6. A person's conduct with regard to his absolute right is only legitimate if 
he does not harm others by it.15 
7. No person may deal with the property of another held in absolute owner-
ship without such person's permission [article 96] and no person may take 
another person's property without some legal reason [article 97].16 
8. An act endorsed by law cannot be made the subject of claim for com-
pensation [article 91] .17 
9. The enjoyment of a thing is the compensating factor for any liability 
attaching thereto ; that is to say, in the event of a thing being destroyed, the 
person to whom such thing belongs must suffer the loss and conversely may 
enjoy any advantages attaching thereto [article 85] ; Disadvantage is an 
obligation accompanying enjoyment. That is to say, a person who enjoys a 
13The maxim reads : [ Yu{laf al-f;,cf ilii 'l-fiicil Iii 'l-iimi.r mii lam yakun mujbiran]. 
14-rhe maxim reads : [al-{larar yuziil]. 
15This maxim is not included in the Majallah. Its Arabic text reads : [la$arruf al-insiin ft khiili$ 
haqqih innamii YD$ilJIJ idhii lam yata{larrar bihl ghayrah] 
i 6The maxim reads: [Iii yajiiz Ii al)ad an yala$arraf ft mi.lk ghayrih bi Iii idhnih] and the other one 
reads : [laysii Ii al)ad an ya'khudh miil ghayrih bi Iii sabab sharer]. See Majabtit, pp.56-57. 
17The maxim reads: [al-jawiiz al-sharci yuniift al-{lamiin] 
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thing must submit to the disadvantages attaching thereto [article 87] ; The 
burden is in proportion to the benefit and the benefit to the burden [article 
88]. l 8 
10. Remuneration and liability to make good loss do not accompany each 
other [article 86] .19 
11. The guarantor owns the guaranteed property from the moment it is taken 
into possession. 20 
12.Necessity does not invalidate the right of another [article 33].21 
13. Something which cannot be safeguarded from destruction should not be 
burdened with liability. 22 
14. The hand [holding possess10n of a property] is responsible until he 
returns it or indemnifies it. 23 
18 Article 85 reads : [td-khariij bi '1-{lamiin ] ; Article 87: [td-ghurm bi '-ghunm] ; and article 88 : 
[td-nicmah bi qadr td-niqmah wa '1-niqmah bi qadr td-nicmah]. See Sh.Zarqa', p.437. 
l 9The maxim reads: [td-ajr wa '1-{iamiin Iii yajtamiciin]. This rule will only apply if ajr and ¢aman 
share the same basis and direction, whereby they cannot co-exist. For instance a person cannot be a 
truthful employee and a liable usurper at the same time. Similarly, qi~ii~ and diyat cannot 
accompany each other, based on the same premise. See Sh.Zarqa', p.431. 
20niis maxim is not part of the Majallah but considered by Wahbah al-Zul)ayll as complimentary to 
the previous two maxims. It has a ijanafi origin and has been applied therein. See NOJ,./)aman, 
~l.219-223. 
The maxim reads :[td-iflliriir Iii yubfil IJaqq td-ghayr] 
221t is not part of the Majallah. The text reads: [ mii Iii yumkin td-i/Jtiriiz canh Iii {iamiin fih]. 
231t originates from a l)adith which reads: [cal.a '1-yadd mii ukhizat !Jattii tu'addih]. See al-~ancaru, 
Subul al-Salam, vol.III, p.67. Cf.Maj.Sharriyyah, art.43 on ffamiin in respect of properties by 
virtue of a contract or a possession. 
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15. When the original undertaking cannot be carried out the equivalent 
thereof is carried out [article 53].24 
16. There will be no liability in cases of caretaking if one has exerted his 
utmost.25 
17. The testimony of a trustee is accepted for the purpose of excluding him-
self from liability but not for the purpose of imposing liability on others. 26 
18. No liability attaches in connection with offences of or damage caused by 
animals of their own accord [article 94]. 27 
19.A condition must be observed as far as possible [article 83].28 
20.An approval sanctions the action. 29 
Mul)ammad Fawz'i FayQ Allah in his N~ariyyat al-J?aman ft )l-Fiqh al-
cJmm has listed twelve maxims which he described as the most important qawacid 
in treating tjaman in Islamic law. Unlike Wahbah ZuhaylI , FawzI's list was based 
24-rhe maxim reads :[idha tacadhdhar al.-a# yu~ar Ua 'l-badal].Cf Maj.Sharciyyah, art.143. 
25The maxim reads :[La rjamiin cal.a 'l-mubaligh ft 'l-l)if.z]. Cf. the maxim of Mufti Malµniid 
l:Iamzah : [la rjamiin cal.a 'l-sa'i mii kana ~iidiqan wa mutalPJ[.iman. See his al-Fara'id al-
Bahiyyahft 'l-Qawacid wa 'l-Fawa'id al-Fiqhiyyah, pp.136-139. 
26The maxim reads: [yuqbal. qawl a/.-amin bl bara'at nafsih La.ft ilziim al.-rjamiin cal.a 'l-ghayr]. 
27The maxim reads: Uinayat a/.-cujamii' jubbar]. 
28The maxim reads : [yulwm muracat a/.-sharf bi qadr al-imkan]. 
29The maxim reads: [al.-ijawh ta/.l)aq al.-a.riil]. 
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more on establishing the theoretical foundation of the subject. He placed the 
maxim on the obligation to remove injury30 on top of the list as it is the bedrock of 
the practice of {l,amlin. Subsequently, he mentioned the maxim on rejection of 
necessity as a defence from liability31 as well as the principal maxims like : legal 
endorsement is a waiver from liability32, enjoyment of a privilege is balanced with 
burdening of a liability33 and the legal standing of a person holding posession of a 
property (dhu )l-yadd). He then referred to the maxims dealing with the disposition 
of the property of another34 and finally with maxims on the liability of the person 
who performs the action (al-mubiishir) and the person who is the cause to the per-
formance ( al-mutasabbib). 35 W ahbah Zul)ayl"i' s list instead started with the maxims 
on the last issues on Fawzl' s list, which can be viewed as his priority concerning 
methods of establishing liability. He came up with more maxims than Fawzl 
simply because he has included not only principal maxims but also the subsidiaries. 
Subhi Mahmassani's list of maxims dealing with contracts and torts has 
been embodied in his Falsafat al-Tashrrc ft )l-lsliim as well as his al-Na;,riyyat al-
cA_mmah Ii )l-Mujibiit wa ;z_cuqud, which was also mainly based on the Majallah. 36 
30 Article 20, supra. 
31Article 33, supra. 
32 Article 91, supra. 
33 Article 85, supra. 
34 Article 96 and 97, supra. 
35Nll!-./)aman 'Amm, pp.213-214. 
36-rbe maxims of the Majallah which have been listed by Mahmassani are articles 3 [a contract is 
judged by intention], article 19 [on tortious liability], article 20 [on removal of injury], article 25 
[on prohibtion of removing an injury by administering a similar injury], article 53 [on substitution 
in compensation], article 57 [on the requirement of taking possession in a gratuitous contract], arti-
cle 58 [on the management of a citizen's affairs], article 59 [on the supremacy of private 
trusteeship], article 67 [on the value of silence], article 69 [on the value of written contract], article 
70 [on the testimony of a dumb person], article 72 [on the value of a conjecture obviously tainted 
by error], article 82 [on stipulations], article 83 [on sustenance of a stipulation], article 84 [on a 
promise which is dependent on a condition is binding], article 86 [on remuneration and liability 
which does not accompanying each other], article 89 [on the liability of an author of the action not 
the person ordering it], article 90 [on the liability of the direct author], article 91 [on waiver of 
liability by legal permission] , article 92 [on liabilities on a direct author of action], article 93 [on 
the waiver of an indirect author of action], article 94 [on liability in connection with injury caused 
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He listed thirty maxims, m numerical order as m the Majallah, which makes 
reference to it easier. They are similar to Zul)aylI's list except for a few additions. 
Among those are, the maxim that intention in contract is paramount to that of any 
formal pattem37, the maxim on the requirement of qabfi, in a gratuitous contract38 , 
the maxim on testimony of a dumb person 39 and others. However, Mahmassani's 
classification of topical groupings of the maxims is worthy of further analysis, at 
least to be adopted as a model in looking into a specific case like fi,aman. 
Mahmassani begins his explanation of his list by highlighting the rule of 
necessity and need. Rules of law, according to him, have been so designed as to be 
general in nature so as to consider all situations and all individuals. This character-
istic, however, in certain circumstances will bring about injury and injustice. Thus, 
it becomes necessary to lighten the peoples' burden by disregarding the rules. 
Mahmassani quoted the maxim hardship begets facility40 which is backed by the 
plea of juristic preference (isti~san), or public interest (ma~ali~ mursalah) or by an 
explicit textual authority. He cited an example by applying the maxim to a case of 
loan transaction in which a debtor is in financial difficulty. If the inability of the 
by animals], article 95 [on invalidity of an order to deal with property of others], article 96 [on 
prohibition to deal with the property of another without permission], article 97 [on prohibition to 
take another person's property without legal cause] .See Falsafat, pp.206-207. 
37 Article 3 : In contracts, effect is given to meaning and intention and not to words and forms. The 
maxim reads in Arabic as : [ a/.-cibrah ft 'l-cuqiid Li 'l-maqa#d wa 'l-macanl la 'L-aJ.ra,. wa 'l-
mabani]. 
38 Article 57 : a gratuitous favour becomes complete only by taking possession. The term delivery 
has been used in various occassion but does not in actual fact represent the term qabfl, but instead 
tasllm. The maxim reads in Arabic : [ La yatimm a/.-tabarruc ilia bi 'l-qabf[]. 
39 Article 70 : The recognized sign of a dumb person take the place of a statement by word of 
mouth. The maxim reads in Arabic as : [a/.-isharah a/.-machiidah Li 'l-akhras ka 'l-bayan bi 'l-
lisan]. 
40The maxim reads in Arabic as : [a/.-mashaqqah tujlib al-tayslr] 
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debtor to pay his debt is established, payment by instalment may be permitted. 41 
He also quoted Ibn Rajah's maxim : a person who destroys a thing to ward off an 
impending injury from it is not liable to pay compensation. 42 The notion that 
hardship is the cause for facility has been a basis for many legal rules such as 
loans, transfer of debts, incapacity and others.43 On this matter, 'AII ijaydar com-
mented: 
"Whenever any difficulty (~ucabah) represses [certain performance], 
it became a reason for relief (tashll). In other word, it is necessary 
to allow widening (tawsr') [of such facility] in such a strenuous 
time. Indeed, the facilities afforded by the Sharrcah (al-tashrlat al-
sharciyyah) by allowing qarfj, IJawlilah, IJijr, wa~iyyah, salam, 
iqlilat al-bayc, rahn .... . all are based on this maxim as the permis-
sion is for the purpose of eliminating the hardship (mashaqqah) and 
offering facility. This is known as rukh~ah. ,,44 
Al-GhazfilI maintains that all prohibited things become permissible by 
necessity45 and corresponds to the maxim : "Necessity renders prohibited things 
permissible. "46 This rule is not absolute as there are certain limitations to it. In 
analysing this maxim, Subhi Mahmassani noted that permissibility is limited by 
41This leniency is founded on the basis of a Qur>anic provision which reads : "And if the debtor is 
in straitened circumstances, then let there be postponement to the time of ease" [ wa in kiina dhii 
cusrahfa nflli,ratun ilii maysarah]. See Q., al-Baqarah [2] : 280. 
42Qawa'id, p.36. Cf.Maj.Shar'iyyah, art.26 
43Falsafat, p.154. See article 673 [on transfer of debt], article 941 [on legal impediments], article 
32 [on level of need which become a necessity], article 118 [on bay' al-wafa'], article 957 [on the 
category of people prohibited from managing their property], article 964 [on impediment on a per-
son who might harm the public], article 1523 [on the notice for dismissal of an agent]. 
44Rukh~ah literally means widening, relief, easiness etc. Technically, it means the rules (aJ:zkiim) are 
decided on the basis of the inability to perform by virtue of a prohibiting injunction (al-i'dhar ma'a 
qiytim al-dalrl al-muJ:zarram) as a facility for the hardship. This can be treated as an exceptional 
situation whereby there is a departure from the original rule (known in u~al al-fiqh as 'azlmah). For 
instance permission has been granted by law on practices like bay' al-salam (sale for future 
delivery), bay' al-mu'ii!ti.h (sale by mere gesture, without the conventional pronouncement of ljab 
and qabal), J:zawtilat al-dayn (transfer of debt) and so on. See Durar, vol.I, pp.30-31. Kamali 
termed rukh~ah concession and 'azTmah strict rule. See his Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
p~.167. 
~ Wajrz, vol.II, p.216. 
46Maj. 'Adliyyah, Art.21 reads : [al.-(iariiriit tubllJ al.-malJ.plriit]. See Durar, vol.I, p.31. 
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textual authority (na~~), by the extent of the necessity and by the time of the neces-
sity. As far as limitation by text is concerned, he quoted lbn Nujaym's saying that, 
"Hardship may be pleaded only when no text exists" .47 On limitation by extent, he 
referred to the maxim "Necessity is estimated by the extent thereof'48 as well as 
the maxim "Injury is removed as far as possible"49. He concluded by saying that 
necessity is an exceptional circumstance and as such should be given a narrow and 
restricted interpretation. Thus any authorization that may be deemed necessary 
should not be absolute but should be to the extent required for meeting the 
hardship. Limitation by time is viewed on the basis that licence by necessity or the 
exceptional rules, remains valid so long as the excuse or the cause of the urgency 
exists. If this exceptional circumstance ceases, the licence also ceases and there 
would be a return to the original principle. 50 
Another issue discussed in this context is whether or not allowance be given 
to necessity when it conflicts with some other necessity. The Majallah ruled that 
"the lesser of the two evils is preferred". 51 This maxim has been the fountain of 
many other supplementary maxims such as warding off public injury52 which are 
exemplified in the prohibition of an incompetent physician (al-tablb al-jahil) from 
47 Ashbtih.N, p.33. This is the view of Abu ijarnfah and Mul;iammad al-Shaybaru. Abu Yusuf, dis-
agreed and based on his opinion on isti~san (juristic preference). He opined that the text should be 
discarded in favour of the custom (curf). The strength of a textual authority, nevertheless, has not 
been affected by such view and remains superior to that of curf as a secondary source of Islamic 
Law. 
48Maj. cAdliyyah, art.22 reads : (al.-{lariirah tuqaddar bi qadarihii] or [mii ubll}.a Li 'l-{lariirah 
yataqaddar bi qadarihii]. 
49 Article 31, supra. 
50Maj. cAdliyyah, art.23 provides : "Whatever is permissible owing to some excuse ceases to be 
~ermissible with the disappearance of that excuse"[miijiizii Li cudhr ba{ala bi zawiilih] 
1 Article 29 which reads : fyukhtiir ahwan al.-sharrayn]. According to <Ali ijaydar this article is 
akin to that of article 28 which reads : [idhii taciira{la mafsadatiin riiciyii a~zamuhumii {lararan bi 
irtikab akhaffihimii]. See Durar, vol.I, p.37. . 
52Maj. cAdliyyah, art.26 reads : A private injury is tolarated in order to ward off a public injury 
fyatal}.amnud al.-{larar al.-kh~~ Li daf' al.-{larar al.-ciimm]. 
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practise and the prohibition of an insolvent artisan (al-makiirl al-muftis) in order to 
protect the general public from any harmful consequences to their well-being. 
Subhi Mahmassani further highlighted the issues like price control (tasclr)53 of 
commodities by the government in situations of monopoly, forcing a monopolist to 
sell his stocks of food in cases of need and the like. 54 Warding off evil is another 
corollary principle. If there be a conflict between warding off an evil and securing 
benefit, the former is given preference over the latter. 55 The ijanafi school built 
upon this principle the theory of the abuse of right (nG.?.ariyat al-tacassuf ft isWmlil 
al-IJaqq). It provided that a person may be denied the exercise of his right if such 
exercise should result in "excessive injury" to others. 56 
4.3 Intention in Actions 
In applying ~aman, it is necessary to determine a person's action in order to 
establish liability. Every action of a human being must stem from his will that ise 
his choice of such action. This act of will is termed intention (niyyah). In Islamic 
law an act is judged in light on the intention or the purpose it seeks to carry out. A 
l)adith of the Prophet reads : "Deeds are judged by intentions and every person is 
judged according to his intentions". 57 Thus an act has been linked to intentions as 
53For details on price regulation, see Abdul Azim Isiahi, Economic Concept of lbn Taimiyah, 1988, 
pp.93-102. This subject will be discussed in further detail in the forthcoming chapter on the role of 
hisbah in application of flam/in. 
54Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqtit, vol.II, p.350; lbn Qayyim, al-Turuq al-ljukmiyyah, p.223 and 233. 
55 Maj. cAdliyyah, art.30 reads : Repelling an evil is preferable to securing a benefit [dar' a/,-mafiisid 
awlii minja/.b a/.-ma$iilil}]. See Ashbah.S, p.62; Ashbtih.N, p.36. 
56Details on the theory of the abuse of right can be found in an excellent work of Fatij.1 al-Darim, 
Ncq.ariyat al-Tacassuf ft lsticmal al-ljaqq fl 'l-Fiqh al-lslami, 1968. See also Majabtit, vol.I, p.45. 
57Badr al-Din al-<Ayni, cumdat al-Qari' li SharJ:z al-Bukharl, p.34. The Qadith reads : [inama 'l-
acmiU bi 'l-niyyiit wa innama Li kulli imri'in mii nawii] 
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may be discerned in the maxim : "Matters are determined according to 
intention". 5B That is to say, the effect to be given to any particular transaction must 
be in accordance with the intent underlying that transaction. 59 
Among other corollary maxims is : "In contracts effect is given to intention 
and meaning and not words and forms". 60 This means that in the event of a dif-
ference between intention and outward expression, the judgement should be in 
accord with the intention to the extent that it may be ascertained as consideration 
should be given to the meaning and not to literal wording. 61 For instance, it is 
known that a contract for the use of a thing is called i}lirah (hire) if a remuneration 
is stipulated as a consideration of such a use and it is called qar¢ (loan) if no such 
remuneration is stipulated. If two persons conclude a contract apparently of a loan 
but in consideration for which a specific rental is provided for, the contract would 
be regarded as a contract of hire as its real meaning indicates and not a contract of 
loan as the wording of the contract would suggest. 62 
This rule applies if no third party's right is dependent upon the outward 
expression. If such rights be involved, effect should be given to the outward mean-
ing with a view to safeguarding the people from injustice. Nevertheless, an inten-
tion should be known if it is to be effected. Thus if a divergence exist between the 
intention and the outward connotation and there is difficulty in ascertaining the 
58Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.2 which reads: [al-umiir bi maq~idi.ha]. See Sh.Baz, vol.I, pp.17-19. 
59Falsafat, p.160. 
60Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.3 reads : fal-'ibrah ft 'l-'uqiid Li 'l-maqii$id wa 'l-ma'iin'i la 'L-alra;. wa 'l-
mahiinfj. See Sh.Baz, vol.I, pp.19-20. 
61 Falsafat, p.160. 
62Majabtit, vol.II, p.28-31. 
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intention, effect should be given to the outward connotation. 63 The Majallah says 
: "In obscure matters the proof of a thing stands in the place of such a thing". This 
is to say, obscure matters in which it is difficult to discover the truth are judged 
according to the obvious proof concerning their outward connotation. 64 Above all, 
knowledge of intention is important because it determines the correct juridical rule 
and failure to apprehend it makes it necessary to have recourse to outward mean-
mg. 
This principal maxim on intention has also served as a basic guideline for 
intepretation of legal rules in Islam. For instance, the Majallah provides that: "In 
principle, words should be construed according to their real meaning"65 However, 
in certain situation the metaphorical meaning is upheld by virtue of the maxim: 
"When real meaning cannot be applied, the metaphorical sense may be used". 66 
Abu ijanifah said that effect should be given to the real not the metaphorical. His 
two disciples, Abu Yusuf and al-ShaybanI, al-GhazfilI and other jurists held that 
preference should be given to the metaphorical and the customary if they have 
become generally accepted and predominant. Hence, the Majallah ruled that "the 
real meaning is to be disregarded in favour of that established by custom". 67 There 
are a few other maxims which are essential for interpretation of legal rules like : 
63This is supported by a l,tadith : "We give judgement on the basis of the apparent [evidences], God 
takes care the inward intention" [l)akamna bi 'L-lJlwiihir wa Allah yatawallii al-sarli>ir]. See al-
A.midi, al-l~klimft U~al al-A~klim, vol.III, p.91 ;Muhadhdhab, vol.II, p.86. 
64Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.68 which reads : [dalll al-shay' ft 'L-umiir al-biifinah yaqiim maqlimuh]. For 
discussion on certain cases involving fiamii.n see Sh.Zarqii.), pp.49-53. 
65Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.12 which reads : [al-a$f fi 'L-kaliim al-l)aqlqah]. 
66Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.61 which reads: [idhii ta'adhdharat al-l)aqlqah yu~lir ilii 'L-majii.z]. 
61Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.40 which reads: [al-l)aqiqah tutrak bi daliilat al-'iidah]. . 
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[a] Article 13 : "No attention shall be paid to inference in the face 
of an explicit statement". 68 
[b] Article 67 : "No statement is imputed to a man who keeps 
silence , but silence is tantamount to a statement where there 1s a 
necessity for speech". 69 
[c] Article 64 : "The absolute is construed in its absolute sense, pro-
vided that there is no proof of a restricted meaning either in the 
explicit text or by implication" . 70 
[ d] Article 66 : "A question is considered to have been repeated in 
the answer". 71 
[ e] Article 65 : "A description with reference to a thing present is of 
no consequence but the contrary is the case if such a thing is not 
present". 72 
68The maxim reads : [iii cibrata Li 'l-daliilahft muqiibalat al-la$r'i/}]. 
69The maxim reads : [iii yunsabu ilii siikit qawl Lakin al-sukiitft macrar) al-l}iijah bayiinJ 
70nie maxim reads : [al-muf[aq yajn calii if[iiqih idhii lam yaqum dalll al-taqyld na$$an aw 
daliilatan I 
71 The maxim reads : [al-su'iil muciidft 'l-jawiib]. 
72The maxim reads : [al-Wa$/ ft 'l-J)iit!ir laghw waft 'l-ghii'ib muctabar]. In cases where the object 
of sale is present and its characteristics are apparent, there is no need for elucidation. If the descrip-
tion is erroneous, it has no effect. But if the object of sale is not present, its characteristic is 
presumed to be uknown and therefore requires exposition. Maj. 'Adliyyah art.310 provides : "If the 
vendor sells property supposedly of desirable quality and such property is devoid of a such quality, 
the purchaser has the option of either cancelling the sale or of accepting the thing sold for the whole 
of the fixed price. This is called option for misrepresentation. See Falsafat, pp.166-167. 
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[fj Article 63 : "A reference to part of an indivisible thing is 
regarded as a reference to the whole". 73 
4.4 Methods to Establish Liability. 
Evidence and proof is of supreme importance in the administration of jus-
tice and so to serve as restrainer to false, weak and unsubstantiated claims. 74 The 
l)adith of the Prophet says : "If people's claims were accepted on their face value, 
some persons would claim other people's blood and properties but the oath falls on 
the defendant. ,,75 By virtue of this general rule, a claim though genuine, is of no 
consequence if the claimant is unable to produce a proof. Only substantiated claims 
are upheld even though they are based upon some secretly forged but apparently 
sound proof. Regarding this matter, the Prophet gives a resolute warning: 
"You come to me for adjudication. Perhaps some of you have astute 
arguments compared to others. Should I adjudicate in favour of a 
litigant against his brother upon the former' s statements while the 
latter in reality is in the right, then I would only be handing the for-
mer a piece of hellfire. Let him not take it. "76 
a] Rules of Islamic Law of Evidence as they Affect 
l)aman. 
73The maxim reads : [ dhikr bac{i mii la yaJajau.a' ka dhikr kulluh]. 
14Falsafat, p.168. On methods of establishing liability according to classical Islamic law see 
Khadijah Jaafar, al-Bayyindt al-Muthbitah li 'l-ljuqaq, Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of al-
Azhar, Cairo, 1988. 
75see Muslim, $alJIIJ Muslim, vol.V, p.128. · 
76This Q.adith is narrated by Bukhari. See al-cAyni, cumdat al-Qari', vol.XIII, p.257. In light of the 
ordinary mechanism of administration of justice in Islam, a person found guilty of having, of his 
own accord, given evidence concerning a fact of which he is ignorant, even if his evidence was 
indeed the truth, must be sentenced to the correctional punishment laid down by the law. See 
M ukhta~ar, p. 280. 
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In litigation 77 be it judicial or otherwise, there are at least two parties, the 
plaintiff (mudda cl) and defendant (mudda ca calayh). There is a link between the 
notion of evidence and definition of plaintiff under the Sharlcah. Samir Saleh sug-
gested that a plaintiff is not merely the litigant who initiates judicial or arbitration 
proceedings. According to him, a plaintiff is the litigant who, by lodging a claim 
before a qlif/,l or an arbitrator, as the case may be, disrupts an apparently normal 
state of affairs by alleging that this state of affairs does not conform with his 
rights. A classical example cited in textbook of Islamic law is that pertaining to an 
individual who claims that he is the rightful owner of a moveable property in the 
possession of another. The defendant is the party who admits or denies the 
plaintiff's claim.78 
There is no doubt that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. This is 
explained by the fact that what is apparent is presumed to be the original state and 
any one who makes a claim to the contrary must prove such a claim. The function 
of such evidence, according to the Majallah is : "The object of evidence is to prove 
what is contrary to apparent fact whereas the object of the oath is to assure the con-
tinuance of the original state". 79 There is another maxim on the matter : "The bur-
den of proof is on him who alleges ; the oath on him who denies". 80 The justifi-
cation for placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff rests on two grounds; firstly, 
77see Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1613; Emile Tyan, "Dacwa," E/(2), vol.II, pp.171-172. See Mu'in, p.54 
and 151-15 5. 
78Arbitration, pp.59-60. Also see Falsafat, pp. 169-170. For definitions of plaintiff and defendant 
in the classical work of Islamic law see al-Marghinaru, al-Hidayah, vol.III, p.142. For modem 
work see cAll Quracah, Kittib al-U~al al-Qa~a'iyyahft 'l-Murafa'at al-Shar'iyyah, 1925. 
79Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.77 which reads : [al-bayyinah Li ithbiit khiliif al-µihir wa 'l-yamln Li ibqii' al-
a$[]. See Sh.Raz, vol.I, p.51. 
80Maj. 'Adliyyah, art. 76: [al-bayyinah 'ala 'l-muddaCf wa 'l-yamln 'ala man ankara]. 
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the existing situation presumed to be the original and normal state of affairs and it 
is up to the plaintiff to establish the contrary; secondly, a person summoned before 
the qa(IJ or the arbitrator is presumed to be free from liability. 81 
Therefore, if someone claims something from another party, it is his duty 
to prove it because a defendant is presumed to be free from liability. The Majallah 
provides : "Freedom from liability is a fundamental principle". 82 This was one of 
the principle upon which the Shafitt jurists based their theory of isti~IJab (presump-
tion of continuity)83 and upon which a similar maxim is formed that : "it is a fun-
damental principle that a thing shall remain as it was originally. "84 Accordingly, 
"judgement shall be given in respect to any matter which has been proved at any 
particular time, unless the contrary is proven. "85 The principle of freedom from 
liability necessitates the rejection of an unsubstantiated claim and requires a return 
to the original state. 
In establishing (/,amlin, there are two maxims which relate to the question of 
presuming the existence of the original attributes. The first maxim reads : "Things 
81Arbitration, p.60. For detailed treatment see Minhtij, p.506. 
82Article 8: [al-a# barii'at al-dhimmah]. See Sh.'Z.arqa', p.114. 
83Literally isti~}Jtib means escorting and companionship. Technically, it denotes that facts or rules 
of law and reason, whose existence or non-existence had been proven in the past are presumed to 
remain so for lack of evidence to establish any change. In other words, isti~}Jiib presumes con-
tinuance of both the positive and negative until the contrary is established by evidence. In the posi-
tive sense, isti~}Jtib requires that once a contract of sale is concluded, it is presumed to remain in 
force until there is a change. Thus, the ownership of a purchaser is presumed to continue until trans-
fer of ownership can be established. A mere possibility that the property in question might have 
been sold is not enough to rebut the presumption of isti#:zab. However, if the law only validates a 
contract on a temporary basis, such as lease and hire, then isti~}Jab cannot presume its continuity on 
a permanent basis. The contract will continue to operate within the specified period and terminate 
when the period expires. See Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
~p.377-378. Details can be found in fiam, vol.I, p.294. . 
4 Article 5 : [al-a# baqii' ma kiina cala mii kiina] 
85 Article 10 : [mti thabata bi zamiin yu~kamu bi baqa'ih mii. lam yaqum al-dalil (ala khilafih] 
(197) 
which have been in existence from time immemorial shall be left as they were, "86 
and the second reads : "Injury cannot exist from time immemorial, "87 There are 
two kinds of attributes, namely original and intervening. 88 Consequently, the 
Majallah provides : "Non-existence is a fundamental presumption attached to inter-
vening attributes. For example, in the case of a partnership of capital and labour, if 
a dispute arises as to whether or not profit has been made, the statement of the per-
son supplying labour is heard and the owner of the capital must prove that profit 
has in fact been made". 89 
The principle of burden of proof on the claimant has an exception which 
reads : "A trustee [person to whom a property has been entrusted for safekeeping] 
making a statement upon oath is worthy of credit". 90 Thus, if a person who has 
entrusted his property to another party for safekeeping brings an action against that 
person, who in tum alleges that he has returned the property entrusted to him, the 
trustee shall be believed if he swears that he has discharged his obligation. This 
provision is contrary to the general rule because the trustee is a making a claim 
contrary to the apparent fact and by analogy should be asked to prove his claim 
that he has returned his trust. 91 
86Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.6 : [al-qadim yutrak 'ala qidamih] 
87 Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.7 : [al-f[arar Iii yakunu qadiman] 
88The original are those which existed with the object initially like presuming that a person who has 
reached the age of majority is of sound mind because the attribute opf sanity is fundamental with 
majority and exists with it iniatially. The intervening or transitory attribute does not exist initially 
with the object described. Madness and drunkness, for instance, are qualities not presumed to exist 
originally and a person who claims their existence must prove his contention. See Falsafat, p.171. 
89Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.9 : [al-a# ft al-$ifiit al-'iiri<fah al-'adam - fa idhii ikhtalafa shankii 'l-
mu(liirabah .ft QU$iil 'l-ribl) wa 'adamih fa 'l-qawl Li 'l-mu(liirib wa 'l-bayyinah 'ala rabb al-miil Li 
ithbiit al-ribl)] 
90Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1774 : [al-amin ya$duq bi yamlnihfi barii'at dhimmatih] 
91 Falsafat, p.171. 
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Claims for c)aman, be it in the sense of kafalah or gharamcih will take the 
form of any claim relating to property (dacwa )l-mal) that is by admission (iqrar), 
oral testimony (bayyinah wa shahadah) and oath (yamln). 92 Before elucidating each 
of the classical forms of evidence as stated, together with other rules like presump-
tions and documentary evidence, it is important to see the procedure involving 
financial matters in Islamic law. The process begins with a claim (dacwa; {alab) in 
which a plaintiff lodges a claim stating who the defendant is and the definite sub-
ject and amount of the claim. The claim may be in written or verbal form. It must 
be made in mcijlis al-qac)a) and in the presence of the adversary (kha~m). 
Subsequent! y, in the second stage, the qac)l will invite the defendant who is 
obliged to appear to answer the plaintiff's claim. If the defendant admits the claim, 
the qa¢l should adjudicate in favour of the plaintiff. On the other hand, if he 
denies the claim (nukul), the qac)l will have to invite the plaintiff to adduce evi-
dence (bayyinah) which will be mainly oral testimony. The dispute should then be 
decided promptly and upon satisfactory evidence. However, if the plaintiff fails to 
adduce the testimonial evidence required by the Sharlcah, he may administer the 
oath (yamln) to the defendant. If the defendant swears that the claim is groundless, 
the plaintiff's claim will be dismissed. If the defendant refuses to take an oath, the 
case will be decided in favour of the plaintiff. 93 
b] Admission 
92Mutlif<it, p.297. 
93Arbitration, pp.60-61. For details see Mu'In, p.54; Tab~irat, vol.I, p.133; Muhadhdhab, vol.II, 
p.310; MughnI, vol.IX, p.84; Mul)ammad Rakan :Oayf Allah al-Daghml, Da'wa al-Tanaqu(i wa )l-
Daf ft al-Shari'ah al-lslamiyyah, pp.39-52. Cf. Ibn Nujaym, Rasa)il Ibn Nujaym, p.307. 
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Admission of the defendant of a claim for cjaman is the strongest proof to 
establish the plaintiff's claim. The Quran ruled that : "O ye who believe ! Be ye 
staunch in justice, witness for God even though it be against yourself." 94 It is 
futher affirmed by the l)adith : "Speak truth even though it be against yourself". 95 
This principle has been embodied in the Majallah which reads: "A person is bound 
by his admission". 96 It is a prerequisite for a valid admission that the person 
making it should be of sound mind, free from duress (ikriih) and interdiction (IJajr) 
and should have attained the legal age of majority. Hence, admissions made by 
minors, lunatics or other interdicted persons and those under duress are not valid. 97 
The valid admission of a plaintiff's claim by the defendant is a recognised 
form of evidence capable of leading to a judgement in the plaintiff's favour. Once 
admission is made, no retraction is possible in civil and commercial matters. 98 The 
B:anafi and Mfilild schools permit a qualified admission such as a defendant 
acknowledging a debt but maintains that the debt has been settled. By doing so, he 
will be bound by his admission but will be able to adduce evidence to show that the 
debt has been settled. This view is unacceptable among the Shafi'ls and B:anbalis. 99 
c] Oral Testimony 
94Q., al-Ma?idah [4] : 135. 
95al-Suyui1, Jami' al-$aghlr, No.5004. 
96Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.79. 
97 Falsafat, pp.173-174. 
98This is not the case in criminal cases, especially those involving f}udad or questions relating to 
f}aqq Allah (rights of God with right of the public), in which retraction is allowed. This is in con-
formity with the Q.adlth : "Set aside [the implementation of] f}udad punishment where there is a 
doubt"(ldra" al-f}udad bi al-shubhtit). 
99 Arbitration, pp.61-62. 
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The second method of establishing liability is oral testimony. Bayyinah in 
the linguistic sense means the "evident" and "obvious". In law, it has been used to 
connote "strong proof" 100 because it makes the truth evident and obvious. In the 
Islamic legal system, the concept of testimony is usually referring to the testimony 
of witnesses. Throughout the legal history of mankind, laws have been very 
stringent in accepting testimony to the extent that some legal systems have 
excluded such testimony in civil matters. In Islamic law, however, the majority of 
jurists have sanctioned testimony in all areas of law but have determined a strict 
regime on witnesses. A witnesss must have attained the age of majority, not be 
subject to any incapacity, a Muslim and of upright and trustworthy character. IOI 
Furthermore, it is required prior to the giving of evidence that the witness should 
be absolutely impartial102 and any potential cause for impartiality will be a reason 
for inadmissibility of the testimony. 
"In addition to qualitative requirements of witnesses, the Sharlcah 
prescribes certain circumstances in which a witness will be dis-
qualified from testifying. Ancestors, descendants and spouses may 
not testify in favour of each other. A husband or wife may not 
testify in favour of each other's children by another marriage. 
Testimony based on enmity or intended to procure an advantage or 
avoid damage is also forbidden" .103 
IOOMaj. 'Adliyyah, art.1676 reads: "Evidence consists of adduction of reliable testimony" [al-
bayyinah hiyii al-IJ.u.ijah al-qawiyyah] 
101 Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1705 of the Majallah : "A witness must be an upright person ['adl]. An 
upright person is one whose good qualities are greater than his bad qualities. Consequently, the evi-
dence of persons who habitually in a manner inconsistent with hounour and dignity, such as dancers 
and comedians and persons who are known to be liars, is admissible". This criterion is so required 
as the evidence given is information [khabar] which can be true or false. What is accepted as a 
proof is the true information [al-khabar al-~idq] and only the criterion of 'ado.Lah ratifies the truth. 
See Sh.Bti.z, vol.II, p.1039. 
102Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1700 : It is a condition required before giving evidence that the witness 
should be entirely impartial [yashtarif an Iii yakun ft '1-shahiidah da.r mughram aw jarr mughnam 
yacnl an Iii takun difiyyah Ii da.r al-11Ul{:iarrah awjalb al-manfacah]. See Sh.Baz, vol.II, p.1023. 
I03Arbitration, p.62. 
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There 1s a special quantitative aspect m the Sharlcah with regards to 
testimony. In financial disputes, the rule is that the testimony of two trustworthy 
male witnesses is required. However, the combination of the testimony of one man 
and two women is permitted. The Quran provides : "And call to witness from 
among your men two witnesses. And if two men be not at hand then a man and 
two women" .104Tue testimony of one man combined with the oath of the plaintiff 
is accepted in all school except the ijanafis. In such circumsatances, according to 
Samir Saleh, the qarjJ is in a position and in strict law under obligation to assess 
the quality of witnesses.105 Practically, it is through the challenging of the integrity 
of the plaintiff's witnesses that the defendant is in a position to refute a claim 
rather than by the technique of cross-examination or the submissions of his own 
witnesses.106 Al-Kh~~af, according to Farhat Ziadeh, has even dealt with such 
possibility in his Adah al-Qacjl. If the defendant has contested the integrity of the 
witnesses already cleared by the qacjl, the qacjl is to repeat the scrutiny of the wit-
nesses by asking some other trustworth people about them. If these latter should 
104Q., al-Baqarah [2] : 282. For details on the category of testimony see Falsafat, pp. 177-178. 
Maj. 'Adliyyah, art. 1685 provides : In civil cases, evidence can only be valid when given by two 
males or one male and two females : but in places where males are not possessed of the necessary 
informations, the evidence of females alone will be accepted in respect of property. 
105 Arbitration, p. 62. Al-Ja~~~ [d.980] in his commentary of Adab al-Qti~l of al-Kh~~af [d.874], 
while discussing the question of 'adtilah [integrity] especially Abu ijarufah's contention that all 
Muslims are considered persons of integrity, has quoted the l)adlth : "The best people are those of 
the generation in which I was sent [as a prophet]." Then he says : " As you can observed today, 
most people are not characterised by integrity. Thus there is no way out of investigating the charac-
ter of witnesses in all testimonies." This theory of gradual degeneration, coupled with the impor-
tance of shahtidah in Islamic legal practice, give rise not only to the institution of the vindication of 
witnesses (t<lVciyyat al-shtihid), similar to security clearance nowadays, but also to the institution of 
witnesses being vindicated beforehand or by notaries. See Farhat Ziadeh, "Integrity ['adtilah] in 
Classical Islamic Law," in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence edited by Nicholas Heer, Seattle, 1991, 
pp. 79-81. In this article, the author has strongly emphasized that the meticulousness in the proce-
dure of the qti~l's court contrasts sharply with the wrong perception of laxity and informality of 
such procedure that became prevalent in the West. He critised a remark passed by Mr.Justice 
Frankfurter in his dissent in the case of Terminiello v. Chicago [337 U.S. I, 1949] : "This is a 
court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing 
justice according to considerations of individual expediency". 
106 Arbitration, p. 63 . 
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mention any factor that would nullify the witnesses' integrity, the qa(jJ would do 
so, and would not give weight to their testimony .101 
It is also crucial to note that, one of the fundamental conditions before any 
action in civil cases like rjamlin is the actual institution of the action. I 08 The evi-
dence given is admissible if it is relevant to the point at issue in the action, if it 
corresponds with the nature of the claim, not merely as regards to the language but 
also in the facts and substance, that would be accepted. I 09 Two cases are cited as 
illustration: 
"[l] The action concerns a property deposited for safekeeping 
(wadlcah) and witnesses testify that the defendant has admitted the 
deposit or the action concerns wrongful appropriation (gha~b) of 
property and witnesses give testify that the defendant has admitted 
the action, their testimonies are admissible. 
[2] A debtor maintains in the court that he has paid his debt. Wit-
nesses give evidence that the creditor released the debtor from pay-
ment (ibrtn. This evidence is admissible. 11 110 
It was further elucidated in the Majallah that evidence must conform with 
the claim, whether such evidence refers to the whole or part of such claim. For 
instance, if the plaintiff claims one thousand piastres and witnesses only testified 
for up to five hundred, their evidence as regard to the five hundred is valid. 111 
107 Al-Kh~~af, Adah al-Qiifll, p.301 quoted in Farhat Ziadeh, op.cit., p.80. 
108Maj. rAdliyyah, art.1696 which reads : [yashtari{ sabq al-dacwii .ft al-shahlidah bi IJ.uqii.q al-
niis]. This action or claim [mufiilabah] can be moved by the rightful person or his representative. 
Unlike cases involving J:zaqq Allah [relating to public interests], shahiidah is accepted without a 
prior action. Action has already become incumbent on everyone who has a kha~m to be charged and 
thereby it is deemed that claim has been established. See Sh.Baz, vol.II, p.1020. 
109Maj. rAdliyyah, art.1706 : [tuqbal al-shahlidah in wiifaqat al-dacwii - wa in Iii Iii]. H is required 
that the conformity is in all aspects like genus, quantity, method, time, mode of action, attributes an 
so on. See Sh.Baz, vol.II, p.1042. 
I lOcivil, p.464. 
l 11 Maj. rAdliyyah, art. 1707 : [muwiifaqat al-shahiidaJ Li 'l-dacwii immii bi ~ii.rati mu{iibaqatihii bi 
'l-tamiim aw bi kawn al-mashhud bihi aqall min al-muddaCf bihi]. 
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Thus evidence for more than five hundred is regarded as admissible.112 In an action 
claiming absolute ownership, which does not state how the ownership has been 
acquired, evidence from the witnesses of details of the origin of ownership is 
admissible. 
In cases involving debt, evidence given contrary to the claim is 
inadmissible. For instance, if the plaintiff claims payment of one thousand piastres 
alleged to be due as the price of a sale and the witnesses give evidence to the effect 
that the defendant owes such sum in respect of a loan, their evidence is 
inadmissible.113 As far as contradictory evidence is concerned, article 1712 speaks 
about contradiction in respect of the object (al-mashhad bihi) on which the evi-
dence given is inadmissible. Article 1713 touches the question of contradiction in 
matters related to the object which has an effect on the case, the evidence is 
inadmissible too. Article 1715 discussed contradiction as to the amount of the price 
in the evidence of the witnesses in an action on a contract as rendering the 
testimony as inadmissible.114 
There are two views in Islamic law concerning the administering of an oath 
to a witness. The first group maintains that no oath is required as uttering the word 
testimony (shahiidah) implies giving an oath. This view is held by the :ijanafi 
school. The second view requires the administering of the oath because it maintains 
that the trustworthiness of witnesses comes to be in doubt and therefore it should 
be reinforced by oath. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah commented: "If a judge is entitled 
l 12Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1708. 
11 3Maj.'Adliyyah, art.1711: [la tuqbal al-shahiidah idha khalafat al-da'wafi sabab al-dayn -
mathalan idha idda'a 'l-mudda'i al/ an min thaman al-mabl' wa shahida 'l-shuhiid 'ala 'l-mudda'i 
'alayh bi al.fin min jihat al-qarf[. fa Ia tuqbal shahiidatuhum]. 
114civil, pp.467-469. 
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to separate between witnesses if his suspicion were to be aroused as to their 
veracity, it would be even more proper in that case to make them take an oath." 
This standpoint is supported by Imam Ibn AbI Layla, MuJ:iammad ibn Bashir judge 
of Cordova and Ibn Nujaym.115 
d] Oath 
The third method of proof is oath. An oath may only be sworn in the name 
of God according to a J:iadith which reads: "He who swears by no other than [by 
the name of God]." 116 If a person brings an action against another and the latter 
denies the claim, the plaintiff must produce evidence. Failing that, he may ask that 
the defendant be required to deny the claim under oath. Otherwise, the plaintiff's 
claim would be rejected. This is evident in a case presided over by the Prophet, 
when he asked the plaintiff, "Do you have any evidence ? ". The plaintiff replied in 
the negative whereupon the Prophet said to him, "You may ask for his 
[defendant's] oath". The plaintiff replied, "He readily swears and does not care". 
The Prophet said, "You have nothing but these, either your two witnesses or the 
defendant's oath" .117 The oath has been sanctioned in cases involving property and 
chattels but it is not usually acceptable in criminal cases involving public rights. If 
a plaintiff tenders the oath to the defendant, three courses may be followed : the 
115Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1727 : "Should the person against whom evidence is given ask the court, 
before giving judgement, to make witnesses take oaths that their evidence is not false, the court 
may, if it deems necessary, strengthen that evidence by administering the oath. The court may 
inform the witnesses that their evidence will not be accepted unless they swear an oath." See Fal-
s'tat, p.185. 
1 6Al-Suyfiii, Jami' al-~aghlr no.9866 cited in Falsafat, p.190. 
117 Al-cAyni, 'Umdat al-Qtiri), vol.XIII, p.243 and 248. See also Mabsa!, vol.XVII, 30. 
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defendant may take the oath, he may refuse to do so or he may demand instead that 
the oath be taken by the plaintiff himself .118 
In the situation where the defendant opted to testify under oath to maintain 
his freedom from the alleged liability, the plaintiff's claim would be dismissed. A 
matter of dispute is whether there can be any testimony after an oath has been 
taken. There are three views on this issue. The first groupl 19 maintains that the 
oath is a weak method of proof. Evidence is the original method of proof and thus 
the oath is regarded as a substitute which can be overidden by the original method. 
The Caliph cu mar is reported to have said, "A deceitful oath is more deserving of 
rejection than trustworthy evidence". The second groupl20 permitted a plaintiff to 
submit evidence to support his claim after defendant had testified under oath on 
condition that the plaintiff was not aware of the existence of this evidence when he 
asked for the defendant's oath. Otherwise such action is not acceptable. The third 
group considers the oath as decisive in a dispute and therefore a plaintiff may not 
give any testimony thereafter. They argued that the oath cancels the right of the 
plaintiff and no evidence may be presented on the basis of a right already dis-
charged.121 
On the other hand, if the defendant refuses to take the oath, judgement 
would be given against him essentially because of his refusal or alternatively, the 
118Mabsaf, vol.XVI, p.119; BadaJic, vol. VI, p.229; Umm, vol. VII, p.34; Malik, Mudawwanah, 
vol.XIII, p.24; Wa}Iz, vol.II, p.265; Mughnl, vol.XII, p.124; Acl<im, vol.III, p.344; lbn Rushd, 
Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, p.386 ; lbn Qayyim, al-Turuq al-lfukmiyyah, p.117. 
119This group is suppoted by Ibrahim al-Nakha'I, ShurayQ and the ijanafi, Shafi'! and ijanball. 
Ibid. 
120supporters of this view include Malik and a number of Shafi'! jurists including al-Ghazali. See 
Wa[Iz, vol.II, p.265. 
12 Falsafat, p.191. 
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plaintiff would then be asked to take the oath. According to the I:Ianafis and one 
version of the I:Ianbalis, refusal is treated as tantamount to admission. It is argued 
that if he was honest, he should not have hesitated to take the oath. The oath 
should not be demanded of the plaintiff whether the defendant has requested that or 
otherwise. The provision in the SharI'ah on such matter is categorical that : "The 
burden of proof is on him who claims and the oath on him who denies". The 
Majallah adheres to this interpretation: 
"If the defendant refuses to take the oath, the judge shall deliver 
judgement based upon such refusal. If the defendant states that he is 
prepared to swear an oath after judgement has been so delivered, the 
judgement shall remained undisturbed." 122 
There is another opinion held by other schools of law including the second 
version of the ij:anbalis that the refusal of the defendant to take an oath is not in 
itself a sufficient ground to pass judgement against him. Such a refusal is a weak 
method of proof which must be corroborated by the oath of the plaintiff whether 
arising from the defendant's request or not. If the plaintiff takes the oath, judge-
ment would be given in his favour. If not, his case would be rejected. They argued 
that the l)adith referred to above does not mention the possibility that the defendant 
may refuse to take the oath.123 
The oath is one of the oldest means of proof and has been adopted widely in 
legal proceedings. It is generally based on the principle of reminding the swearer 
of his religious faith and of God who requires truthfulness and integrity. Despite 
that, judicial experience shows that the oath is a weak method not resorted to 
122Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1820 reads: {ulhii nakala 'l-mudda'1 'alayh 'an al-yamln IJ,akama 'l-IJ,iildm bi 
nukiilih, wa idhii arlida ba'd dhiilika an yalJ,lif Iii yaltafit ilii qawlih]. See Sh.Baz, vol.II, p.1179. 
123 Falsafat, p.193. 
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except in the absence of other evidence and that the persons asked to swear the 
oath usually do so easily, except on rare occassions.124 
e] Written Evidence. 
In the present day, written evidence consisting of documents and written 
instruments is one of the most important and effective method of proof. This due 
to the prevalence of literacy, complexity of trade and commerce, lack of people's 
integrity and so on. In Islamic law, personal testimony was dominant due to lack 
of writing and recording in the olden days and the fact that people were not 
accustomed to the use of written documents125, at least during the earlier part of 
Islamic civilization. Another main reason is the Quranic prescription to write a 
contract was interpreted as a simple recommendation confined only to loans : "O 
you who believe, when you contract a debt for a fixed time, record it in 
writing" _126 Therefore the texts of Islamic law did not attach much weight to writ-
ten evidence and there are many controversies concerning conditions for accepting 
written evidence. At any rate, it was not regarded as one of the primary method of 
proof but was merely mentioned in connection with admission by writing and 
giving testimony to ascertain the authenticity of such writing.127 
I24Falsafat, p.194. 
125 A written document was deemed as a kind of aide-memoire with no probatory force in its own. 
This force stemmed from the witnessing of the accord of the contracting parties whether such an 
accord was verbal or written. See Nabil Salleh, "Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Islamic 
and Arab Laws," ALQ [1987), pp.269-290; Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.1736-1739. Also see discussion on 
the importance of written documents as a mean of security in chapter II, supra. 
126Q., al-Baqarah [2] : 282. 
127oetails could be found in Mabsa!, vol.XVIII, pl 72; Tab~irat, vol.I, p.294. 
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As the need to resort to written evidence is increasing, some jurists128 have 
lifted the position of such method by applying isti~stin (juristic preference).129 The 
Majallah adopted the same course and recognized proof by means of promissory 
notes, register of merchants and the like provided that they were free from forgery 
and fabrication. It considers admission in writing the same as oral admission and it 
recognized official documents if they were free from any taint of fraud like the 
government's rescripts, entries in land registers and court files.130 
Samir Saleh is still pessimistic about such perceptions. He considers that the 
timid modem attempt to outline the advantage of written evidence has not changed 
its position from an ancillary method to that of oral evidence. It is true that the 
1-Janafi school in articles 1606 to 1612 and articles 1736-1739 of the Majallah 
recognised the value of private deeds, court registers and trade registers as evi-
dence provided that there are free from alteration and forgery. However this recog-
nition is lessened by the the wordings of article 1610 and 1737 which are quick to 
128Mabsuf, ibid.; Ashbiih N., 86. 
129The ijanafi jurist al-Sarakhsl [d.483/1090] considers istif:zstin to be a method of seeking facility 
and ease in legal injunctions. It involves a departure from qiyas in favour of a ruling which dispels 
hardship and brings about ease to people. Al-Sarakhsl said : Avoidance of hardship [raf al-J:zara1l is 
a cardinal principle of religion which is enunciated in the Qur>an that "God intends facility for you 
and He does not want to put you in hardship". [al-Baqarah [2] : 185] .Regarding istiJ:zsan, Kamali 
commented : "lstiJ:zsan is an important branch of ijtihad and has played a prominent role in the adap-
tation of Islamic law to the changing need of the society. It has provided Islamic law with necessary 
means with which to encourage flexibility and growth. Notwithstanding a measure of juristic tech-
nicality which seems to have been injected into an originally simple idea, istif:zsan remains basically 
flexible and can be used for a variety of purposes ...... Juristic preference is a fitting description of 
istif:zsan as it involves setting aside an established analogy in favour of an alternative ruling which 
serves the ideals of justice and public interest in a better way". See Mohd.Hashim Kamali, op.cit., 
l~.246-247. 
OProvisions of the Majallah article 1736 reads : No action may be taken in writing or a seal alone. 
If such writing or seal is free from any taint of fraud or forgery, however, it becomes a valid 
ground for action, that is to say, judgement may be given thereon. No proof is required in any other 
way. Subsequently, article 1737 speaks about the validity of the Sulftin's rescript as well as land 
registers. Article 1738 is on registers kept by the court as a guarantee from any irregular practices 
and deception. See Civil, p.475. 
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deny the evidentiary value of written deeds if the defendant denies their 
authenticity. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Mfiliki, Shafi'T and ijanbalI 
schools would grant the evidentiary strength given by the ijanafi Majallah to pri-
vate deeds and trade registers. Thus oral evidence would still prevail over private 
and even notarized deeds whose contents are open to challenge, without necessarily 
alleging forgery .131 
fl Supplementary Sources of Evidence 
Presumption (qarii)in), personal knowledge of the qii<f.l (cilm al-qii<f.l), 
expert opinion (ra)' al-khablr) are among other supplementary methods of proof. 
As far as presumption is concerned, it is only favoured by a minority of jurist like 
Ibn Qayyim who speaks about enlarging the scope of evidence. The ijanafis, 
through the Majallah, have attempted to developed a definition of conclusive 
presumption (qarlnah qaµcah)132 but have heavily concentrated on criminal cases. 
Despite that, there are a few examples on civil matters like : "Judgement shall be 
given in respect of any matter which has been proven at any particular time unless 
the contrary is proven" _133 The example quoted to illustrate this provision concerns 
the contest of absolute ownership. Ownership of a person at any particular time 
shall be held to be valid unless circumstances arise which invalidates such owner-
ship. 
131Arbitration, pp.65-66. 
132Maj. cAdliyyah, art.1740 reads : [al-qarlnah al-qii/icah alJ,adu asbiib al-IJ,ukm ay{lan] and article 
17 41 reads : [al-qarlnah al-qii/icah hiyli. 'l-imii.rah al-bii.lighah IJ,add al-yaqln]. See Durar, 
l~.340-341. 
3Maj. cAdliyyah, art. 10 reads : [mii. thabata bi wmli.n yulJ,kamu bi baqii.'ih mli. lam yaqum dalll 
CaJQ khilii.fih] 
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Another presumption 1s provided for at article 44 which reads : 
"Commercial custom in a trading community is deemed to be part of the agree-
ment between traders who are parties to a contract" 134 as we have already seen. In 
the matter of the personal knowledge of the qacjJ, except for the early Ijanafi 
scholars who authorised the qacjJ to decide on financial matters based on his own 
personal knowledge, the MfilikI and majority of the ShafiCJ and the f:lanbalI schools 
do not allow such practice.135 Ibn al-Qayyim also advocated the use of ray al-
khab1r, a person whose expertise is essential to assist the court to settle a case.136 
4.5 Pleas and Def enc es. 
As part of the Shar1cah's scheme of fair trial, litigants are allowed to submit 
their defences. The jurists have expressed their approval for that as they unani-
mously agreed on its legality (mashru/iyyat al-daF) and allowed both parties to 
resort to it. They also suggested that it is a proper responsibility of the qacjJ to fol-
low this procedure, whether the defence is from the defendant or from the plaintiff 
in response to the defence in order to refute the defence advanced by the defend-
ant.137 
134rbe maxim reads : [m-macraf bayn a/,-tujjar ka 'l-macruf baynahum]. 
135 Arbitration, p.67. 
136Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-ljukmiyyah, p.188. 
l37Durar, vol.IV, p.186-196; Mabsaf, vol.XVI, p.63; Ashbah N., p.225; Sh.Baz, p.932 ; 
Maj.Sharciyyah, p.622; Adab al-Qafiti', p.471; Tab~irat, vol.I, pp.161-166; Qawtinin, p.310. Also 
see Mul;lammad Rakan J;>ayf Allah al-Daghnll, Dacwti al-Tantiqufi wa 'l-daf ft 'l-Sharicah al-
Islamiyyah, pp.156-157. 
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Briefly, defences in the form of seeking exemption from liability is one of 
the most common pleas heard in court. In respect of rj,aman cases, it is known as 
cawarirj, al-rj,aman [waivers from liability]. In most situations, this type of defence 
is attributed to legal capacity and competence (ahliyyah). Under Islamic law, the 
capacity of human being to exercise rights and discharge obligation is twofold. 138 
Firstly, a potential passive right to acquire rights (ahliyyat al-wujub)139 and sec-
ondly, an effective active capacity to exercise rights and discharge obligation 
(ahliyyat al-adli)).140 
I38Arbitration, p.26. 
139Receptive legal capacity may either be deficient (naqi~ah) or complete (klimilah). The receptive 
legal capacity of a child in the womb is incomplete in the sense that it can only receive rights such 
as inheritance (mfrath) and bequest (wa~iyyah) but cannot bear any obligation toward others. Recep-
tive legal capacity is complete when a person can both have rights and bear obligations. This type of 
legal capacity is acquired by every human being as of the moment of birth. During infancy and later 
stages of childhood [namely the age of reason - tamyrz], a child is capable of discharging, albeit 
through his guardian, certain obligations like maintenance, liability for loss frlaman) and payment 
for services rendered to him. See Muhammad Hashim Kamali, op.cit., p.446. 
140Legal active capacity is envisaged in three possible situations. [1] A person totally lacking in 
active legal capacity such as a child during infancy or an insane of any age. Since neither is 
endowed with the faculty of intellect, no legal consequences are accrued from their words and acts. 
When a child or a madman kills someone or destroys the property of another person, they can only 
be held liable with reference to property not life. They can only shoulder civil liability but not 
criminal responsibility. [2] A person may be partially lacking in active legal capacity. Thus a dis-
cerning child (~abr al-mumayyiz) [between the age of seven and about fifteen] and an idiot (ma(tah) 
who is neither insane nor totally lacking in intellect but whose intellect is defective and weak pos-
sess legal capacity which is deficient. ... They are capable only of concluding acts and transactions 
that are totally to their benefit such as accepting a gift or charity even without the permission of 
their guardians. But if the transaction in question is totally disadvantageous to them, such as giving 
a gift or suretyship these are not valid at all even with the guardian's approval. As for transactions 
which partake both benefit and loss, they are valid but only with the permission of the guardian. [3] 
Active legal capacity is complete upon attainment of intelectual maturity [some jurists require 
bulagh [age of puberty], some require rushd [prudence; adulthood]. Hence every adult who has 
acquired this ability is presumed to possess active legal capacity unless there is evidence to show 
that he or she is deficient of intellect. Persons who are fully competent may sometime be put under 
interdiction (~ajr) with a view to protecting the rights of others. A person may be interdicted by 
mean of a judicial order which restrict his powers to conclude certain transaction. A debtor may 
thus be interdicted so that the right of his creditors may be protected. Abu I:Iarufah held, contrary to 
the majority of jurist, that foolishness (safahah), indebtedness (gharim) and carelessness (ghaflah) 
do not affect the active legal capacity. He said that the benefit of interdiction in these cases is out-
weighed by its possible harm. See M.H.Kamali, op.cit., pp.446-447. Cf. Abdurrahim, Islamic Jur-
isprudence, p.220. 
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Generally, one will be able to make a defence on various grounds namely 
minority (~ighar), insanity (junun), prodigal (safahah), embicility (catah) and being 
under duress (ikrah). In the fiqh literature, this subject has been treated extensively 
as to determine whether or not a transaction is executed by a competent person. 
The status of the transaction being valid (~a~T~) or invalid (bli{il) is a basis to 
determine the application of any remedial measures including ¢am.an when 
responsibility of the party commiting the wrong is established. It will be concerned 
with, 
"The legal capacity of the ma~kam calayh, that is the person to 
whom the ~ukm is addressed and it looks into the question whether 
he is capable of understanding the demand that is adressed to him 
and whether he compreheds the grounds of his responsibility (taklif). 
Since the possession of mental faculty of caql is the basic criterion of 
taklif, the law concerns itself with the circumstances that affect the 
sanity and capacity of the individual such as minority, insanity, 
duress, intoxication, interdiction and mistake" .141 
Such a rule has been overwhelming! y concentrated in the area of breach of 
contracts primarily concerned with redress to remove ¢.arar in the sense of 
gharamah. The issue of kafalah occupies less space because as a gratuitous con-
tract the capacity of the parties to the contract will be determined prior to its con-
clusion. Nevertheless, any problem arising could still be resolved by the same par-
ameter. However, such a defence in civil matters is not conclusive and has not a 
similar strength compared to that of criminal cases. The notion of ~urmat al-mal 
is a strong element in (/,am.an and is automatically established by mere occurence of 
the event. The judge has to bear this in mind in deciding any claim. A criminal 
case, on the other hand, requires a stricter rule especial! y in establishing criminal 
responsibility (mas)uliyyah jinli)iyyah). The nature of the criminal conviction which 
141 M.H.Kamali, op.cit., pp.444-447. 
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requires "proof beyond any doubt" [idra' al-IJ,udud bi 'l-shubuhat] is the main dis-
tinguising criterion. 
Mul)ammad FawzI Fayc;l Allah has also suggested that defence can be 
instituted under the theory of negation of liability (intifa' al-{iamlln).142 Among 
other grounds cited are personal defence (difac-y, necessity ({iarurah), execution of 
a directive (tanftdh al-amr), permission by the owner (idhn al-miilik) and permis-
sion by the ruler (idhn wall al-amr). From a different perspective Sub I) I 
Mal)massanI argues defence on cessation of obligation (suqu{ al-mujibat), which 
can either be based on the agreement of the parties or otherwise.143 Mal)massanI 
mentioned performance or satisfaction of the obligation (lfa'), replacement 
(istibdal), renewal of the obligor (tajdld al-mujib)144 and release (ibra') as exam-
ples for methods based on agreement. On the other hand, methods without agree-
ment are merging of obligation (itti}Jad al-dhimmah)145 , set-off (muqa~ah), 
impossibility of performance (isti}Jalat al-tanftdh) and lapse of time (murur al-
zaman).146 
4.6 The Theory of Damages. 
Every injurious act inflicted in any form will bring about loss and suffering 
({iarar) and is in antagonistic to law and order. As such, the Sharlcah needs to 
impose sanction that will remove that particular {iarar. This concept is founded on 
142N<q..J?amii.n cA_mm, p.195. 
l43Details on the subjet of suqaf al-majabtit could be found in Majabtit, pp.541-594. 
144Murshid, arts.250-252. 
145Maj. cAdliyyah, art.667. 
146Maj. cAdliyyah, art.1660.; Sh. Zarqa), 483; Majabat, pp.571-594. 
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the authority of the maxim : "Injury must be removed" [al-r;Jarar yuzal). Injury 
cannot be inflicted neither as fresh action nor as retaliation (la r;Jarar wa la 
r;Jirlir). 147 The infliction of r;Jarar as a reaction to a r;Jarar is strongly prohibited in 
Islamic law. Retaliation in cases involving properties is prohibited by a celebrated 
maxim : An injury should not be removed by another injury [al-r;Jarar la yuzal bi 
)l-r;Jarar]. The infamy of jinliyat al-itlaf could likely be removed by demanding the 
liable person to replace the damaged property. The similar indentical property will 
remedy the injury suffered by the victim. Inflicting a similar injury will not bring 
about any solution to the problem.148 This is called tacwrr;J which means removing 
the material injury inflicted on a person aiming thereby to prevent recurrence of 
the injury and multiplication of evil and suffering.149 
The Sunnah has clearly ruled that "al-ta(lm'in bi )l-mithl la itlii.f al-na7Jr" 
[compensation is by replacing a similar merchandise not committing the similar 
damage. cA.)ishah was asked by the Prophet to replace a similar wooden food con-
tainer belonged to another wife, Ijaf~ah. This settlement is believe to be good for 
both parties. The injured party will get back her property and everything is 
presumed to be rectified and back to normal. The benefit of use and perfect owner-
ship has been restored.150 
Imposition of some kind of kind of penalty to the wrongdoer by way of 
compensation will serve the purpose of redress. By that, he suffers lessening of his 
147 Ashbtih N., p.85; Ashbah S., p.83; Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.20. Al-Tarabulusi" in his book mentioned 
three stages involved in looking into various cases. First, the liability must be established. Sec-
ondly, a judgement must be pronounced and thirdly, carrying out the decision. As far as carrying 
out the judgement, particularly involving property, is by warrant of arrest, confiscation of property, 
returning the right to its bearer and releasing all the detained rights. See Mu'in, p.51. 
l48Mutlifat, p.563. 
149Ncq..I;Jaman 'Amm, p.157-161. 
1501bn I:Iajar, FatJ:i al-Bari, vol. VI, pp.49-50. 
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property which is taken to pay for c;laman. This method is deemed to be more 
beneficial (anjac-y, do more improvement (a#aJ:i) and suit human instinct and 
nature. The objetive is nothing but to remove the injury (ra.f al-rjarar). There are 
fundamental difference between civil and criminal offences as regards methods of 
redress. The nature of the wrong committed in criminal cases renders the imple-
mentation of similar injury (as in the case of qi~a~) sanctioned by the law, as that is 
the only suitble way of redress. In civil cases, that method is not viable. The legis-
lation of rjaman in most civil cases and qi~a~ in some criminal cases has its own 
merits, as : "God did not equate between the two matters in their nature, neither in 
people's perception towards it nor in the law formulated [fa ma sawwa Allah bayn 
al-amraynfi tab' wa la 'aql wa la shar1.151 
It has been an embodied golden rule of the Sharl'ah that rights (J:iuqilq) 
should be returned in their original form if possible.152Radd al-'ayn is regarded as 
the original obligation (al-mujib al-a~l) and accepted as just in removing rjarar and 
the impairment in both form and essence. paman al-mithl (replacement of similar 
merchandise) is the best form of redress if radd al-'ayn is impossible. The next 
possible means is rjaman al-qlml (paying the value). paman al-mithll is a better 
151A'lam, vol.II, p.229; Madkhal, vol.I, p.576,963,965; Na;..'f?aman, p.90. In civil cases, the role 
of ta'zir (discretionary punishment) is vital. It is evident from its etymological meaning, which 
originate from 'azr, denoting "to prevent, to respect and to reform". Legally, it is a punishment 
aimed at preventing the wrongdoer from committing the offence again. It has been perceived as the 
discretionary punishment to be delivered for transgression against God or against an individual for 
which there is no fixed punishment nor penance. It equals the fixed punishment (~udad) in being 
designed to bring about reformation and provide warning. In this respect, other than relying on the 
normal method of redress through fiaman, the qaf/I can impose a wide range of punishments, from 
which he choose the one suitable for the nature of wrong committed. It can be in the form of 
admonition (wa':e;), reprimand (tawbikh), threat (tahdid), fine and seizure (gharii.mah wa 
mu~lidarah), imprisonment (~abs) and others. See Tab~irat, vol.II, p.200; Ma'alim, pp. 73-78; al-
e Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, pp.96-119. 
152Qawa'id A~kiim, vol.I , p.180; al-Qurafi, al-Furaq, vol.I, p.214 ; Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-
Mujtahid, vol.II, p.312; Mughni, vol.V, p.374. 
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option among the two, as it is based on mumiithalah (proportionality) in respect of 
form (~arah), appearence (mushlihadah) and substance (macna), whereas in rjamlin 
al-qlml, everything is based on mere estimation and conjecture.153 
Based on the standpoint of majority of the fuqaha) that qlml property is to 
be compensated with its value, it is essential during the assessment of the com-
pensation to consider the value of the property not the price.154 It was reported in 
al-Muwarra) that Malik was reported to have said it is not our established practice 
to reduce the value (tarjcif al-qlmah). A liable man is asked to compensate the 
value of a riding animal according to the value on the day he took it.155The 
Sharlcah, as reflected in the legal texts, is concerned with the point of time of the 
contract to determine compensation (waqt taqdlr al-rjaman).156 The value of a 
property differs from one time to another. In the event of unavailability of similar 
merchandise in the market, the judge or arbitrator, may determine that on the basis 
of certain rules. 
Abu Yusuf opined that it should follow the value on the day of the 
appropriation (yawm al-gha~b). He said that since there is no supply in the market 
and no rules are available and therefore the value is determine based that on the 
existing value on the day the cause of rjaman was effected. MuI:iammad al-
ShaybanI, ruled that the price on the day in which supply of similar goods stopped 
(yawm al-inqi[a~ should be the guide. Abu ijanifah, has ruled that deciding the 
153Mughnl, vol. V, p.375; BadaJic, vol. V, pp.150-151; al-Marghinaru, al-Hidayah, vol.IV, p.9. 
154Thaman [price] is what has been agreed upon by the two contracting parties and subject to chang-
ing of its value. Qimah is the value of a thing based on certain parameter without subject to price 
fluctuation. Determination of value can be established by certification of two upright experts. See 
lbn <Abidin, Radd al-Mukhtar, vol.IV, p. 71. 
155Muwa{!a), vol.II, p.748. 
156NG.?,.I;Jaman cA_mm, p.162. 
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value on the day of the adjudcation (yawm al-qafi,li)) is reasonable.157 The Majallah 
adopted the opinion of Abu Yiisuf.158 Al-Shafi'T ruled that the determination of 
value should be based on the highest price from the time of the injury to the state 
of inability to obtain similar merchandise.159 
Conclusion 
The treatment of the complicated legal matters especially on fi,amlin has 
become not only easy but interesting subject, with the help of the maxims. They 
served as formulas in looking into various details of fiqh. It has a great role to play 
especially in complementing the role of u~al al-fiqh in the treatment of the farac 
(branches) of fiqh. The brief survey on the procedural rules and law of evidence 
involved had demonstrated the viability of Islamic law in developing a sustainable 
legal system. 
157 al-Marghinam, al-Hidtiyah, vol. VIII, pp.246-247. 
158 Article 921 , 93, 53. 




INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE APPLICATION OF ])AMAN. 
"To rule with justice and to render their dues to those who have a 
claim, constitute the essential principles of just government (al-
siytisah al-ctidilah) and the very purpose of public office (al-wiltiyah 
al-~tiliJ:iah).,, 
[lbn Taimiyah, al-Siyasah al-Sharciyyah, p.16] 
The application of rjamlin in respect of providing remedies to contractual 
faults and offering protection against transgression of rights can be carried 
out through various instititutions. These institutions range from a tribunal 
with judicial authority, arbitration, an insurance company, a banking 
institution and others. This chapter is an attempt towards the evaluation of 
the role played by various institutions in Muslim civilisation, that had con-
tributed in their own special way to the application of rjamlin. Such a dis-
cussion will reflect the extent that rjamlin is being used to help people settle 
their disputes, remedy any deficiency in their transactions as well as helping 
the authorities to administer justice. The institutions which will be surveyed 
are : [a] al-qarja) (court of law). [b] al-f1Ur!,li1im (the higher authority) [c] 
al-}Jisbah (office of fair trading); [d] al-ta}Jkrm (arbitration) [e] al-ma~lirif 
(banking and financial house) and [f] al-ta)mrn (insurance). 
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5.1 The Judicial Authority. 
The judicial authority in Islamic law is generally known as wilayat al-
qarja;l . Literally, qarja) signifies the meaning of completing (imfili)), making 
(~anaca), satisfying (ada)) and limiting (~addadli). 2 Technically, the jurists have 
come up with different definitions, which differ in their modes of expression but 
essentially represent the same basic idea. Qarja) is defined as conveying the legal 
value (~ukm sharer) by way of imposition of its order ( caza sabrl al-ilzam]. 3 It is 
also defined as concluding adversaries [fa~l al-khu~umat) and settling disputes (qa( 
al-munazacat) using a special method. 4 Al-Buhuti's definition has an express clarity 
on the function of qarjr as he said: "It is the implementation of the Sharrcah rules 
and settlement of conflicts. ,,5 The definition in al-Iqnac read: "Settlement of dis-
putes between two parties or more based on the Sharrcah laws. "6 
The establishment of this authority is one of the highest prorities of reli-
gious obligation after the pronouncement of faith. It is also considered as the 
noblest form of worship and devotion to God. 7Furthermore, there has been a 
loriginally, this type of authority is categorised as wilayah 'ammah (authority of universal nature) 
in the sense that it is a jurisdiction over all people and mandated by the people [wilayah 
muta'addiyah wa mustamaddah min al-ghayr]. However, the universal authority has been subject to 
limitations such as jurisdiction based on time, location and type of case, which has led to the judge 
as having a specialised and limited jurisdiction. The term wilayah means administrative function 
(tadbir), competence (qudrah), support (nu~rah) and power (sul!tin). Listin, vol.XV, pp.406-415. 
See AJ:µnad MuQ.ammad Malljl, al-Ni!-am al-Qaflti'l al-/sltimI, p.17. 
2Lexicon, Supplement pp.2989-2990. 
3Tab~irat, p.8 
4Ibn C.~bidln, /fashiat Radd al-Mukhtar, vol. V, p.352 ; lbn Nujaym, al-Ba~r al-Ra'iq Shar~ Kanz 
al-Daqa'iq, vol. VI, p.277. 
5al-Buhufi, Kashshaf al-Qina' 'an Matn al-lqna', vol. VI, p.285. 
6MuQ.ammad al-Sharblm al-Khatib, al-/qna' ft Ifill Al/£11- Abf Shu} a', vol.II, p.290. 
7 Fatawti, vol. V, p.197 ; al-Buhufi, Kashshtif al-Qina' 'an Matn al-/qnti', vol. VI, p.286; Mabsa!, 
vol.XVI, p.59. 
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prophetic precedents on such practice evident from the Quranic declaration : "O 
Dawiid ! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth, so judge thou between 
men in truth". 9 In another verse, it was mentioned : "We have sent down to thee 
the book that thou mightest judge between them as guided by God, so be not used 
as an advocate by those who betray their trust" .10 The Quran clarifies this by 
saying: "Mankind was one single nation. And God sent His Messengers with glad 
tidings and warnings and with them He sent the Book in truth to judge between 
people in matters wherein they disputed" .11 
The sunnah of the Prophet has demonstrated a clear guideline to resort to 
judicial authority to settle any matter which suits the nature of its function. It was 
reported that the Prophet said : "Do you know the people who will first be given 
the shade of God on the day of judgement ?". The Companions replied : "God and 
His messenger know better". He said : "Those who are rendered with rights will 
accept them. When asked, they will exercise them and will pass judgement among 
people as they pass judgement on their ownselves" .12 In another report, the 
Prophet is reported to have passed a significant remark on the function of the judi-
c1ary: 
"I am only a man and when you come pleading before me it may 
happen that one of you might be more eloquent in his pleadings and 
that as a result I adjudicate in his favour according to his 
[convincing] submission. If it so happens and I give advantage to 
81bn Abl >I-Damm has pointed out that [al-qafia) tilwu al-nubuwwah] and that is one reason of their 
appointment to that function. See Adab al-Qafla), p.5. 
9Q., $ad [38] : 26 reads: [ya diiwud innajacal.naka khmifatanfi 'l-ar(lfalJkum bayn a/.-nas bi 'l-
haqq] 
ioQ., al-Nisa> [4] : 105 reads [inna anzalnaka al-kitiib bi 'l-IJaqq Ii talJkuma bayn a/.-nas bi mii 
araka Allah wa la takun Ii 'l-kha'inln kha$lmii]. 
11 Q., al-Baqarah [2] : 213 reads [kana 'l-nas ummatan walJidatan fa bacatha Allah a/.-nabiyyln 
mubashshir'in wa mundhir'in wa anuda macahum a/.-kitiib bi 'l-IJaqq Ii talJkuma bayn a/.-niis fl mii 
ikhta/.afu fih] . 
12al-Shawkam, Nayl al-Awfar, vol. VIII, p.260. 
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one of you by granting him a thing which belongs to his opponent, 
he had better not take it because I would have been giving him a 
portion of hellfire. "13 
In the Islamic legal system, the qarjl basically represented ordinary justice, 
in contrast to other magistrates and to officials of other categories, who exercised 
extraordinary justice. One kind of Islamic court on the one hand, has been seen as 
operating with rigid rules and following a procedure and methods of proof which is 
set and imposed upon the interpreter of the law. On the other hand, there is also 
another court which has been freed from such rules and follows a procedure which 
has left scope to the judge's discretion and generally based upon equity. The first 
type of court was the qarja) and the second corresponded mainly to the institution 
called mll!.lilim. The function of the qlirjl and his jurisdiction has been described in 
the writings on Public law 14 by al-MawardI or Abu Yacla or by authors of adab 
al-qarjaJ15 like MawardI, Ibn AbI )I-Damm and lbn Farl:iiin. 
"There are certain important exception to these principles. In the 
Mfilild school of law, aside from his ordinary judicial powers, the 
qlirjl enjo~s a power of extraordinary justice called al-siylisah al-
sharciyyah16 , which allows the judge freedom in finding equitable 
solutions to litigations." 17 
13This case involves a claim by two men on a property left as inheritance. Both of them pleaded 
without being supported by any evidence. When both heard the Prophet's statement, they broke into 
tears fearing the consequence of abusing the judicial institution for their own benefit. Then, they 
both settled the matter amicably as advised by the Prophet. Ibn ijajar al-<Asqalaru, FatJ:z al-Bari 
SharJ:z al-Bukhiirf, vol.XIII, p. 134 ; al-$ancanI, Subul al-Salam, vol.IV, p.165; Muwaffii), p.488. 
14Emile Tyan, "Judicial Organisation," in Law in the Middle East edited by Majid Khadduri and 
Herbert Liebesny, 1955, pp.259-260. 
151t is a special thorough study on the conduct of judicial operations. In Islamic legal literature, this 
studies have been carried out by two groups; [a] the scholars who contributed on the theoretical 
foundation of judicial matters like duties and priviliges of the qaf!T, rights of the litigants, methods 
of conviction, principles of fair trial and the like [b] the practitioners mainly those who have been 
on the bench as judges as they are able to reflect their practical experiences while conducting the 
trial. See Mul;lammad Mu~tafii al-ZuQ.ayli in his introduction to his edition of Ibn Abl >1-Damm's 
Kitab Adah al-Qafla), pp.7-8. 
16This concept has been clearly been the bedrock of their decisions. For instance in deciding on the 
liability of the artisans (taf/mln al-~unna'), Abii al-I:Iassan <Ali b. RaQ.Q.aI al-Ma<dani and Ibn Farl;liin 
have indicated that decision was based on this concept. See Taflmln, p.2; Tab~irat, p. 45. 
17Emile Ty an, op.cit., p.260. 
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a] The Need for the Qa{li's Court. 
As the preceding discussion has clearly demonstrated the importance of 
qafl,ii>, this part will specifically deal with the importance of qafl,a) in respect to the 
application of fl,aman. Al-Mawardi has clearly outlined ten functions of a qafl,l, 
although he has mixed purely judicial and administrative functions. The first three 
main function, arranged presumably on order of priority deal with settlement of lit-
igations between individuals, enforcement of rights established in court and pro-
tection of the weak.18 However, it is suggested that it is worthwhile to look closely 
into the full statement of MawardI on these matters as that will give a fuller perspc-
tive. 
In the first function, al-MawardI speaks about settlement of conflict ifa# al-
munazacat) and conclusion of any discord and adversity (qafc al-tashajur wa )z_ 
khu~umiit), whether in the form of both parties agreeing to reconciliation (~ul~) and 
agreement to any possible but permissible way out. Alternatively, a court order 
will be issued based on the evidence brought before the court and binding on the 
parties.19 Secondly, al-MawardI came up with the idea of retrieving rights from a 
person who delayed returning them [or detained them] and returning them to the 
I 8This translation of al-Mawardi's discussion in A~kiim Sul!iiniyyah was provided by Emile Tyan. 
See Emile Tyan, op.cit., pp.261-262. See also Mul).ammad Salim al-<Awwa, On the Political Side 
of Islamic State, p.76. Also see H.F.Amedroz, "The Office of Qagi in the Al}.kam Sul!aniyyah of 
Mawardi," JRAS (1910), pp.761-796. For the later development see Jennings, "Kagi, Court and 
Legal Procedure in the 17th Century Ottoman Kayseri," SI [1978], pp.133-172 and his "Limitation 
of the Judicial Powers of the Qagi," SI, pp.151-184. 
l 9The text reads : [/~l a/,-muniiwciit wa qa!c a/,-tashii.jur wa 'l-khu$iimiit immii $Ull)an can tarii{l 
wa yurififihi a/,-jawliz aw ijbiiran bi l)ukm biit yuctabar fihi 'l-wujiib] See Sul!tiniyyah, p.70. 
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rightful owner upon establishing the right of claim (thubut al-isti~qaq) by either 
method of proof, namely admission (iqrlir) or testimony (bayyinah).20 In the third 
function al-MawardI established that the qarjJ has an inherent competence over 
those who have been legally incapacitated as a result of insanity (junun), minority 
(~ighar) and he also has power to impose an interdiction order on the prodigal 
(safth) and the bankrupt (muftis). This is to protect the property of the rightful 
owner and to remedy the contractual agreements therein. 21 As has been dealt with 
in the preceding chapter, there is a limitation on the qafl,r' s function with regard to 
private rights particularly civil claims like fl,aman as it is only actionable upon 
claim.22 
The scholars have unanimously advocated that the process of claim (dacwli) 
in demanding a right (muflilabat al-~aqq) must be made in the authority of a per-
son who can render the right to its orginal owner, once it is established. 23 The term 
"man lahu khalli~" refers to the office of the qlif/,1 who is competent to resolve the 
disputes and pass judgement and impose them on the litigants. 24 This is why they 
are appointed to the post. The Majallah requires that a claim must be made in the 
presence of a qliff,125. The phrase ''ft ~ufl,ur al-qafl,1" signifies that a claim must be 
carried out in the presence of a judge, otherwise it cannot be described as such. 
2°'fhe text reads : [istife' al-IJ.uqiiq min miifil bihii wa l$iilihii ilii mustalJ.iqqihii bacd thubiit 
istilJ.qiiqihii min alJ.ad al-wajhayn iqriir aw bayyinah] Ibid. · 
21The text reads : [thubiit al-wiliiyah calii man kiina mamniic al-la$arruf bijuniin aw $ighar wa 'l-
IJ.ajr calii man yarii 'l-IJ.ajr calayh Li saf ahin aw /alas in IJ.if.zan Li 'l-amwiil calii mustalJ.iqqlhii wa 
IQ$/Jlhan Li a}Jkiim al-cuqiid fihii]. Ibid. 
22The text reads : [iqiimat al-}Judiid calii musta}Jiqqihii, fa in kiina min IJ.uqiiq Allah taciilii tufridu 
bistlfii'ihi min ghayr {alab bi iqriir aw bayyinah, wa in kiina min IJ.uqiiq al-adamiyyln kiina 
2'1wqiifan calii {alab mustalJ.iqqlh]. Ibid. 
3Durar, vol.II, p.329. 
241bn Humam, Shar~ Fat~ al-Qadir, vol.VI, p.137. 
25Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1613 reads :[al-dacwii hiyii {alabu al].adin IJ.aqqahu min iikhar ft IJ.ur;J.iir al-
qii<fi]. See Durar vol.V, p.151. 
(224) 
cAli ijaydar includes the requirement of "~al al-munazacah" as excluding the claim 
which is at the stage of recociliation. 26 The jurists have agreed that dispensing jus-
tice and realization of rights (ta~~rl al-~uqaq) through qatjli) is indispensible. 
Resorting to judicial authority to settle disputes is almost mandatory and taking the 
law into one's own hand is prohibited.27 
It was mentioned in a legal text that the compulsion to resort to judicial 
authority (wujab al-raF ilti )l-qatjr) is not absolute and failing to do so will not 
render the person sinful. What is prohibited is freedom of seeking remedies and 
settlement on his own without resorting to the appointed authority capable of doing 
so. Such action will bring about an unsystematic solution and potential problems. 28 
The jurists have also allowed the use of extra-judicial methods of realization of 
right with certain qualifications. For instance, tjararah can be a reason for such an 
alternative method provided that the method will not bring about any evil and 
destructive consequences. 
The Sharrcah has also advocated the rule of fair trial. Five basic principles 
of practical scope and importance can be extracted from various prescriptions relat-
ing to the conduct of trial. It is required that, the litigants are given strict equality 
of treatment, decisions can only be made after the qatjr has heard both plaintiff and 
defendant, parties should be allowed to submit their evidences, pleas and defences 
and the Sharrcah has categorically ruled that substantive truth should prevail over 
procedural technicalities. 29 These meritorious qualities, aimed to be the guide for 
26cAli I:Iaydar, ibid. 
27 Qawa'id Ahkli.m, vol.II, p.198; Muhadhdhab, vol.II, p.217. 
28M.Mu~taj," vol.IV, p.462. 
29 Arbitration, pp.67-71. 
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the judicial authority, have been embodied in the alleged letter containing all the 
laws governing the office of a qatjl sent by cumar al-Khattab to Abu Musa which 
reads : 
" The office of a judge is a definite religious duty [farltjah 
mu}Jkamah] and a generally followed practice [sunnah muttabacah]. 
Understand the affidavit that are made before you, for it is useless to 
consider the plea that is not valid. Consider all people equal before 
you in your court and in your attention, so that the noble [sharif] 
will not expect you to be partial and the humble [tjacif] will not 
despair of justice from you. The claimant must produce evidence; 
from a defendant an oath may be exacted. Compromise [~ul}J] is 
permissible among Muslims but not any agreement through which 
something forbidden would be permitted or something permitted for-
bidden. If you give judgement yesterday and today, upon 
reconsideration, come to the correct opinion, you should not feel 
prevented by your first judgement from retracting. Justice is eternal 
and it is better to retract than to persist on worthlessness. Use your 
brain about matters that perplex you and to which neither the Quran 
nor Sunnah seem to apply. Study similar cases and evaluate the 
situation through analogy with those similar cases. If a person brings 
a claim, which he may or may not be able to prove, set a time limit 
for him. If he brings proof within the time limit, you should allow 
his claim, otherwise you are permitted to give judgement against 
him. This is the better way to forestall or clear u~ any possible 
doubt. .... avoid fatigue and annoyance at the litigants. O 
5.2 M~alim: A Higher Authority 
The study of the role of qatja) would be incomplete without incorporating 
the role of both wilayat al-ma;alim and wilayat al-J;isbah. The word ma;alim 
[pl.ma;limah] means injustice or wrongful deed, generally perceived as putting 
things in a place not their own.31Jts opposite is cadl [justice] and it was the ruler's 
primary responsibility to see that cadl prevailed. On this premise, he makes himself 
301bn Khaldun, Muqaddimah [tr.Rosenthal], pp.453-454; D.S.Margoliouth, "Omar's Instructions to 
the Qfu;ll," JRAS X [1910], pp.307-325. See al-Kindi, Kitab al-Qufltit alladhTn Wallu Qaflti) Mi~r 
~jh~ History of the Eg.ypti~ Cadis] edited by R.J.H.Gottheil, 1908. 
Lzslin, vol.II, p.649, Lexicon, vol.II, pp.1922-1923. 
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accessible to his subjects so that they would appeal directly to him against 
injustices in general and usurpation by government officials in particular. 32 In the 
sense of its application to the particular institution, ma;alim is seen as a forum for 
complaints against injustices committed by the strong against the weak. 33 
On this issue, the work of al-Mawardi is again of central importance. In his 
al-AIJkam al-Sulfiiniyyah, he provides a comprehensive survey of the various 
aspects of ma;.alim jurisdiction, its relationship to qa(l,ii) and its procedure. 34 He 
also emphasized that the Caliph is the authority ultimately responsible for supervis-
ing ma;.iilim though he will normally appoints a supervisor (ntq,ir). Because of the 
nature of the institution, the na;,ir must combine in himself the authority of an 
administrator and the competence of a qii(/,l. Only certain individuals are capable of 
undertaking the function of supplementing the deficient power of qa(/,l. This 
includes the heir apparent (wall az-cahd), plenipotentiary minister (wazlr al-tafwir!J 
and provincial governors. The ma;.iilim court is constituted by the ntq,ir with vari-
ous classes of assisting personnel, guards, legal advisors, scribes and witnesses 
who meet in regular publicized and open sessions. 35 The ntq,ir may appoint an indi-
32J.S.Nielsen, Secular Justice, p.l. He suggested that ma;,ti.lim, at least in its idealized form, can be 
considered as an expression of phenomenon which appears also in ancient China and in the Swedish 
ombudsman of the 18th century. See E.A.Kracke, "Early Visions of Justice for the Humble in East 
and West," JAOS XVI (1976), pp.492-498. 
33 This has been expressed in a celebrated definition: "Supervision of the nuqiilim means bringing 
litigants to a settlement by fear and restraining them from conflict by awe." See J .S .Nielsen, 
"M~im and Dar al-cAdl under the Mamliik," MW LXVI (1976), pp.114-132. At the developed 
stage of the theory, there are reports in leading chronicles about the primacy of maJ,iilim such that of 
Qalqashandi : "It is an important matter in which the wronged is given redress against wrongs, the 
truthful is protected from the liar, the weak is help against the strong and the law of justice 
(qawanrn al-'adl) are kept in force throughout the realm." See Qalqashandi, $ub}J al-A'shii, vol.VI, 
~.204. 
4J.S.Nielsen, Secular Justice, p.17. See also H.F.Amedroz, "The M~im Jurisdiction in the 
Ahkam Sul~aniyyah of Mawardi," JRAS (1911), pp.635-674. 
35sulfaniyyah, p.66. 
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vidual or a council (majlis) to give him advice or to investigate, arbitrate or even 
to pass judgement on his behalf. 36 
Al-MawardI has enumerated ten functions of the f1la?.li1im which fall under 
the theme of the abuse of official powers and enforcement of the decisions of the 
qtujJs. This study will confine its inquiry to the distinct way the f1la?.i1lim con-
tributed to the application of <},amiln. Plainly, the f1la?.i1lim is seen as competent to 
implement the qli<},l' s decisions which have failed due to an inability to enforce 
them as a result of their weakness of the successful litigants in the face of his 
rivals, due to the latter's arrogance, power and high status. The f1la?.li.lim will also 
intervene in areas concerning public interest in which the mul}tasib is unable to 
deal with, such as openly identifying the forbidden which he is too weak to prevent 
and the infringement of rights which he cannot defend. 37 
The procedure of the ma;.alim is an open one so far as the power of deci-
sion and the means of establishing proof is concerned. It is not subject to limita-
tions and the strict regulations of the procedure of the qi1<},l court. 38 This is why 
MawardI is said to have successfully attempted to keep the f1la?.i1lim within the 
bounds of the established precepts of Islamic law but not the procedures of the qa<f,l 
court. 39 While the qa<},l' s court normally must wait for an individual to raise a case 
before it can act in cases involving misuse of public authority, the f1la?.lilim court 
can take the initiative to investigate. The f1la?.lilim is distinguished from the qli<},l' s 
court by the much more liberal access to and use of evidence. The nicq.alim may 
36Ibid., pp.80-82. 
371.S.Nielsen, Secular Justice, pp.22-23. 
38Emile Tyan, "Judicial Organisation," in Law in the Middle East edited by M.Khadduri and 
H.Liebensny, p.265. 
391 S N. I "M~-:;;:•· " . 116 . . 1e sen, ~1m op.cit., p. . 
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subpoena and investigate witnessses and take evidence independently of the parties 
to the case. 40 Mazalim has extensive power to refer to arbitration. 
Regarding the m£q.tilim's alleged role as an appellate body, Nielsen said that 
such is quite difficult, except in the loose sense. It is the only place where the sub-
ject could appeal to sovereign justice. In the more technical sense of being an 
instance to which the decision of the lower courts could be referred for possible 
revision, the m£q.li.lim' s status of appeal court is supported by five cases of the 
Bal:in Mamliiks. 41 On the other hand, Kamali appeared to be more confident about 
the role of m£q.tilim as an appellate jurisdiction. 42 He said that although it was first 
known as an administrative tribunal which looked into disputes between the citizen 
against the state, it was also seen as a high court of appeal which entertained 
appeal against the decisions of the qtief,l courts. It is therefore not surprising that 
many observers have considered the m£q.tilim as a high court of appeal (mal}kamat 
al-isti )nlif) and an integral part of the judiciary. 43 
401 SN' 1 "M~-::::::•· " . 116 . . 1e sen, ~1m, op.cit., p. . 
4l For details see J .S.Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State Under the BaJ:zri Mamlaks [662-
789H I 1264-1387M], p.121. 
42M.H.Kamali, "Appellate Review and Judicial Independence," in Islam and Public Law edited by 
Chibli Mallat, p.62. 
43Fat~i' cuthman, al-Fikr al-Qanani, pp.312-313 cited in Kamali, Ibid. In his article, Kamali has 
discussed the position of judicial review in Islamic law. According to him, evidence for such a prac-
tice could be drawn from cumar's letter to Abii Musa wherein it was mentioned that a qa!fi may 
review their own decision or correct any error that he may detect at any stage prior to enforcement. 
He quoted the opinion of al-Sarakhsi' who allowed review to be carried out by the issuing qa!fI or 
another qa!fi may review the initial judgement. There are differences of opinion on the matter but 
notwithstanding the differences of interpretation, it is suggested that judges have authority under 
Islamic law to review their own decisions, whether such decision are flawed by personal erroneous 
reasoning or departure from the clear injunctions of the Shari'ah. Such a practice is based on few 
maxims such as "a ruling which opposes the text and consensus is reversible" [yunqll{l td-l)ukm td-
mukhiilif Li '[-nQ.$~ wa 'l-ijmii1, "oppressive decisions of disreputable judges are reversible" 
[tunqll{l al)kii.m qu{iat td-jiir wa 'l-sii' idhli. kii.nat jli.'irah] and "[decision which is] found to be 
manifestly wrong" [khata' bayyin lamyukhttdaf fih]. See pp.66-83. 
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As a matter of fact, the place of the rntJ?.lilim m Islamic judicial theory 
underlines the internal contradictions and tensions. It has no place in strict 
Sharlcah, as is evident from its omission in the legal manuals. Only the Malikis 
allow mar,alim a role in the discourse on qar)a), demonstrated in the writings of al-
Qurafi and Ibn Farl:iiin. The rntJ?.lilim has always been connected by the scholars to 
siyasah sharciyyah. The increasing use of J;,iyal (legal devices) and resorting to the 
jurisprudential justifications based on istil}san and isti#al}, have been suggested as 
an explanation of this development. 
5.3 l:fisbah: The Enforcement Authority 
lfisbah literally means arithmethical problem, sum or reward. It is also 
attributed to the act of computing or measuring. 44 The derivative if;,tisab45 could be 
associated with the activities of a person who invites others to do good (macraf) 
and forbids them from evil (munkar) hoping to be rewarded in the Hereafter. Tech-
nically, f;,isbah connotes the state institution to promote what is proper and forbid 
what is improper. 46 The Islamic state has been enjoined to institute an efficient 
44Lexicon, pp.564-565. 
45To talce into consideration or to anticipate a reward in the Hereafter by adding a pious deed to 
one's account with God. Ibid. 
46Muhammad Akram Khan, "al-l:lisbah and the Islamic Economy," appendix in Ibn Taimiyyah, 
Public Duties in Islam : The Institution of ljisba, p.135. Mul:iammad al-Mubaralc in his book Ara) 
lbn Taimiyyah, 1973, p.73-74. opines: "It is a control function of the government through persons 
acting especially in fields of morals, religion and economy and generally in the areas of collective 
and public life, to achieve justice and righteousness according to the principles of Islam and com-
monly known good customs of the time and place." In his al-ljisbah wa )l-Mulpasib ft )l-Isltim, 
Nichola Ziadeh defines l:iisbah as the office to control the market and common morality (iidab). See 
Abd al-cA~m I~lfil}.I, Economic Concept of Ibn Taimiyah, p.187. 
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arrangement to oversee the implementation of amr bi 'I-ma 'nlf wa 'l-nahy 'an al-
munkar. 41 
The Prophet and the four Khulafa' al-Rashid1n are reported to have carried 
out the function of mu}Jtasib themselves. 48 The provincial governors have acted as 
mu}Jtasib on behalf of the caliph. During the Abbasid caliph Abu Ja'far al-Man~ur, 
a separate department of }Jisbah was established. Full-time professional mu}Jtasib 
was appointed together with qualified supporting staffs known as 'lirif and amln. 
The office of a mu}Jtasib is well received at every stage of Islamic history. 49 In var-
ious places, they are known with various designation other than mu}Jtasib, like 
~li}Jib al-suq in North Africa, mu}Jtasib aghlisl in Turkey and Kotwal in India. so As 
a result of a meticulous development, unlike the nuq,lilim, there is a wealth litera-
ture dealing with }Jisbah, both in theory normally written by the classical jurists51 
and practical elucidations by the mu}Jtasibs themselves. 52 
4 7 Q., Al clmran [3] : 110 reads : Ye are the best of peoples evolved for mankind enjoining what is 
rilht and forbidding what is wrong and believing in Allah. 
4 At this initial stage, this function is better known for supervising the saq [marketplace] before it 
evolved to a more sophisticated institution later. The theme is presumably the same, the difference 
is only the operation. Al-Sa'ib b. Yazid claims that he was an camil caza saq in Madinah during the 
reign of cumar al-Khattab. This is noted to be the first time such designation was ever used for an 
Eastern market inspector, before it was replace by the title mul:ztasib. The role of camil al-saq, after 
J:zisbah had been fully institutionalised during the Abbasid, seem to be declining. Interestingly, the 
surviving Umayyad family in Spain had preserved the function of ~al:zib al-saq, a clear transposition 
of the Eastern camil al-saq.R.P.Buckley, "The Mul)tasib," Arabica XXXIX [1992], pp.59-67. For 
details on market inspection in the Islamic West see Yal)ya b. cumar, Kitab al-N<q,ar wa 'l-AJ:zkamft 
Jamrc Ahwtil al-Saq, 1975. 
49 . . 
Buckley, op.cit., pp.60-62. 
50Muhammad Akram Khan, op.cit., pp.136-137. 
51The most celebrated texts are : a] Ibn Taimiyah, al-ljisbah ft 'l-Jsltim. b] al-Mawardi, al-AJ:zkam 
al-Sul[tiniyyah. c] al-Ghazfili, ll:zya' Ulam al-Drn. 
52 Among other manuals of l)isbah are : 
a] Nihti.yat al-Rutbah ft '(alab al-ljisbah by al-Shayzari. 
b] Nihti.yat al-Rutbahft '(alab al-ljisbah by lbn Bassam. 
c] Macalim al-Qurbahft AJ:zkam al-ljisbah by Ibn Ukhuwwah 
d] Fr Adah al-ljisbah by Mul)ammad al-Saqa~i. 
e] Kittib al-/shti.rah ila MaJ:zasin al-Tijarah by Abu '1-
FaQl JaCfar b. cAli al-Dimashqi. 
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Al-MawardI declared that the jurisdiction of the l]isbah lies midway 
between the qarjli) and that of fna!,tilim. 53 There are Quranic references which have 
been taken to define the role of the mul]tasib in cases of short weight or measure, 
commercial frauds and unjustified delay in payment of debts. 54 Where debt is 
acknowledged, the mul]tasib may compel payment. 55 These roles clearly serve the 
purpose of applying rjamtin, in either sense of kaftilah or ghartimah, if a proven 
rjamtin arises. In these matters, the authority of mul]tasib is equal with that of the 
qarjl. It is inferior to it in that he is not permitted to deal with cases in which the 
wrong is not immediately obvious. For instance, he may not deal with contracts 
and agreements except where there is a specific authoritative text on the subject. 
Furthermore, a mul]tasib may only deal with cases in which the wrong is admitted. 
Where there is any dispute the hearing of evidence becomes necessary and need 
reference to a qarjl. 56 
Despite those limitations, the mul]tasib' s authority is greater than of the 
qarjl's in certain respects. He may proceed independently of any complaint to 
53H.F.Amedroz, "The l::lisba Jurisdiction in the Al)kam Sultaniyyah of MawardI," JRAS (1916), 
~p.77-101; 287-314. 
4y arious Qur>anic injunctions quoted in this respect are: 
a] al-Mutaffifin [83) : 1-3 reads : Woe to those that deal in fraud, those who, when they have to 
receive by measure from men exact full measure. But when they have to give by measure or weight 
to men, give less than due. 
b] al-Shu'ar~P [26] : 181-183 reads : Give just measure and cause no loss [to others by fraud] and 
weight with scales true and upright. And withhold not things justly due to men, nor do evil in the 
land, working mischief. 
c] al-Nisa> [4] : 107 reads : Contend not on behalf of such as betray their own souls for Allah loveth 
not one given to perfidy and misdemeanor. 
d] Yusuf [12) : 52 reads : This [say I], in order that he may know that I have never been false to 




investigate cases where he suspects illegality, whereas the qaf/,l can proceed only 
where there is a complaint. 57 He has, further, a measure of secular authority and 
has the right to use force in pursuance of his duty and to inflict punishment. In 
these respects, the J:iisbah resembles the fna?,li.lim, but it differs from it because it is 
not competent to hear cases outside the jurisdiction of a qa<jl. 58 
Apart from the muJ:itasib officials appointed by the government, there has 
been private individuals who want to carry out the role of muJ:itasib on a voluntary 
basis. 59 There are differences between the two group, primarily because of the 
specific mandate given to the official mu~.tasib. As such, he is compelled by his 
office to act and not to undertake other duties. He is authorized to summon 
offenders to appear before him and must act when called upon by a complainant. 
He may appoint assistants, inflict punishment and is entitled to draw emoluments 
for his services and more importantly, he is considered competent to exercise 
ijtihad in deciding cases involving curf. 60 
In his comprehensive study on the economic concepts of lbn Taimiyyah, 
cAbd al-cA:~im I~la.Qi pointed out the important role of J:iisbah to promote high 
morality and competence in matters concerning law, the market and manufactur-
ing. 61 Through J:iisbah, the government can exercised a comprehensive socio-
economic control on trade and economic practices. It can serve as supervisors to 
57 Another expression used is "when there is a claim" or "when a litigation is institued". See Chap-
ter IV on Methods and Procedure, supra. 
58Ibid. 
59This aspect is highlighted on purpose to show that the role of what known as public-interest group 
in contemporary consumer protection has existed in Islam. This resembles in some respects con-
sumer associations. Cf.Ian Ramsay, Consumer Protection : Text and Materials, p. 83. 
60Ibid. See R.P.Buckley, op.cit., p.67. 
61Nichola Ziadeh, op.cit., p.34, 55. 
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industry, professional services, standardisation of products, check on hoarding, 
middlemen and usurious practices, apart from his main function of looking after 
people's social behaviour, performance of religious duties and municipal works. 62 
As regards economic functions, the mu!Jtasib is responsible for supply and 
provision of necessities. He had to keep a check on the aavailability of essential 
goods like foodstuffs and services like construction, cultivation, cloth manufactur-
ing and others. In industry, the mu!Jtasib's main duty was standardization of 
products. He was also authorized to ban harmful industries. For instance, if a 
chemist produced deceitful and unsound goods, the muhtasib should act against 
him. He could also resolve industrial disputes ansmg between employers and 
employees and if necessary, fix the minimum wages. 63 
He was also responsible for monitoring the professional services rendered 
in the society. Deception is perhaps easier in the case of services than goods. The 
mu!Jtasib was authorized to check whether physicians, surgeons, pharmacologists, 
engineers, architects and others were doing their jobs properly or otherwise. In the 
same way, teachers, grinders, inn-keepers and others were also regularly 
inspected. 64 As far as markets are concerned, the mu!Jtasib had to supervise the 
market in general and different trade practices in particular. He had to check 
weights and measures and product quality to ensure that the merchants and their 
agents did not resort to practices calculated to deceive the consumers about mer-
chandise and the prices charged for it. He also made sure that the merchants did 
62cAbd aP~m I~lfil.U, op.cit., p.189. 
631bn Taimiyah ,al-lfisbah, p.34. 
64Nichola Ziadeh, op.cit, p.118-121. 
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not indulge in any operation which was connected with the prohibited practices of 
interest and other usurious transactions. 65 
5.4 Arbitration 
Arbitration is often either overlooked in manuals of Islamic law or treated 
cursorily, usually in a chapter related to administration of justice (qafj,a)). Arbitra-
tion is generally described as a permissible substitute for the jurisdiction of an 
ordinary judge (qafj,l). 66 Among other systematic definitions found is that given by 
the Majallat al-A~kam al-cAdliyyah in which arbitration is defined as: "voluntary 
submission by two litigating parties of their disputes and claims to determination 
by a qualified person". 67 Samir Salih suggested that a definition by a contemporary 
scholar of Islamic Law, Mul)ammad Salam Madkur is the most comprehensive, in 
which arbitration is said as: "The submission by two or more contracting parties to 
a third party of a dispute to be adjudicated according to Sharicah. "68 
Arbitration (ta~klm) is considered as a simple option to resolve a dispute. It 
1s not really characterised by adversity but more by conciliation. The texts of 
Islamic law have described arbitration as the spontaneous and less improvised 
approach. The arbitrator known as ~akam or mu~akkim, is in normal cases, an 
ordinary man but possessing all the qualifications of a qafj,l. The dispute is to be 
651bn Taimiyah, op.cit., pp.21-22; cAbd al-cA~m I~lfil).1, op.cit., p.190. 
66Arbitration, p.20. 
67 Article 1790. 
68Mul}.ammad Salam Madkiir, al-Qa¢a', p.131 cited in Arbitration, Ibid. 
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determined according to the Sharlcah both in procedure and substance, regardless 
of whether the case in dispute is extra-judicial or already pending in court. 69 
The ijanafis are seen to be more receptive to arbitration compared to other 
schools of law. They ruled that arbitration is valid in all cases which do not involve 
legally fixed punishment (IJudud), although whether qi~a~ can be the subject of 
arbitration remains a disputed matter. Arbitration is encouraged in marriage, 
divorce, sale, loan and guarantee contracts. 70 The Majallah permits the use of arbi-
tration in financial matters involving private rights (IJuquq al-nas) wherein agency 
and representation is approved unlike in cases involving public rights where no 
proxy is allowed. 71 All three other leading Sunni schools allowed arbitration m 
financial matters as well as in the discretionary punishments (taczlr). 72 
Except in the opinion of a dissenting minority of the Shafi9" jurists73, the 
award when issued by the arbitrators has the same binding and enforceable effect 
as a qlirjl' s judgement. Certain ijanafi authors have denied that the award is bind-
ing and enforceable before its confirmation by the qlirjl. However, most ijanafi 
authors as reflected in the Majallah confer a binding and enforceable effect on the 
award before any confirmation by the qlirjl. 74 'Ali ijaydar favours the qarjl' s con-
firmation for the reason that if and when the confirmation is granted by the qlirjl, 
69 Arbitration, p.20-21. 
7D-rbe evidence for such a practice is based on verse 9 of al-ijujurat [49]: "If two parties among the 
believers fall into a quarell, make ye peace between them ... ". See also Hedaya, p.243; Mu'fn, p.24. 
71 Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.1841. See Arbitration, p.47. 
12Mukhta~ar, p.438; Tab#rat, p.43; WajTz, p.238; Minhaj, p.366; Mughnf, p.108. For modem 
treatment see M.S. el-cAwa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study, 1982. 
73Ibn Abi al-Dammm mentions the opinions of some Shaficl scholars who require the parties to arbi-
tration to give their agreement so that the award becomes valid and enforceable. See Adab al-QadiiJ, 
7p.139-141. 
4Mu'Tn, p.24; Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.1842, 1848 and 1849. 
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the award will then become protected from challenge on the ground that the award 
does not conform to the <latrine of another qtujJ. 75 
5.5 Amicable Settlement (~ull}) 
Apart from arbitration, there is another method of settlement of dispute 
which is much faster and less adversarial. This method is known as ~ul~ or 
amicable settlement between the parties involved. Literally, ~ul~ means reconcilia-
tion, discontinuation or stoppage of the dispute or dissension and contention. 76 
Legally, ~ul~ is a contract to terminate or to avert a dispute of a lawsuit between 
two litigants. 77 Unlike arbitration where a third party is appointed to adjudicate, 
the two contracting parties in ~ul~ are peacemakers or conciliators (mu~lili~). 78 The 
litigated right or the case at issue is the right to be settled (mu~lili~ canh), involving 
private claims like tjamlin. To arrive at a conclusion would involve mutual settle-
ment enshrined in the willingness to give badal al-~ul~. 79 
The contract of ~ul~ is not only a scheme for the elimination of dispute but 
also as a mean to amend an existing obligation. For instance, a creditor may waive 
75Durar, p.879. 
16Lexicon, II, p.175. 
77Evidence for the legality of such a method is founded on the basis of the reconciliation of marital 
relationship in al-Ma?idah [4] : 127 reads: "If a wife fears cruelty or desertion on the part of her 
husband, there is no blame if they arrange an amicable settlement between themselves and such 
settlement is best [wa 'l-$ull) khayr]." See Heffening, "Sul})," El(/), vol.IV, p.541; See also Sales, 
7~.478-479. 
Article 1531 of Maj. 'Adliyyah reads : A settlement is a contract concluded by offer and accept-
ance and consists of settling a dispute by mutual consent [al-$ull) caqdun yurfacu 'l-nizac bi 'l-tarQ{li 
wa yancaqid bi 'l-ljiib wa 'l-qiibiil]. See Sh.Baz, p.827. 
19/ntroduction, p.148. Also see Sales, p.476. 
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his original claim. 80 This is what is called by Shafici as ~ull] ibrli) (reconciliation 
performed by release)81wherein the element of benevolent gift is dominant. The 
other type is ~ull] mucliwafl,ah (reconciliation requiring a return) wherein a con-
sideration is expected. He equated ~ull] to the contract of sale in the sense of its 
application to any permissible acts or otherwise. 82 
$ull] can be accomplished by way of admission (iqrar) of the defendant, by 
way of his denial (inklir) and his silence (sukilt) consequent upon the absence of 
any admission or denial. 83 A person may appoint any other person as his agent to 
settle an action and when the agent makes a settlement, the principal is bound by 
such settlement. The agent is in no way responsible for any claim in connection 
therewith, unless he made himself a guarantor thereof, in which case he is liable. 84 
Once a settlement is accomplished, neither of the parties may retract therefrom. 85 
By agreeing to the settlement, the plaintiff becomes entitled to the consideration for 
80 Article 1552 reads : If any person affects a settlement with any person in respect to a portion of a 
claim that he has against such person, the person affecting the settlement is considered to have 
received payment of part of the claim and to have forgone his right to the balance, that is to say, to 
have released such person from the remainder. Article 1553 reads : If any person effects a settle-
ment whereby a debt repayable instantly (dayn al-mucajjal) is converted into a debt repayable at 
some future date (mu'ajjal), he is considered to have relinquished his right to instant payment. See 
Civil, p.406. 
81 Jbrti' consists of two parts : the first part consists of release by way of renunciation of a right 
[ibrti' isqti!], the second consists of release by admission of payment [ibra' istifa']. A special release 
[ibrti' khti:\':\'] is a release of a person from an action instituted in respect of a claim relating to some 
particular matter. A general release [ibra' ctimm] is a release of a person from all actions. See 
Maj. cAdliyyah, arts.1536-1538. 
82umm, vol.III, p.226. 
83Detailed discussions can be found in al-Kasaru, Bada'ic, vol.VI, p.40. Also see Maj. cAdliyyah, 
art.1535. 
84see Maj. cAdliyyah, art.1543. For illustration on the modus operandi of ~ull:z see articles 1548-
1555. 
85 Article 1556 reads : [idhii tamma al.-$ull) fa laysa Li wal)idi.n mi.n al.-farfqayn al.-rujuc canh]. 
Salim Baz has enumerated a few exceptional situations to this general rules, citing various ijanafi 
authorities. [1] $ull:z with property wherein later it was found that there is no obligation on the 
defendant.[2] Loss of the transported merchandise by ajrr mushtarak, :\'Ul/:z is agreed but later the 
merchandise was found. [3] When the defect of the good was contended and :\'ulJ:z was reached but 
later its non-existence or disappearance was realized. See Sh.Baz, p.845. 
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the settlement. He no longer possesses any right to bring an action. The defendant 
may not claim the return of the consideration for the settlement from him. 86 
5.6 Insurance [Ta)min]. 
An insurance contract is undoubtedly a recent phenomenon in Islamic 
societies despite the fact that in some respects it bears similarities with vanous 
types of established transactions. Some scholars have suggested that as a result of 
extensive trading activities with the West, this idea and institution was known 
among Muslims. 87 However, this idea was developed in the 18th century and it 
was only in 20th century, that the term ta)m1n was adopted. Earlier, the term 
sukara (security or securite) was more popular alongwith the Italian term siguare 
and Turkish sigorta, However, it is hard to conceive that Muslims did not practice 
insurance in very much earlier time as they were involved in marine activities in 
the Mediterranean and Indian ocean as early as the seventh century. 88 
A recent finding on the conduct of Islamic maritime law which touches 
marine insurance89 has suggested that insurance was practised though not known by 
such a designation and structure. 90 It was suggested that the Arabs were familiar 
86Civil, p.407. 
87E.Klingmuller, "The Concept and Development of Insurance in Islamic Countries," IC XLIII 
~ an.1969], pp .27-37. 
80.F.Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and early Medieval Time, p.66. 
89Maritime, p.188. 
90Islamic law recognizes several transactions and institutions which function in a similar way to 
certain types of insurance. [1] Contract of f!aman [guarantee] [2] paman kha!ar al-!ariq [guarantee 
against travel hazard] [3] Wala) al-muwaltit (transfer of clientage) [4] Diyah [blood money] [5] 
Muf!arabah [dormant partnership] [6] Zakar [7] Waqf (charitable endowment) [8] Jizyah (Poll Tax). 
See Mu~tafii Zarqa>, Ta)mln, p.12. 
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with manne insurance as recorded in their famous dictum: "Sustenance through 
trade on sea" [al-rizq bi )l-tijarah ft )l-balJ,r]. 91 In the field of maritime commerce, 
risk of loss has always been the primary concern of both merchants and mariners. 
To protect against risk and thereby minimise loss and risk by sharing loss, the con-
tract of insurance was adopted as a from of mutual assistance (taklifu.l). 
The research further suggested that this type of mutual assistance might 
have its nucleus in the commercial life in Arabia. Hourani testified that the 
rigorous practice of seafaring and trading among the Arabs would have been a pos-
sible reason for adopting such a measure. 92 The purpose of such insurance is two 
fold, namely, security against risk and indemnity for loss. The term insurance sig-
nifies the notion of 'making sure' parallel to the French 'sure' and the Latin 
'securus', employed by notaries and merchants in the early Middle Ages to des-
cribe a contract of security against risk in maritime trade. 
The ever growing complexity of the economic system in the industrial age 
has increased the importance of risk management, that is reduction and removal of 
risks, in the productive process and commercial transactions. If the risk of loss in 
business by shipwreck, air crash, theft, natural catastrophe like floods and the like. 
91Roberts, The Social Laws of the Qur'an, p.99. See Maritime, p.187. This aspect has its origin in 
the Qur>an XVI : 14 which reads : It is He Who has made the sea subject that ye may eat extract 
thereof flesh that is fresh and tender and that ye may extract thereof ornaments to wear and thou 
seest the ship therein that plough the waves that ye may seek [thus] of the bounty of God and that ye 
may be grateful. 
92Afzalur Rahman seem to denote that the merchants of Makkah used to form a mutual fund to help 
the victims and survivors of natural hazards during their commercial ventures to Syria, Iraq and 
other places. See Afzalur Rahman, Banking and Insurance, p.34. See also Vardit Rispler-Chaim, 
"Insurance and Semi-Insurance Transactions in Islamic History Until the 19th Century," JESHO 
XXXIV [1982], pp.142-158. 
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By meeting pure risk through insurance, the investor will be facing only normal 
business risk and uncertainties, which are inevitable in all invesment. 93 
a] Debate on Insurance Among Contemporary Scholars 
There has been a mixed reaction towards the contract of insurance among 
Muslim scholars. There are at least three standpoints; absolutely prohibited 
(J:iarlim), absolutely permissible (mubaJ:i) and allowing some forms of insurance but 
disapproving of others. 94 
The proponents of the prohibition of insurance argued that their objection to 
it is that it has the elements of ribli (usury), gharar (risk), juhala (uncertainty), 
maysir (gambling and unearned gain), attempting to supersede the will of God, all 
of which is said to be diametrically opposed to the ethical standards set by Islamic 
law. 95 This group also argued that the application of ~amlin in insurance is not an 
obligation founded on sound Sharlcah sources. At the same time, it contains the 
prohibited elements mentioned earlier and there is no real reason to have an alter-
native of such contract. 96Tue insurance contract is alleged to be "exploiting the 
people's anxiety of their uncertain future". 97 
93M.N .Siddiqi, Insurance in an Islamic Economy, p.23. 
94Af)mad al-Sa<ld Sharaf al-Din, 'Uqad al-Ta)mfn wa 'Uqad I;Jamtln al-Istithmtlr, p.88-94 ; 
M.Muslehuddin, Insurance and Islamic Law, p.109-125. For details on the polemic between 
Shaykh Mul)ammad Abu Zahrah and Shaykh Mu~tafii Al).mad Zarq~P see Zarqa»s works 'Aqd al-
Ta)mrn [al-sukrah} wa Mawqif al-SharT'ah al-Islamiyyah minhu [A lecture delivered during the 
Usbu< al-Fiqh al-Islamiyy], Damascus, 1962 and a recent work 'Aqd al-Ta)mln ft al-Sharf'ah al-
Isltlmiyyah, 1982. 
95M.Muslehuddin, op.cit., p.109. See also Nik Ramlah N .Mahmood, "Takaful :The Islamic 
System of Mutual Insurance - The Malaysian Insurance," ALQ [1991], pp.280-296. 
96A.S.Sharaf al-Din, op.cit., p.88. 
97 A.S.Sharaf al-Din quoting the saying of Mul)ammad al-Ghazfill in his al-Islam wa )l-Mantlhij al-
Ishtirakiyah that ta)mln is nothing but [istighliil.an Li tahayyub al-niis min ghaddi.him al-mubham]. 
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Mul)ammad Abu Zahrah has made the qualification that ta)mln not founded 
on a collective basis (al-ta)mln ghayr al-tacawunl) is reprehensible (makrah). Such 
a decision is established on the basis of the classical methodology of culama) al-
salaf that no prohibition will be pronounced except where there is an explicit evi-
dence (dalll qa(l). The 1976 First International Conference on Islamic Economics 
held in Makkah resolved that : "The Conference feels that commercial insurance 
(ta)mln tijarl) as currently practised does not realise the Sharlcah. aims of coopera-
tion and solidarity because it does not satisfy the required conditions therefor". 98 
The proponents of the permissibility of ta)mln declared that such a contract 
is allowed when it is free from riba. It is considered as a collective undertaking 
(carnal tacawunl) which takes care of the welfare (ma~ali~.) of individuals and 
society. In so far as ma#a~ah is achieved, it is in compliance with the law. Fur-
thermore, originally all contracts are permissible (al-a# ft )z_cuqad al-iba~ah) and 
as such it can be equated by analogy to various permissible contracts (cuqad 
ja)izah). 99 Justification based on public interest and even on the socio-economic sur-
vival of the Muslim ummah has also been put foward.100 
98First International Conference on Islamic Economics, Makkah, 1976 [General Recommendations 
No.6]. See Mul).ammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking : A Survey of Con-
temporary Literature," in Studies in Islamic Economics edited by Khurshid Ahmad, 1976, p.217. 
On that premise, the Conference has also recommended formation of a committee consisting of spe-
cialists in Sharrcah and Ecomonics to recommend a system of insurance which is free from riba and 
speculation, promotes cooperation in accordance with the Sharlcah and helps replace the current 
form of commercial insurance. M.N.Siddiqi, ibid. See also proceeding of the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy discussing on insurance in Qararat Majlis al-Majmac al-Fiqhl al-/slaml [19 January 
1985], pp.43-52. 
99 A.S.Sharaf al-Din, op.cit., p.90. 
lOOsee MuQ.ammad al-Bahl, cAqd al-Ta)mln, p.23 ; Faraj al-Sanhuri, al-Ta)mlnat, p.175. 
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The justifications of ta)mln advanced by Mu~tara Zarqa>lOl and cAn al-
Khafifl02, leading contemporary scholars, have been overwhelmingly accepted. 
Firstly, it was argued that ta)mln is a newly known contract not covered by any 
text (na~~) whether approving or disapproving of it. It should be then allowed 
(jli)iz) and permissible (mubli~). Secondly, since it is a contract based on ma~la~ah 
and since there is no aspect of any harm (cjarar), it complies with the prescribed 
law. Thirdly, insurance has become a common usage (curf ca.mm) necessary for the 
attainment of private and public interests. curj is argued to be a source of law, so 
far as it does not contradicts the precepts of the Sharlcah.103 
The contracting parties are given freedom to choose the legal techniques to 
be adopted in order to achieve the intended deal, so long as the conditions are valid 
in terms of Islamic law. Ta)mln is argued to fall under the generic basis of two 
dominant maxims, (i) obligation to fulfill contractual undertakings [awfu bi )l-
cuqudj; and (ii) legitimacy of trading with mutual consent [illii an takuna tijiiratan 
can farii!lin minkum]. Islamic law grants mankind freedom to create any contract 
which they need within the fringe of the general rules when there is no text 
prohibiting it as well as when it does not defy any religious precepts.104 
The third group ruled that some forms of ta)mln are allowed and some are 
prohibited. Some of them allowed the use of ta)mln on property but banned life 
insurance. Some also allowed it on a restricted basis, only to undertake 
101 His finding on this matter was delivered in the Usha' al-Fiqh al-Islii.ml in Damascus [1961] as 
well as in his deliberation at the Makkah Conference [1976]. 
102His opinions submitted to the Second Assembly of the Majmac al-Bul;tiith al-Islamiyyah [Islamic 
Research Academy] of al-Azhar University in which he excluded life insurance from the list of vali-
dated insurances. 
103 A.S.Sharaf al-Din, op.cit., p.90. 
1041bid., p.98. 
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responsibility corresponding to the contract of clientage ( caqd al-muwiiliih) .105 
There are also certain scholars who determine the legality of ta)mln based on the 
nature of the risk (khatar) involved. Ta)mln is allowed only if the risk is actuated 
by human act whereas in a case involving natural misfortune, using ta)mln as a 
security is deemed to be a form of speculation and gambling.106 
b] Ta)min and the grounds for cJaman. 
Since it has been alleged that ta)mln. is established on the basis of guarantee 
(fiamiin) which is provided for the consequence of the risk suffered by the 
guaranteed person who has been given the guarantee by the guarantor, it is 
pertinent to see whether ta)min falls under any of the legal grounds for fiamiin. 
The jurists have enumerated a number of grounds of fiamiin which include, among 
others, transgression that is ruination whether directly or causative (tacaddr - al-
itlaf mubiisharatan aw tasabbuban), fraud (taghrir), unentrusted possession of 
property (wafic al-yadd ghayr al-mu)taminah) and suretyship (kafalah). Mul)ammad 
Bakhit al-MuWI viewed that ta)min does not fall under any of these grounds and 
therefore should be seen as "an obligation which is not required by the law" .101 
Another proponent of ta)min has suggested that such a practice of paying com-
pensation to the insured by virtue of the loss suffered while the insurer has no role 
whatsoever in that respect, has no good reasons according to the Sharlcah.108 
105see Faraj al-Sanhiirl, op.cit.,168. 
106Fatwa of Najm al-Din al-Waci'.?, the Mufti of clraq cited in Faraj al-Sanhiirl, p.185. 
107He voiced it as [caqd ilziim Ii mii La yulmm sharcan] similar to the one said by Ibn cA.bidin 
[ilti1iim bi mii La yulmm sharcan]. See A.S.Sharaf al-Din, op.cit., p.100. · 
I 08shaykh cAbd al-Ral}.man Taj said that such has justification in the Shan-cah and contradicts the 
law as it is susceptible to deceit (ghubn), injustice (~iyafJ and taking people's property illegally (akl 
amwli.l al-nas bi )l-bii{il). See his Sharikiit al-Ta)mrn min wijhat nG.?,ar al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah 
[discussion paper at the seventh assembly of the Maj mac al-Bul}iith al-Islamiyyah]. 
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On the contrary, it was argued that restriction (~a~r) should not be imposed 
while determining grounds of rjamlin. After all, there is no decisive text on the 
issue and thus it is still subject to deliberation. paman can still be applied is cases 
involving entrusted possession of property like in tarjmin al-~unnlic (civil liability 
of the craftsman) .109 In reality, every contract regardless of its characteristic, is 
considered a ground of rjamlin by most jurists. I IO For instance, the contract of 
clientage (caqd al-walli)) brings about a guarantee by an Arab for the wrong com-
mitted by his non-Arab Muslim client.111 
It was also pointed out that a contract of settlement on one property for 
another property (al-~ulh calli mlil bi mal)l 12 works on the same basis. Therefore, it 
appears that contractual guarantee (rjamlin caqdl) can become a legally viable 
mechanism for ta)min, regardless of the occurence of any transgression (tacaddl) or 
negligence (taq~lr) or both.113 Based on this argument, ta)mln is considered as a 
lawful contract after the notion of rjamlin caqdl has been widened, with a condition 
that it is free from any prohibited elements like gharar, riba and the like.114 
Even if the question of legal mechanism may seem to being resolved in 
favour of some form of ta)min, there are still a number of important questions to 
be clarified. Can rjamlin be applied when the risk in unknown and uncertain?. cAn 
al-Khafif and Mu~tafa Zarqa) clarified that rjamlin al-majhul when based on the 
109NG?-./)aman, p.67 ; cAbd al-N~ir al-<Mtar, "J:Iukm al-Ta>m1n fi al-Shan-cab al-Islamiyyah," 
t{_~allat cuzam al-Qananiyyah wa )l-/qti~ad. 
NG?-./)amlin, p.65, 144. 
l l l A.N .aI-<Attar, ibid. 
l 12Naz,.Damlin, p.152. 113 .. 
NG?-./)amlin, p.67. 
11 4A.N.aI-<Attar, op.cit., 37, 61. 
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prevailing risk is permissible. They apply an analogy to kafalah in which rights 
will be established afterwards. It is also similar to kaflilah bi )l-jucz (guarantee to 
give reward) where reward will be honoured after performance of the task. There-
fore, the application of fjamlin in the sense of undertaking the consequence of the 
risk (talJammul al-tabicah) does not require its actual presence. It is sufficient that 
it should only be presumed to exist (mu}Jtamal al-wujud). Ignorance about the 
amount of debt in kafalah does not invalidate such dealings as "the type of jahalah 
which is forbidden is the one that inhibits fulfillment of the obligation". Thus 
ignorance of the amount of compensation (jahalat miqdlir al-ta cwrfj) does not affect 
ta)mrn in any way. 
In practice, the concept of mutual insurance (takliful) can be seen as a 
method of joint guarantee among a group of members or participants against loss 
or damage that may be inflicted upon any of them. The members of the group 
agree to guarantee joint! y that should any of them suffer a catastrophe or disaster 
he would receive a certain amount of money to help him meet the loss or damage. 
It means mutual help among the members by pooling efforts to support the 
needy)15Takliful has been developed as a form of business. Its business venture is 
based on the principles of Islamic transactions, particularly the contract of 
mufjarabah. 
"Under the contract of takiiful based on the principle of mufl,arabah, 
the entrepreneur or the takliful operator (mufjarib) will accept pay-
ment of takiiful instalments or contributions termed as ra)s al-mlil 
from the investors or provider of capital [ takiiful participants] acting 
as ~a/Jib al-mlil. The contract specifies how the profit which is the 
surplus from the operations of takllful managed by the takiiful 
operators is to be shared, in accordance with the principles of 
115M.Fadzli Yusof, "Takaful - Islamic Alternative to Insurance," Paper presented at the Law Semi-
nar of the Kulliyah of Laws, International Islamic University, Malaysia, 26-27th July 1986, p.4. 
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mufjiirabah. The sharing of such profit may be in a ratio of 5:5, 
6: 4, 7: 3 etc. as agreed between the contracting parties." 116 
In addition to that, the manner in which the taklifal contributions are to be 
invested will be spelt out clearly in the contract. The general terms and conditions 
include benefits which the participants are entitled to, as well as rights and obliga-
tions of both the participants and the takiifal operator. Another equally important 
feature of the takiifal contract is the Islamic concept of tabarru c. Under this 
arrangement, the participants agree to relinquish as donations made in accordance 
with the concept of tabarruc, certain proportion of their takiifal instalments in order 
to fulfil the obligations of mutual help as embodied in the concept of takiifal. The 
purpose of tabarru c as stipulated in the contract is to enable the participants to per-
form their deeds in helping fellow participants who might suffer loss or damage 
due to a catastrophe or disaster .117 
This present work inclined to support Zarqa?'s standpoint on insurance. The 
matter has become a routine in businesses and thus an Islamic alternative need to 
be worked out. As long as there is no transgression against the precepts and the 
spirit of the Sharlcah such an important institution is needed. What is equally 
important is the amount of research done in order to identify the weaknesses in the 
operation of taklifal and building a comprehensive body of principles based on 
sound Islamic legal rules. 
5. 7 Banking and Financial House (M~ariO 
l l61bid., pp.4-5. 
ll 71bid, p.5. 
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Literally, ~arf in relation to property means turning, sending and employ-
ing. Mu~firafah thus signifies the act of dealing, buying and selling and it is some-
times attributed to exchanging money .11 s Ma~tirif is the technical term used to 
denote financial houses or banking institution.119 It is an important financial inter-
mediary and vital institution in the economic structure of any society. It mobilises 
savings and idle funds in an economy and makes them available to those who can 
make better and fuller use of them. In this way, banking effects a reallocation of 
the capital funds. Beside this main function, the banking system makes possible a 
most convenient method of payment through chequing facilities and renders many 
other subsidiary services.120 
a] The Operation of Islamic Banks based on Mucamalat 
Islamic banking is founded on the basis of a sound Islamic economic 
philosophy. It evolves on seven key concepts, founded on the broad terms of vari-
ous divine prescriptions in the Qur'an. Firstly, the economic principle of an 
Islamic bank should be based on the concept of God's ultimate ownership of prop-
118E.W.Lane, Lexicon, pp.1680-1681. 
11 9The ~arraf or money changer became an essential feature of every Muslim market. A bank with 
headquarters in Baghdad and branches in other cities was mentioned in Arabic sources. They carried 
on business through an elaborate system of cheques and letters of credit etc. which was so 
developed that it was possible to draw a cheque in Baghdad and cash it in Morroco. Indeed it was 
reported that in B~rah, the centre of trade with the East, where each merchant had his own bank 
accout, payment were effected in cheques and never in cash. It may be significant to mentioned that 
the word cheque is derived from the Arabic word ~aide See Hassan and Hill, Islamic Technology, 
1.18. 
20Mul}ammad Uzair, "Some Conceptual and Practical Aspects oflnterest-Free Banking, 11 in Studies 
in Islamic Economics edited by Khurshid Ahmad, p.37 ; Mohsin Khan and Abbas Mirakhor, "The 
Framework and Practice of Islamic Banking, 11 Finance and Development [Sept.1986], pp.32-36. 
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erty .121 Secondly, mankind is seen as the vicegerent of God on earth with the dual 
responsibility of worshiping God by submitting to His commandments and manag-
ing the worldly affairs by deploying God's bounties according to that scheme.122 In 
this context, wealth is given to mankind as a trust (amanah) as they are subject to 
God's rules and hold the property for a limited timespan, during their lifetime. 
Thirdly, emphasis is placed on the integration of ethical values in economic 
activities as Islam is perceived as a comprehensive way of life encompassing every 
aspect.123 Fourthly, it advocated positive attitute towards rigorous economic 
activities and development. As God has prescribed a set of rules on economic mat-
ters, the wealth entrusted to mankind need to be managed accordingly and should 
be invested in a productive and beneficial way. Hoarding of property in any man-
ner is strictly prohibited as that will impede economic growth, causing monopoly 
and manipulation and all kind of injustices.124 Similarly, the Sharlcah also speaks 
about striking the balance between consumption and saving for investment.125 
121 Q., al-M~Pidah [5] : 17 reads : " .... For to Allah belongth the dominion of the heavens and the 
earth and all that is between ... " Also see al-M~Pidah [5] : 18 ; Taha [20] : 6 ; al-Baqarah [2] : 284 ; 
Ali chnran [3] : 26 ; Yasin [3 6] : 83. 
122Q., al-Baqarah [2] : 30 reads : Behold, thy Lord said to the angels : "I will create a vicegerent on 
earth. More clearl;y terms al-J:Iadid [57] :7 reads :Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend 
[according to the Shan-cab] out of the [substance] whereof He has made you heirs. For those of you 
who believe and spend [in that manner] for them is a great reward. Also see al-A'raf [7] :129 ; al-
Ancam [6]:133 ; al-Niir (24] : 55. 
123Q., al-A'raf [7] : 96 reads : If the people of the towns had but believed and feared Allah , We 
should indeed have opened out to them [all kinds of] blessings from heaven and earth ; but they 
rejected the truth and We brought them to book for their misdeeds. Also see Taha [20] : 123-124 ; 
al-Tawbah [9] : 105. 
124Q., al-Tawbah [9] : 34 reads : .... And they are those who bury gold and silver and spend it not in 
the way of Allah, announce unto them a most grevious penalty .. 
125Q., al-lsra> (17] : 27 reads : Verily spendthrifts are brothers of the evil ones and the evil ones is 
to his Lord (himself) ungrateful. Further, in al-Furqan [25] : 67 God ruled : Those who, when they 
spend, are not extravagant and not stingy but hold a just [balance] between those extremes. See also 
al-Isra> [17] : 29 ; al-Nis~P [4] : 5 ; al-Jumucah (62] : 10. 
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The fifth concept is related to the question of redistribution of wealth based 
on social orientation. The mechanism used is the institution of zakli.t, by which 
wealth is shifted from the rich to the poor.126 The sixth concept, an important land-
mark of Islamic banking, is eradication of riba.127 As an alternative, the seventh 
concept emphsizes the importance of profit-sharing, using the contract of 
mucjarabah (trustee profit-sharing) and musharakah Goint-venture profit-
sharing) .128 
In practice, it was suggested that banking activities in the medieval Islamic 
world were quite extensive despite the fact that there is no autonomous or semi-
autonomous institution whose primary concern was dealing with money as a spe-
cialized pursuit. This is quite contrary to the situation of banking in medieval 
Europe epitomised in the proposition "there can be no banking without a bank". 
Such constituent elements of banking as deposits, credit and bills of exchange were 
quite differently construed within the medieval Islamic setting compared to that in 
European banks. Banks do not make their appearance in the Islamic Middle East 
until comparatively recently. This is partially due to economic and political contact 
with premodern Europe.129 
126Q., al-Tawbah [9] :103 speaks about the objectives of zakat: Of their wealth take alms that so 
thou mightest purify and sanctify them. al-Dhari yat [ 51] : 19 explains : And in their wealth and 
possession [was remembered] the right of the [needy], him who asked and him who [for some 
reason] was prevented [from asking]. See also al-Tawbah [9]: 60; al-lsra> [17]: 26; al-Baqarah 
[2] : 177, 195. 
127 Q., al-Baqarah [2] : 278-279 reads : 0 ye who believe fear Allah and give up what remains of 
your demand for usury, if ye are indeed believers. If ye do it noty, take notice of war from Allah 
and His Messenger. But if ye turn back, ye shall have your capital sums. Deal not unjustly and ye 
shall not be dealt unjustly. See also al-Baqarah [2] :275. 
128sobri Salamon, Bank Islam [in Malay], pp.1-19. 
129 A.l.Udovitch, "Bankers Without Banks : Commerce, Banking and Society in the Islamic World 
of the Middle Age," in The Dawn of Modem Banking edited by Center for Medieval and Renais-
sance Studies, University of Claifornia, Los Angeles, pp.255-256. 
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As regards the application of fiamlin, it appears that it will predominantly 
be in the area of lwfalah without denying the importance of gharamah. As far as 
the Malaysian Islamic Bank [BIMB]130 is concerned, it operates based on the 
Islamic muciimaliit mechanisms. Firstly, the customers' deposits are accepted on 
the basis of current accounts, saving accounts and general investment accounts. 131 
A current account is a deposit from customers who are looking for safe 
custody of their funds and absolute convenience based on the principles of wadrcah. 
The bank requests permission from such customers to make use of their funds so 
long as these funds remain with the bank. The customers may withdraw a part or 
the whole of their balance at any time they so desire and the bank guarantees the 
refund of such balances. All profits generated by the bank from the use of such 
fund belongs to the bank. 
The saving account works on the same basis except the bank has an absolute 
discretion to reward the customers by returning a portion of profits generated from 
130nie Malaysian Islamic Bank was incorporated as a public companies under Companies Act 1965 
on 1 March 1983. The Islamic Banking Act was enacted by Parliament and came into force on 10 
March 1983. The Act seeks to provide for the licensing and regulation of Islamic Banking business. 
It was modelled on the Banking Act 1973 with modification and amendments as were necessary to 
conform with Islamic Banking operations and practices. See Nik Norzrul Thani, Legal Aspects of 
the Regulatory Framework of the Malaysian Financial System, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, London 
University, 1993, pp.293-294. Thani pointed out that the Islamic Banking Act does not set out the 
details of such commercial transactions allowed by the Shari'ah, as it is only regulatory and does 
not provide any statement of the substantive law to be aplied in cases of disputes. Furthermore, dis-
putes as regards commercial matters are brought to the civil court not to the Shari'ah court. The dis-
putes then continue to be dealt with according to the principles of common law as evident in Tinta 
Press Sdn Berhad v. Bank Islam Malaysia [1987) 2 MLJ 192-195. See also T.Naughton and 
B.Shanmugam, "Interest-Free Banking: A Case Study of Malaysia," National Westminster Bank 
Quarterly Review [1990), pp.16-33. 
131A.H.Ismail, "Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad : Principles and Operations," in S.G.S.Abod et.al, 
Islamic Finance, pp.272-282. Also see Mahsin Mansor, Konsep Syariah Dalam Bank Islam [The 
Shan-cah Concepts of Islamic Banking], Kuala Lumpur : BIMB, 1983. 
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the use of their fund from time to time.132Tuus the bank's use of the money while 
it is held by it with the approval of the customer and satisfies the requirement in a 
wadlcah contract where the holder of the deposit may use it with the permission of 
the depositor. Another difference is that saving account does not give chequing 
facilities. Despite this limitation, the customer will benefit from the profit gener-
ated from the said fund. 
In the general investment account, the bank accepts deposit from its 
customers looking for investment oppotunities based on mu<}lirabah. The deposit 
will have to be for a specified period. As a full-pledged operations, the bank 
intends to accept deposit from a period as short as one month to one of sixty 
months or even longer. In such a transaction, the bank acts as the entrepreneur and 
the customer as the capital provider and both have agreed on the distribution of 
profit. In the event of loss in the investment, the customers bears the loss. The 
customers does not participate in the management of the investment fund.133 
As regards to financing operations, BIMB participated in providing finance 
for its customers' projects or asset acquisition in various ways under extensive 
muclimallit principles. Those various modes of financing are as follows : 
a. Project Financing through Mu(larabah - The bank will undertake to 
finance acceptable projects under trustee project financing. It works on the 
established mu<Jarabah rules.134 
132Ibid., p.272;274. 
1331bid., p.274. 
134-nie acceptability of this type of financing by the BIMB depends upon the ability of the con-
tractor to perform his obligations and the ability of the contractee to pay the debt when it is due. 
Important aspects relating to security, credit analysis, various aspects of ability to generate income 
and financial appraisal are being carried out. Proper documentations of all instruments involved are 
prepared accordingly. Thereafter, disbursal of fund will follow suit and all this will be closely 
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b. Project Financing through Musharakah - The bank undertakes the 
financing of acceptable project under joint-venture project financing. It 
works on the established musharakah rules. 
c. Financing the Acquisition of Assets through Bay ( bi Thaman Ajll -
The bank will finance its customers who wish to acquire a given asset for a 
specified period and to pay by instalments under the principle of deferred 
sale. The bank has to determine the customers' requirements, subsequently 
purchase the asset and then sell it to the customer at an agreed price which 
comprises the actual cost of the asset and bank's margin of profit. 
d. Financing the Use of Services of Assets through Ijarah - The bank will 
finance its customers to acquire right to use the services of a given asset 
under a lease. The bank first purchases the asset required by the customers 
and subsequently leases the asset to the customer for a fixed period, lease 
rentals and other terms and conditions are agreed by both parties. 
e. Financing the Use of Services and Subsequent Acquisition of Assets 
through Bay( Ta]iti - The bank will finance its customer who will inia-
tially wish to acquire the right to use the services of a given asset but sub-
sequently to own the asset under the principle of leasing ending with owner-
ship. It works the same way as ijarah except that both parties agreed at one 
point of time that the customer will buy from the bank the asset concerned 
supervised. See BIMB, Contract Financing Through Mu~arabah, n.d., pp.2-6. 
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at an agreed price with all the previous lease rentals constituting part of the 
pnce. 
f. Discharge of Social Responsibilities known as Qar{l al-lf asan - The 
bank may use an appropriate portion of the funds at its disposal for what 
may be considered as the discharge of social responsibilities through loans 
to deserving customers. This is known as benevolent loan. This loan may 
be granted to truly deserving customers for worthy economic projects with 
the underlying objective of support and assistance.135 
Apart from these operations, BIMB also provided specific facilities or 
financing mostly on short-term basis for the purpose of facilitating trade or work-
ing capital for its customers. These facilities may be granted in connection with the 
purchase, import and export of goods and machinery and the acquisition and hold-
ing of stock and inventories, spares and replacements, raw materials and semi-
finished goods. These types of facilities are essentially founded on the extension of 
the mucamalat rules on {iamiin and kafalah.136 
Among other facilities provided is letters of credit under wakalah. The 
customer will inform the bank his requirements and request the facility from the 
bank. The bank may require the customer to place a deposit to the full amount of 
the price of goods to be purchased or imported under the principle of wadrcah. 
With all the requirements satisfied, the bank will proceed with issuing the letter of 
credit and pay the proceeds to the negotiating bank utilising the customers' deposit 
135Ibid., pp.275-277. 
136For general discussion see cAII Al)mad al-Sfiliis, al-Mu'iimaliit al-Miiliyah al-Mu'ii~arah ft paw' 
al-Sharl'ah al-Jslamiyyah, Kuwait : Maktabat al-Fala!), 1986. 
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and subsequently releasing the document to the customer. The bank charges the 
customer fees and commission for the services rendered.137 
A letter of credit under musharakah is a transaction wherein the customer 
notifies the bank of his requirements and negotiates the terms of musharakah finan-
cing subject to the procedure relevant to this principle. The customer places a 
deposit in the bank for his share of the cost of goods to be purchased as stipulated 
in the musharakah agreement based on wadicah. The bank then establishes the let-
ter of credit and pays the proceed to the negotiating bank using the customers fund 
together with its own share of finance and subsequently releases the document to 
the customer.138 
A letter of credit can also be effected under murabalJ,ah by which the 
customer request the bank to purchase the goods indicating thereby that he would 
be willing to purchase the goods from the bank upon their arrival on the principle 
of cost-plus (murabalJ,ah). The bank establishes the letter of credit and pays the 
proceeds to the negotiating bank utilising its own funds. The bank then sells the 
goods to the customer at a sale price comprising its cost and a profit margin under 
murabalJ,ah for settlement by cash or on deferred terms.139 
The bank may also provide the facility of a letter of guarantee to its 
customers for certain purposes under the principle of kafalah. The letter of 
guarantee may be provided in respect of performance of a task, settlement of loan 
and the like. Customers may also ask for finance towards his working capital 




requirement to purchase stock and inventories, spares and replacements, raw 
materials and others. It is done by the bank initial appointment of the customer as 
its agent to purchase the required goods on its behalf and it settles the purchase 
price from its fund. The goods are then sold to the customer on murliba}Jah. There 
are some other subsidiary services offered by BIMB like remittance and transfers, 
sale and purchase of foreign currencies, sale of travellers' cheques, investment or 
portfolio management, trustee and nominee company services and others. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the way <jaman, as wide concept, being 
applied in various institutions where it has been involved. Despite the various 
nature of the operations, it is a viable method of providing security whether in the 
sense of personal suretyship or in the sense of providing protection against prob-




])AMAN IN CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION. 
"Looking to the future, there are two principal features of modernist 
legal activities which command attention. In the first place the current 
expression of the law rests upon the striking diversity of juristic 
criteria, which represent varying degrees of fusion between the two 
basic influences of practical necessity and religious principles." 
[N.J.Coulson, A History oflslamic Law, p.218.] 
This chapter seek to survey the extent of the relevance of the classical prin-
ciples of tjamlin in the modem statute law in Muslim nations, providing a brief 
study on the trend of current laws in selected Middle Eastern countries. These 
countries have been particularly chosen in terms of their strong adherence to the 
principles of the Sharlcah. It hoped to provide a broad idea of the law currently in 
operation and the intensity of the Islamic influence in the era known as "the reas-
sertion of the Sharie ah" .1 
At the outset, it is pertinent to discuss briefly the position of Islamic law in 
the twentienth century. During the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire fell 
under the influence of European civilization and began to adopt a European legal 
system. This domination has resulted in the imposition of the occidental system on 
the Muslims being justified by the alleged irreconcilable conflict between the 
lsee W.M.Ballantyne, Commercial Law in the Middle East: The Gulf States, p.24. 
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orthodox legal doctrines and the desires of the Muslim community to receive Euro-
pean influence. 2 
Ian Edge asserted that the Middle Eastern countries have approached the 
problem of reforming civil and commercial laws which purportedly suit the need of 
modern industrial society. He surveyed the process of adoption of foreign civil and 
commercial laws by Middle Eastern countries and divided the development 
chronologically into four stages. These are the period of colonial rule from around 
1850-1950, the post Second World War to 1970, the decade between 1970-1980 
and 1980 to present. 3 He pointed out that the third period has witnessed a rigorous 
intra-Arab borrowing which was more acceptable in reforming their civil and com-
mercial laws due to religious and cultural factors. In the fourth period, there has 
been a considerable pressure in all states to Islamicise the laws and to use, to 
certain extent, European precedents which were amended to suit the need of a 
modern yet Islamic society. 4 
2This standpoint, advanced Kourides, is not viewed in light of the flexibility of Islamic jur-
isprudence in confronting the changing world but rather on a static given situation. Islamic law is 
not given a chance to prove its viability. Even if the Majallah as the sole survivor has been subjet to 
various unnecessary attacks. At one point of time, leading scholars like Snouck Hurgronje and 
Schact suggested that Islamic law has no future and has no place in the modern setup. Recent devel-
opment has proven otherwise especially in the late 1980s. See N .Kourides, "The Influence of 
Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems : The Formation and Binding Force 
of Contracts," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law vol.IX [1970), p.384; Joseph Schacht, 
"Problem of Islamic Legislation," SI 13 (1960), pp.99-129. Also see W.M.Ballantyne, 11 The New 
Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates : A Further Reassertion of the Shan-ca, 11 ALQ vol.I [3] 
[1986], p.245. 
3Ian Edge, " Comparative Commercial Law of Egypt and the Arabian Gulf," Cleveland 
State Law Review vol.34 [1985-86), pp.129-130. 
4Ibid., p.130. Ahmad Ibrahim said that in the Middle East, western influence on Muslim 
law and jurisprudence exerted itself through the medium of Islamic modernism. Modernism is 
aimed at adapting Islam to modern conditions by renovating those parts of its traditional equipment 
which are regarded as medieval and out of touch with modern times. The criticism is directed not 
against the concept of an Islamic law, the concept that Islam as a religion ought to regulate the 
sphere of law as well, but against the traditional form of Muslim jurisprudence and against the way 
in which Muslim scholars of the middle ages have applied the message of Islam in the sphere of 
law ... Many of the modernists are lawyers by profession and it is the modernist jurists who 
prepared, provoked and guided the new legislation. See Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaya, 
p.102. 
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More recently, new constitutions and constitutional amendment in several 
Muslim countries have proclaimed the Sharlcah as the principal source of legisla-
tion. Concurrently, with the adoption of those provisions or closely following upon 
it, there has been an increasingly vocal demand that the existing law be abrogated 
in favour of an immediate return to the classical Sharlcah. This challenge, accord-
ing to Mursi Badr, need to be confronted with enlightened rationalism. The 
proponents of this school hold that the Sharrcah' s claim to excellence as a legal 
system is based on objective grounds and believe it to have the intrinsic potential to 
undergo necessary changes without loss of its Islamic character. Their indispensible 
premise is that the process of independent and innovative formulation of new laws 
(ijtihlid) which are derived from the original sources must be resumed. In this 
regard, he further emphasized that there is a serious need to study fiqh and u~al al-
fiqh on the advisability of reviewing the existing laws in order to relate their provi-
sions to the principles and rules of the Sharlcah and interpreting the existing laws 
in the light of such principles. 5 
6.1 Codified Islamic Law. 
One of the most glaring feature of the legal reforms and modernisation in 
Islam is codification. It is in the interest of the treatment of legislative trend in 
selected Middle Eastern nations that such analysis has become inevitable. The 
sG.M.Badr, "Islamic Law and Challenge of Modern Time, II in Law, Personalities and 
Politics in the Middle East edited by James Piscatori and George Harris, pp.29-32. See also 
D.Bondermann, "Modernization and Changing Perception of Islamic Law," Harvard Law Review 
[April 1968], pp.1169-1193. 
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Sharlcah rules were not officially codified until recent times. References made to 
the case of the compilation of the Quran during 'Uthman's reign, the compilation 
of l)adith during the time of 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, Ibn al-Muqaffa"s general 
code of law and Aurangzeb's collection of fatliwli - can only be regarded as early 
attempts linked at codification. 6 However, the Sharlcah laws remained officially 
uncodified till the time of Ottoman administration. In the nineteenth century, a 
number of European codes were prepared and the Ottoman state felt that the needs 
of the time necessitated the issuing of codes of appropriate laws. Thus was enacted 
the Commercial Code 1850, the Land Code 1858, the Criminal Code, the Code of 
Commercial Procedure and the Civil Procedure Code, all based on foreign codes in 
text, spirit and arrangements. 7 
The Ottoman administration also decided to prepare a civil code. A seven-
man committee of jurists called the committee of the Majallah was appointed 
aiming at "preparing a book on juridical transactions which would be correct, easy 
to understand, free from contradictions, embodying the selected opinions of the 
jurists and easily readable by everyone." The Majallah comprises 1,851 articles 
arranged in an introduction and sixteen books. The introduction consists 100 arti-
cles dealing with Islamic legal maxims. The code promulgated in 1875-1876 con-
6Falsafat, pp.39-42. Also see Ahmad Ibrahim, ibid. 
7For detailed development see M.Khadduri and H.Liebesny [eds.], Law in the Middle 
East, 1955. In evaluating the impact of codifications, Wahbah al-Zul)aylI opined that there were 
undoubtedly both negative and positive results of such policy. Among the unfavorable consequences 
are [a) restriction to the codified rules which caused the law to become dormant [b] it will annihilate 
the ijtihad endeavor [c) imposition of a solitary view. Positively, such a move will bring about 
absolute ease to refer to the codified rules. The differing standpoints are overcome by citing a 
preferred view adopted in the codification. This will also make possible the standardisation of judi-
cial decisions. See Wahbah al-Zul)aylI, Juhad al-Taqnln al-Fiqh al-/slaml, pp.26-28. Also see a 
critical examination of the development of codification of Islamic by Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The 
Shan"""1:ah: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?" in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 
edited by Nicholas Heer, pp.177-198. 
(260) 
sists sixteen books covering all forms of civil transactions as well as on the admin-
istration of justice. 8 
The influence of the Ottoman throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
century Middle East was significant except in Egypt. 9 The Majallah was applied as 
civil law in the Ottoman domains and thus was applicable civil law in Jordan, 
Syria, c1raq and Kuwait. Even when these jurisdictions were promulgating their 
own modem civil code, the Majallah is useful to fill the gaps in those areas of law 
not dealt with by other sources. IO As Ottoman power did not wholly extended to 
the rest of the Gulf nor to Saudi Arabia, these countries never adopted the Majal-
lah. However, Ottoman influence was occassionally apparent. When King lbn 
8The books of the Majallah are as follows : 
a] Sale [bay'] 
b] Hire [ijarah] 
c] Guarantee and suretyship [~aman wa kafalah] 
d] Transfer of obligation [J:zawalah] 
e] Pledges and mortgages [rahn] 
fJ Deposit and trust [ wadr'ah] 
g] Gift [hibah] 
h] Wrongful appropriation and destruction [gha~b] 
i] Interdiction,constraint, pre-emption [J:zajr,ikrah,shu.fah] 
j] Joint-ownership and partnership [sharikah] 
k] Agency [waklilah] 
l] Settlement and release [~ull:z wa ihra"'] 
m] Admission [iqrar] 
n] Actions [da'wa] 
o] Evidence and administration ofoath [bayyinat] 
p] Administration of justice by courts [qa~a"'] 
See Falsafat, pp.43-44. Also see Civil, vol.I, pp.1-11. 
9Though not directly influenced, Egypt did feel the new trend set by the Ottomans espe-
cially in the field of codification of Islamic law. Murshid al-ljayran [Guide to the Confused] com-
piled by Qadri Basha has been noticed as Egypt's Majallah-styled codification though it has been 
unable to compete with the Majallah, let alone to influence other countries. Despite that, it is still a 
valuable source of legal development in this area. Qadri who is not a graduate of al-Azhar had a 
special fondness for Islamic law. He believes that a new code based on the compromise between 
occidental and Islamic law was favourable. Along this line, he mastered both systems and tried to 
present Islamic law in a new fashion. For his biography see M.Husain Haykal, Tarajim Mi~riyyah 
wa Gharbiyyah, n.d. His scholarly activities have been described by Farhat Ziadeh in his Lawyers, 
the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt, pp.19-20. 
IOHisham R.Hashim, The Jordan Civil Code [of Muslim Jurisprudence], p.IV (Preface). 
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Sa'iid wanted to reinforce the commercial law of Saudi Arabia in 1930, he adopted 
the Ottoman Commercial Code l 850 although it was already outdated. The recent 
development has witnessed the formulation of the f:lanbali own compilation known 
as Majailat aL-Af.zkllm ai-Shar'iyyah. 11 
6.2 The Egyptian Civil Code [1949] 
The new civil code, promulgated on 29 July 1948 was brought into force on 
15 October 1949. By that, the civil codes serving the Mixed Courts (maf.ziikim 
mukhtali!ah) 1874 and the Native Court (maf.zakim ahliyyah) 1883 were repealed. 
cAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhun, a distinguished Egyptian judge and jurist, headed the 
commission which drafted the new civil code for Egypt. He invited his professor at 
l1 Maj.Shariyyah. 1980. This compilation. by cAbdullah al-Qari', consists of twenty one 
book, namely : 
I Sale :its various incidents. conditions. options. 
II Hire 
m Loan of consumables 
IV Waqf 
V Gift 
VI Mortgage ; Pledge 
VII Guarantee & Indemnity 




XII Unlawful Appropriation 
XIII Duress 
XIV Joint-ownership ; pre-emption 




XIX The Judiciary 
XX The case 
XXI Evidence and Oath. 
(262) 
Lyons, Edouard Lambert to draft the general provisions in the preliminary chapter 
of the code. 12 
Much has been said about the composition of this code. It was suggested 
that five-sixth of its provisions are based on the previous codes and the interpreta-
tion put upon them by Egyptian court. A great deal of emphasis was placed in pub-
lic debate, not only on the percentage but also on the enrichment of the code from 
comparative legislation and from the Sharlcah.13 Al-Sanhiin admitted that such a 
situation did not in fact amount to very much more direct borrowing from the 
Sharlcah than had been true in the previous codes although he reiterated that he had 
made a careful choice of principles more consonant with Islamic principles. He 
stated: 
"We did not leave any single sound provision of the SharFah which 
we could have included in this legislation without doing so ... We 
adopted from the Sharlcah waht we could adopt, having regard to 
sound princ~les of modem legislation and we did not fall short in 
this respect. 4 
In the light of this statement, Anderson has examined the extent of 
influence of the Sharlcah on the code.15 The debt which this code owe to the 
Sharlcah can best be summarised into four headings. First, the inclusion of 
Sharlcah as one of the sources from which an appropriate rule can may be derived 
12Ian Edge, op.cit., p.132. 
13J.N.D.Anderson and N.J.Coulson, "Islamic Law in Contemporary Cultural Change," 
Seaculum XVIII [1967], p.40. See also Anderson, "Recent Development of the Shan-ca II," MW 
vol.XU [Jan.1951), pp.34-48. 
14Ibid. There has been a lengthy debate on the issue of the Shari'ah input in the Egyptian 
code. Sanhuri has been subjected to a rigorous interrogations by the 'ulama:> like ijassan al-
I:Iuc.laybl, Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab Tala'at, Sayyid 'Abdullah 'All ijusayn regarding his stand on 
this matter, that is placing Islamic law in the third place as the source of Egyptian law. See 'Umar 
Sulayman al-Ashqar, al-Qawtinin al-Ilahiyyah la Jl-Qawanin al-Jahiliyyah, pp.123-146. 
15 J .N .D Anderson, "The Shan-cab and Civil Law: The Debt Owed by the New Civil Codes 
of Egypt and Syria to the Shan-ca," IQ [1954), pp.29-46. 
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by the courts in default of any relevant provision.16 Secondly, the influence which 
a desire for conformity with the Sharrcah has exercised on the choice made in this 
code between certain concepts of modem European codes. 17 Thirdly, a few princi-
ples or provisions newly borrowed from the Sharrcah, whether exclusively, chiefly 
or in part.18 Fourthly, those provisions taken over by previous legislation from the 
Sharrcah. 19 
16 Article 1 of the Code reads: "The provisions govern all matters to which they apply in 
letter or spirit. In the absence of any provision that is applicable, the Judge will decide according to 
custom, and, in the absence of this, in accordance with the principles of the Sharf'ah. In the absence 
of these, the Judge will apply the principle of natural justice and the dictate of equity." 
17 Anderson suggested that there are few aspects of law by which the Sharl'ah influence is 
evident: 
i) An objective rather than subjective tendency in regard to treatment of obligations and 
contractual rights; 
ii) The principles applicable to the abuse of rights; 
iii)The legal consequences of eceptional and unpredictable events; 
ivJ Provisions regarding the assignment of debt. See Anderson, ibid., pp.33-34. 
1 This includes: 
i) Principles regarding majlis al-'aqd, influenced by the Banafis; 
ii) Principles regarding legal capacity, also derived from the Banafis; 
iii)Principles governing the lease of waqf property; 
iv) Principles regarding contracts of J:zikr; 
v) Principles governing the lease of agricultural land (muzara'ah); 
vi) Principles relevant to the termination of a lease on the death of the lessee and the annul-
ment of a lease on the grounds of "serious and unforseen circumstances"; 
vii)Principles applicable to the release of debt by uilateral declaration. See Ibid., pp.35-38. 
19 Among other principles taken over from the Sharl'ah are: 
i) Principles applicable to dispositions of property during "death sickness"; 
ii) Principles to ghubn (lesion); 
iii)Principles regarding the party at whose risk a purchase remains; 
iv) Principles applicable to planting or building on leased land; 
v) Principles relevant to the ownership of different stories in the same building, or of a 
party wall; 
vi) Principles relevant to the right of pre-emption (shu.fah); 
vii)Principles relevant to gifts; 
viii)Principles governing settlement of liabilities before an estate can devolve to legal heirs. 
From the Islamicist point of view, Wahbah al-ZuQayll clarified that placing Islamic law as 
a source of law in that manner has very little practical importance. He stressed that the qa<fl will not 
resort to it except when in the situation when he fails to arrive at any ruling from the codified laws. 
The possibility for that to happen is quite remote. Nevertheless, this event has contributed to the 
increase of attention given to Islamic law which later became an impetus for its revival. He specifi-
cally praised the value of a comparative study of law, between Islamic and man-made laws, both in 
theory and practice. He said that : "Every faqlh and qa<fi has an incumbent obligation to improve 
the civil code, particularly when there is no textual authority on it, by referring to the principles of 
fiqh, as done by al-Sanhiiri in his Ma~adir al-ljaqq, p.48. See Juhad Taqnln, p.35. 
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The interplay between the principles embodied in the Code and Islamic law 
is demonstrated by the analysis by Ian Edge on decennial liability.20 Edge sug-
gested that provisions on decennial liability21, as embodied in articles 650-653, 
have been compared to various principles of fiqh, to see its compatability with 
them. As far as the role of r)amtin in explaining decennial liability, he has 
cautiously remarked: 
"The main thrust of these provisions is that modern contract known 
as caqd al-muqawalah is said to be comparable with one of the types 
of the Islamic contract of ijarah (hire) in which the hiree is in the 
position of an ajlr mushtarak ... .It is said further, however, that 
according to Islamic law the ajlr mushtarak is subject to civil 
liability (r)amtin) for things done in the course of completing the 
contract, and the commentary then equates this with decennial 
liability, seemingly supporting its use from Islamic sources. 
Unfortunely, these slight references to Islamic legal ideas are not 
sufficiently dealt with nor are they correct to describe this purported 
liability. "22 
He opined that the concept of ¢amtin is better considered as a form of 
tortious liability than as an extended form of contractual responsibility (which is 
what decennial liability is), even though the word muta¢amin comes from the same 
root. Even if it could be used to support this liability, it is clear that in Islamic law, 
before r)amtin could operate, one has to show positively some illicit act (tacaddl) or 
negligence (tafri!) by the ajir mushtarak, whereas decennial liability is a form of 
strict liability. He also pointed out that there is little reference made in the book of 
fiqh to a contract of construction under ijarah. He is suggesting that some answer 
201an Edge, "The Development of Decennial Liability in Egypt," in Islamic Law and Juris-
prudence edited by Nicholas Heer, pp.161-175. Cf. Nairn Attia, "Decennial Liability Under Egyp-
tian Law," ALQ (Nov.1986), pp.504-524. 
21This was originally a French concept of "la garantie decennale" which is a special 
liability imposed upon a contractor, constructor, engineer and architect for the damage caused by 
any defect which is discovered in the construction after completion. 
22Jbid., pp.172-173. 
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could be found under contract of salam or contract of isti~nac, as far as the modem 
contract of construction and decennial liability are concemed.23 
However, Edge's views should be compared with Wahbah al-ZuJ:iayli's 
analysis of caqd al-muqliwalah. He has suggested that this type of contract has its 
foundation on the basis of the liability of ajlr mushtarak. He said that the con-
tractor has certain responsibilities namely: a] he must guarantee the quality of the 
material used in the construction; b] he must take care of the interests of the owner 
of the building; c] he must give priority over the success of the project; d] he must 
also execute the work according to the agreed terms and conditions; e] he must 
guarantee that the damage on the building as a result of his imperfect work unless 
it is proven that the damage is due to uncontrolable cause. 24 Taking these views 
into consideration, it seems possible that modem Islamic jurists may well be able 
to find some means of reconciling decennial liability with the basic classical 
sources. 
Discussion of the Eyptian Civil Code is essential because it had a great 
influence other Arab civil codes subsequently enacted. Apart from the role of al-
Sanhiiri in the drafting of most of the civil codes, legal personnel are also trained 
in Egypt and Egyptian judges have been invited to serve in various jurisdictions in 
the Middle East. It is also important to see how the increasing adherence to the 
Sharlcah in later civil codes, like Jordan and the UAE has marked the change to a 




6.3 The U AE Civil Code 
In this code the paramountcy of the Sharlcah is evident. 25 In the Union Law 
No.10 of 1973 setting up the Union Supreme Court, it is provided at article 75 that 
" The Supreme Court shall apply the prov1s1on of the Sharlcah, 
Union Laws and other laws in force in the member Emirates of the 
Union conforming to the Islamic Sharlcah. Likewise, it shall apply 
those rules of custom and those principles of natural and compara-
tive law which do not conflict with the principle of the Sharicah. "26 
In another legislation, Union Courts of First Instance and Appeal [Law 6 of 
1978] provides that : "The Union Courts shall apply the provisions of Islamic 
Sharlcah, Union Laws and other laws in force, just as they shall apply those rules 
of custom and general legal principles which do not conflict with the provisions of 
the Sharicah.27 
The long-awaited Civil Code provides topical and important examples of 
the increasing trend towards a reassertion of Islam in legislation and jurisprudence 
25s.H.Amin said that commercial law of the UAE is a hybrid of the Sharf'ah and imported 
statutory law. See his Middle East Legal System, 1985, p.396. Also see Comm., pp.3-5. 
26w .M.Ballantyne, "A Reassertion of the Shan-cab : The Jurisprudence of the Gulf States," 
in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence edited by Nicholas Heer, pp.149-156. Earlier, Ballantyne pointed 
out that, in the U AE Provisional Constitution, Shari< ah is provided as a principal source of legisla-
tion. The net effect of art.75 of the Union Supreme Court Law [Law 10/1973] and art.8 of Union 
Court of First Instance and Appeal [Law 6/1978], that should there be any challenge to the con-
stitutionality of such provisions, the case will be heard before the Union Supreme Court. This is 
because it is itself the Constitutional Court of the State.See Ballantyne, Commercial Law in the 
Middle East: The Gulf State, pp.57-59. 
27 Among other significant impacts of this provision is that is has a stronger prescription to 
respect the Shan-cab law and in practice has invalidated arts.61 and 62 of the Abu Dhabi Civil Pro-
cedure Code, which allows the civil court to require the levying of interest upon a judgement sum 
until full amount due had been paid. See Abdullah Rashid Hilal v. The International Bank of 
Credit and Commerce [Civil Appeal no.5 I 1979]. 
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in the Islamic countries. The code consists of 1,528 articles. It has appeared to owe 
overwhelmingly to provisions of fiqh, conveniently, the Majallah, with undertones 
of civil law gleaned from Egyptian and other Arab codes, particularly that of Jor-
dan and possibly the Sudan. 28 
This Federal Civil Code, styled the Code of Civil Transaction29 was pub-
lished at the end of 1985 and put into effect as from 1 April 1986. This new code 
is closely based on the Jordanian Civil Code 1976 which is strongly Majallah-
based. This is why the same committee of the Jordanian Code took the task of 
drafting the U AE code. This step is very much in line with the draft proposal of a 
united civil code for the entire Arab nation produced by the Academy of Islamic 
Research (Majma( al-Bu~ath al-Islamiyyah).30 In drafting this code, the committee 
sought the most lenient doctrine of from the Malik! and I:IanbalI schools, if it is 
demanded by necessity. It also resorted sometimes to the doctrine of other schools 
of law as well as upholding the prevalent custom which had a Sharlcah backing. 
"The Legislative provisions shall apply to all matters dealt with by 
these provisions in the letter and spirit. There shall be no innovative 
reasoning (ijtihad) in the case of provision of definitive import. If 
the judge finds no provision in this law, he has to pass judgement 
according to the Islamic Sharlcah. Provided that he must have regard 
to the choice of the most appropriate solution from the School of 
Imam Malik and Imam Al)mad bin I:Ianbal, and if none is found 
there, then from the school of Imam ShafiCJ and Imam Abu ijanlfah, 
as most befits. If the judge does not find the solution there, then he 
must render judgement in accordance with custom but provided that 
the custom is not in conflict with public order and morals. If a 
custom is particular to a given Emirate, then his judgement will 
apply to that Emirate.31 
28w.M.Ballantyne, "The New Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates : A Further of the 
Shan-ca," ALQ vol.I pt.3 [1986], pp.245-264. 
29wahbah al-ZW,ayll suggested tressed that the different title of the code marked a depar-
ture from typical Arab codes, as it adopted the name Qanan al-Mu<amaliit al-Madaniyyah instead of 
just Qanan Madanl. See his Juhad Taqnrn, op.cit., p.68. 
301bid. 
31 UAE CC, Art.I 
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Apart from this clearcut provision on the sources of law, this code also 
provides that: "The rules and principles of Islamic Jurisprudence shall be relied 
upon in the understanding, construction and interpretation of these provisions. "32 
In spelling out the meaning of "public order", article 3 provides that public order 
must not conflict with the definitive provisions and fundamental principles of the 
Islamic Sharlcah. The committee later reiterated that the implementation of the 
Sharicah in civil transactions (mucamallit madaniyyah) is hoped to set a firm founda-
tion for these practices and for realizing justice and fairness for everyone and cut 
down civil disputes33. 
The Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates, is composed and arranged in 
an introduction and four chapters. The introduction comprises provisions governing 
the application of law with regard to time and place34, certain jurisprudential max-
ims and rules of interpretation35, status of a person36, deliberations on things and 
property37 and classification of rights including abuse of rights and proof of 
rights.38 
32uAE CC, art.2. The exact expression employed in code is "qawtfid wa u~al al-fiqh al-
Islliml" which should apply to the rules of U~al al-Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and Qawifid Fiq-
hiyyah (Islamic Legal Maxims), the tools for the understanding of Islamic Law or Islamic Legal 
Rules (Fiqh). James Wheelan's translation of the code citedfiqh as Islamic Jurisprudence. However 
that is not correct as is clearly shown by this article. Wahbah al-Zul)ayli has pointed out that: "In 
the second part of the introduction, this code has embodied some legal maxims [arts.29-70] taken 
from the classical sources of Islam, the majority of which are part of the introduction of the Majal-
lat al-AJ:zkam al-'Adliyyah." He asserted that this proves the strong reliance of this code to Shari'ah 
sources, particular those of the I:Ianafis. This is also the case the Jordanian Civil Code on which the 
UAE code relied substantially. Majority of the provisions are drawn from the I:Ianafis, then the 








Article 124 spells out the question of personal obligations and rights. The 
provision reads: "Personal obligations or rights arise out of dispositions, legal 
events and the law; and the sources of obligations shall be as follows : contracts, 
unilateral acts, acts causing harm (tort), acts conferring a benefit and the law. 39 
Part one of chapter one is on the general theory of contract. It includes 
provisions on general matters of a contract40 including its elements, validity and its 
eff ect41 various options42, as well as the construction of a contract43 and finally the 
dissolution of a contract. 44 Part two of this chapter deals with unilateral disposi-
tions45 Part three is on acts causing harm in which the law spells out clearly the 
question of liability for personal acts46, liability for the act of others47 and liability 
for animals and objects and use of the public road. 48 
Provision for a contract conferring ownership, particularly sale is in book 
two at article 489-567. Here, the definition of sale and the effect of sale in the 
sense of obligations of both the seller and the purchaser are explained. That 
includes transfer of ownership as part of the obligation of the seller49, delivery of 
the property sold50 and liability for latent defects51. On the part of the purchaser, 














his obligations include payment of the price and taking delivery of the goods and 
the cost of sale. 52 Various types of sale are mentioned like forward sale, deferred 
sale, sales of fruit and the like. 53 
Provisions for companies and partnership are divided into two section. Sec-
tion one is on general issues pertaining to partnership54 whereas section two is on 
specific types of companies like companies to perform work55, speculative venture 
partnership56 and mucjarabah. companies. 57 Articles 710-721 are on loans (qurar/) 
whereas articles 722-741 deliver the law on accord or settlement of disputes (~ul}J). 
Chapter II is meant for usufructuary contracts. In part one, hire was dis-
cussed in detail. Section one containing 54 article is on hire in its general terms, 
which include definition, elements and effects of hire, rights and obligation arising 
therefrom and methods to terminate hire. 58 In section two, the code specified 
certain types of hire like lease of agricultural land59, sharecropping (muzaracah.)60, 
a contract to perform work on another's agricultural land in consideration of part 
of the crop (musaqah.)61, joint-ownership of land and crop (mugh.arasah.)62 and 
lease of charitable endowment (waqj)63. 
52Arts.556-567. 
53 Arts.568-606. 











Chapter III concentrates on contracts of work. In the definition and scope of 
a muqawalah (contract to make anything or to perform a task) is spelt out64, 
together with the effects of a muqawalah65, subcontracting66 and termination of a 
muqawalah. The contract of employment is discussed at articles 897-923. Next 
come the contract of agency67, the contract of bailment68 and the contract of 
custodianship or stakeholding69. The contract of insurance is given in chapter IV of 
this code. 70 
Suretyship is dealt with in chapter V from articles 1056-1105. This include 
the provision for elements of suretyship 7I, securing attendance of a person 72, darak 
surety ship [guarantee to give indemnity if goods sold are owned by a third party J73, 
effects of suretyship74 and the termination of suretyship. 75 A closely related sub-
ject, th~t is assignment (IJawalah), is given from articles 1106-1132. 
Before the topic of securities for property is elucidated, the code has pro-
vided an important prelude by showing, in Book three, original rights in rem. This 
includes the question of ownership, means of its acquisition, right of pre-emption, 
possession and certain rights of where benefits are derived from ownership, like 
enjoyment, use and easement. 76 Book four deals with provision of securities for 
64 Arts.872-874. 
65 Arts.875-889. 
66 Arts. 890-89 I. 
67 Arts.924-961. 
68 Arts. 962-996. 
69 Arts.997-IOI I. 
70 Arts. I 026-I 055. 




75 Arts.1099-I I05. 
76Arts.1133-I398. 
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property, namely pledge or mortgage by way of security77 and possessory pledges78 
Finally, chapter III of the code explains the question of priority rights or lien, 
which is vital in most settlements of mortgage agreements. 79 
6.4 Provisions for l)aman in the UAE Civil Code. 
In the sense of suretyship, the code has adopted the l;Ianafi rules. The 
definition of kefalah is simulated from the Majallat al-A~klim al-cAdliyyah8o, so as 
the case with the classification of kefalah81. Article 1068 reads : 
"(1) Surety for the person obliges the guarantor to produce the per-
son guaranteed at the time stipulated at the request of the beneficiary 
of the guarantee and if he does not do so, it shall be permissible for 
the judge to impose an exemplary fine, but it shall be permissible 
for him to exempt him if he proves that he was unable to secure the 
attendance of the person guaranteed. 
(2) If the surety for a person has undertaken to pay a specific sum 
by way of a penalty clause in the event that he does not secure the 
attendance of the person guaranteed, he shall be bound to pay the 
sum, as the judge may exempt him from it either in whole or in part 
if it appears that the course is justified." 
The inclusion of the clause for exemplary fine (taczlr mlill) is something 
new and needed for the smooth administration of justice. This rule is again adopted 
from the l;Ianafis but it is also found in some other schools. The reason behind this 
77 Arts.1399-1447. 
7 8 Arts .1448-1503. 
79 Arts.1504-1528. 
80 Art.612. Article 1056 of UAE CC reads : Suretyship is the joining of the liability of a 
person called the surety with the liability of the obligor in the performance of his obligations. 
8l Arts.613-617. See also 'Uqad, p.234. The code accepted the Majallah's three-tier pres-
cription - kafalah bi 'l-nafs, kafalah bi 'l-mal and kafalah bi 'l-darak representing a strong package 
of personal suretyship prevalent in Islamic law. See discussion in Chapter II, supra., pp .46-53. 
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clause is the preservation of public interest (ricayatan Ii )l-ma#af;ah). 82 Article 58 
of the Majallah strengthens this clause by a celebrated maxim : "The exercise of 
control over subjects is dependant upon the public welfare." 83 
The code has also come up with a prov1s1on spelling out the difference 
between kafalah and f;awalah. Article 1065 reads : 11 Suretyship conditional on the 
discharge of the principal obligor is an assignment [of obligation]. An assignment 
which provides that the the assignor should not be discharged is a suretyship. 11 84 
This clearly demonstrated the adoption of ijanafi rules on the subject. 
The code has also borrowed from Murshid al-Ifayran85 regarding ruling on 
the suretyship for a person who is dying. This rule is closely linked to rules on 
bequest but is consequential to loss of rights of various interested parties. The 
provision reads : 11 Surety ship for a person suffering a terminal illness shall not be 
valid if the debtor owes a debt greater than the amount of his property. 11 86 The 
suretyship, however, shall be valid if the debt is not greater than the amount of 
property and the provision on wills shall apply thereto. 87 
The acceptance of {i.amlin al-darak in this code reflected the adoption of a 
rule decided unanimously by the jurists which was an exception (istithna>) from the 
general rule. As a general rule, the guaranteed right must be an established debt 
82cuqad, p.311 ; Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.651 ; Murshid, art.850. 
83Civil, p.22. Also see art.1069 of the UAE CC : If the surety undertakes to pay the debt 
upon his failure to deliver the person guaranteed, he must pay it. 
84cf. Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.648-649. This is supported by the maxim : In contracts, effect is 
given to intention and meaning and not to words and phrases [Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.3]. See also 
Sh.Baz, vol.I, p.5 and discussion in Chapter II, supra., p.80. 
85 Art.843. 
86Art.1064 (1). 
87 Art.1064(2). See also Jordanian Civil Code, art.957. 
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(dayn thlibit) and the validity of rjamlin depends on the existence of the debt. It is 
rather inconceivable if rjamiin is antecedent the debt. As the guarantee for payment 
of the price to the seller is a dayn ~a~l~ on the buyer, it is equally legitimate to 
allow the same to the buyer in the event of default of ownership. 88 In such a case, 
the debt is not yet in existence and it is difficult for rjamlin to be applied. 
However, in the case of rjamlin al-darak, payment is required before rjamiin arises. 
A rightful claim resides in the property before the contract is concluded and only 
the buyer is entitled to the guarantee for darak. 
a] Effects of Suretyship [between surety and guaranteed person] 
The obligations of the parties to a kaflilah contract are set forth at article 
1077-1092. Basically, these provisions define the legal consequences on the surety, 
on the creditor and on the surety capability to redirect the liability to the principal 
obligor. 89 As in the classical rules, the code adopted the ruling that the surety must 
discharge his obligation when the time falls due. 90 On the other hand, the obligee 
may claim against the principal obligor or the surety or may claim against them 
both. 91 If the surety has another surety, the creditor may claim from anyone he 
wishes. However, claiming from any one of them would not relinquish the credi-
tor's right to claim his rights from the remaining obligors in the event of non-
88This is why this type of guarantee is called fiaman al-darak or fiamlin al-'uhdah. See 
Wakin, Function of Document, p.60. For classical treatment see Mughni, vol.V, pp.76-78 ; Umm, 
vol.III, p.203 ; Ashbtih.S, p.490; Bada)i', vol.VII, p.3420. See Chapter, II, pp.52-23 and Chapter 
III, pp.98-101. 
89The classes of athlir of the kaftilah are : athar tata'allaq bi )l-ka.fil, athar tata'allaq bi )l-
da)in and athlir tata'allaq bi ruja' al-ka.fil 'ala )l-a~il. See 'Uqad, pp.321-326. 
90uAE CC Art. I 077. Cf.Maj. 'Adliyyah, Arts.634, 637, 639, 643. 
91 UAE CC Art.1078.Cf.Chapter II, supra., pp.69-75. 
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payment by the one he made a claim against. This is taken from the ijanafi doc-
trines. 92 
For administrative purpose and offering the surety some facility, article 
1091 requires the obligee to submit all papers related to the suretyship to the 
surety. The provision reads: "The obligee must deliver to the surety upon dis-
charge by him of the debt all necessary papers to enable him to exercise his right 
of recourse to the principal obligor." According to al-ZulJaylI, this situation can be 
treated as muqaddimat al-wajib (prerequisite for performance of an obligation). 93 If 
the debt is jointly secured by other means of security like pledge, it is also 
incumbent upon the creditor to pass the property or the rights attached thereto to 
the surety. The surety will have to bear the costs of such transfer and may have 
recourse for these costs against the principal obligor. 94 
Equally important, article 1092, rules that a debt which falls due must be 
claimed by the creditor within six months from the date on which it fell due, other-
wise the surety shall be deemed to have been discharged. 
"If payment of debt falls due on a certain date, the creditor must 
claim within six months from that particular date. If no claim is 
made, the surety may notify the creditor using an established proce-
dure. If there is no action taken, the surety is subsequently dis-
engaged from kafalah so that he will not be jeopardized should the 
debtor suffers unexpected financial setback (i (stir (tirVi or other 
reasons that will circumvent accomplishment of the rights. Injury 
must be removed as inju~ is prohibited absolutely whether 
inaugurate or as a rejoinder." 
92Maj. 'Adliyyah, Arts.626, 644, 645. See also Chapter II, supra., pp.69-75. 
93The maxim reads : [mii Iii yatimmu 'l-wiijib illii bihifa huwii wiijib] 
94 Art. I 091 (2). 
95cuqad, p.322. 
(276) 
When a debtor become insolvent, the creditor must provide proof of the 
debt due to him in the bankruptcy, otherwise his right of recourse against the 
surety shall lapse to the extent of the loss sustained by his not having so done. al-
Zul)aylI claimed that such principle is derived from the Shafitt and Mfiliki schools 
of law.96 
Article 1090 reminded the surety to be prudent when discharging the 
obligor's liability as no right of recourse to the principal obligor is granted if 
suretyship arose at the request or with the consent of the principal obligor. He shall 
have any right of recourse in respect of early payment of a deferred debt until such 
time as the debt would fall due. 97 
At the inception, the surety is obligated to fulfil his obligation (al-wafli) bi 
)l-iltizlim). If the suretyship is unqualified (mutfaqah), the obligation of the surety 
shall follow the obligation of the principal obligor, whether the debt is payable 
immediately or deferred. 98 If the surety guarantees an immediate debt (dayn 
mucajja[) by way of deferred suretyship, the debt as against both the surety and the 
principal obligor shall be deferred unless the surety stipulates that deferment shall 
apply to himself alone or the obligee stipulates that the debt should be deferred 
with regard to the surety only. In that event, the debt shall not be regarded as 
deferred with regard to the principal obligor. 99 
In certain situations, suretyship is affiliated to some other prior negotia-
tions. For instance, it shall be permissible for the suretyship to be conditional upon 
96Ibid. 
97uAE CC Art.1090(1)(2). 
98uAE CC Art.1080. 
99uAE CC Art.1081. 
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the discharge of the debt out of the property of the obligor deposited (as wadicah) 
with the surety, on condition that the obligee agrees thereto.100 If a debt is secured 
by a security in rem (ta)mln caynl or rahn ~iylizl) prior to the suretyship arising and 
the surety has made it a condition that recourse should be made against principal 
obligor first, it should be permissible to execute against the property of the surety 
prior to executing against the property standing as security for the debt. IOI 
b] Relationship Between the Surety and the Principal. 
In a kaflilah deal, the essence is the personal guarantee. According! y, if the 
surety gives any other thing in lieu of debt, then his recourse as against the princi-
pal obligor shall be for that which he stood surety and not for that which he 
actually gave.102 If the obligee accepted a proportion of the debt in settlement 
(~ul~), then the recourse shall be only for the amount paid by way of settlement not 
for the entire debt.103 
Article 1094 provides that if the principal obligor pays the debt before the 
surety pays it or if he learns of any reason preventing the obligee from making a 
claim, he must notify the surety or if he does not do so and the surety discharges 
the debt, he may then as his choice have recourse against the principal obligor or 
the obligee. In addition, if a claim is made against the surety, he must join the 
principal obligor therein and if he does not do so it shall be permissible for the 
lOOuAE CC Art.1079. See cuqad, p.323. 
101 UAE CC Art.1082. 
102 U AE CC Art. I 093. The text reads : [fa innahu yarjic bi mii kaf mahu la bi mii addahii 
fie/an idha adda ciwQ{lan can a/,-dayn shaycan akhar. 
103 Bada)ic, vol. VI, p.15; Maj. cAdliyyah, Art.651; Murshid, Arts.863-864. 
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principal obligor to raise as against him any defences which it would have been 
competent for him to raise in the claim brought by the obligee. 
These two-tier duties, according to al-ZuI:iaylI, are complementary proce-
dural rules. To ensure smooth process of payment of the debt and thus release of 
suretyship, the creditor is duty bound to notify the surety about the debt he has 
paid. On the same basis, the surety is responsible for including the principal 
obligor in any litigation pertaining to the secured obligation. They are both based 
on nw~la"f.ia"f.i. The root of the creditor's duty is the surety's inherent right to ask 
from the principal obligor to release him from the liability if it not requested by 
him. The second issue is attributed to the right of the principal obligor to defend 
himself against any action taken against him.104 
The law at article 1095 also provides that a surety for property or for 
delivery the person may make an application for an order preventing the person for 
whom he stands surety from travelling abroad if the suretyship arose through his 
order and there is evidence giving rise to a fear that the surety will suffer loss. 
c] Termination of Suretyship. 
Despite the fact that most textbook of Islamic law only enumerated a few 
grounds for termination of suretyship, namely adll), ibrll) and ~ul"f.i, the code has 
104cuqad, p.325. Al-ZW,ayll asserted that this provision could be equated to that of article 
1637 of the Majallah: "It is required that both parties in wadl'ah, 'ariyah, ijtirah and rahn to attend 
the litigation related thereto." 
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included eight grounds, including those disputed grounds amongst the schools of 
law. 
Article 1099 set forth those gounds as follows: 
[a] By discharge of the debt105; 
[b] By loss of the thing held by the makfol by force majuere and before 
claim106. 
' 
[c] By the cessation of the contract by virtue of which the right against the 
principal obligor arosel 07; 
[ d] If the obligee discharges the surety from his suretyship or the pricipal 
obligor from his debt108 
[e] Upon the death of the principal obligorl09; 
[f] By the principal obligor being brought to the place of delivery after the 
deferred time matures notwithstanding that the obligee refuses to accept 
delivery unless he is unlawfully prevented from doing sol 10 ; 
[g] By bringing the principal obligor before the period falls due, and the 
obligee suffers no loss through taking delivery of him 111 ; 
[h] By handing over the principal obligor himself, in order to fulfil the very 
purpose of the suretyshipl 12. 
1 OS[Adii' al-dayn ilii 'l-Dii'in] 
106[Talifa al-cayn allati tal)t yadd al-makfii.l bi quwwat qiihirah wa qabl al-falab]. 
107[Zawiil al-caqd alladhl wajab bihi al-l)aqq cala 'l-makfiil). 
108[/brii' al-dii'in al-kafil min al-kafiilah aw ibrii' al-madin min al-dayn]. 
109[Mawt al-makfiil]. Cf. UAE CC Arts.1102-1103. 
110(1/].{iar al-makfiil bi nafsih .ft makiin al-tasllm bacd inqi{lii' al-ajal]. 
l 11 [Il){liir al-Makfiil qabl l)uliil al-ajal, wa lii {iarar calii 'l-makfiil Lah .ft tasallumihf]. 
112[Tasllm al-makfiil nafsah Li tal)aqquq al-ghar(l{i al-ma/liib min al-kafiilah].Cf.Chapter 
II, supra., pp.76-80. 
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d] Other Methods of Security. 
The code provided IJawlilah as a means to securing fulfilment of an obliga-
tion at articles 1106-1132. lfawlilah is defined as : the transfer of a debt and claim 
from the liability of a transferor to the transferee.113 As a consequence, the creditor 
shall have the right to make a claim against the transferee and the transferor shall 
be discharged from the debt and claim together if the claim is validly made.114 
To ensure that the practice is sound, the law reqmre the transferor to 
deliver the creditor the document of title relating to the obligation transferred and 
any necessary evidence or means to enable him to obtain his right.115 This transfer, 
however, according to another provision shall retain all the guarantees attaching to 
the debt in its original form of despite the fact that the person of the debtor has 
changed. The surety (kaftl), whether in rem or in personam, shall not remain liable 
to the creditor unless he has agreed to the transfer.116 In the event that the trans-
feror guarantees to the creditor the insolvency of the transferee, such guarantee 
relates only to his solvency at the time of the transfer unless a contrary agreement 
is made.117 
In Islamic law, other than IJawlilah, pledge or mortgage is another impor-
tant means of security. It is done by way of the appropriation of a specific property 
59. 
113u AECC Art.1106. Concerning other methods of security, see Chapter II, supra., pp .54-
11 4UAECC Art.1116. 
115UAECC Art.1125. 
116u AECC Art.1119. 
117uAECC Art.1126. 
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usually owned by the debtor for security of the right of the creditor for the pay-
ment of the debt. There are two types of real securities, one is involving the trans-
fer of possession of specific property known as possessory pledge (rahn J:iiytizl) and 
formal pledge (rahn rasml aw ta)mlnl). The formal pledge is limited to immovable 
property while possessory pledge embraces both movable and immovable prop-
erty.118 
Although this classification is a new theme in analysing rahn, it has not 
departed from the original concept of security for payment of debt (ta)mln al-dayn 
wa {i,amlin al-waftF bihi). Furthermore, rahn is more needed in loans involving 
massive amounts, whether on its own strength or in association with kafalah. 
Kafalah will normally be useful in loans of insignificant sums, if it is used sepa-
rately. In the U AE code, rahn is defined based on the ijanafi rulesl 19 as a contract 
whereby the obligee acquires over real property allocated for satisfaction of his 
debt, a right in rem, whereby he shall take precedence over ordinary obligees and 
obligees subsequent in rank to him in satisfaction of his right out of the proceeds of 
such real property, in the posssession of whomsoever it may be.120 Rahn J:iiytizl is a 
contract giving rise to a right to retain the property in the hands of the obligee or 
the hands of a stakeholder as a security for a right which may recovered thereabout 
in whole or in part in priority over other obligees.121 
There are vanous other prov1s1ons, with close relevance to sources of 
Islamic jurisprudence. For instance, pledge shall be indivisable and each part of the 
118F.J.Ziadeh, Property Law in the Arab World, pp.74-88. See also 'Uqad, pp.343-344. 




real property pledge shall stand as security for the whole of the debt and each part 
of the debt secured by the real property pledged.122 Another proviso added to the 
code is regarding pledge of moveables, which requires such moveables to be 
registered under other regulations like cars, ships and others.123 Al-Zul:iayli main-
tains that such rules have their root in the idea of promoting ma#a~ah.124 As has 
been spelt out in the classical sources, article 1408 also mention about the meaning 
of land, which includes the appurtenances like buildings, cultivation, affixation and 
others. 
Article 1414 asserts that the pledgor shall be guarantor (~timin) of the prop-
erty pledged and shall be liable in full for its safety until the date the debt is paid. 
The pledgee may make objection to any deficiencies in the security and may utilize 
any possible steps to preserve his right and the value of the property. He may also 
have recourse to the pledgor for the costs of having to do so. 
The question of destruction of the pledged property is discussed at articles 
1415 to 1417. If the destruction is attributed to the default of the pledgor, the 
pledgee shall have the right to require that his debt be paid immediately or that suf-
ficient security for his debt be provided.125 If the pledgor had nothing to do with 
the damage, he may choose between providing sufficient security for the debt or 
discharging the debt prior to the maturity date thereof.126 If acts take place which 
are such to expose the property pledged to destruction or damage or which may 
render the property insufficient as a security, then the pledgee may apply to the 
122uAECC art.1410. 
123uAECC art.1411. 




court for an order that such acts cease and that steps be taken to prevent any 
occurence of them .127 
e] Rules on Insolvency. 
In accordance with the guidelines of the Islamic legal system, the law has 
regulated in a firm manner the· debtor's insolvency by imposing ~ajr. This is to 
protect the interest of the creditors. The code employs the term restriction instead 
of interdiction for ~ajr. It is provided that such measure may be placed on an 
obligor if his obligations due exceed his assets.128 This law finds its foundation in 
the Sharlcah's approval of imposing ~ajr on a bankrupt debtor from executing any 
financial transactions, based on provisions of the ijanafis.129 
The imposition of ~ajr has to go through the judicial order (~ukm qafili1) 
based on the demand of the creditors or even from a single creditor.130 Imposition 
of the interdiction insisted by the debtor himself is also accepted, as that is benefi-
cial for him as well as the creditors.131 
Article 404 provides the procedures utilized to implement ~ajr. The clerk of 
the court must, on the day on which the application for interdiction is lodged, 
register the contents of the claim in a special register arranged in order of the 
names of the obligors over whom an interdiction is applied for. He must also take 
127uAECC art.1415(3). 
128uAECC art.401. 
129Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.959-999. Cf.Chapter II, supra., pp.82-85. 
130This is a MfilikI decision. 
131This is a Shaficl view. See 'Uqad, p.342. 
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a note in the margin of the said register of the order made in the claim and of any 
order confirming or reversing it, on the same day that such order is made.132 
The interdiction shall have some consequences. Among others, any deferred 
obligations due by the obligor shall become due, any disposition by him over his 
existing and future property shall be ineffective as against his obligees as a whole 
and any acknowledgement of an obligation made by him to another person shall be 
ineffective as from the time the order is registered.133 Subsequent! y, the property 
of the obligor shall be sold and divided among the creditors by way of pro rata 
sharing in accordance with the procedures laid down by law and he shall be left 
such money as he needs to maintain himself and other persons whom he has an 
obligation to maintain.134 
The interdiction order will be removed by the order of the judge having 
jurisdiction, if the property subject to an interdiction is divided among the credi-
tors, if it is established that the obligations of the obligor do not exceed his assets 
and if the obligor satisfies his obligations which have fallen due without the inter-
diction having any effect and the obligor has discharged all the instalments that 
have fallen due.135 






As far as gharamah is concerned, it covers various types of nominate con-
tracts. Despite that, the provisions on the general principles of contract are suffi-
cient to cover the purpose of treating all of them. Specific nominate contracts with 
distinct issues are dealt with separately. 
The clearest demonstration of the rules, as in the classial manuals, is 
enshrined in the chapter on sale as well as in the section on the general theory of 
contract. Rayner observed that the definitions on modern commercial sales are nar-
rowerl 36 as the UAE code defines it as: the exchange of non-money property for 
money .137 In fiqh sale is known as the exchange of one commodity for another of 
which one is called the object and the other the price.138 
As regards the various prescriptions on contractual matters in the code, the 
predominant rules of fiqh are adopted. As far as off er and acceptance (ljab wa 
qabal) are concerned, the code has demanded the similar requirements purposive to 
ensure a perfect contract is conluded. If such is being properly observed, it will 
reduce the possibility of the occurence of any defective elements in the contract.139 
Article 136 specifically recognizes the concept of kh.iyar majlis (option of the ses-
sion). The provision ruled that while the two contracting parties are still in ses-
136sue Rayner, The Theory of Contract in Islamic Law, p.103.Cf. Chapter III, supra., 
pp.87-175. . 
137uAECC art.489. Cf. Art.115 of the Federal Commercial Code of the UAE (1993) and 
art.93 of Bahraini Commercial Code 1987. Details could be found in W.M.Ballantyne, "Notes on 
the Commercial Code of Bahrain," ALQ vol.II [4], Nov.1987, pp.352ff. 
138Madhiihib, vol.II, p.147. 
139UAECC Arts.129-148. 
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sion140, each party retains the right to revoke any agreement made between them 
from the moment they came together.141 
Sue Rayner maintains that modern legislation governing the legality of the 
object of sale states that illegal property consists of "anything forbidden by a provi-
sion of the law or contrary to public policy or morals." 142 The U AE code is using 
the series of requirements enunciated infiqh such as legality (mashracan), existence 
(mawjadan), the capability of being held in usufruct and delivered (musallaman) 
and the property constituting lawful benefit (muntafican sharcan).143 The general 
provisions contained in this part144 shall apply to nominate and innominate con-
tracts145. With regards to rules applying to certain contracts only, the special provi-
sions governing the same shall be laid down in this law146 or in other laws.147 
g] Formalism in Contractual Relationship. 
140This means that they have not gone their separate ways and are still effectively together. 
See James. Wheelan's note in his translation of the UAE code p.48. 
141 Al-Zu}:tayll asserts that this concept corresponds the concept of khiyar al-qabal promul-
gated by the J:lanafi school. See 'Uqad, p.16. 
142uAECC art.205(2) and 126. Also see the definition of public policy and moral, supra. 
In addition to immorality and against public policy, the consideration for "harm to person or prop-
erty of third party" is also assumed to be catered for in this code. See Sue Rayner, The Theory of 
Contract, p.131. 
143Maj. 'Adliyyah art.205 states: If the object does not exist the sale of it is invalid (bti[il). 
Art 211 reads: "The sale of property which is not nutaqawwim is invalid." The concept of mtil 
mutaqawwim is defined at article 127 as: "A property the benefit of which is permissible by law to 
enjoy." Detailed treatment can be consulted in Ma~adir, vol.IV, p.135. In addition to that 
art.203(1) requires that: In commutative contract involving property the subject-matter must be 
specified in such a way as to avoid gross uncertainty (gharar) by reference to it or to the place 
where it is located at the time of the contract or its statement of distiguishing characteristic and the 
amount thereof must be stated if it is moveable property and the like, so as to avoid gross 
uncertainty. 
144part I on Contracts [section I: General Provisions]. UAECC arts.125-128. 
l45uAECC art.128(1). 
146The Law of Civil Transactions of the UAE 1985. 
147uAECC art.128(2). 
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With regard to the form of contract, the principle is that the expression of 
intention will be taken into consideration if the expression is unequivocal. But if 
the expression is not clear, then the intention will be taken into account.148 This 
prominent consideration afforded to the true will and consent in modem Islamic 
legal philosophy is manifested in the modern codes. Article 258(1) of the UAE 
code provides: "That which is a consequence in contracts is intention and meaning, 
not expression and form. "149 
It may be remarked that the principal purpose for introducing formalities 
into a system of contracts is primarily to intoduce clarity and to provide an 
unambiguous forum by which to express the parties' intention. It may also serve to 
make the parties to realise their responsibilities and duties regarding contracts. The 
general trend with formalities, however, has been to move away from the freedoms 
enjoyed by early Muslims. To an increasing extent, written evidence is becoming 
the requisite. The complexities of modem commerce life have led not only to 
increased documentation in contracts but the current state of affairs renders it no 
longer advisable to enter into undocumented contracts. The modem legislation too 
has made it a characteristic and requires the formality of documentation for evi-
dence at law.150 
148Ma~adir, vol.II, p.90. 
149cf. Art.3 of Maj. 'Adliyyah : In contracts effect is given to intention and meaning and 
not to the words and phrases. Also see Civil, p.17. 
lSOniis is especially so within the fields of company and real estate laws, particular those 
related to [a] articles and memorandum of association; [b] commercial agency contract; [c] company 
registration; [d] rent; [e] mortgage and lease contracts. See Sue Rayner, The Theory of Contract, 
pp.167-168. 
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The importance of this formality is emphasised by a decision in the case of 
The Ras al-Khaimah Asphalt Co. and The Bank of Oman v. Uoyds Bank (and 
Others). In this case, one of the formalities of Islamic law, namely that monies of 
a qarrj loan should be delivered to the borrower for the contract of qarfl, to be of 
effect, was not adhered to. A European businessman has offered the R.A.C, 
heavily indebted to the Bank of Oman, a loan of twenty million Deutschmarks to 
reapy its debt. The loan was to be repaid by nine bills of exchange, maturing at 
various times over a five years period. These bills, duly drawn on and accepted by 
the R. A. C. and guaranteed by the Bank of Oman, were handed over to the 
businessman who promised to deliver the loan money within a few days. The 
monies never reached the company. Instead, the bills were discounted in the Euro-
pean financial market; the proceeds were cashed and disappeared. The businessman 
was prosecuted, convicted for fraud and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 
Three of the bills had been bought by Lloyds Bank International Limited and in 
September 1978 the company and the Bank of Oman sought a judicial order in Ras 
al-Khaimah to prevent Lloyd Bank and other purchasers from taking any step to 
enforce payment of the bills. The court of Ras al-Khaimah is facing the legal inci-
dents and effects of the commercial paper of modern international finance.151 
On November 1, 1978 the court ruled that the first defendant failed to per-
form his obligation in paying the sum agreed upon to R.A.C. Accordingly the 
agreement concluded between R.A.C. and the first defendant is no contractual 
agreement at all and consequent! y the guarantee proffered by the Bank of Oman is 
totally devoid of legal effect.152 In looking behind the formal obligations of the sig-
151Ras al-Khaimah Civil Court Suit 397/78 cited in Commercial, pp.1-3. 
152Ibid. 
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natory of a bill of exchange to the reality of the initial transaction on which it was 
founded, the judgement of the Civil Court of Ras al-Khaimah is an outstanding 
example of decision based on fiqh. The concept of qar4l53 ruled that it is not bind-
ing unless the monies is delivered to the borrower. As there was no loan at all to 
the R.A.C., and since a guarantee must relate to a binding debt (dayn ~alJ,11]), there 
was no legal basis for the guarantee given by the Bank of Oman.154 
h] Obligations of the Contracting Parties. 
The vendor is obligated by the concluded contract to transfer the ownership 
of the sold property to the purchaserl55 and other rights in rem over moveables and 
real property may be transferred by contract if the elements and conditions thereof 
required by law are satisfiedl56. The exception is when deferred price or paying by 
instalment is agreed, the seller may stipulate that the transfer of ownership be 
suspended until he pays the whole price, notwithstanding that the goods have been 
deliveredl57. Such a rule is needed to offer the seller a kind of protection of his 
right (4amlin IJaqqihi) to secure full payment of the purchased merchandise. He i_s 
capable, according to this arrangement, to repossess the merchandise in the event 
of default of payment, without having to compete with the buyer's other credi-
tors.158 
The vendor is also allowed to demand the revocation of the contract as a 
result of default of payment by virtue of article 425 on general liability. The 







vendor is then responsible for returning the money paid though he can tell the pur-
chaser about non-refund or partial refund in lieu of the cancellation and the benefit 
of use enjoyed by the purchaser whilst holding the property. This is known as al-
shart al-jaz.li>"i that is a commitment to restitution as a penalty for breach or delay 
in performance of obligation. Though perceived as an imported rule, Mu~ta.Ia 
Zarqa.> has suggested that such rules has been voiced by classical jurists like Qac.II 
Shurayl) and lbn Sirin.159 In one article, Nabil Salih posed a valid question whether 
or not compensation for lost profit and intangible or abstract damage could come 
under (l,amiin al- caqd. His reason for questioning so is presumably because such 
matters were not specifically discussed in classical texts.160 Having said that, there 
are avenues for such issues to be reevaluated within the broad premise of (/,amiin 
and freedom of contract and making stipulations as allowed by the law. In princi-
ple, so long as the terms and conditions are harmonious with the u~Ul of the 
Sharlcah, it should be allowed161 and to be able to cope to the changing business 
practices and experiences. This also proved the flexibility of Islamic law and its 
ability to adjust to the changes within human life without loosing its basic charac-
teristics. 
In discussing the obligations of the contracting parties, the code is inspired 
by the classical laws rules that if the goods sold are destroyed prior to delivery or 
if part of them is lost through the act of the purchaser, he shall be deemed to have 
taken delivery of the goods sold and he shall be bound to pay the price.162 Con-
159Madkhal, p.234, 391. However, he does not give references for his claim. 
160Nabil Salih, "Remedies for Breach of Contract under Islamic and Arab Law,'' ALQ 
[1987], pp.269-289. 
161The maxim reads: [kullu shar{ yukhlilif u~iil al-Shar'icah bii{il]. See Sh.'Ztzrqa), p.485. 
Cf. on Islamic thoery of damages, chapter IV, pp.210-213. 
162uAECC art.532. For details see Badti.Jic, vol.V, pp.244-246; Fiqh Islaml, vol.IV, 
pp.418-421; cuqad, p.75. See Chapter III, pp.93-96. 
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trarily, if the goods are destroyed prior to delivery through a cause in which nei-
ther of the contracting parties played any part, the sale shall be cancelled and the 
purchaser shall be entitled to recover the price which he has paid.163 Being dif-
ferent from the two preceding situation, article 533(1 )(2) rules that : if the goods 
sold are destroyed prior to delivery through the act of a third party, the purchaser 
shall have the option as he wishes either to cancel the sale or to affirm it. He shall 
also have right to recourse against the person who has caused the loss either for 
equivalent goods or for the value thereof. 
Pertaining the shortfall decrement and excess in quantity of the goods which 
are sold, article 523 provides comprehensive regulations: 
" If the contract specifies the quantity of the goods to be sold and it 
appears that there is a shortfall or an excess in them, then, if there is 
no provision or custom in that regard, the following rules shall have 
effect: 
[a] if the goods sold would not be harmed by being divided, the 
excess belongs to the seller, and he may recover the same in specie, 
and any shortfall is to his account, whether the price is fixed per 
unit or by measure, or for the whole goods. 
[b] If the goods would be harmed by being divided and the price has 
been fixed by unit or measure, then the excess shall belong to the 
seller and he shall be entitled to the price thereof and any shortfall 
shall be to his account. If however a price has been fixed for the 
goods as a lot, the excess shall belong to the purchaser and there 
shall be no change in the price if there is a shortfall. 
[c] If the excess or shortfall places a greater obligation upon the pur-
chaser than that for which he contracted to purchase or amounts to a 
different bargain for him, he shall have the option to rescind the 
contract unless the amount is minimal, and the shortfall does not 
prejudice the intention of the purchaser. 
[ d] If the purchaser takes delivery of the goods sold knowing that 
they are short, he shall lose his right to elect to rescind the contract 
as referred to in the foregoing paragraph. 
163u AECC art.531. 
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i] The Status of Transactions Deemed Void, Invalid 
and Suspended. 
Within the Sharlcah and modern legislation alike, void transactions are of 
no effect and legally non-existent.164 Consequently, no property right can be trans-
ferred and no liabilities are incurred by the purchaser in respect of goods, regard-
less of whether he has taken possession of them with the consent of the purchaser. 
The void transaction cannot be validated, ratified or amended by approval of the 
parties or by the passage of time.165 The U AE code also ruled that if the void part 
is separately specified or if only a part is dependent upon the grant of consent 
which has not been given, these parts may be severable.166 
There is a potential problem that might arise from such situation, that is the 
destruction of the goods. In cases of ruination of the property, it is the vendor who 
bears the cost or loss in void sales. It was generally held by the classical jurists that 
upon deeming nullity of contract once seisin has passed to the purchaser, the object 
becomes a trust in the hand of the purchaser. The purchaser is not empowered to 
perform any act in respect of the object of sale and it is as if he merely retains 
164Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.370 reads : A sale which is void is of no effect whatsoever. Con-
sequently, if in the case of a sale which is void, the purchaser has taken delivery of the thing sold 
with the permission of the vendor, and such thing is destroyed without the fault of the purchaser 
while in his possession, there is no necessity for the purchaser to make good the loss, the thing sold 
being in the nature of a thing deposited on trust. See Civil, p.85; Ma~lidir, vol.IV, p.145 ff. 
Cf.Chapter III, pp.95-98. 
165uAECC art.201 (1) reads: A void contract is one which is unlawful in its essence and 
form, lacking the elements of a contract or defective in its subject matter or purpose or form as laid 
down by law for the making of the contract and such a contract shall be of no effect and shall not be 
capable of being rectified by consent. Art.210(2) rules that any person having an interest may rely 
on the voidness of the contract and a judge may so rule of his own motion. Art.210(3) provides that 
no claim (for a declaration) that a contract is void shall be heard after the expiry of 15 years from 
the date the contract was made, but any person having an interest may raise the defence of the void-
ness of the contract at any time. 
166UAECC art.211(1)(2). 
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seisin with the consent of the vendor. Therefore, should the object perish whilst in 
his possession, he is not liable.167 
The general rule is that a voidable contract can be validated through 
ratification by the interested party. The majority opinion rules that in such a trans-
action, when the purchaser has taken possession of the goods with the consent of 
the vendor where both goods and consideration constitute property, the right of 
ownership of these goods transfers to the purchaser. He is then responsible for the 
loss or damage to the goods while these were in his possession.168 The right of 
property which devolves from an invalid sale nevetheless remains weak and is 
dependent upon the transfer of possession to have any effect. It stands to reason 
that right of ownership should not be transferred before possession, in order for the 
invalid circumstances to be removed.169 
The invalid contract may be anulled by either party prior to the transfer of 
the object. Whilst the invalidating factor remains, the contract may also be anulled 
by either party after seisin. Where the contract is not binding (ghayr lazim), subject 
to the right of option, the person who has the right of option may annul an invalid 
contract.170 The U AE law provides that the right to grant or withhold consent to 
the contract shall be that of the owner or the person in whose favour the right over 
the thing contracted for exists, or in the tutor or guardian, or in the person of 
defective capacity after the defect has been remedied or the person who has suf-
167see Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.370, supra. 
168uAECC art.212(1) reads: A voidable contract is one which is lawful in its essence but 
not in form, and if the cause of the voidability is removed, the contract shall be valid. Also see Saba 
Habachy, "The System of Nullities in Muslim Law", AJCL 13 (1964), p.62. 
169uAECC art.212(2). 
170Maj. 'Adliyyah, art.376 : In the case of a revocable sale, a person possessing an option 
can cancel such sale. 
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fered duress after the the duress has been removed, or such person to whom the 
law gives that power.171 
A suspended contract (bayc mawquj) has a beneficial effect only after 
approval has been given by a relevant party. If consent is given to a suspended 
transaction, it shall become effective retroactively to the time it was made, and the 
subsequent consent shall have the same effect as a prior agency [approval]. If con-
sent is refused, the disposition shall be void.172 
j] Restitutions for Defects. 
Restitution regarding defects usually referds to default in ownership and 
imperfection of the goods themselves. This is because the seller is obliged to 
ensure that the goods sold are free from the right of any third party who may 
object to the purchaser if the cause of that third party['s] right antedates the con-
tract of sale.173 The vendor shall also ensure that the goods sold are free of any 
third party right if such a right is based on a cause arising before the sale out of his 
act.174 
171 UAECC art.214. 
172uAECC art.217(1)(2). 
173uAECC art.534(1).Cf. Maj. rAdliyyah, art.616 on al-kafalah bi Jl-darak, supra. See also 
Murshid, art.491. Al-Zul).aylI commented that the basis for ~aman in such situation is that there is a 
flaw in the transaction as the vendor is disposing something which he is not a rightful owner. The 
property can also be subjected to a firm established right (IJ.aqq muqarrar tho.bit) and he is thus 
liable to the purchaser and has to pay ~amti.n. In certain circumstances, the purchaser can demand, 
in ensuring discharge of the liability, a guarantor (kafll) from the vendor .... See ruqad, p.83 and 
Chapter III, pp. I 02-105. 
174uAECC art.534(2). 
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If judgement is passed affirming a third party['s] right over the goods sold, 
such a third party may have recourse against the vendor for the price if he affirms 
the sale, and the goods sold shall then belong exclusively to the purchaser.175 If the 
third party does not affirm the sale, the contract shall be cancelled and the pur-
chaser may have recourse against the vendor for the price.176 The vendor shall 
compensate the purchaser for any useful improvement in the goods sold made by 
the latter calculated on the value thereof on the day of delivery to the third party 
claimant.177 The vendor shall likewise make good to the purchaser any loss out of 
the third party claim to the goods sold.178 
The law has also outlined the procedure of such situation as enshrined in 
article 535. If the third party is claiming his right over the goods sold prior to 
delivery thereof, he must direct such a claim against both the vendor and the pur-
chaser. If the claim is brought after delivery of the goods sold and the purchaser 
does not joint the vendor in the action at the appropriate time and a judgement is 
issued against him which becomes final, he shall lose his right of recourse for an 
indemnity if the seller proves that if he had been joined in the action the result 
would have been the dismissal of the third party's claim of right.179 
Regarding the question of latent defect in the goods, articles 543-555 spells 
out the vendor's liability. He is legally duty bound to guarantee that the goods sold 
175uAECC art.536(1). 
l 76uAECC art.536(2). 
177uAECC art.534(3). 
l 78uAECC art.536(4). 
179uAECC art.535(1)(2). 
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are fre from any defect, save such as are within the customary tolerance. I SO This 
provision clearly recognizes the role of custom in determining the remited defect 
and upholding the threshold of Islamic business ethics demonstrated in condemna-
tion of concealment of defects and fraudulent pratices. For instance, in determining 
cayb, custom of the traders (curf al-tujjlir) is used to asses the reduction of price as 
a result of the deficiency of the goods of from their original nature (a~l al-fi[rah al-
sallmah).181 
The vendor shall be exempted from liability for cayb in the goods sold in 
certain situations: 
[a] If the vendor disclosed the defect to the purchaser at the time of the 
sale; 
[b] If the purchaser accepted the defect after he had seen it or after learning 
thereof from another person; 
[ c] If the purchaser purchases the goods with knowledge of the defect 
therein; 
[ d] If the vendor sells the goods with a condition that he is not to be liable 
for any defect therein, or for a specified defect, unless the vendor 
deliberately conceals the defect or if the purchaser is prevented from seeing 
the defect; 
180UAECC art.543(1). This general rule relating to the option of defects shall apply not 
only to contract of sale but also to all contracts involving devolution of ownership, particularly that 
known as 'uqad al-mu'tiwa~lit (commutative contracts). See 'Uqad, p.86. The conditions of ~amlin 
al-'uyab are : [1] it must be antecedent (qadim); [2] the antecedent defect must be latent; [3] the 
buyer is ignorant about the defect. 
181 'Vqad, p.89. Coulson observes that: trade is permitted and implied conditions of mer-
chantability of the goods (suitability of the property or service for the proposed declared intention in 
a contract). Arising therefrom is a warranty against defect in the goods sold. The consequence of 
such practice is that every vendor, hirer or contractor of services has a duty to disclose any defects, 
faults or unsuitability of the goods for their declared intended purpose. See Commercial, p.65. 
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[ e] If the sale is by public auction by the judicial or administrative author-
ities.182 
There are certain situations where recourse for defect is hindered and pay-
ment of {i,aman is waived. This happens when the purchaser assented the defect 
after knowing it by either express or implicit statement I 83, when the purchaser has 
utilized the goods like a rightful owner after realizing the defect and thus losing his 
right of option184, when the goods are destroyed in the hands of the purchaser or he 
has consumed them before knowing about the defect185, when a new defect 
occurs186 and when there is an increase in the goods187. 
k] The Islamic System of Option. 
The Islamic system of khiyar creates the power of unilateral rescission of 
the contract under condition of vitiated consent. A party who had mistakenly 
entered into or who has been unfairly or unwittingly forced or tricked into entering 
a contract, was provided with a remedy against the effect of such a contract. The 
victims of mistake, fraud or deceit, who are unaware of that fraud or deceit at the 
time of the contract would, in all prospect, have refrained from entering into that 
contract had they indeed known of the discrepant factors. In three circumstances, 
182uAECC art.545. As far as the sale by auction is concerned, it is suggested that the 




186u AECC art.548 
187uAECC art.549. 
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the contract becomes voidable (qtibil Ii )l-ib[lil) with the right to avoid given to the 
contracting parties whose consent is vitiated.188 
Article 193 of the UAE code reads that: "No regard shall be had for any 
mistake save in so far as it is contained in the form of contract or demonstrated by 
the surrounding circumstances and conditions, or the nature of things or custom." 
In this respect, it may be said that the law will recognize technical errors of the 
contract and obvious mistakes in the deduction of the parties' will and inferred 
intention. Rayner observes that modern Islamic legislation does not go beyond this 
and thus marked the approach of the U AE code towards the more restrictive 
bounds of Western Civil systems. 
Mistake (ghala[), which is a false and inexact representation of reality, may 
be made in regard to different elements of a contract like substancel 89, qualityl 90 
and the contracting parties. It is regarded the least among the impediments of con-
tract despite the fact that it is the most conducive factor to dispute.191 Another evi-
dence to support this contention is the fact that khiylir ghala[ does not strictly exist 
in Islamic jurisprudence.192 
Islamic law generally recognizes mistake as to value in conjunction. with 
flagrant misrepresentation (ghubn fli~ish)l 93. In such a practice, there is an 
excessive deception without fraud in the transaction. The provision of legislative 
188see discussion of contractual warranty in chapter III, supra., pp.90-112. 
189 Attributed to ghalaf al-ma'na. 
~:~Normally results in losing the intended features ifawat al-wa~f al-marghab). 
Ma~tidir, vol.II, p.112. 
l92commercial, p.107. 
193cf.Maj. 'Adliyyah, arts.356-357. 
(299) 
welfare for vulnerable institutions has been taken up in the U AE code. Article 191 
reads: "When a contract may not generally be cancelled on the basis of ghubn 
fiil]ish without the accompaniment of misrepresentation (taghrlr), contracts in 
respect of property belonging to person under interdiction, waqf and state may be 
so cancelled." The code also provides that where exploitation or conspiracy has 
been exerted in dispositions of property of subsequently restricted persons, the 
judge may void the contract despite the fact that the dispositions were made prior 
to the court's restriction. 
As regards to fraud, article 185 provides that taghrlr is when one of the 
contracting parties deceives the other by means of trickery of word or deed which 
leads the other to consent to what he would not otherwise have consented to. 194 
Provision on this issue reflects a wide concept of fiqh being adopted. For instance 
it is provided that deliberate silence concerning a fact or set of circumstances shall 
be deemed to be a misrepresentation if it is proved that the person misled thereby 
would not have made the contract had he been aware of the fact or set of circum-
stances.195 And if one of the contracting parties makes a misrepresentation to the 
other and transpires that the contract was concluded by a gross cheat, the person so 
misled may cancel the contract.196 
The U AE code also recognizes the specific trust sale contracts like 
murlibal]ah, tawliyah, wadlcah and ishriik. In these transactions, as in fiqh texts, 
the original cost price paid by the seller must be disclosed by him in addition to the 
194rbe UAE provision is taken from the Jordanian Civil Code article 143 where both codes 
are employing the term "taghrir" unlike the Kuwaiti code whic uses the term "tadlrs". 
195UAECC art.186. 
196u AECC art.187. 
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profit percentage or the rebate percentage, as the case may be. If it is later estab-
lished that the price paid by the seller is less than what disclosed, the buyer need 
only to pay the real price.197 The UAE law also provides that where the original 
cost price is not known at the time of the contract, the purchaser is given option to 
rescind the contract when he learns of it.198 He shall also have the option to rescind 
if he learns that the seller conceals a matter affecting the object or the capital 
value, but he loses this right, if he converts, consumes or disposes of the goods 
after delivery .199 
I] Unfair Competition. 
In defining the concept of miil mutaqqawwim, the code has extended its 
meaning by including not only specific property200 but also to usufructuary rights 
(manafif) and other rights in property such as a debt attached to the dhimmah of a 
person, right of easement (~uqaq al-irtifaq) as well as the industrial and intellectual 




200This will also include any tangible material (ashya) maddiyyah) proclaimed as legitimate 
accordin~ to the Sharicah. See Maj. cAdliyyah, art.127. 
01 UAECC art.200. According to article 121 of the Provisional Constitution of the UAE, 
the Federation is granted exclusive authority over the most important areas of codification (al-
tashricat al-kubra) such as civil and comercial law (mucamaltit madaniyyah wa tijariyah) and over 
the protection of industrial property and copyright law (~imiiyat al-milkiyyah al-~inticiyyah wa 
~uqaq al-mu)allifin). See Nasrallah Mangalo, "Tradmark and Unfair Competition Law in the United 
Arab Emirates," llC 13 [1982), p.596. Also see Irshad Abdul Kadir, "Trademark Protection in the 
UAE," ALQ [1991), pp.31-47. In this article the author had listed the relevant statute laws in 
trademark protection. They are : (a) Ras al-Khaimah Trademark Law 1974; (b) Abu Dhabi Torts 
Law 1966; (c) Abu Dhabi Penal Code 1971; (d) Abu Dhabi Commercial Register Law 1973; (e) 
Federal Commercial Law 1975; (t) Suppression of of Fraud and Deceit in Commercial Transactions 
(Federal Law No.4 1979); (g) Commercial Agency Law (Federal Law 1981 and (h) Federal Penal 
Code 1987. 
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new federal law on trade mark and copyright recently202 , after it has being felt as 
a "notable absence" except in the rarely-invoked trademark law of Ras al-
Khaimah. 203 
It was argued by Mangalo that such development was influenced by the 
Egyptian law, based on their experiences and case law. For instance, in the case of 
Thani Ben Murshid v. al-Nawis Company204, the plaintiff was an agent for a 
Dutch company producing a well-known canned-milk under the trademark "Rain-
bow". The defendant company imported for sale an inferior product called 
"Rainshow". The plaintiff company sued to stop this practice. The court in Abu 
Dhabi looked at Abu Dhabi law first, and only when the answer could not be 
obtained did it look to Islamic law generally and the laws of other Arab countries. 
In this case, the judge has referred to the Egyptian decision in 1950 that infringe-
ment was a form of unfair competition. It was important for the state to protect the 
consumers from false and possibly dangerous consumer goods. This approach was 
later developed in McDonalds Company v. An.Uni. 205 
202Law 37 /92 concerning Trademark; Law 40/92 concerning protection of intellectual 
work; Law 44/92 concerning regulation and protection of industrial ownership, patent, idustrial 
drawings and prototypes. See W.M.Ballantyne, Register of Law in the Arabian Gulf [9th edition], 
1993, p.342. In his article Irshad Abdul Kadir also suggested the additional measures in addressing 
the trademark infringement and unfair competition. This include local licensing procedure, adminis-
trative intervention, cautionary notice and international agreement. Op.cit, pp.37-38. 
203Ras al-Khaimah Trade Mark Law 1974. For details see Nasrallah 
Mangalo,Ibid.,pp.588-625. See also Ian Edge, "Comparative Commercial Law of Egypt and the 
Arabian Gulf," Cleveland State L<lw Review 34 [1985/6], pp.142. 
204Abu Dhabi Civil Court decision 1973 in IIC [1981], pp.883-890 and 891-892. See Ian 
Edge, ibid. 
205see also judgements of Pif Paf Civil Suit 166179 [1982]DCC; Prophecy and Cachet 
[1982] DCC; Brylcream Civil Suit 1378177 [1982] DCC. Details of these cases and other cases has 
been supplied by Mohamed Osman Abdalla el-Saeid, Aspect of Banking Law and Legal Practice in 
Light of the Commercial Code of the U.A.E., Unpublished Ph.D Exeter University, 1990. 
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In other matters, the U AE courts have prefered to refer to general principle 
or to Islamic law rather than directly to Egyptian law. Certain UAE courts, partic-
ularly those of Dubai, have considered the validity of shipping contracts (bills of 
lading and charterparties) which refer to foreign choice of law and which contain 
limitation of liability of the shipowner based on Hague Rules. This has given rise 
to two related questions, about the applicability of foreign choice of law clauses in 
contracts to be performed in the U AE and the validity of such exemption clauses in 
UAE law. Neither question has been legislated in the UAE since it is not a party to 
the Hague Rules. In these cases, the courts apply the general principle of con-
tract. 206 
"The requirement in article 5 of the Code Of Civil Procedure of 
Abu Dhabi to follow Islamic jurisprudence in their decision granting 
trademark protection under unfair competition has not yet resulted in 
applying provision of Islamic law or even judge-made law based on 
Islamic legal theory (fiqh). The courts have instead found a basis for 
t~ademark pro_tect!on in the princi~le of equity (cadlilah) and justice 
(m~af) embodied m the Sharlcah." 07 
It was perceived that if Islamic law is to be directly applied for purposes of 
trademark protection under unfair competition, a more detailed consideration of 
application of such law by the court would be neccessary. Trademark and unfair 
competition law is not an express part of Islamic law. However, trademark pro-
tection and unfair competition law, as elements of industrial property law 
(milkiyyah ~inliciyyah) can be compared in general to private property (milkiyyah 
kha~~ah) under Islamic Property law208 and the use of such property 
(intifac;istighlal) and promotes economic freedom (~urriyat al-tijarah wa ;z_ 
2061an Edge, ibid., pp.142-143. 
207Nasrallah Mangalo, ibid., p.611. 
208Ma~adir, vol.II, p.23. See also M. Yusuf Miisa, al-Amwal wa NG.?.ariyyat al-'Aqd ft )z_ 
Fiqh al-lslaml, p.159. 
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~inlicah) and thus free competition (munlifasah mashracah). The specific ground 
rules of unfair competition law follow from this principle and are supported by 
theories developed in Islmic law such as misuse of rights (tacassuf bi )l-IJ,aqq),209 
unlawful conduct (camal ghayr mashru')210 and the rule of restitution (~amlin).211 
Mangalo further stressed that the general expression on unfair competition 
could be found in the Islamic view of damaging conduct (ji,Cl ~ar), according to 
which a person causing damage (musabbib) must repair or make for the damage 
(tacwl~ al-~arar).212 An act of unfair competition is in its nature merely a form of 
damaging conduct and should be regarded as illegal conduct. The unauthorized use 
of another's distinctive and already used mark impairs his property rights in his 
enterprise and thus creates liability under the rules relating to damaging conduct, 
which has its root from the classical principles on ~am.an. 
However, it should be understood that the United Arab Emirates Civil Code 
represents an effort at reevaluating the role of Islamic law vis-a-vis modern legisla-
tion. It is an attempt towards harmonizing the existing laws based on European 
civil law as well as English common law with Islamic legal precepts. Such an 
approach has been the basis of earlier attempts in Egypt, Syria, 'Iraq and Jordan. 
209u AECC art. I 06 reads: (1) A person shall be held liable for an unlawful exercise of his 
rights. (2) The exercise of a right shall be unlawful [a] if there is an intentional infringement of 
another's right; [b] if the interests which such exercise of right is designed to bring about are con-
trary to the rules of Islamic Shari' ah, the law, public order or morals; [ c] if the interests desired are 
disproportionate to the harm that will be suffered by others; [d] or if it exceeds the bound of usage 
and custom. For detail treatment on the subject on a comparative basis between Islamic law and 
modern Arab laws see Fatl)I al-Darim, Nazariyyat al-Ta'assufft Isti'mal al-ljaqq, 1967. 
210 . N.Mangalo, op.cit., p.612. 
21 lsee chapter III, supra. 
212see al-Mudhakirat al-lfia~iyah li Jf-Qanan al-MadanI al-UrdunI [Explanatory Notes on 
Jordanian Civil Code] edited by Niqabah al-Mul)amin, al-Maktab al-Fann1 [Lawyers Chambers' 
Technical Office], 1976 Art.256-271 cited in Mangalo, ibid. 
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However, this pragmatic approach evolving as it did out of various factors like 
political negotiations, social reality and the legal history of the country, was faced 
with the fact that these were not always in conformity with Islamic law as it had 
earlier been perceived. This has led to an attempt by modernising Islamic jurists to 
reconsider aspects of received legal doctrines to make them conform with Wes tern 
precepts that could be considered to be within the realms of equity. When Sudan 
attempted to impose an Islamic code based on traditional values uninterpreted by 
modern Western concepts, the result was not altogether successful. However, the 
attempted harmonisation present in the UAE code seems to have been more accept-
able to modern jurists as well as opening the way for a more modern understanding 
of the classical Islamic concepts. 
Conclusion 
From the survey in this chapter, it can be established that there has been a 
trend towards Islamization of the laws in the Muslim countries or in other words to 
harmonize Islamic and modern commercial laws. A comparative studies of the two 
systems and finding the viable ways of bridging the Islamic and modern jurists is a 
meritorious effort and should be further enhanced. Certain legal problems which 
have no direct rulings in the classical texts should be resolved by the intensified 
ijtihad exercises. In addition, presenting Islamic fiqh in its new form (al-fiqh ft 
thawbihl al-jadid) is essential in providing the legal practitioners, especially those 




The concept which represents the Sharlcah' s notion of general liability and 
preservation of legitimate rights, namely (l.aman, was used interchangeably with 
similar terms in the various contexts whenever it was deemed appropriate. The 
Quranic evidence for (l.aman exists despite the fact that the term itself never 
occures in it. The most celebrated verse cited in almost all manuals of Islamic law 
is: "For him who produces it, is the reward of a camel load, I will be responsible 
for it." This is appropriate if (l.aman was only applied to the notion of kafalah. 
However, as the research was not confined to (l.aman in the sense of suretyship but 
also to remedies in contractual relationships, a reassesment of the evidence from 
the Quran is inevitable. Thus, verses on the significance of responsibility 
(mas)aliyyah), retributive justice (jaza)) and prohibitions of violation of rights and 
inflicting mischief, have been given attention thus providing the discussion on such 
an important matter with stronger textual injunctions. 
As far as the sunnah was concerned, the research found that some writers 
have confined their elucidation of (l.aman to the celebrated Prophetic saying which 
was later adopted as an important maxim: "no harm shall be inflicted nor should 
any be inflicted on a reciprocal basis." Most classical jurists recommended that 
the whole body of Prophetic statements and decisions were appropriate to explain 
the way (l.aman should be applied. In tum, decisions on the issue attributed to the 
Companions, where no earlier precedents from the Prophet's time existed, became 
another step in the development of the concept. It was further developed by 
scholars and jurists of later generations. 
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In many aspects, fl,amlin as a classical concept of Islamic law is still rele-
vant to commercial life and worthy of being incorporated in modern commercial 
legislation. However, the concept needs to be restated, without losing its original 
essence, in the language and context of modern commerce. This restatement is cru-
cial in order to make the concept of f/,amlin fit easily into the complexity of com-
mercial techniques in modern days, particularly so as the classical manuals are 
normally confined to issues faced during the time they were prepared. Such an 
effort is important to ensure that maximum benefit can be attained from the rich 
Muslim intellectual heritage and these concepts can be applied in the present time. 
In this respect, the ideal way to study an aspect of commercial law like f/,amlin 
would be to compare the legal principles embodied in the manuals with the 
materials relating to its application in economic life as manifested by actual con-
tracts, business records as well as the fatliwli of the jurists in response to any new 
cases arising in the society. 
As regards the usage of f/,amlin in the sense of suretyship, the research 
found that it was, and still is, an important means of security when involving loan 
transactions. However, personal suretyship is only sufficient to secure loans 
involving a small amount. In loan agreements involving large amounts, collateral 
security represented by the practice of rahn is needed. This would be further 
enhanced with the full utilization of written documents and their being witnessed 
by notaries. In light of ma#a~ah, documentation of contracts is seen as an absolute 
necessity despite the general attitude of Islamic scholars in treating it as mere 
recommendation. In practice, the use of written instruments in establishing con-
tractual obligations and legal entitlements has gained some prominence and given 
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rise to a distinct branch of legal science, that is the shuruf literature. The scope of 
~aman has been enlarged by modern jurists, basing themselves at least theoretically 
on the classical jurists, to encompass the Islamic perspective of bankcruptcy and 
the usage of ~aman in the form of negotiable instruments. Thus, this Islamic con-
cept has shown viability and vitality in the changing milieu. 
Modern developments have also been able to adapt the way the concept of 
~aman was applied to serve as remedies to contractual injustice. paman is con-
sidered as "implied terms" inherent in any concluded contract by which it spells 
out the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. This serves as a protection 
against any infringement that might take place. Another modern aspect is {iaman in 
fiduciary relationship where liability will only arise when transgression is com-
mitted. There are certain contracts whereby both elements are material. These 
arrangements are vital in regulating business activities and the extensive study of 
them has provided the theoretical foundation for a distinct law of fair trading and 
consumer protection law. 
The developing concept of ~aman is exemplified by the operation of the 
Malaysian Islamic Bank. Despite the fact that the Malaysian Islamic Banking Act 
1983 is merely a super-imposition of some Islamic prescriptions on the Banking 
Act 1973, it is the beginning of an era of looking into the importance of muciimaliit 
rules in banking. However, there is a need for better legislation to harmonise 
detailed substantive laws within the framework of Islamic law. 
The assessment of the trend of legislation in the Middle East, particularly 
that of the U AE provided the evidence of the continuing process of the reassertion 
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of the Sharlcah within the context of harmonization with the existing secular legis-
lation. This is providing a challenge to Muslim jurists and has proved to be the 
most effective approach thus far. The Sharlcah and modem law need an effective 
interaction, as far as promulgation of new laws is concerned. This relationship 
between the Sharlcah and modem law is described by William Ballantyne as "an 
irresistible force against an irremovable object." However, as the thesis has indi-
cated there are considerable possibilities of recociling the Sharlcah with modem 




Qur'an ! _..r_. 








of --Fiqh --; ' ' 





- Economic Usul al- - History 











:t· ' . ' 
I - • .. 
~~i 
Books on 
Ad ab --al-Qada' 
Modern 
·~~ Civil Codes - of Manuals -
- Muslim of -
His bah Countries 
l 
(310) 
IJE COl\CEIYr .-\~D .-\PLLIC.-\TlO~ OF l)A.\lA.:\ lN lSL\.\HC C0:\1\lERCl:\L L:\ W. 
KEYS: 
Lc:.!:d foundations of dam:in 
I. al-11wqa~id al-slwr'iyyalz. 
11. Iii t)arar wa la (liriir. 
111. ~1umull al-milkiyyah. 
IV. ~1urn)·a1 al-ta(ri.qud. 
Grounds of dam:.ln: 
P. Contract (raqd). 
(). P11sscs:-.io11 (wa{r al-yutld). 
IL Oeslruction (itltij). 
S. Ulockadc Uwyliilah). 
T. Deception (gltun.ir). 
1\lethoc.h of securit v (lawthiq): 
(Al Other method.-; of securil": 
I . PlcUJ.!C (ru/111). 
::!. AssiJ,!mllcnt of deht Uzaw<ilahl. 
3. Dornme11t~1tion uf cuntr:.H:ts ki1uballl. 
-L Function or notaries (shaluidahJ. 
I Bl l\.af:llah: 
l. Co11Yenti1111al usace. 
a. Suretyshi p for person (al-kafiilalz bi 'l-11afsl. 
h. Suretyship for daim (al-kaf<ilalz bi 'I-ma/). 
c. Guarantee for fault of ownership (al-kafiilalz bi 'l-darakl. 
2. Use of kafalah in new tran.'iaclions: 
a. Bill of exchance (suftajalz; kambia/alt). 
h. Letter of :,!Uarantec (kltittib ai-{lwmi1l). 
c. Letter of ucdit (al-irtimiid al-mustanadi) etc. 
l>;a111:"i11 ill lhl' SCllSC of char:1111ah: 
:\~\q;/{i,;;,;'j;;~~i1~n·i;-;(i,~;;;;;i" i.-. tn·atcu as rn11lrnl'lual 
\\ arranty mainly based on rnnlract of sale - rii.d•t of 
option. rcscis.o.;ion, reparation. 
L3. Contract of fidelity where !lamciu ari:-.es if the tru:-.t is 
hrcad1cd. 
C: Contracts with l>oth clements - J!U~1rantc~ and tru'il. 
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This list is developed based on Joseph Schacht's An Introduction to Islamic Law, to 
which most of the English equivalent terms are taken. However, some necessary 
additions and variations of meaning are duly made, to suit the present work. An 
addition symbol [ +] is used against mark new terms added. An asterisk [*] is 
used against variant terms from Schacht. A slight difference is marked with [#]. 
#adab al-qacJi: special works on duties of the qa<;II. 
#'adl : good character; trustee to hold the pledge. 
#ahliyyah : legal capacity. 
ajir : hired worker. 
+ajir kb~~ : an employee. 
+ajir mushtarak: professional artisan. 
ajr : wage; remuneration. 
'aqd : contract. 
'aqil : sane. 
amanah : trust; fiduciary relationship. 
*aman : protection; safeguard; safety. 
'amil al-siiq: inspector of the market. 
amin : a person in the position of trust. 
'ariyyah : loan of non-fungible things. 
~ii : the principal; principal debtor. 
~I : the nature of a transaction. 
'ayn 
bad al 
: thing; substance. 
: consideration. 
+ bara)ah : exemption. 
batil : invalid; null and void. 
batin : the 'inward' state. 
bay' : sale; exchange. 
bayyinah : evidence. 
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: to conceal a fault or defect. 
: liability; warranty; guarantee. 
: liable. 
: injury; damage; loss. 
: default in ownership. 
da'wa : claim; lawsuit. 
dayn : debt; claim; obligation. 
#dhimmah : engagement; undertaking; obligation; care 
as a duty of conscience. 
dhukr : written document. 
dhu al-yadd : possessor. 
fasid : defective; voidable. 
fatwa : the considered legal opinion of a muffi. 
fu<Jiili : unauthorized agent. 
furii' : branches of positive law. 
+ gharamah : fine; redress; restitution. 
gharar : risk; hazard; uncertainty. 
ghallah : proceed. 
gh~b : usurpation. 
+ghubn ffil}.ish: grave deception; fraud. 
+ ghunm : to gain; profit; advantage; benefit. 
+ghurm : to suffer loss. 
+ghuriir : deception. 
ghayr ma'liim: not known. 








: destruction; damage. 
: right. 
)Jaqq adami : private claim. 
#l)aqq Allah : right of God (public interest). 
#)Jawalah 
+ l_iayliilah 



















: custody (of things). 
: the enforcement authority. 
: legal device; evasions. 
: acquittance; release [from liability]. 
: fulfilment (of an obligation). 
: insolvency; bankruptcy. 
: (religious) precaution. 
: offer (as a constitutive element of 
contract). 
: hire; lease. 
: consensus. 
: independant judgement; interpretation. 
: liability; responsibility; undertaking. 
: reversal (of a sale). 
: acknowledgement; confession. 
: joint ownership. 
: relinquishment (of a claim). 
isfifiil : receiving (taking possession). 
istighlfil : acquisition of proceeds. 















: juristic preference; equity. 
: vindication. 
: presumption of continuance. 
: taking the public interest into account. 
: contract of manufacture. 
: countervalue; compensation. 
: allowed; permitted. 
: reward. 
: taking possession. 
: acceptance. 
: ordinary qac.lI court. 
: payment (of debt). 
: ajudge. 
: suretyship. 
: surety; guarantor. 
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qar<J : loan of fungible objects for consumption. 
qawacid : 'rules'; the technical principle of 
positive law; subject of special works. 
#khiyar : right of option; right of rescission. 
khu~iimah : litigation. 
qimah : value. 
lazim : binding. 
#mfil : property. 
manfacah : proceed; usufruct. 
#mashriic : legally recognized. 
+ ma~arif : banking and financial houses. 
ma~lal.Iah : the public interest. 
#mactiih : imbecile. 
milk : ownership. 
mithl : just means; average; fair. 
mucamalat : pecuniary transaction. 
+ mucawa<Jah : commutative contract. 
#mu<Jarabah : commenda; dormant partnership. 
muddaca alayh:defendant. 
mudda'i : claimant; plaintiff. 
mufawa<Jah : unlimited mercantile partnership 
+ muflis : a bankrupt. 
+ muqawalah : contract of work. 
murabaI.iah : resale with a stated profit. 
+muriir al-zaman: lapse of time. 
+mutalabah : demand; claim. 
muwakkil : the principal (as opposed the agent). 
muwfilat : contract of clientship. 
#muzaracah : contract of sharecropping. 
nafidh : operative. 
+n~ir al-m~alim: inspector for complaints. 
nukiil : refusal (to take the oath). 
#rabb al-mfil : capital provider; investor. 
rahn : pledge; pawn; security. 











: foolish; irresponsible; prodigal. 
: striking a deal (by handshake). 
: mmor. 
~fil).ib al-siiq: inspector of the market. 
~al.iii} : valid; legally effective. 
#~akk : written document; cheque. 
salam : contract for delivery with prepayment. 
~arf : exchange (of money and precious metals). 
~ariJ.i : explicit (declaration). 
shahadah : testimony; evidence of witnesses. 
shahid : witness. 
sharik : partner. 
sharikah : partnership. 
shart : prerequisite; condition; stipulation. 
shira) : purchase. 
shuriit : 'stipulations'; legal formularies. 
sijill : written judgement of the qa.QI. 
simsar : broker. 
siyasah : 'policy'; administrative justice. 
#siyasah shar'iyyah: sharI'ah-oriented policy; policy within the 
bounds assigned to it by the shari'ah. 
suftajah : bill of exchange. 
~ulJ.i : amicable settlement. 
#sunnah : precedent; established practice. 
#ta'addi : fault; illicit; tort; transgression. 
+ta) min : msurance. 
+ tabarru' : gratuitous contract. 
+ tal)kim : arbitration. 
+ tafrit : negligence. 
tajir : trader. 
taqabucJ : taking possession reciprocal! y. 
ta~arruf : capacity to dispose. 
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: delivery. taslim 
taczir 
thaman 

















: excuse (from fulfilment of contract). 
: professional witness; 'notaries. 
: a guarantee against specific fault. 
: custom and usage. 
: the 'roots' or theoretical bases of Islamic law. 
: deposit. 
: procuration; agency; representation. 
: deputy; agent; proxy. 
: legal guardian. 
: the circumstances of a transaction. 
: written document (for giving security). 
: competence; jurisdiction. 
: possession. 
: oath (underaking). 




Sources in Arabic. 
Books of Tafsir [Exegesis] 
al-J~~a~, Abii Bala AI:imad b. cAn b. al-RazI [d.370H], AIJ,kam al-Qur)an, Cairo 
: Matbacat al-Awqaf al-Islamiyyah, 1335H. 
Ibo al-cArabI, Abu Bala MuI:iammad b. cAbd Allah b. AI:imad [d.543H], AIJ,kam 
al-Qur)an, Cairo : Matbacat Dar II:iya) al-Kutub al-cArabiyyah cisa Babi al-f:lalabI, 
n.d. 
MuI:iammad Fu)ad cAbd al-BaqI, al-Mu]am al-Mufahras Ii Alfa7- al-Qur)an al-
Kafim, 1378H. 
al-QuqiibI, Abu cAbd Allah Mul:iammad b. AI:imad al-An~arI [d.671H], al-Jami( Ii 
AIJ,kam al-Qur)an, Cairo: Matbacat Dar al-Kutub al-Ma~riyyah, 1353H/1935M. 
al-Zamakhshan, Jar Allah Abii al-Qasim Mal:imiid b. cumar [d.538], al-Kashshaf 
(An Ghawam4f al-Tan:fil wa (Uyun al-Aqawil ft Wujuh al-Ta)wll, Cairo : 
Matbacat al-Sharafiyyah, 1308H. 
Books of ij:adith. 
al-cAsqalanI, Shihab al-Din Abii al-Fac;ll AI:imad b. cAII b. MuI:iammad b. ijajar 
[d.852H], Bulugh al-Maram min Jam( Adillat al-AIJ,kam [printed with its com-
mentary Subul al-Salam], Cairo : Matbacat Mu~tata al-Babi al-f:lalabI, 
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